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 Abstract 
This thesis analyses whether the British Army’s doctrinal approach for countering 
insurgency is still valid in the light of the war in Iraq.  Why is this important?  
Insurgency remains a prevalent form of instability.  In the absence of a major 
conventional threat to British security, it is one which is likely to confront the Army for 
the foreseeable future.  If British doctrine for counterinsurgency has been invalidated by 
the campaign in Iraq, this will have profound implications for the way the Army 
approaches, and is organized, equipped and trained for counterinsurgency in the future.  
If the doctrine is found to be valid, another explanation has to be found to account for 
the conduct and outcome of British operations in Southern Iraq between 2003 and 2009. 
Using historiographical techniques, the thesis examines the principal influences on 
extant British doctrine, developed in 1995.  It analyzes the principal British manuals, 
the influence on doctrine of the campaigns in Malaya and Northern Ireland and the 
theories of Sir Robert Thompson and Gen. Sir Frank Kitson in order to distil a ‘British 
Approach,’ against which both doctrine and the campaign in Iraq are judged.  It 
examines the course of operations in Southern Iraq to determine the validity of Counter 
Insurgency Operations, and uses the U.S. Army’s experience in developing and 
applying new doctrine in Iraq in 2007 and 2008 as a comparator.  The thesis concludes 
that there was a dichotomy between theory and practice:  British doctrine provided a 
valid theory for counterinsurgency, yet British commanders followed it only in part to 
achieve, at best, mixed results.  Conversely, U.S. commanders applied their new 
doctrine, based on British theory, to great effect.  While British doctrine may be valid, 
the issue was the extent to which it had been assimilated. 
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 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Defining the Problem 
This thesis analyses whether the British Army’s doctrinal approach for countering 
insurgency is still valid in the light of its experience in Iraq.  Why is the British 
approach to counterinsurgency important?  Insurgency remains a prevalent form of 
instability, and, in the absence of a major conventional threat to British national 
interests, one which is very likely to confront the Army for the foreseeable future.  If 
British doctrine for counterinsurgency is found to have been invalidated by the 
campaign in Iraq, such an outcome will have profound implications for the way the 
Army approaches, and is organized, equipped and trained for counterinsurgency in the 
future.  If the doctrine is found to be valid, another explanation has to be found to 
account for the conduct and outcome of British operations in Southern Iraq between 
2003 and 2009. 
The British Army has a long history of countering insurgents, so it would be reasonable 
to assume that its doctrinal approach was well-founded and generally applicable.  At the 
start of Operation TELIC, the name for the British campaign in Iraq, the Army was 
well-trained for warfighting and well-versed in operations other than war.  It was 
generally assumed that it would be able to take Iraq in its stride.  For the first year or so 
of the campaign that appeared to be the case.  The U.S. Army turned to its British 
counterpart for guidance and yet, as the U.S started to adapt to the challenges it faced in 
Iraq, British operations in Southern Iraq struggled to the extent that efficacy of the 
British approach was questioned openly.  Now that the campaign is over, it is 
appropriate to ask whether, in the light of Iraq, the Army’s doctrine for 
counterinsurgency remains valid.  There are five principal questions to answer: 
1. What was the British doctrinal approach to countering insurgency?   
2. Was the approach published in the British Army’s appropriate doctrinal 
document, Counter Insurgency Operations sound theory and relevant?   
3. Did the doctrine work and, if not, why?   
4. What was it about the campaign in Iraq which made theory difficult to apply in 
practice?   
5. Where does Iraq leave the British approach to countering insurgency? 
The first step in answering these questions is to establish what the doctrine is.  The 
Army’s doctrine is published in a two-volume Field Manual.  Volume 1 provides 
guidance on combined arms operations at divisional, brigade and battlegroup level in 
conventional warfighting, counterinsurgency and stability operations.  Volume 2 
provides guidance on specific operational environments, including urban, jungle and 
mountainous terrain.  Counterinsurgency doctrine is published in Volume 1 Part 10.1  
Counter Insurgency Operations was first published in 1995 and revised in early 2001.  
To avoid confusion editions will be identified by year of publication.  It is unusual in 
that it covers the strategic and operational aspects of a counterinsurgency campaign, 
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 defined as “a set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic 
objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, 
land and air forces.”2  The rest of the series covers tactical doctrine and the conduct of 
battles and engagements.  The 2001 edition was the final step in a process of review and 
revision which started in 1993.  Brig. (Retired) Gavin Bulloch was the principal author, 
and his contribution to modern British military doctrine is considerable.  Counter 
Insurgency Operations (2001) was the last in a line of Army publications published 
since 1949 which wrestled with the increasingly difficult challenges of applying 
military force to deal with revolutionary wars, threats to internal security, and 
insurgencies.  These publications were: 
1949 – Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power.3
1957 and 1963 – Keeping the Peace (Duties in Support of the Civil Power).4
1969 and 1977 – Counter-Revolutionary Operations.5
1995 – Counter Insurgency Operations. 
To avoid any confusion between editions of doctrine with the same title, publications 
will be identified by name and year of publication, thus Counter-Revolutionary 
Operations (1969) and Counter Insurgency Operations (2001).   
At this stage, it is necessary to explain that while Counter Insurgency Operations was 
published in 1995 and 2001, the only principal difference was that the 2001 edition did 
not contain the tactics, techniques and procedures included in 1995.  This was because 
in 1998 Bulloch reviewed both counterinsurgency and peacekeeping doctrine and 
realized there was a considerable overlap in the tactics used in both.  He therefore 
decided it best to merge Parts 3 (Tactics) and 4 (Techniques and Procedures) with the 
procedures contained in Peacekeeping Operations and to publish them in one book, the 
Tactical Handbook for Operations Other Than War.6    
Counter Insurgency Operations was the British Army’s approach.  It emphasised the 
minimum use of force, the need to uphold the rule of law, the importance of 
intelligence-led operations, the need for close civil-military cooperation, and the 
requirement for tactical adaptability and agility.  That said, there was formal recognition 
that this was not “a general antidote to the problem of insurgency,”7 neither was 
countering insurgency a case of applying one form of military force against another.  As 
such, this was very much in line with the views articulated by Gen. Sir Frank Kitson.  
He was the most important twentieth century British military thinker in the field, having 
published the widely acclaimed Low Intensity Operations in 1972 and Bunch of Five in 
1977.8  Both books drew on his experiences in Kenya, Malaya, Cyprus, and Northern 
Ireland.  Kitson’s influence on Army thinking was considerable, introducing novel 
approaches as a brigade commander in Northern Ireland, commandant of the Staff 
College, a divisional commander and, finally, as Commander-in-Chief United Kingdom 
Land Forces.  Kitson was adamant that,  
there can be no such thing as a purely military solution because insurgency is 
not primarily a military activity.  At the same time there is no such thing as a 
wholly political solution either, short of surrender, because the very fact that a 
state of insurgency exists implies that violence is involved which will have to be 
countered to some extent at least by the use of legal force.  Political measures 
alone might have prevented the insurgency from occurring in the first place, ... 
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 [but] once it has taken hold, politics and force, backed up by economic measures 
will have to be harnessed together for the purpose of restoring peaceful 
conditions.9
Although Counter Insurgency Operations describes the Army’s approach, it does not 
describe how British counterinsurgency developed, so simply analyzing the published 
doctrine is not enough to determine its validity and relevance.  At this point three 
assertions require to be made about doctrine in general.  First, effective doctrine 
depends on blending practical experience with analysis and theory.  Second, doctrine 
has met its principal purpose – that of providing practical guidance for the conduct of 
operations – when the approach it describes is assimilated fully into the organization, 
and its decisions and actions reflect the principles and approach its doctrine describes.  
Third, assimilation depends on training and education.  To test these assertions, 
something needs to be understood of how and why doctrine developed, not just the 
central themes but also the context in which it was expected to be applied.   
Examining the Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine will allow the thesis to draw out how 
the Army’s understanding of counterinsurgency, shaped and informed by doctrine, is 
altered by the reality of enduring operations.  The study therefore needs to answer three 
second order questions which provide support to the main analysis:  what were the 
Army’s imperatives at the time Counter Insurgency Operations was published? How 
was the doctrine developed?  What were the doctrine’s key themes?  Answering these 
questions is important because, as will be shown, the Army’s focus was not on 
counterinsurgency when its doctrine was last published.  In 2001, the focus of Defence 
as a whole was conventional, expeditionary warfighting, and had been since the 1998 
Strategic Defence Review.10  This was despite the evidence from operations in the 
Balkans that a change in the character of war was underway, and that a regular-irregular 
asymmetry between regular armed forces and sub-state factions and entities was 
apparent. 
1.2 What is Doctrine? 
The second step to take is to answer the question ‘What is doctrine?’ The answer will 
establish the role and function doctrine plays and the significance it has.  The 1996 
edition of British Military Doctrine describes doctrine as “a formal expression of 
military knowledge that the Army accepts as being relevant at a given time.”11  The link 
with the 1926 definition offered by Maj. Gen. J. F. C. Fuller, the British military 
theorist, is evident.  Fuller’s influence on the conceptual development of the British 
Army Doctrine is examined in Chapter 2, however doctrine, Fuller posited, was, 
the central idea of an army… which to be sound must be principles of war, and 
which to be effective must be elastic enough to admit mutation in accordance 
with change in circumstance.  In its ultimate relationship to the human 
understanding this central idea or doctrine is nothing else than common sense-
that is, action adapted to circumstance.12
Little has emerged since to challenge Fuller’s view and, by 2001, the Ministry of 
Defence had developed its definition to explain that doctrine provided “the fundamental 
principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives.  It is 
authoritative, but requires judgement in application.”13  The assumption is clear:  
doctrine is the distillation of the history and experience; it codifies best practice; and it 
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 enunciates enduring principles which then are applied sensibly according to the 
circumstances.  In other words, ‘the law is in the circumstances,’14 not the doctrine. 
Effective doctrine does not, however, develop in a vacuum.  Those writing it  should 
take due account of historical and more recent experience, contemporary pressures, and 
identifiable trends, so that at the point doctrine is published, it should represent relevant 
military knowledge.  This is what Marcus Mäder refers to as the “collective perception 
of historical experience and current interests.”15  Although it might be overtaken by 
rapid change in the field, published doctrine is the Army’s accepted view.  Doctrine is 
an important influence on organisational culture, which may well add a bias into the 
development of doctrine, as doctrine may reflect how the organisation as a whole views 
itself.  This makes it necessary to identify what, if at all any bias was present at the time 
the doctrine was written, and the effect any such bias had subsequently in terms of 
application of doctrine in the field.16  For this reason, it is necessary to identify what 
those biases were and then examine the extent to which they affected the development 
of counterinsurgency doctrine. 
1.3 Defining Insurgency and Counterinsurgency 
The next step is to define insurgency.  Insurgency is an age-old problem which 
continues to take many forms.  It stems from a wide range of causes, both real and 
perceived.  Steven Metz notes the principal causes when he described insurgency as “a 
strategy sometimes adopted by the weaker party in an internal war.  The war itself can 
be based on ideology, class, religion, ethnicity, sectionalism, or, most commonly, some 
combination of these factors.”17  In every case, insurgency develops when those in 
power ignore the particular demands of a group which feels that it has no alternative but 
to resort to violence to pursue its objectives.  In many cases the problem has been 
compounded where there has been a political failure to respond or, worse, there has 
been a political vacuum.  Whatever the circumstances, it is generally understood that 
insurgency is a highly complex form of political conflict with many contributory and 
complicating factors.  For the government attempting to defeat insurgency, a wide range 
of problems have to be addressed, compounded by the fact that it has to react to the 
insurgents’ actions.  This means that, by extension, the government tends to cede the 
initial advantage to those challenging it, those who have had time to plan, organise and 
initiate their insurgency.   
It is generally accepted that insurgency and the business of countering it are long, drawn 
out affairs with no easy strategies to follow for either side.  This form of conflict 
accentuates the asymmetry between the insurgent and the counterinsurgent.  The 
insurgent needs time to build up support and strength before initiating the campaign 
when the circumstances are right.  Insurgents tend to see time as an ally, and require 
patience to build organisational capacity.  However, the less permissive the security 
environment, the longer this takes.  In the early stages at least, the insurgent has to avoid 
government strengths and tends to act cautiously to avoid being killed or captured.  The 
insurgent has the advantage of being able to advance the campaign, or disengage and 
recuperate, depending on how effective the government is.  Although the government 
starts the campaign with all the instruments of national power at its disposal, compared 
to the insurgent who has little more than an idea or grievance, it will generally not have 
the intelligence needed to counter its opposition.  This takes time to develop but, if the 
insurgent has got his strategy right, during the time it takes the government to build its 
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 intelligence and to start to counter the problem, the insurgent will grow in strength.  The 
insurgent and the counterinsurgent struggle, therefore, to disrupt and undermine the 
other’s organisation and activities.  Between the two stands the population, the support 
of which is the key to success for both sides.  The side which gains and holds popular 
support will ultimately win.  Winning over the population to generate that support is a 
lengthy process, mainly because it takes time to change mindsets and to convince the 
majority that one side or the other is worth supporting. 
Kitson observed that, “events in real life don’t lend themselves to … clear cut 
definitions.”18  Nevertheless, several definitions of insurgency exist, and a brief 
examination of them will help to establish a broad framework against which the Army’s 
definition of insurgency can be examined.  Bard O’Neill’s book Insurgency and 
Terrorism was an important influence on Counter Insurgency Operations, in particular 
the categories he offered:  anarchist, egalitarian, traditionalist, apocalyptic-utopian, 
pluralist, secessionist, reformist, preservationist and commercialist.19  O’Neill defined 
insurgency as, 
a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the 
nonruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g., organisational 
expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, 
or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics.20   
Thomas Mockaitis, in his seminal study of British counterinsurgency, British 
Counterinsurgency 1919-1960, defines insurgency as “a hybrid form of conflict that 
combines subversion, guerrilla warfare and terrorism … [in] an internal struggle in 
which a disaffected group seeks to gain control of a nation.”21  David Galula, the 
French soldier-theorist of the early-1960s and whose work was based on personal 
experience in French Indo-China and Algeria, defined insurgency as “a protracted 
struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate 
objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order.”22  Galula became an 
important influence on U.S. Army thinking during its revision of counterinsurgency 
doctrine in 2005-06.  He alone among counterinsurgency theorists links Clausewitz to 
this form of conflict: 
Paraphrasing Clausewitz, we might say that ‘Insurgency is the pursuit of the 
policy of a party, inside a country, by every means.’  It is not like an ordinary 
war – a ‘continuation of the policy by other means’ – because an insurgency can 
start long before the insurgent resorts to the use of force.23
Kitson, in Low Intensity Operations, defines insurgency as “the use of armed force by a 
section of the population against the government,”24 with the purpose of overthrowing it 
or forcing it to do something which it did not wish to do.  Later, in Bunch of Five, and 
after some reflection, he narrows his terms to “a rising in active revolt against the 
constitutional authority of the country,”25 and he makes the point that considerable 
squalor, fear and suffering for the population are associated with it.  Crucially, Kitson 
introduces the psychological dimension, recognizing that insurgency is “primarily 
concerned with the struggle for men’s minds.”26  The U.S. Army defines it as “an 
organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the 
use of subversion and armed conflict;”27  Robert Cassidy reflects this view in his 
definition; “protracted political military conflict aimed at undermining government 
legitimacy and … increasing insurgent control.”28  Thomas Marks introduces the 
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 importance of popular support; “a popular movement that seeks to overthrow the status 
quo through subversion, political activity, insurrection, armed conflict and terrorism.”29
No one definition stands out as being more relevant than the next.  Taken as a whole, 
however, they bound a problem which is protracted, grievance driven, challenges 
legitimate political authority and uses influence, coercion and violence in pursuit of its 
objectives.  Metz characterizes it as,  
protracted, asymmetric violence; political, legal, and ethical ambiguity; and the 
use of complex terrain, psychological warfare, and political mobilization. It 
arises when a group decides that the gap between their political expectations and 
the opportunities afforded them is unacceptable and can only be remedied by 
force.30
Having established insurgency’s principal themes, through these definitions, this thesis 
will now focus on its subject, the British Army’s approach to countering insurgency, 
and use the Army’s definition to provide the study’s baseline.  After all, it is the 
definition in use when the insurgencies in Iraq started to emerge in the summer of 2003.  
The Army defines insurgents as “those taking part in any activity designed to undermine 
or to overthrow the established authorities”31 and insurgency as the “actions of a 
minority group within a state who are [sic] intent on forcing political change by means 
of a mixture of subversion propaganda and military pressure aiming to persuade or 
intimidate the broad mass of people to accept such a change.”32   As such, the definition 
picks up on the broad themes identified by the principal theorists.   
It is necessary at this point to note that British doctrine deliberately avoids confusing or 
overly complicating the definition by not drawing any marked distinction between terms 
often associated with insurgency, “guerrilla, revolutionary, terrorist, dissident, rebel, 
partisan, native and enemy.”33  Neither does it stray into the debate over the difference 
between insurgency and civil war.  This decision has a particular relevance when it 
comes to putting the Army’s approach in context.  In Iraq the insurgencies had a 
visceral sectarian dimension, which brought the Coalition campaign to the point of 
defeat, but it did not produce large scale warfare between Iraqi belligerents.  Instead, 
those “intent on forcing political change” resorted to terrorist or guerrilla tactics against 
the population and Iraqi and Coalition forces.  This study therefore adopts the doctrinal 
approach, avoiding civil war per se for the same reasons as Counter Insurgency 
Operations, but it is noted that each sub-division identified its own nuances and 
challenges, and that they have all been the subject of much study and research in their 
own right. 
Insurgencies vary greatly and so too do the ways to counter them.  Some approaches 
have been successful, some have failed along with, as tends to be the case, the 
government attempting to defeat the insurgent threat.  Countering insurgency is, 
principally, a political effort to address the political root cause of the problem.  It has a 
military dimension to deal with in terms of the insurgent’s use of or ability to use force.  
Successful counterinsurgencies place the military operation in support of the 
government’s overall strategy to treat, picking up on Rupert Smith’s point, the causes as 
well as the symptoms.34  Counterinsurgency is not, and should not be confused with the 
military operation alone.  Kitson made this point very clear and it is spelled out in the 
Army’s definition:  “Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological 
and civil actions taken by the Government to defeat insurgency.”35  The U.S. Army 
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 definition is very similar: “Counterinsurgency is military, paramilitary, political, 
economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat 
insurgency.”36  The importance of following through on this broad approach to solving 
insurgency will become clear as the study unfolds.  The British experience in Iraq will 
show, to paraphrase Kitson, real life is more complicated than clear cut definitions. 
1.4 The British Approach to Countering Insurgency 
Having established what insurgency and counterinsurgency are, it is necessary to 
examine whether there is a recognizable British approach.  The Army has a long history 
of countering insurgency.  In contrast to the vast literature of historical analysis which 
covers the subject, the Army has produced surprisingly little doctrine over the last one 
hundred years.  The preface to Counter Insurgency Operations (1995) notes that 
experience “evolved into a doctrine,”37 with the implication that this was something that 
the Army did almost subconsciously rather than through a formalised process of 
development and acceptance.  The 1995 edition was part of the AFM dedicated to what 
was termed at the time Operations Other Than War.  There is an implication in this title 
that countering insurgency was somehow a lesser form of warfare; that countering 
insurgency was a distraction from the main business of warfighting; something that did 
not require the attention and formal direction that preparing for major combat 
demanded.  Perception and reality were different and the history book tells a very 
different story, one which shows time and again that countering insurgency requires a 
very clear understanding of the nature of the problem, and very specific training and 
techniques.   
Col. Charles Callwell (1906) defined Small Wars as “all campaigns other than those 
where both the opposing sides consist of regular troops,”38 and the Army has spent 
more time engaged in small wars than it has fighting major wars.39  Some, Rod 
Thornton for example, argue that the British Army is first and foremost a 
counterinsurgency army, designed to intervene overseas in small wars, and that its 
involvement in major conventional warfare and its warfighting aspirations are 
abnormal.40  Reflecting Thomas Mockaitis, Counter Insurgency Operations (1995) 
explains that the British approach is based on “three broad fundamentals of doctrine 
developed and adapted by the British for counter insurgency”41 which are minimum 
force, civil-military cooperation and tactical adaptability.  The three are recurring 
themes in doctrine since Duties in Aid of the Civil Power was published in 1923,42 and 
some formal recognition was made that small wars, or internal security operations 
needed their own doctrinal principles.  Until 1923, Hew Strachan suggests, the Army 
believed that the principles of war could be adapted to match the circumstances of each 
campaign.43  Since 1923, British principles have evolved as experience and 
understanding has grown of what constitutes effective counterinsurgency.  The 
evolution of British counterinsurgency doctrine is covered in detail in Chapter 4. 
While Counter Insurgency Operations (1995) is clear about the fundamentals of 
counterinsurgency and its principles, it makes the point that “The British have not 
developed a general antidote to the problem of insurgency...  Not only is the threat 
changing, but so too is the environment in which an insurgent must be confronted.”44  It 
goes on to say: 
Theories, strategies and tactics come and go depending upon circumstances or 
merely intellectual fashion (the five main British COIN manuals published since 
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 1949 have included several different lists of principles). What remains a 
constant is the fact that insurgency and counter insurgency are essentially about 
the battle to win and hold popular support, both at home and in the theatre of 
operations.45
1.5 What is the Problem? 
This thesis addresses two principal issues.  The first is the development of Counter 
Insurgency Operations.  This means understanding how doctrine is developed, 
determining whether it presented a complete picture of counterinsurgency and whether 
it reflected the Army’s understanding of counterinsurgency.  The second issue is its 
application in Iraq, which means gaining an understanding of how, once published, 
doctrine was assimilated, applied, and, if necessary, adjusted.  It is in this area that two 
further issues emerge:  will doctrine be ignored if it is not relevant and up-to-date, and 
what happens when doctrine is relevant but it is not understood?  Callwell observed that 
“theory cannot be accepted as conclusive when practice points the other way,”46 and the 
1994 Army Staff College Counterinsurgency reader made clear that “whilst it should 
draw on lessons from the past, doctrine must evolve if it is to remain relevant.”47  What 
is the result if doctrine meets these conditions and yet is not assimilated?  This question 
is at the heart of this thesis. 
1.5.1 Did the Army have relevant doctrine and did it understand it? 
The need for an organization such as the Army to have a common philosophy has been 
long understood, and in doctrinal terms started with the publication of Field Service 
Regulations in 1909.  Doctrine provides the intellectual framework of understanding 
which allows the structures, equipment and training to be adapted from one form of 
operation to another.  Kitson wrote Low Intensity Operations “to show why it is 
necessary for the army to be ready to suppress subversion and insurgency.”48  He also 
highlighted specifically the importance of education and training for counterinsurgency, 
and attending to “the genuinely educational function of attuning men’s minds to cope 
with the environment of this sort of war.”49  This is a crucial point for this thesis.  
Doctrine has traditionally been viewed as ‘that which is taught.’  If doctrine is not 
taught, does the Army have a doctrine?  Without the philosophy contained in doctrine 
being assimilated, where is the central idea?   
Kitson argued against the view then held centrally in defence, that so-called outpost 
operations were less important than the Army’s role on NATO’s Central Front.  He 
believed that the military implications of insurgency were so different from 
conventional operations that soldiers could not make the transition simply from one to 
the other.  He had the early years in Malaya to support his argument.  Later, Richard 
Simpkin, a highly regarded military theorist writing in the 1990s, made the point that an 
army had to have a broader capability and utility than warfighting alone: 
By the same token, established armed forces need to do more than just master 
high-intensity manoeuvre warfare between large forces with baroque equipment.  
They have to go one step further and structure, equip and train themselves to 
employ the techniques of revolutionary warfare – to beat the opposition at their 
own game on their own ground.50  
The conclusion to be drawn from Kitson and Simpkin is that having published doctrine 
is not enough.  The doctrine has to be understood, and this is achieved through 
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 education, training and practice.  Kitson placed considerable emphasis on this theme 
and devoted a whole chapter to them in Low Intensity Operations in which he 
established four principal themes necessary to address education and training for 
counterinsurgency:   
• Provide the educational framework to attune “men’s minds to cope with the 
environment of this sort of war.” 
• Teach officers “how to put a campaign together using a combination of civil 
and military measures to achieve a single government aim... It involves 
teaching them the value of non-military ways of harming the enemy.”  
• Teach “officers how to direct the activities of their own soldiers... 
policemen... or locally raised forces.”  
• Identify the training methods needed to teach counterinsurgency 
techniques.51   
During the late 1980s and through the 1990s, the Army developed and then assimilated 
doctrine for Manoeuvre Warfare (later the Manoeuvrist Approach) and Mission 
Command.  Encouraged by the expansive manoeuvrist strike in the first Gulf War, it 
went to great efforts during the 1990s to institutionalise the two as core tenets of the 
British approach.  At that time, particularly among Infantry regiments, the Army still 
had deeply ingrained experience from Northern Ireland.  From 1993, experience was 
added to from peace support operations in the Balkans, albeit to a much lesser degree 
because fewer troops took part.  Knowledge and understanding were passed on through 
training and practice rather than through extensive handbooks and pamphlets.  While 
the Army had been busy on operations other than war, its view was that there was little 
pressure to update approaches to counterinsurgency because there was no real evidence 
of a need to change.  This, in many ways, suited its focus which was to establish what it 
really meant to be an army with an expeditionary warfighting capability.   
1.5.2 Iraq:  Did Theory Translate into Practice?   
The second part of the problem is to examine how successfully theory translated into 
practice?  This is the essence of the research question, for which the focus is Operation 
TELIC, the British operation in Iraq between March 2003 and June 2009.  The 
fundamental problem the Army had to deal with was how to answer Clausewitz’s 
question of definition: 
The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman 
and commander have to make is to establish … the kind of war on which they 
are embarking, neither mistaking it, nor trying to turn it into, something that is 
alien to its nature.  This is the first of all strategic questions and the most 
comprehensive.52   
That which started off in Iraq as a campaign of liberation through regime change, 
developed into an occupation by legal definition.  By the summer of 2003 it was nation-
building, carrying out stability operations and reconstruction.  Less than a year later, the 
campaign had, as one commander described it, “lurched into insurgency,”53 but not 
insurgency as the Army knew it, and there remained considerable debate about the 
character of the security problem the British faced in the south.  The UK maintained the 
line for a long time that its forces were not facing an insurgency in the south at all until 
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 Moqtada al Sadr and Jaish al Mahdi (JAM) rose against Coalition Forces in March 
2004.  The insurgency faced by British-led forces in Multinational Division South East 
(MND(SE)) proved to be very different from the Sunni insurgency in Baghdad and 
central Iraq, one fuelled by al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).  MND(SE) faced Shi’a factions 
using insurgent tactics to gain political and economic power.  They did not want to 
replace the Government of Iraq (GOI).  Put simply, they wanted British forces to leave, 
and to allow militant Shi’a and associated criminal activists to assert, maintain and 
exploit power and access to resources.  Galula recognized that “an insurgency can start 
long before the insurgent resorts to the use of force.”54  With hindsight, it is now 
possible to see that the period of so-called stability and reconstruction in 2003 and early 
2004 was only such in Coalition eyes, a perception reflected in the title of the Army’s 
internal campaign analysis of Iraq between May 2003 and January 2005:  Stability 
Operations in Iraq.55     
The issue at stake is how doctrine is transformed from an approach into action.  As 
Mockaitis and Ian Beckett have shown in their analyses of British counterinsurgency, it 
is where practice and doctrine diverge that difficulties emerge.  To what extent in Iraq 
did practice differ from theory?  To what extent was the doctrine for counterinsurgency 
relevant for the circumstances in which the Army found itself?  To what extent did the 
doctrine work and why, and how and why did it fail or could not be applied?  Strategic 
staying power is important in a form of conflict which is recognised to be protracted and 
therefore expensive in terms of commitment and resources.  Rod Thornton observes 
that,  
one of the great tools used by counter-insurgency forces in the past is the 
message that ‘we are more powerful than you and we will outlast you’. Such a 
message brings indigenous people to your side and away from that of the rebel 
because they can see which way the wind is blowing and where the future lies.56   
Harlan Ullman and James Wade make the same point.  In Shock and Awe – notable 
because it captured the imagination of American policy makers in the late 1990s who 
believed Shock and Awe offered an economical yet decisive way of winning modern 
war – they explained that, 
Another enduring truth is the need for staying power and ensuring that this 
capacity is perceived by a potential adversary.  ‘Staying power’ means the 
ability to press the initial advantage gained until the strategic objective is 
achieved.57   
At its peak, during and just after the invasion, the British force was 43,000 strong.  By 
September 2003 it was 15,000 and from mid-2004 it was at 8000, with considerable 
pressure from London to further reduce the force.  James Quinlivan has offered a ratio 
of twenty members of the security forces (regular and auxiliary military and police) for 
every thousand head of population.58  Basrah, the British focal point for the campaign, 
had a population of over 1.5 million.  The British force was so very small in numbers 
that its physical presence and the effect it could therefore have on the Iraqi population 
was limited.  What effect did this have on the Army’s ability to exercise influence and 
control in the way its doctrine envisaged? 
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 1.6 Methodology 
The focus of the study is the British Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine, the context is 
Iraq and the issue is its validity.  The methodology this thesis follows is to establish and 
examine the philosophical and practical origins of the Army’s doctrine in order to 
explain why the approach it laid out was chosen.  The second part is to examine how the 
doctrine was applied in Iraq and the extent to which the campaign in Iraq validated or 
invalidated British doctrine.  Although this is not a historical narrative or an analysis of 
the Iraq campaign per se, it is necessary to explain how the campaign unfolded so that 
the practical application of the Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine can be tested.  This 
approach will then be used to examine the U.S. Army’s experience in Iraq which will be 
the comparator.  The U.S. Army started the campaign with a virtually unknown but, as 
will be demonstrated, valid doctrine, it had to learn from bitter, hard fought and costly 
experience, and to adapt its approach.  It finished the campaign with a much-acclaimed 
counterinsurgency doctrine, and the approach it followed in Iraq from early 2007 tested 
and ultimately validated the principles and the approach its doctrine laid out. 
1.6.1 Knowledge 
The thesis uses an epistemological methodology, with a strong bias towards the Platonic 
interpretation of knowledge.  It has been accepted that there are key truths.  These are, 
first, the Army had a doctrine and what it contains can be analyzed and evaluated.  
Second, there is a reasonably clear picture of what happened in Iraq and, certainly for 
British and U.S. forces, for what purpose.  Third, there is a clearly established set of 
beliefs which the principal protagonists have recorded albeit that many have been 
subject to subsequent re-examination and possibly reinterpretation.  In this thesis, 
knowledge therefore takes the form of how the truths and the beliefs, expressed as 
doctrine and intent, overlap in terms of military operations in the context of a complex 
counterinsurgency campaign.   
The thesis’ philosophical starting point is a positivist approach.  Its premise is that the 
truth exists amongst those who produced the doctrine and those who put it into practice.  
However, the thesis does not exclude the constructivist paradigm that the truth is, in 
fact, in the minds of those who took part and is a product of their constant re-evaluation 
of the concepts in the context of what took place.  In this case, the author judges that 
there is no significant conflict between the positivist view and the constructivist because 
doctrine, which attempts to codify a wide range of inputs, and the written and oral body 
of knowledge which exists as a result of the campaign in Iraq, complement each other.  
The knowledge of the campaign is both physical and conceptual.  Physical knowledge is 
found, for example, in how many people took part, where they were located, who gave 
what instruction, where and when an action took place, what was its outcome and why.  
Conceptual knowledge includes the ideas and objectives behind what the Army was 
required to do, how it had been trained and educated, and what its doctrine was for the 
range of actions it carried out.  The potential conflict between the physical and the 
conceptual was borne in mind both during the data capture process and its subsequent 
analysis.  The thesis therefore takes a qualitative rather than quantitative approach.  It is 
interested more in why and how the Army’s approach worked, not necessarily in the 
factors which help to construct context – the what, where and when – rather than 
explaining directly the validity of the Army’s approach.   
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 1.6.2 Historiography 
A principal task is to establish the context in which Counter Insurgency Operations was 
written.  To do this, the thesis adopts an approach that examines doctrine using 
historiographical techniques.  It develops the idea proposed by Oliver Daddow in 2004 
who noted that the philosophy of history, in particular historiography, had a direct 
relevance to the writing of military doctrine.59  Daddow’s proposal centred on the 
proposition that “if something is written, it is pertinent to ask how, why and in what 
context it was written.”60  His central contention was that “recent trends in philosophy 
can help us in our quest to write the history of British military doctrine in the 1980s and 
1990s, especially if one deploys the toolkit of historiography, which means the study of 
the art of history-writing.”61  He identified that doctrine’s intellectual and practical 
implications “open it up for analysis not simply in military terms but as a record of the 
spirit of its age and an insight into the prevailing wisdom.”62  He drew this approach 
from three sources:  Peter Burke’s view that historiography is “the history of history-
writing”; Robin Wink’s view that it is “an examination of why a body has taken the 
shape it has”; and William Roger Louis’ conclusion that historiography is “the art of 
explaining why historians wrote as they did.”63
Daddow suggested that by replacing the term historian with doctrine-writer, a better 
understanding of doctrine’s evolution could be gained by using historiographical 
methods.  These included examining “the time [period] in which it was written, the 
structures within which doctrine writers operated and which helped bring doctrine 
manuals to fruition and the key personalities involved.”64  He makes a striking point, 
because the similarities between historiography and the study of doctrine-writing are 
marked.  E. H. Carr said “history is a process, and you cannot isolate a bit of process 
and study it on its own... everything is completely interconnected.”65  The same can be 
said of doctrine writing.  Just as Richard Evans recognizes that historians “are people of 
their time, with views and assumptions about the world which they cannot eliminate 
from their writing and their research”,66 so too are doctrine writers.   
There is, however, an important difference between the two.  Doctrine writers have a 
sense of the utility of what they write.  Their work should have a clear practical 
application as the ideas it contains will be used to shape and direct military operations.  
The historian’s work may not have any practical value at all.  While some historians 
may be informed or prompted by theories, for example political or economic, which 
then shape policy or legislation, this is not true for all.  Historical analysis does not have 
to have a practical utility in the way that doctrine must. 
When Carr attempted to answer the question ‘What is History?’ he observed that the 
answer “consciously or unconsciously, reflects our own position in time.”67  Daddow 
develops this to take account of the doctrine writer’s position in time, and he identifies 
four key components to assist in understanding how doctrine evolves:  the doctrine 
writer, the networks within which doctrine writers work, the domestic political 
environment, and the international context.  Noting that all four are strongly inter-
dependent, Daddow concluded that a development in one may well affect the others, 
and that interactions are “neither predetermined nor predictable.”  By following 
Daddow’s approach, it should be possible to seek, as Michael Bentley suggests, a 
“freshness of viewpoint by offering a synthetic account which searches for connection 
and comparison”?68 Does this explain how doctrine is written, and to identify what 
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 prompts the doctrine writer?  To pick up on Theo Farrell’s phrase, will it allow some 
sense to be made of doctrine?69
1.6.3 Organizational Culture 
In addition to doctrine’s historical context, another influence must also be considered.  
That is the organization itself – in this case the Army – and how it identifies and 
instigates the need for doctrinal change.  Since doctrine is generally written to meet an 
organizational requirement, how doctrine develops is likely to depend greatly on the 
culture of the organization involved.  Richard Downie made this a central theme when 
he examined the relationship between experience, learning, doctrinal change and 
organizational culture.70   In Learning from Conflict, he looked at how the U.S. military 
responded to its campaigns in Vietnam, El Salvador and Colombia. Just as Daddow 
suggested that doctrine reflects the relationship between the writer, and the domestic 
and international contexts of the day, Downie identified a very close link between 
organizational culture and how doctrine develops.  He saw this relationship as a key 
determining influence on how an organization’s conventional wisdom develops and, in 
turn, how its institutional memory influences further responses to change.  If the 
organizational culture is ambivalent to change, doctrinal change does not take place.  If 
the culture supports change, a major transformation can be achieved.   
Based on his findings, Downie proposed a cycle of institutional learning, the 
underpinning concept for which is that doctrinal change depends on one of three 
conditions being met:  actors emerge with sufficient organizational power or persuasive 
ability to generate consensus within the institution; or an idea itself is so powerful; or 
there is an existing and overwhelming recognition within an organization that a change 
to doctrine is necessary.  He cites the example of General George Joulwan, commander 
of U.S. Southern Command, who wanted to introduce a new approach to the drug war 
in Colombia in the 1990s.  The new approach would require active support from the U.S 
armed services, joint staff and the Department of Defense.  Joulwan achieved the 
sustained organizational consensus necessary to get the doctrinal change needed to 
allow military support to law enforcement authorities because he was the commander 
fighting the ‘war on drugs,’ he knew how to work the system, and there was no viable, 
competing alternative solution backed by equally influential actors.  By contrast, using 
Vietnam and El Salvador, Downie shows how attempts to change counterinsurgency 
doctrine failed because those seeking change could not achieve the sustained consensus 
required to push through reform.71  Instead, after Vietnam, as will be examined in 
Chapter 7, the U.S. Army turned its back on counterinsurgency and focussed on the 
doctrinal, technical and operational challenge posed by the Warsaw Pact.  Defeat in 
Vietnam prompted considerable internal military soul-searching and debate.  The 
reforms which followed – which included new, coherent operational doctrine published 
in Field Manual 100-5 Operations – show what can be achieved once sustained 
organizational consensus is achieved.  The U.S. Army’s refusal to respond directly to 
the lessons of Vietnam show what happens when the organization rejects it.72
Downie identified that an open-minded, adaptable institutional memory is a 
“prerequisite for learning and occurs when an organization captures and institutionalizes 
lessons learned by its members.”73  While individuals have the ability to learn, an 
organization does not start to learn unless it can “first act to interpret, evaluate, and 
accept the lessons learned by individual organizational members and then make the 
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 decision to adapt organizational behavior to this new knowledge and transmit it 
throughout the organization.”74  Downie concluded that effective adaption could only 
take place within an organization if its decision-makers were both able and willing to 
capture lessons from individual experience, to accept the need to change, and then to 
agree to change existing doctrine and practices quickly or to develop new ideas that 
reflected the experience learnt.75   
Achieving consensus is therefore a crucial point in the process.  Downie describes a six-
step process:  individual actions, or attention to events, identify an organizational 
performance gap; a search for alternative responses from the organization; the process 
to achieve a sustained consensus to accept or reject the solution; publication of the new 
doctrine; and an organizational response to the change in doctrine, at which point the 
cycle starts again.  In Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, a comparative study of 
organizational learning in the British and the U.S. Armies which greatly influenced 
American thinking in 2005-06, John Nagl further developed Downie’s Institutional 
Learning Cycle.76  This is illustrated in Figure 1 (below) and will be used throughout 
the thesis to identify the stages of doctrinal development, and determine the validity or 
not of decisions associated with this process.  
Individual Action
or
Attention to Events
Organizational 
Performance Gap 
Identified
Search for Alternative 
Organizational 
Actions
Sustained Consensus:
Accept or Reject 
Appropriate Solution 
or Alternative as 
Doctrine
Change in 
Organizational 
Behaviour
Transmit 
Interpretation:
Publish Doctrine
 
Figure 1 - The Institutional Learning Cycle:  The Process of Doctrinal Change 
(After John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Chicago:  Chicago University Press, 2005, p. 8) 
1.6.4 Sources 
Primary sources for the study are published doctrine and policy papers.  Counter 
Insurgency Operations is clearly the central text but every British manual relating to 
other key Army and Joint Doctrine publications also provide context.77  The principal 
policy papers are the 1998 Strategic Defence Review and the 2002 New Chapter, which 
stated the UK response to the attacks of 11 September 2001 and their consequences.78  
The House of Commons Select Committee on Defence provides further primary source 
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 evidence from its analysis of the initial campaign and subsequent post-conflict and 
counterinsurgency reports.79  Secondary sources have been used to analyse the debate 
about the development of doctrine and then its application.  These sources include: 
• Conference papers and lectures.80 
• Professionally recognised journals and fora:  the Royal United Services 
Institute (RUSI), the Army’s Strategic and Conflict Studies Institute 
(SCSI), Small Wars and Insurgencies Journal (SWIJ), Adelphi Papers 
and Survival.  The U.S. Army’s War College Strategic Studies Institute 
(SSI) has published many monographs covering asymmetric warfare, 
insurgency and counterinsurgency and analyses of the campaign in 
Iraq.81 
• Classified material. 
Although published doctrine is freely available, much of the debate and staff effort to 
develop the doctrine is not because it has not yet been released.  This makes examining 
the process of developing doctrine somewhat difficult.  Little is available publicly about 
that which influenced the development of doctrine, where and with whom ideas 
originated, and the process by which they were then adapted, adjusted, presented and 
finally approved.  The process therefore remains, for the most part, closed.  Those 
responsible for and involved with doctrine’s development have occasionally, however, 
offered some insights into the origins of, influences on and decisions about doctrine.  In 
the main, these were provided by those working at Army’s Development and Doctrine 
directorate (DGD&D), through the SCSI, and in speeches at and papers published by 
RUSI.  During its short existence between 2001 and 2003, the British Military Doctrine 
Group (BMDG) also provided an important forum, organizing a series of research 
seminars designed to share academic and military thinking on the role, use and character 
of doctrine, and to discuss the intellectual development of British doctrine on a joint and 
single service basis.  Together, the proceedings and publications that these sources 
provide shed valuable light on the formal and informal development processes that 
resulted in published doctrine.  It is by examining such sources that many of the 
principal waypoints in its development can be established.82
1.6.5 Participant Observation 
In contrast to the U.S., in the UK there is little published work on doctrinal 
development, and little authoritative material on the British campaign in Iraq.  This 
created the requirement to augment and in many cases expand the material available by 
determining Participant Observations. This took three forms.  The first was subject 
interviews.  Those involved with either or both doctrine and the campaign in Iraq were 
identified and interviewed.  The second aspect involved direct personal observation of 
military operations in Iraq.  The author served as Chief of Campaign Plans in 
Headquarters Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) in 2007-08, which provided the 
opportunity to observe the application of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine at first hand, 
and to compare relative progress between U.S. and British forces.  Noting that this 
provided a snapshot of the campaign, nevertheless, it provided unparalleled access to 
the principal protagonists at the pivotal stage in the campaign.  The third form was the 
analysis of personal documents, made available to the author by interviewees.   
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 Oral history was established through interviews with the principal British and American 
participants, both those who developed and published respective counterinsurgency 
doctrine, and those who put doctrine into practice in Iraq.  Selection criteria for 
doctrine-related interviews centred on Daddow’s historiographical approach.  This 
required the doctrine writer to be identified.  In the British case it was Gavin Bulloch; in 
the U.S. case, Conrad Crane, John Nagl, Lt. Col. Jan Horvath, and Gen. Petraeus 
provided the principal insights.  Interviews with Bulloch identified the main editorial 
influences on his work, and those with whom he worked at DGD&D during the 1990s.  
The final group of interviewees centred on those responsible for shaping, approving or 
teaching counterinsurgency doctrine.  Those interviewed included members of the 
Army Board, other senior appointees, members of the Army Doctrine Committee 
(ADC), and those involved with officer education, particularly at the Staff College and 
the Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC).  The same approach was 
followed in examining U.S. doctrine, but the number of interviews conducted was 
limited to the key personalities.   
The campaign analysis started by reviewing all British post operational reports.  This 
allowed the key events and key campaign themes to be identified.  One of the problems 
this thesis identifies is that very few commanders answered Clausewitz’s ‘first of all 
strategic questions’ in the same way.  It was important, therefore to determine why that 
may be.  A cross-section of British divisional and brigade commanders were selected to 
provide a view at every stage of the campaign.  Interviewees were also chosen from 
senior staff officers who served in Iraq.  Those who served with the Coalition in 
Baghdad offered a view that took account of prevailing U.S. interpretations of the 
British operation in Southern Iraq, and were able to compare British progress with that 
of American forces elsewhere in Iraq.  The master question list is presented at Table 1 
to be found at the end of this chapter. 
The thesis makes much use of official Post-Operational Reports from divisions, 
brigades and units on their return from Iraq, and from Post-Operational Interviews 
conducted by Brig. (Retired) Iain Johnstone at the Land Warfare Centre, Warminster.  
Johnstone’s interviews were conducted as part of the Army’s Lessons process in order 
to capture lessons, observations or other information relevant to Operation TELIC.  
Where individuals have given permission to be identified, material cited is attributed.  
Where permission has not been given, material is cited using Johnstone’s file reference 
system of date of interview and appointment, for example ‘050215-GOC MND(SE)’.  
Full identification of interviewees is available in the cited archival material at 
appropriate levels of classification.  
1.7 Literature 
The historical dimension of doctrine development is provided by Brian Holden Reid, 
John Gooch, Colin McInnes, Oliver Daddow, and Marcus Mäder.83  Holden Reid, while 
concentrating on the Army’s warfighting experience in the twentieth century, and 
highlighting the particular influence of Fuller in the development of doctrine, suggests 
that the Army showed a largely haphazard interest in developing its intellectual 
foundation.  He identifies the essence of the problem being a reluctance “to build on the 
lessons of the past and formulate a... doctrine as the focus and framework for a 
commonly agreed approach to the conduct of operations.”84    
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 McInnes highlights the danger the Army’s approach to developing its doctrine brought 
to its full spectrum of capabilities.  Its concentration on interventionist warfighting, and 
the institutional belief that an army trained and equipped for high intensity operations 
would be able to step down to operations other than war, carries an inherent risk that the 
concentrating on one would neglect the very real challenges of the other.  He contends 
that conservative evolution, rather than development that keeps pace with or ahead of 
real world change, would put the Army at disadvantage if prediction and reality proved 
to be too far apart.  Mäder’s analysis of the development of British doctrine during the 
1990s highlights the institutional difficulties in switching from a threat-based approach 
to one which was more broadly based and capability driven.  He offers a valuable 
analysis of an important period of doctrinal development, the emergence and impact of 
joint doctrine and the challenges of overcoming organisational culture. 
Ian Beckett has written prolifically not just on British counterinsurgency campaigns and 
the efficacy of the British approach but on the prevalence of insurgency around the 
world.  The strength of his observations is that they are set in a broader temporal and 
spatial context than is possible by examining one campaign or one national approach.  
His central argument is that insurgency was the most prevalent form of conflict in the 
twentieth century and that the continuing proliferation of insurgency is evidence of its 
continued effectiveness.  He draws a distinction between guerrilla warfare, which he 
sees as a purely military form of conflict, and insurgency which is a political act arising 
from some sense of grievance.  He argues that weaknesses which are inherent in both 
the state which suffers insurgency and the insurgent movement  which pursues violent 
anti-state action, the risk of fracture, and the difficulty in being able to focus on one 
aspect in particular, will continue to make countering insurgency a “testing 
challenge.”85  He uses British counterinsurgency principles as a framework for analysis, 
an approach relevant to this study. 
The British classical counterinsurgency approach is provided by four writers; Callwell, 
General Sir Charles Gwynn, Sir Robert Thompson and Kitson.86  Their principal themes 
provide the central tenets of British counterinsurgency doctrine.  Callwell and Gwynn’s 
works were officially endorsed but did not become official doctrine.  Callwell, who 
Colin Gray describes as a “superior theorist,”87 writes of the savage, asymmetric war 
between the regular soldier and his irregular opponent.  This form of conflict is so 
different from what was then regarded as normal warfare that the “method [is] totally 
different from the stereotyped [regular] system… The conduct of small wars is in fact in 
certain aspects an art by itself, diverging widely from what is adapted to the conditions 
of regular warfare.”88  He asserts that the differences between conventional and 
guerrilla warfare are so marked that if they can be avoided they should but if they are 
unavoidable, then the soldier must be trained and prepared for them.  This conclusion is 
repeated by Kitson and Simpkin. 
Gwynn follows Callwell’s concept of the small war, this time in the specific context of 
military support to the civil police.  Gwynn examines eleven imperial campaigns 
between 1919 and 1937, notably omitting Ireland 1919-1921.  Gwynn emphasises the 
intrinsic difficulties the soldier faces when dealing with a deepening insurgency and 
when the civil policy is more conciliatory than confrontational.  He identifies four 
principles that apply across the range of military tasks that the army may be required to 
perform in support of the police:  questions of policy remain vested in the civil 
Government; the amount of military force employed must be the minimum the situation 
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 demands; firm and timely action is needed to discourage further disorder.  Implicit in 
this is the need for the military response to be firmer in the short term than might have 
been considered in order to maintain control.  Gwynn’s fourth principle is co-operation 
which recognises that the task of restoring order does not rest on the Army alone:  unity 
of control, close co-operation and mutual understanding are all important between the 
civil authority and the military.  Gwynn’s principles are echoed again by Kitson and 
Thompson and are a clear influence in British counterinsurgency principles.   
Thompson is important because the basis of his work is the administrative requirements:  
the military aspects of the campaign are secondary to a government’s political and 
administrative response.  He describes the general problems a government faces when 
an insurgency emerges.  He describes the emergence of a new development in 
insurgency, that of sanctuary, external support.  Thompson examines lessons learned 
from Malaya and Vietnam, noting that neither campaign was complete at the time he 
wrote.  He asserts that insurgency requires a cause and that an insurgent movement is a 
war for the people.  Thompson makes clear that without reasonably efficient 
government administration, no counterinsurgency programmes will deliver the results 
required.  Thompson identifies five principles of counterinsurgency, examined in detail 
in Chapter 4:  the government must have a clear political aim; it must function in 
accordance with the law; the government must have an overall plan; it must give 
priority to defeating the political subversion not just the guerrillas; and in the early 
stages of the campaign, secure base areas first.89  All have been woven into the British 
Army’s doctrinal approach and all are underpinned by the need for the campaign to be 
founded on sound intelligence, to which he devotes considerable attention.  Of note in 
the contemporary discussion, Thompson’s section on operational concepts resonates 
with those that David Galula puts forward.  Assuming that the government has a plan, at 
the tactical level, Thompson describes an approach of Clear-Hold-Winning-Won where 
intelligence-led operations act to clear insurgents from an area, control is imposed over 
the cleared area to protect the population and isolate the insurgent, good government in 
all its aspects introduced to win and the area won at the point when control measures 
can be lifted. 
Kitson’s work is central to this thesis and, other than highlighting his considerable 
importance in developing the Army’s understanding of insurgency and 
counterinsurgency, the detailed examination of what he says will be undertaken in 
Chapter 4, when British counterinsurgency doctrine and its influences are examined.  
Kitson’s clear grasp of the essentials, as articulated in his two main publications, often 
repeated in many presentations through his career, and his conclusions remain valid in 
supporting an army to organise, equip, train, educate and prepare it for future 
counterinsurgency operations. 
David Galula is the final classical counterinsurgency theorist to inform this thesis.  
While he has had virtually no impact on the development of the British approach, his 
work with RAND in the 1960s was central to the revision of U.S. Army doctrine and his 
work holds a position in the U.S. Army akin to Kitson’s in Britain.  Galula offers a 
bitter, realistic view of counterinsurgency based principally on his experience in 
Algeria.  He covers this in Pacification in Algeria90 and develops the ideas further in 
Counterinsurgency Warfare.  Galula is clear from the start that countering insurgency is 
a political conflict, which is undoubtedly protracted and unconventional to the end.  His 
central theme is securing and protecting the population, gaining its support, and then 
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 acquiring information to identify and locate insurgents in order to defeat the insurgency.   
Galula’s laws and principles, distilled from his analysis, are focussed on the 
population’s central, fundamental position.  He adds value to the discussion through his 
analysis of the asymmetry between the insurgent and counterinsurgent.  It captures the 
inherent unfairness of insurgency and concludes that most aspects of this form of 
conflict favour the insurgent.  Kitson and Thompson include observations and guidance 
on the role of information operations.  Galula is more direct.  He refers to propaganda, 
not information, and places considerable emphasis on it:  it must deal with the substance 
of local issues, be addressed to specific groups, it cannot be “pre-cooked” at the highest 
level.   Finally, he makes the point that while not ideal in any way, as a necessity born 
of circumstances, particularly early on in a campaign, the military must be prepared to 
undertake non-military tasks. 
The historical dimension is developed from Beckett through Mockaitis, John Nagl and 
Rod Thornton.91  Mockaitis analyses British counterinsurgency campaigns, examines 
principles and approaches and the importance of ‘Hearts and Minds.’  His work is 
important because he sets British campaigns in the context of wider defence policy and 
he uses the three fundamentals of minimum force, civil-military cooperation and tactical 
adaptability as his framework for analysis.  He concludes that British success and 
failure provide a baseline and widely accepted understanding of the development of the 
British approach.  Rod Thornton argues that the British Army is first and foremost a 
counterinsurgency army that prefers to use minimum force and can attribute its 
successes to good civil-military relations.  He identifies those campaigns where poor 
political direction has resulted in ineffective civil-military coordination and this has had 
an adverse effect on military effectiveness. 
Nagl’s work of comparative analysis of approaches to countering insurgency - the 
British in Malaya and the U.S. in Vietnam - centres on how institutions learn and adapt 
from experience.  Those who learn and adapt succeed; those who persist in techniques 
and approaches that the adversary has mastered tend to fail.  It is incumbent on the 
counterinsurgent, therefore, to assess continually the nature of the challenge faced, or 
Clausewitz’s “first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement.”  He 
concludes that armies which learn counterinsurgency effectively generally develop local 
doctrine which meets local requirements, they establish local training centres, they 
regularly challenge their assumptions, both formally and informally, they promote 
suggestions from the field (bottom up review not top down), establish rapid avenues to 
ensure dissemination of lessons learned and they coordinate closely with governmental 
and non-governmental partners at all levels of command.   
Revisionist approaches have been argued by Cassidy, Thomas Hammes, David 
Kilcullen and John Mackinlay.92  Cassidy argues that organisational culture predisposes 
an army to success or failure in counterinsurgency and that understanding the nature of 
the society in which the insurgency takes place, making full use of indigenous forces 
and building capacity in them where necessary, is the means by which cultural gaps 
between the counterinsurgent and his host population can be closed.  Hammes offers a 
view of contemporary conflict which argues against the approach espoused by the so-
called Revolution in Military Affairs and the U.S. dependency on technology.  His 
thesis is that technology is an inappropriate response to a form of conflict instigated by 
adversaries exploiting contemporary regular-irregular asymmetries.   
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 Kilcullen’s observations on contemporary counterinsurgency and the relevance or not of 
its doctrine has changed from being dismissive of what he refers to as Classical 
Counterinsurgency (the theory of counterinsurgency war developed in response to the 
so-called wars of national liberation between 1944 and about 198293) to a position 
which recognises that classical principles remain relevant today.  His start point is the 
same as the Counter Insurgency Operations; to understand modern counterinsurgency 
one must first understand insurgency, and to understand insurgency it is necessary to 
understand the nature of the state which they are attacking.  He argues that the role of 
insurgents today reverses the traditionally held view that insurgents are a source of 
revolutionary change.  Today’s reality, Kilcullen argues, is that they fight to preserve 
the status quo against the revolutionary change that the counterinsurgent presence 
creates.  Further changes that affect the situation include globalisation, proliferation of 
media which serves to amplify the insurgent’s message to audiences worldwide, co-
operation and cross-pollination of ideas between groups, the disappearance of borders as 
barriers to the transfer of ideas and the phenomenon of insurgent groups winning by 
surviving not, as was the case in revolutionary war, winning by replacing the existing 
government.  In the light of his analysis, he proposes seven new paradigms for 
counterinsurgency that draw in the themes of increased politicisation of the problem, the 
greater requirement for unity of effort, the need to balance intelligence and information 
in order to get things done and the requirement to isolate the problem while recognising 
it might be global in scope.94
John Mackinlay argues that the British doctrine and approach, shaped by experience of 
peace support operations in the 1990s, has failed to keep pace with changes in the 
strategic environment.  He cites the impact of globalisation, proliferation of media and 
the insurgent’s ideology and understanding of the impact of and use of the Propaganda 
of the Deed as changes which have not been addressed adequately, if at all, in the 
Army’s doctrine.  Although there was a danger that in revising counterinsurgency 
doctrine in the light of a global insurgency, the experience of previous campaigns might 
have been forgotten, the arguments Mackinlay presents informed doctrine development 
and indicated areas that warranted further analysis:  the importance of coherent 
alliances, securing of the strategic population and a more rigorous, realistic doctrine 
development process. 
Bernard Fall’s contribution is through his exceptional analysis of French defeat in 
Indochina and his subsequent work on the American involvement in Vietnam.95  His 
work remains relevant because of the emphasis he places on identifying that an 
insurgency exists and the problems any delay or inappropriate assumptions create for 
the counterinsurgent.  He sees the two wars, correctly, as revolutionary warfare; a 
combination of guerrilla warfare and political action where the military aspect remains 
the secondary to the pre-eminent to the political, administrative and ideological 
dimensions.  Fall concludes that the only effort worth making is to improve the 
administrative and governmental structure based on his observation that when a country 
is being subverted, it is being out administered.96
The broader issues surrounding the application of force in contemporary operations 
were provided by Colin Gray, Edward Luttwak, Michael Howard and Rupert Smith.97  
They draw in issues of the impact of the Revolution in Military Affairs and technology, 
the paradoxes of modern strategy, the interrelationship of states of peace and states of 
war and the recognition that conflict takes place for the people, amongst the people and 
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 observed by the people.  Luttwak takes exception to the revised U.S. Counterinsurgency 
doctrine, offering a view that contemporary insurgencies are irreconcilable and 
therefore warrant far firmer measures than the doctrine puts forward.98
Sources that are of particular importance to the U.S. Army’s review of its doctrine and 
the search for a winning strategy in Baghdad, beyond Galula, include Steven Metz, 
Russell Weigley and Antulio Echevarria and Raymond Millen.99  Colin Gray and 
Thomas Ricks provide critical insight into the American experience in Iraq.100  Gray 
identifies thirteen characteristics of the American Way of War (apolitical, astrategic, 
ahistorical, problem-solving and optimistic, culturally challenged, technology 
dependent, focused on firepower, large-scale, aggressive and offensive, profoundly 
regular, impatient, logistically excellent, highly sensitive to casualties101) which 
culturally and structurally limit American military effectiveness when confronted with 
an irregular opponent.  These issues are addressed in the U.S. Army’s revised 
counterinsurgency doctrine.102
Ricks provides a well-informed, provocative and largely factually correct analysis.  
Where he is less strong is in the area of tactical adaptation which was much better and 
more effective than portrayed.  Constraints on force levels prevented those troops who 
were deployed from engaging with the population on the scale required to build 
confidence.  The result was a greater dependence on raids to disrupt and gain 
intelligence rather than through intelligence networks.  It became a battle of perceptions. 
Metz has written on insurgency for over fifteen years and concentrates on how it 
changes.103  His analysis informs a view of future developments which provides utility 
to the doctrine writer beyond historical value.  He has long held the view that 
insurgency, almost irrespective of ideology or its strategy, mutates and with it the 
concept of sanctuary, support, connectivity, propaganda and transparency.  His 
counterinsurgency strategy requires rapid stabilisation of the state or area, rapid 
development of local intelligence, encouraged sustained local reform and a shifting of 
perception from the view of the insurgent to the national and the local problem 
cauterized by strengthening the states surrounding the insurgency.  The psychological 
dimension is a constant thread in all of Metz’s insurgency work and it links effectively 
with the views expressed by Kitson, Thompson and Galula. 
Harry Summers’ analysis of the Vietnam War using Clausewitz,104 in particular the 
theory of war and critical analysis, offers a means of conducting campaign analysis 
against an accepted framework.  He uses Clausewitz’s arguments adeptly to argue that 
American strategic failure, despite its tactical successes, was due to a misunderstanding 
of the nature of the problem, confusion over doctrine which manifested itself in dogma, 
an inability to define success criteria and victory in terms that could be met and, 
ultimately, a failure to implement its counterinsurgency doctrine.  Summers seeks to 
answer why the US did so well in its tactics but failed in its strategy.  He concludes that 
to understand the true nature of the war requires a strict definition of the enemy, an 
understanding of the nature of the war and critical analysis.  Summers’ criticism of the 
U.S. administration’s failure to mobilise national support and its failure to commit fully 
to winning the Vietnam War, and his criticism of the U.S. military for having lost the art 
of war are made at the cost of what Jeffery Record refers to as the “rewriting history to 
confirm the Army’s rejection of counterinsurgency.”105  His approach and his analysis 
have relevance in terms of examining the American experience in Iraq:  there was 
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 confusion over the nature of the war, difficulty in determining the strategy required and 
greater difficulty in rationalising the political, development and security requirements of 
Iraq in an achievable way. 
1.8 Structure 
The thesis first explores the development of the British counterinsurgency doctrine and 
the approach it describes, it then analyses the British campaign in Iraq and, having 
examined the U.S. Army’s experience, it draws conclusions on the validity of British 
doctrine.  Chapter 2 establishes what doctrine is and sets the development of British 
doctrine in historical context, in particular it highlights the importance of Gen. Sir Nigel 
Bagnall in developing manoeuvrist doctrine for the Army and in focussing its attention 
on doctrine.  It then uses Daddow’s framework for doctrinal analysis, supported by 
Downie’s cycle of organizational change, to establish how the Army developed doctrine 
in the 1990s, the international and domestic context in which it was developed and the 
influence of the 1997 Strategic Defence Review.  Finally, it establishes a general 
framework for the analysis to determine doctrine’s effectiveness. 
Chapter 3 focuses more closely on Counter Insurgency Operations.  It examines the 
principles, approach, and the key tenets the manual describes.  It looks at how the 
manual was developed, how the doctrine writing process was adapted to fit 
circumstance, and how it drew from Counter-Revolutionary Operations (1977).  The 
development of a new set of principles is analyzed closely.  Finally, Counter Insurgency 
Operations (2001) is assessed against the criteria for effective doctrine identified in 
Chapter 2.  Chapter 4 examines the evolution of British counterinsurgency doctrine.  It 
follows an episodic approach, concentrating on each of the seven British manuals up to 
the publication of Counter-Revolutionary Operations in 1977.  It looks at the specific 
influence that Malaya and Northern Ireland had on doctrine, both directly and through 
the analysis of Robert Thompson and Frank Kitson.  It concludes by suggesting it is 
possible to distil a ‘British Approach’ against which both Counter Insurgency 
Operations and the campaign in Iraq can be judged. 
Chapter 5 examines the course of British operations in Southern Iraq in order that the 
validity of Counter Insurgency Operations can be determined. It follows a 
chronological approach, starting off with what was characterized by post-invasion 
stabilization operations, and charting the gradual increase in violence and decline of 
British military capability.  It identifies early tensions between the U.S. and the UK, 
looks at the impact of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) on military operations, and 
the effect of continued drawdown of forces.  The chapter examines three operations:  
one which attempted to re-impose classic British counterinsurgency methods, a case 
study of the withdrawal of British forces from Basrah, undertaken at the same time as 
the U.S. surged into Baghdad, and the Iraqi-led operation to re-establish control of 
Basrah, the start of which marked the nadir of the British campaign in Iraq.  Chapter 6 
analyzes Operation TELIC against the principles of counterinsurgency and the themes 
which emerged from interview:  continuity in intelligence and approach, command and 
control, the value of the Ink Spot method, and the importance of education and training.  
It also examines the approach the Army took to revise its doctrine as the campaign 
progressed. 
 Chapter 7 examines the U.S. Army’s experience.  It establishes the role of doctrine in 
the U.S. Army, the effect of Vietnam, how the Army turned away from 
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 counterinsurgency in the 1970s and concentrated on mastering major combat 
operations, and how, despite this, it developed valid doctrine for counterinsurgency.  
The chapter examines how the U.S. Army responded to the intense insurgent pressure it 
faced in Baghdad and the Sunni Triangle; how it returned to classical first principles to 
develop doctrine on which it could base an approach to deal with Iraq’s security crisis.  
Chapter 7 then analyzes how the new doctrine was put into practice in Iraq in 2007 and 
2008 through what became known as the Surge and through the leadership of Gen. 
David Petraeus.  Finally, it assesses FM 3-24 against the criteria for effective doctrine. 
1.9 Contribution 
The campaign in Iraq is one of the most controversial in modern times.  Somewhat 
strangely for a military operation which lasted six years, and which cost one hundred 
and seventy-nine British and 4,183 U.S. military lives,106 little has been published from 
a British perspective.  This thesis addresses this shortfall.  Whether or not the 
Government and the British people saw what transpired as a so-called Bad War, British 
servicemen and women went to Iraq, in the face of the most determined and widespread 
insurgent threat the Army has faced since Aden.  British forces were in Iraq to conduct 
military operations to achieve national objectives.  The Army had a doctrine, written 
specifically for counterinsurgency, the form of warfare which quickly emerged across 
Iraq in the post-invasion political vacuum.  Did the doctrine work and if not, why?  Was 
it because of a failure in doctrine, or was it a failure in its application, or was it a 
combination of both?  This thesis addresses these questions because the answers are 
important to the soldier and to the historian. 
This thesis is the first formal assessment of British counterinsurgency doctrine and 
operations written in the twenty-first century.  It is the first assessment of doctrine 
against today’s form of insurgency.  Its significance is that the author, by happenchance 
and profession, had access to the principal participants involved in writing British and 
U.S. doctrine and fighting their respective campaigns.  The views offered from senior 
officers such as Generals Petraeus, Lamb, Rollo, Riley and Cooper, add a dimension to 
the research that are the modern-day equivalent of interviewing Briggs or Templer in 
Malaya as they fought the campaign.  The strengths and weaknesses of the British 
approach were readily apparent to those who took part and capturing their thoughts and 
analysis early adds vividness and a sense of immediacy.  The doctrine-related research, 
in particular the interviews with Gavin Bulloch, John Nagl, Jan Horvath and Con Crane, 
establishes exactly and fully the motives behind each major theme of recent British and 
American doctrine.  As such, the interviewees’ comments and insights are of 
considerable historical value, removing any doubt about why a particular approach was 
taken, or why a view was discarded.  Together, they allow some sense to be made of 
doctrine.  
This research therefore addresses both academic and military needs.  Although doctrine 
per se has a well-established literature, the emphasis is more on how doctrine has been 
applied rather than how it developed.  This thesis redresses the balance.  On the one 
hand, it is one of the first pieces of research that has followed a historiographical 
approach to examine the development of doctrine.  On the other, it is the first study to 
focus on British counterinsurgency doctrine rather than counterinsurgency.  It is 
certainly the first to test the validity of contemporary doctrine against campaign 
experience.  Work by, among others, Kitson, Beckett, Mockaitis and Paget, has been 
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 informed by doctrine rather than it being the subject of study. 
Military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan continue to attract considerable interest and 
criticism but criticism alone does not help understanding.  Everything about these 
campaigns of choice is complex and Clausewitz’s dictum certainly holds true that 
“Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.”107  He goes on to 
say that, 
difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction...  This 
tremendous friction... is everywhere in contact with chance, and brings about 
effects that cannot be measured, just because they are largely due to chance...  
Moreover, every war is rich in unique episodes.108
Looking at the British involvement in Iraq, sadly for the strategist and the soldier, this 
remains all too true.  Frictions, the role of chance and the richness of unique episodes 
were present throughout the campaign, and much has been written by strategic analysts, 
particularly in the U.S. 
The justification for this study should be unnecessary given today’s strategic situation; 
the British Army has been engaged in two major campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan 
where insurgency, whether identified in British policy or not, has been and remains the 
dominant theme.  The Army has been here before.  In the 1970s and 1980s, it was 
heavily committed on two fronts – Germany and Northern Ireland – and decisions had 
to be taken to address the specifics of one, in the face of the considerable threat posed 
by the other.  Kitson achieved some success in refocusing the British Army’s attention 
on the principal requirements of planning and conducting a counterinsurgency campaign 
in the 1970s.  In so doing he helped to shape what is internationally recognised as the 
classical British approach to counterinsurgency.  Together, introspection and the need 
for the Army to understand, learn and adapt from its experience in Iraq serve a valuable 
purpose.  It is this study’s intention to follow Kitson’s lead and to help recalibrate the 
Army’s approach to counterinsurgency to meet the challenges of the next five years or 
so which will take it into the second decade of the twenty-first century. 
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 Table 1 - The Master Question List 
1. What is doctrine? 
2. What criteria does doctrine need to meet to be effective? 
3. What factors affect the development of doctrine? 
4. What are the difficulties in developing it? 
5. What are the organizational difficulties involved in developing doctrine? 
6. What are the problems posed by building an approach for the future on 
experience from the past?  How might they be ameliorated 
7. What were the principal influences on doctrine development 1996-2001? 
8. How important were Northern Ireland and the Balkans in shaping 
doctrine?   
Section 1.  What 
is doctrine? 
9. What did they tell us about the character of contemporary military 
operations? 
10. What are the difficulties in keeping doctrine relevant? 
11. How was the development of doctrine managed?   
12. How effective is the Army at managing its doctrine? 
Section 2.  
Managing 
Doctrine 
13. How might the process be improved? 
14. How did SDR shape doctrine? 
15. What were the principal SDR influences?   
16. Why did the View 1 (symmetric, high intensity operations) dominate? 
Section 3.  
Developing 
Doctrine:  
Strategic Defence 
Review 98  17. Why was View 2 (asymmetric warfare) ignored?  What effect did this 
have? 
18. To what extent is there a conflict between a warfighting approach and 
the requirements of operations other than war? 
Section 4.  COIN 
Doctrine 
19. To what extent did this manifest itself in the production of COIN 
doctrine? 
20. What emphasis has COIN received in education?  Is there any room for 
improvement? 
Section 5.  
Doctrine and 
Education 21. Does COIN warrant, as Kitson asserts, specific education and training?   
22. How does the Army learn? 
23. What are the benefits and dangers of responding to contemporary 
pressures? 
24. To what extent do differences between theory (doctrine) and practice 
create problems?  
Section 6.  
Learning from 
experience 
25. What are the risks associated with relying on inherent adaptability to 
overcome the unforeseen? 
26. How would you characterise the British approach to COIN? 
27. Was British COIN doctrine relevant to your experience? 
28. To what extent are the 6 principles of COIN still valid? 
29. To what extent is the Ink Spot method still valid? 
Section 7.  
Theory and 
practice 
30. To what extent do you consider the following characteristics important 
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 to COIN:  minimum force, civil-military co-operation, integrated 
intelligence, information operations, and learning and adaptation? 
31. How would you characterise the campaign in Iraq? 
32. What were the principal influences on the Iraq campaign? 
33. How and why did the Iraq campaign differ from doctrine?  Topics to 
consider:  command and control, the multinational dimension, 
Information Operations and force levels. 
34. What was uniquely British about Operation TELIC? 
35. What was new?  Topics to consider:  PJHQ, force levels, the Iraqi 
government, the presence of a trans-national insurgency, competing 
military activities (SSR and COIN), Private Military Companies, and 
militias. 
36. What worked?  Topics to consider:  Command and Control, Legal, 
Culture, People, Intelligence, Info Ops, Education and Training. 
37. What did not work and why?  
Section 8.  Iraq 
and Operation 
TELIC 
38. What could not work and why? 
39. Is the British doctrinal approach still valid?  If so why?  If not why?  Section 9.  
Assessment 40. Has the Army placed the right emphasis on COIN operations?  Have you 
detected any complacency or false assumptions in its approach? 
Section 10.  Gap 
Analysis 
41. What still needs to be addressed? 
Section 10.  Is there anything else the interviewee would like to add or discuss? 
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 2 Doctrine 
 
Military doctrine provides a well-established, if somewhat discrete field of study.  
Although historians have concentrated more on doctrine’s application than its 
development, there are some exceptions.  Much critical attention continues to focus, for 
example, on the theories and the enduring influence on British military thinking of Maj. 
Gen. J. F. C. Fuller and Capt. Sir Basil Liddell Hart.  Their ideas shaped the 
development of formal doctrine, particularly through the concepts of manoeuvre and the 
indirect approach.  The literature is extensive.1  Counterinsurgency doctrine, however, 
has not been examined to the same extent.  The theories of Thompson and Kitson, and 
to a lesser degree Gwynn and Callwell still prompt discussion, however relatively little 
attention has been paid to the application of British counterinsurgency doctrine, still less 
to its development.  Ian Beckett and Thomas Mockaitis were the principal contributors 
in the field2 until Britain’s involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan prompted renewed 
academic interest in counterinsurgency doctrine.3  How and why the British Army’s 
counterinsurgency doctrine has developed in the way it has is neither well-covered in 
the literature nor a well-understood subject. 
The interest shown in doctrine in the academic field is reflected in the Army’s in-house 
journal, the British Army Review.  Since 1989, the year British Military Doctrine 
(BMD)4 was published, the articles published in British Army Review on the doctrine of 
manoeuvre warfare and mission command are legion.5   By contrast and somewhat 
surprisingly given the Army’s history in it, between 1989 and 2001 – the year Counter 
Insurgency Operations was published – British Army Review only published two 
articles on counterinsurgency.  One was written by the author of Counter Insurgency 
Operations, and the other considered the application of manoeuvre warfare to low 
intensity operations.6  If British Army Review is a barometer of professional interest, 
this small snapshot indicates interest in counterinsurgency among officers was low.   
This chapter builds on the approach outlined by Daddow.  It draws on papers published 
by the principal think tanks, and material provided in interview by those involved to 
establish the general doctrinal context at the time Counter Insurgency Operations was 
published, its purpose and its significance.  This will establish the context against which 
the doctrine and what it contains can be examined.  This chapter identifies the role 
individuals played, and the importance of their networks of contacts which prompted 
ideas and regulated their development.  It will set the development of doctrine against 
Downie’s Institutional Learning Cycle, particularly when examining how the Army 
responded to changing circumstances in the operational environment.  The chapter 
examines the development of the Army’s doctrine following the publication of BMD in 
1989, the hierarchy of doctrine established by BMD, of which Counter Insurgency 
Operations was a part, and the institutional interest in doctrine BMD then prompted.  It 
will show that, although it is a product of the Army’s processes to produce doctrine, its 
origins, and the way it was developed, make Counter Insurgency Operations a unique 
publication in terms of how it was written, what it contained, and how it was published.  
Finally, it examines the issue of what constitutes effective doctrine and develops a 
general analytical framework against which doctrine can be assessed. 
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 2.1 What is Doctrine? 
The first edition of BMD defined doctrine as “what is taught,” and explained that it 
provided “the fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in 
support of objectives.”7  Gen. Sir John Chapple, the Chief of the General Staff, 
explained that doctrine “is not in itself a prescription for success as a set of rules...What 
it does provide is the basis for thought, further selective study and reading which is the 
personal responsibility of all of us.”8   The notion of doctrine being ‘what is taught’ 
became the received understanding of doctrine, particularly among graduates of the 
Army Staff College, Camberley, a view reinforced by all those interviewed for this 
thesis.  The link between doctrine and education is a crucial aspect of this thesis, and 
stems from the Army’s own view of the relationship between the two.  
As work on doctrine progressed during the early 1990s, three functions became clear.  
Maj. Gen. Willcocks, DGD&D’s first Director of Land Warfare, presented these at 
RUSI in 1994 shortly before the publication of ADP Operations.  He explained that 
doctrine had an enduring element which captured the essence of best practice as 
fundamental principles; it had a practical function which provided the Army’s tactics 
and procedures; and it had a predictive function which informed ideas about the 
character of future conflict.9  As things transpired in the late 1990s, the predictive 
function proved much harder to address than the other two.  Here E. H. Carr’s view of 
history has relevance.  Transposing ‘doctrine writer’ for ‘historian’, writing doctrine is 
more an art than a science, and whereas science has laws, or statements of tendency, the 
doctrine writer has to generalise, and cannot account for future accidents.10  Months 
after Willcock’s lecture, ADP Operations was published.  It defined doctrine as,  
the formal expression of military knowledge and thought, that the Army accepts 
as being relevant at a given time, which covers the nature of current and future 
conflicts, the preparation of the Army for such conflicts and the methods of 
engaging in them to achieve success.11
In 2001, the authors of British Defence Doctrine, BMD’s joint service replacement, 
further underlined the organizational importance of fundamental principles when it 
included principles as one of the essential elements of British Doctrine.  The other 
essentials were the warfighting ethos, the manoeuvrist approach, the application of 
mission command, the joint, integrated and multinational nature of operations, and the 
inherent flexibility and pragmatism of British doctrine.12  Defence Doctrine emphasised 
that the principles of war, 
are not rigid laws but provide guidance on which military action will be based. 
Their relevance, applicability and relative importance change with the 
circumstance: their application with judgement and common sense will lead to 
success; blatant disregard of them involves risk and could lead to failure.13   
This message has been a constant refrain since the first army doctrine was published in 
1909.   
BMD defined doctrine and explained its importance to an army then unfamiliar with the 
idea of an army-wide doctrine.  It does so by linking the army’s physical and mental 
preparations in peacetime with the need for it to be “clear how the complex situations, 
difficulties and hardships that will inevitably arise in war are to be tackled.”14  
Doctrine’s importance should therefore be seen in terms of the framework of 
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 understanding it establishes for the Army’s approach to war.   Echoing the 1920 
Provisional edition of Field Service Regulations which said “War is an art and not an 
exact science,”15 Liddell Hart asserted that “War is a science which depends upon art 
for its application.”16 BMD makes reference to this when it explains that doctrine is to 
“attend to both aspects [that is art and science], but its Military Doctrine must primarily 
seek to influence the way in which its officers and non-commissioned officers think.”  
BMD explains that doctrine informs both what to think and how to think, and uses 
Fuller to support the point, quoting:   
‘What to think’ of itself is not sufficient; it may be said to supply the raw 
material historical facts, etc. in which ‘How to think’ operates.  ‘What to think’ 
supplies us with bricks and mortar, ‘How to think’ with craftsmanship.  Both are 
all important and complimentary.17
This formal articulation of both doctrine’s importance and its primary function is 
significant:  it unequivocally affirms doctrine’s central role in defining the Army’s 
approach, and that in this respect doctrine is important.  How receptive the Army has 
been to that message, and the broader issue of doctrine’s assimilation, are issues which 
have taken some years to determine.   
2.2 Doctrine in Historical Context 
Until the publication of British Military Doctrine in 1989, as Ian Beckett observes, 
doctrine was “not a strong point”18 in the British Army.  Indeed there is a commonly 
held misconception, noted by Gary Sheffield, Colin McInnes and John Stone, that, until 
BMD was published, the Army had no doctrine at all.19  It is certainly true that before 
BMD the Army lacked operational level doctrine, a view General Sir Charles Guthrie 
reinforces when he said of BMD that it “broke new ground, articulating doctrine above 
the tactical level.”20  But the Army had doctrine well before BMD, but part of its 
problem was that it did not recognize the operational level of war, where policy and 
tactics meet and where an understanding of operational art was necessary.  The lavishly 
illustrated 1985 The Application of Force, written by Col. John Sellers, then the 
principal doctrine writer at the Staff College (the Staff College at Camberley was the 
doctrine hot-house until DGD&D was given the responsibility in the 1990s), uses the 
principles of war and many historical examples to explain all arms tactics from the 
division to the battle group, in all types of operations and in all environments.21  The 
Application of Force caught the attention of Gen. Sir Nigel Bagnall, then Chief of the 
General Staff, who was so impressed with it that he immediately upgraded Sellers’ post 
and set him to work revising the Army’s tactical doctrine.22  This was contained in the 
Land Operations series which, since the late 1960s, provided the Army’s doctrine for 
tactics at the battalion, brigade and divisional level, across a wide range of military tasks 
and in a wide range of environmental conditions.   
2.2.1 Field Service Regulations  
The Army’s first doctrine was published one hundred years ago.  Field Service 
Regulations (FSR) published by the General Staff in 1909,23 were the authoritative 
statement of how the Army was to operate in the field as the preface makes clear: 
This manual is issued by command of the Army Council.  It deals with the 
general principles which govern the leading in war of the Army.  The training 
manuals of the various arms are based on these regulations, which, in case of 
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 any doubt arising, are the ruling authority.24
FSR established the hierarchy of what it contained – the 1920 edition refers specifically 
to FSR as being “doctrine”25 – placing it above the Army’s existing and familiar 
training manuals such as Cavalry Training, Infantry Training and Field Artillery 
Training.26  Taken as a whole, the training manuals described the Army’s tactics and 
provided links to what BMD would later describe as higher level doctrine.  These 
manuals remained the principal repository of tactical doctrine for decades to come.  
Indeed, Lt. Gen. Sir Alistair Irwin recalls that the Army of the 1980s referred to and 
relied on its training manuals, even though at the time the “notion of ‘doctrine’ may 
have been alien.”27   
FSR enshrined the position of principles in doctrine for the first time.  It lists five:  unity 
of effort directed to a definite object; developing an organization “capable of application 
by men of average powers” and “sufficiently elastic to meet all the varying conditions 
which may arise, and which it is impossible to foresee”; application of the principles 
and adjusting them in detail according to conditions; decentralization of responsibility 
among subordinates but central control and co-ordination of subordinate elements to 
achieve the common objective;  and defeat of the enemy’s mobile forces, for which the 
“efforts of all parts of an army must be combined.”28  These principles were “to be 
regarded by all ranks as authoritative, for their violation, in the past, has often been 
followed by mishap, if not disaster.”29  In a way that was to be repeated by Fuller and 
subsequent doctrine writers, FSR emphasises the need for the principles to be learnt, 
understood and then applied judiciously according to the circumstances faced: 
They should be so thoroughly impressed on the mind of every commander, that 
whenever he has to come to a decision in the field, he instinctively gives them 
their full weight. 
... The fundamental principles of war are neither very numerous nor in 
themselves very abstruse, but the application of them is different and cannot be 
made subject to rules.  The correct application of principles to circumstances is 
the outcome of sound military knowledge, built up by study and practice until it 
has become instinct.30
That these principles were “evolved by experience,”31 is further indication that the 
Army had a healthy, if still informal process of assessment and analysis from which it 
developed its approach.  It would be wrong, therefore, to think that FSR arose in an 
intellectual vacuum.  Students at the Staff College used E. B. Hamley’s Operations of 
War32 as their standard text for many years.  Hamley’s book, in a rather Jominian way, 
deduced principles from the study of specific operations.33  Similarly, and in the 
absence of formal doctrine, Callwell’s Small Wars became the Staff College’s principal 
reference for irregular warfare during the 1900s.  These books and the various training 
manuals formed the intellectual foundation for professional study and their impact on 
the conduct of operations should not be underestimated.  While senior officers may not 
necessarily have been masters of doctrine, the principles of operations they learnt at 
Camberley were put to use in the field.  Richard Holmes, for example, cites Gen. Sir 
John French, Commander in Chief of the British Expeditionary Force in 1914, who in 
August 1914 decided not to withdraw on Maubeuge after the battle of Mons because (he 
had a photographic memory) he remembered a line from Hamley which said that a 
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 general who retreated into a fortress was like a sailor who, in a storm, grabbed hold of 
the anchor.34   
FSR described the Army’s approach to the conduct of operations, they codified military 
‘best practice’,35 and they were developed with flexibility and pragmatism in mind.  
These, and the institutional resistance their production generated in some quarters, 
remain the enduring characteristics of doctrine.  An examination of why the Army 
published FSR, what they contain, and the process by which they were subsequently 
developed, highlights three points of relevance to Counter Insurgency Doctrine.  First, 
FSR provide clear evidence that the General Staff considered that doctrine was 
important to the Army.  Second, FSR are the startpoint of a continuum of doctrinal 
thinking, from what FSR termed ‘savage warfare’ to what is now termed 
counterinsurgency.  Third, FSR provided a co-ordinated, systematic approach to the 
conduct of large wars, based on common principles, which would be modified for small 
wars but not supplanted. 
Just as BMD formed part of Bagnall’s reforms, FSR were a product of the sweeping 
changes introduced in response to the Army’s failings in the Boer War.  Richard 
Haldane, Secretary of State for War oversaw the creation of the General Staff (a 
recommendation of the Esher Committee in 1904), reorganized and re-equipped the 
Army, overhauled its training, and established a large standing expeditionary force.  To 
support such widespread change, two volumes – Operations and Organisation and 
Administration – were drawn up by the General Staff under the direction of Douglas 
Haig, the then Director of Staff Duties, to explain how the Army was to operate in the 
field.  The second point is that they were authoritative.  Published by the Army Council, 
Regulations were the Army’s approach to “the leading in war of the Army.”36  Third, it 
was recognized that they would be developed and amended in the light of experience.  
Edward Spiers notes that Haig took the sensible decision that the regulations “would be 
experimental in the first instance, and could be modified as experience dictated”.37   
Modifications followed as Haig led staff rides to test the relations between the three 
principal staff branches.  Fourth, they were contentious.  Creating Regulations required 
considerable zeal and enthusiasm on Haig’s part to get them published.  The idea of 
Army-wide regulations and the process to develop them created considerable resistance 
from the Adjutant-General’s and Quartermaster-General’s branches.  Spiers records that 
Nicholson, the newly appointed Chief of the Imperial General Staff, had to give 
direction that manoeuvres had to follow the Army’s new system,38 and Paul Harris 
notes that Haig had to seek and secure the personal support of the Secretary of State to 
allow Regulations to be tested in the field.39  
Arguments over Regulations continued after Haig had moved on to be Chief of the 
General Staff in India.  However, he understood that doctrine had to be flexible, not 
prescriptive, and a sensible pragmatism was required in its application.  Strachan 
observes that “Haig was clear that the Field Service Regulations were geared for the 
eventuality of major war, and when the First World War broke out he continued to see 
them as his benchmark.”40  Haig was also intent that Regulations should provide what 
Fuller later described as the ‘how to think’, and was aware of the dangers that being too 
prescriptive would bring: 
Certain critics of the British General Staff and of our regulations have recently 
argued that a doctrine is lacking...the British General Staff hesitates to teach and 
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 to publish a clear line of action... The critics seem to lose sight of the true nature 
of war, and of the varied conditions under which the British army may have to 
take the field.  It is neither necessary nor desirable that we should go further than 
what is clearly laid down in our regulations.  If we go further, we run the risk of 
tying ourselves by a doctrine that may not always be applicable and we gain 
nothing in return.41
FSR’s starting point for principles was that they were universally applicable, which 
meant that the approach to the organization of the Army and the conduct of operations 
were equally so.  Nevertheless, it identified one area where some careful adaptation was 
necessary.  In so doing, it provided the first formal doctrine for what were then referred 
to as small wars, and would now include counterinsurgency.  This was provided in 
Chapter X in the 1909 edition titled ‘Warfare in Uncivilized Countries’, a title amended 
in the 1912 to ‘Warfare Against an Uncivilized Enemy,’ and further amended in 1929 to 
‘Warfare in Undeveloped and Semi Civilized Countries’.42  FSR laid out general 
principles for ‘campaigns against savages,’ and highlights the need for self-reliance, 
vigilance, judgement, discipline, organization and training as pre-requisites for 
“overcoming the difficulties inherent in savage warfare.”  The reason for them is made 
clear:  “unless officers and men are ... capable of adapting their action to unexpected 
conditions, and of beating the enemy at his own tactics the campaign will be needlessly 
long and costly.”43
In keeping with its own view that principles should be adjusted in detail according to 
conditions, FSR is clear that in savage wars “the armament, tactics, and characteristics 
of the enemy, and the nature of the theatre of operations demand that the principles of 
regular warfare be somewhat modified; the modifications [the chapter describes] are 
such as experience has shown necessary.”44  This is a strong echo of Callwell who 
concludes that, 
the conditions of small wars are so diversified, the enemy’s mode of fighting is 
often so peculiar, and the theatres of operations present such singular features, 
that irregular warfare must generally be carried out on a method totally different 
from the stereotyped system.  The art of war, as generally understood, must be 
modified to suit the circumstances of each particular case.  The conduct of small 
wars is in fact in certain aspects an art in itself, diverging widely from what is 
adapted to the conditions of regular warfare, but not so widely that there are not 
in all its branches points which permit comparisons to be established.45
Given the status Small Wars had in the Army this is unsurprising, and the general tone 
FSR adopts is redolent of Callwell’s approach.  Callwell talks of the army’s 
responsibility to “hunt [the enemy] from their homes and ... [if necessary to] destroy or 
carry off their belongings”,46 even though these are means that “the laws of regular 
warfare do not sanction”,47 and that “sometimes ... their villages must be demolished 
and granaries destroyed.”48  FSR talks of “the seizure of his flocks and supplies, and the 
destruction of his villages and crops may be necessary to obtain his submission.”49  The 
similarity with FSR is striking. 
FSR provided thin but practical guidance on mountain, bush and desert warfare against 
comparatively poorly-armed opponents.  It was the terrain, and the impact it had on 
standard tactics and principles, which was the important factor, not the potential enemy.  
As such, FSR was the doctrine for conquest not pacification and the re-establishment of 
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 order.  It assumed that standard principles would be adjusted to the conditions, and that 
standard tactics remained largely useful.  It therefore provided little enough detail, as 
Tim Moreman notes, to be of direct use to those training for overseas campaigns.50  
However, as Beckett highlights, FSR were not the sole source of information in these 
specialist areas.  Francis Younghusband’s Indian Frontier Warfare (1898), C. Miller 
Maguire’s Strategy and Tactics in Mountain Ranges (1904), the Indian Army’s Frontier 
Warfare (1900, later expanded in 1906 to include bush fighting), W. C. G. Heneker’s 
Bush Warfare (1904) and W. D. Bird’s Some Principles of Frontier Mountain Warfare 
(1909) contained the collected lessons from the campaigns at the end of the nineteenth 
century and provided an extensive informal doctrine for operations against irregular 
enemies.  It was to these publications that officers turned for detailed guidance.51
2.2.2 Revising Doctrine and Refining Principles 
McInnes and Stone refer to the “supposedly ‘unofficial’ principles which underpinned 
the Army’s pre-[First World War] operational philosophy”.52   The difficulty, as Hew 
Strachan observes, is not that the doctrine “asserted that primacy of the principles of 
war” but that the principles it laid out were too general.53  While the principles of 1909 
were perfectly logical, there was a large gap between the philosophy they framed of 
universal and almost mandatory applicability and the practical business of soldiering.  
The post-war revision of FSR provided the opportunity to resolve this, to capture and 
build on wartime experience, and to revise and refine the principles of war.   
The approach the General Staff adopted to revising doctrine was central to maintaining 
the importance of doctrine to the Army.  By capturing the lessons from the war and by 
using broad-based committees to develop and revise FSR and their supporting training 
manuals, the General Staff ensured doctrine remained relevant, and its authoritative 
position maintained.  David French describes that revisions were “prepared under the 
auspices of the Director of Staff Duties at the War Office,”54 (the executive branch of 
the General Staff responsible for the organization of the army, officer education, staff 
training, and staff work55): 
The first draft of each manual was circulated widely. Each relevant branch of the 
war office, the general officers commanding ... of all of the home commands, the 
commandant and staff of the staff college and, if it was an arm-of-service 
manual, the relevant army school, were invited to comment and suggest 
amendments.56  
The inference from this is that the published edition had to reflect the views of all 
relevant, interested parties.  This clearly meant that the editorial committee would have 
to work to achieve consensus, what Downie describes as the Sustained Consensus stage 
in his Institutional Learning Cycle.   
Only experienced officers were trusted to draft the revisions,57 and the then Col. J. F. C. 
Fuller was one invited to write the 1920 draft of FSR.  He took the opportunity to 
introduce his own carefully considered ideas into doctrine.58  Important for this 
discussion, this included specific principles of war: maintenance of the objective, 
offensive action, surprise, concentration, economy of force, security, mobility and co-
operation.59  In the 1920 Provisional Edition, Fuller further develops the idea of 
judgement and application, first raised in 1909, highlighting that “no two situations are 
identical, and, therefore, the application of principles cannot be made subject to 
rules.”60  This simple statement overcame the difficulty presented in FSR’s first edition. 
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 Fuller made clear in FSR, in a way BDD was to reiterate seventy years later, that the 
principles had to be “interpreted according to circumstance; while these are principles of 
war, these are not laws, but guidelines for action, based upon past experience.”  The list of 
principles evolved with succeeding editions, the debate being influenced strongly by 
Fuller.  However, bearing in mind the central position principles assumed, articulating 
them was a far from straightforward matter.  In 1930, Liddell Hart observed that: 
[W]hat seems to be far more important than abstract principles are practical 
guides....Yet the modern tendency has been to search for a ‘principle’ which can 
be expressed in a single word   and then needs several thousand words to explain 
it.  Even so, these ‘principles’ are so abstract that they mean different things to 
different men, and, for any value, depend on the individual’s own understanding 
of war....In contrast, certain axioms seem to emerge from a close and extensive 
study of war.  These cannot be expressed in a single word, but they can be put in 
the fewest words necessary to be practical.61
The challenge Liddell Hart posed the doctrine writer – to strike the right balance 
between the abstract and the practical – continues to trouble the authors of 
counterinsurgency doctrine today.   
In the guidance on ‘savage warfare,’ Fuller’s revision introduces discussion of the value 
of aerial warfare in obtaining the enemy’s submission. No doubt this was prompted by 
the pivotal role a small detachment of aircraft played in defeating a Dervish revolt in 
British Somaliland in 1919.62  FSR highlights the “moral [sic] and material effect of a 
vigorous aerial offensive” in dealing with the tribesmen, where “the moral [sic] of the 
enemy will inevitably suffer from the knowledge that no difficulties of terrain can 
shelter him from aerial attack.”  The author also notes the detrimental environmental 
impact of operating in tropical climates, the need for a “comparatively large number of 
aircraft” to compensate, and requirement for good roads to ensure that transport can 
keep the air component supplied.63
It is fair to say that although committees worked hard to achieve consensus, it was not 
always achieved.  The revision of Infantry Training provides a useful example.  Liddell 
Hart did much work on the 1921 edition, itself much amended by the War Office and 
subsequently by Lt. Col., later Field Marshal, Lord Gort.  French describes how Gort’s 
edition “ was vetted by the director of military training at the war office, the senior 
officers school, the staff college and all of the home commands, and he was made to 
change at least one section at the insistence of the CIGS and the DSD.”64  In October 
1930, Lt. Col. Bernard Montgomery was appointed as the secretary of the War Office 
committee to revise the pamphlet.65  Montgomery decided to make the book “a 
comprehensive treatise on war for the Infantry Officer.”66  This put him at odds with his 
committee because, as Nigel Hamilton describes, if the manual “was to be ‘official’, it 
must reflect War Office rather than personal views”.67  In his memoirs, Montgomery 
describes the heated arguments that took place as the Committee vetted his work and 
how he circumvented staff process and then ignored the Committee’s comments to 
achieve his own vision of the pamphlet: 
I could not accept many of their amendments to my doctrine of infantry war.  
We went through the manual chapter by chapter.  I then recommended that the 
committee should disband and that I should complete the book in my own time; 
this was agreed.  I produced the final draft, omitting all the amendments the 
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 committee had put forward.  The book when published was considered 
excellent, especially by its author.68
In overall terms, however, the revisions to FSR proved to be what David French 
describes as “important fruits of the general staff’s collective labours.... [and a] 
comparison between the 1909 manual and its post-war successors demonstrates just 
how far British doctrine shifted in the decade after 1918.”69  In fact confidence in their 
contents, allowed the 1924 edition to contain “an explicit declaration to the effect it 
constitutes the Army’s doctrine for land warfare.”70  The FSR were, as Fuller asserts, 
the Army’s ‘central idea’, and their amendment showed an organizational desire that its 
doctrine had to change to reflect changed and changing circumstances – the lessons of 
the First World War, and mechanization respectively.  The main steps of the process of 
doctrinal change are clearly identifiable:  organizational performance gaps were 
identified, alternative responses found, sustained consensus achieved for an accepted 
solution, and, over the following ten years or so, the new doctrine was published to 
become the basis for the Army’s training. 
2.2.3 Inconsistencies in Assimilation, Application and Development 
Fuller believed that FSR were important but that they were not as widely understood as 
they should be, concluding that they were read only “for purposes of examination” and 
that they were “consistently neglected in the field, especially if action were in any way 
hurried.”  He attributed this problem to an institutionally damning “lack of professional 
interest, but also in part to the extreme dullness of the book, especially when read by a 
lukewarm soldier.”71  To overcome these shortcomings, and noting “how unimaginative 
the normal British officer is,” he wrote a series of lectures, later published in 1931, “to 
overcome this disadvantage, which is a real one,” and to present FSR in a “historical 
context as well as an explanatory one.”72 Fuller’s actions address a fundamental issue 
which was not that the Army had any doctrine; rather it was how its doctrine was learnt, 
assimilated and then applied.   
Fuller’s concerns have become a recurring theme in the literature.  Brian Holden Reid 
has highlighted this and singles out the Army’s reluctance to rely on its doctrine as a 
major concern.73  Similarly, McInnes and Stone recognize that the issue is not one of 
doctrine’s “existence, but of its status and use.”74  This comes, they suggest, from “a 
traditional aversion in the British Army to theorising about war, and an organisational 
culture which emphasised ‘common sense’ and praxis.”75  Echoing Fuller, Markus Mäder 
notes generally that “British officers did not care about intellectual debate and felt deep 
reluctance towards any formal writings.  At best some sort of doctrine existed as tactical 
instruction manuals.  However, they were considered to be something for the classroom 
but irrelevant in the field.”76  Michael Howard goes further, referring to an identifiable 
“complacent anti-intellectualism which has long been a predominant tendency of a 
British army which takes a perverse delight in learning its lessons the hard way.”77   
Although McInnes and Stone conclude that the central themes and principles of, for 
example FSR, are recognizable in the way certain commanders such as Slim and 
Montgomery fought their battles, they note that the general application of doctrine 
appears to have been inconsistent:  “generals such as Plumer...achieved their most 
convincing victories only by departing from the Regulation’s neo-Clausewitzian 
orthodoxy.”78  Sheffield agrees; “The problem was that [FSR] were more honoured in 
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 the breach than the observance.”79  This is an issue to which this thesis will return when 
it examines the application of Counter Insurgency Operations in Iraq. 
In parallel with inconsistency in application, Holden Reid notes an inconsistency in how 
doctrine was developed and amended in the light of experience and changes, 
particularly technological.  He notes developments in British doctrine as being 
“haphazard and [largely] the product of hasty improvisation rather than doctrinal debate 
and the exchange of ideas in the calm of peace.”80  This statement, written in the 
relative calm of the late 1990s, was to have an ironic resonance ten years later when the 
Army started to revise Counter Insurgency Operations while it was engaged in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
2.3 The Bagnall Reforms: Re‐Developing the Army’s Doctrine 
FSR were published to support the comprehensive reforms proposed by the Esher 
Committee and undertaken by Haldane.  The Army of the 1980s was not in the same 
position as it was in the 1900s; however its approach to fight on NATO’s Central Front 
had, in the view of Gen., later Field Marshal Sir Nigel Bagnall, become stilted and 
constrained.  Bagnall’s name is now synonymous with re-establishing the Army’s 
conceptual component,81  and BMD was a product of reforms he instigated.  The result 
was what McInnes describes as a “quiet revolution ... in 1(BR) Corps (the main British 
fighting unit in Germany)”.82  Lt. Gen. Sir John Kiszely records how, first as a 
divisional, then corps, and finally Army Group commander, Bagnall critically 
reassessed and then revised the Army’s philosophy.  He changed it from one of “over-
literal interpretation forward defence”83 (NATO’s policy) to one based on manoeuvre 
and decentralized command.84  Over the years, the British Army’s approach on the 
Central Front had become terrain-restricted where “Corps are allocated their areas of 
responsibility and told to fight a corps battle. This in turn leads to a tendency to 
perpetuate an allocation of territory throughout the chain of command, with divisions, 
brigades and even BGs being given their areas to defend without any direction as to the 
overall design for battle.”85  To overcome this problem, he revised tactics which had 
become a series of compartmentalized divisional engagements into a co-ordinated corps 
battle, a process he later repeated at Army Group level.   
Mäder notes that Bagnall opposed “the Army’s over-pragmatism and mindset of 
improvisation, an attitude particularly strong in the ‘small wars’ culture of the Army’s 
more traditional circles.”86  To overcome this, Bagnall required the Army to adopt a 
new mindset, and to develop an understanding of operational art, not just tactics.  
Melvin notes that Bagnall did not have a German-style higher General Staff to develop 
and implement the necessary changes.87  Instead, he used an indirect approach to shape 
his ideas and, to help spread their influence, formed a small, unofficial group, the so-
called ‘Ginger Group’.  In its early years, the group focussed on the tactical problems 
the Army faced in Germany.88  The wider developments Bagnall introduced were the 
first steps in what were to become the philosophies of Manoeuvre Warfare – later the 
Manoeuvrist Approach – and Mission Command.89   
As Chief of the General Staff between 1985 and 1988, Bagnall strove to improve and to 
institutionalize professional understanding within the Army as a whole.90  One of his 
primary concerns was to make the Army more coherent in its approach to doctrine and 
training.91  He instigated an Army-wide doctrine,92  and established the Higher 
Command and Staff Course (HCSC) at the Staff College to teach the operational level 
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 of war and the manoeuvrist approach, which stressed agility, tempo and shock directed 
against an enemy’s vulnerabilities.  The ideas developed by the Ginger Group became 
that which was taught on HCSC, and the course took on a significant role in terms of 
the further development of ideas.  Melvin considers that it became “the principal 
debating ground of the Army and catalyst for further developments in military doctrine 
and operational level thought.”93   
Other changes followed.  In summer 1993 the Inspectorate General of Doctrine and 
Training (IGDT) was created at Upavon.  Echoing the relationship between the original 
Directorates for Staff Duties and Military Training, established when the General Staff 
was created in 1904, the Army now had a dedicated authority responsible for how it 
thought and how it trained.  Previously, the Staff College had the responsibility for 
writing doctrine.  It benefitted from the inevitable discussions and debates between 
those teaching, those writing and those being taught as ideas developed.  Within a year, 
the Inspectorate was re-organized to separate training from doctrine.  The Directorate 
General for Development and Doctrine (DGD&D) became the arm of the General Staff 
responsible for the development and dissemination of doctrine.94  Major General Mike 
Willcocks, the first Director General, described DGD&D as being responsible for 
“producing an authoritative, coherent military doctrine for all levels of the Army for 
every type of conflict.”95  It is Brig. Charles Grant’s view that “DGD&D gave the Army 
the intellectual backbone to allow it to fight its battles for funding and the structures it 
needed.  DGD&D provided the robust arguments to support what the Army required.”96
It took three more years for DGD&D to consolidate its position as the principal focus 
for doctrinal development and debate.   Maj. Gen., later Gen. Sir Mike Jackson, was 
appointed Director General in 1996.  He secured DGD&D’s position as the sole 
authority for Army doctrine from the Staff College ahead of the creation of the Joint 
Services Command and Staff College in 1997.97  Despite these final changes, it is clear 
that by 1994 the Army had created an effective means to develop its doctrine.  As 
Mäder concludes, “the Army had transformed initial impetus, triggered by the 
manoeuvre warfare debate and the subsequent publication of BMD... into a sustained 
doctrinal process”.98  The Army’s efforts made between 1989 and 1994 demonstrate 
“that doctrine came to be understood as a process of institutional importance.”99
2.3.1 The Doctrine Hierarchy 
The publication of BMD, and the shift in responsibility for writing doctrine from the 
Staff College into what became DGD&D, enabled work to start on developing an 
Army-wide doctrine to complete the hierarchy of doctrine BMD described.  It had three 
layers, and each layer was written with a particular purpose in mind.  The author of 
BMD intended that, by degrees, the broad principles and general approach described at 
the highest level would be translated into tactics and procedures which were in keeping 
with the general manoeuvrist approach.  BMD provided the pinnacle of the hierarchy, 
being the highest level of doctrine.  Issued by the Chief of the General Staff, on his 
personal authority, it was “concerned with conveying understanding not instruction.”100  
Its function was to “establish the framework of understanding of the approach to 
warfare in order to provide the foundation for its practical application.”101  Higher level 
doctrine was written to help develop understanding; the lower level would be the basis 
for instruction and training.   
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 Beneath military doctrine sat Higher Level Doctrine, published in the ADPs.  Higher 
Level Doctrine was to deal with the principles that governed the conduct of operations 
at all levels, and with the operational level of conflict and the conduct of campaigns.  
Under the guidance of the Director of Land Warfare at DGD&D, the Army Doctrine 
Publications (ADP) series followed:  Operations in 1994, and then, among others, 
Command, Training, Soldiering and Logistics.102  At the same time, work started on 
revising the existing Land Operations series for it to be republished as the extensive 
Army Field Manual (AFM).  This was the third level of doctrine, Tactical Doctrine.  
The AFMs provided the main body of doctrinal instruction within the Army, and they 
were written “to ensure that all commanders, whatever their specialization, have a 
common foundation on which to base their plans.”103  
As the doctrine was published, it quickly had an impact on education.  Kiszely notes 
that “the doctrine and [HCSC] recognised the operational level of war, and 
acknowledged the centrality of a manoeuvre-oriented approach to warfare, although the 
latter concept was... translated into lower-level doctrine [ADP Operations] and was 
fully embraced into the exercises of the Army Command and Staff Course in 1994.”104  
Although the Army Staff College remained an important think tank, supporting, and 
certainly testing ideas developed in Upavon, the introduction of ADP Operations was 
not without its problems.  Charles Grant, then a member of the Directing Staff at 
Camberley, recalls that the DS had to  
deal with concepts that were virtually alien to them and they had to teach 
concepts for which the Army had no real understanding and little directly 
relevant experience.  The DS were teaching from pre-publication editions of 
ADP Operations and while some understood doctrine’s role as a framework for 
understanding, others did not.  There was considerable anxiety among the DS 
and the students that doctrinal frameworks were being applied too slavishly – 
always a risk with doctrine – at the expense of encouraging genuine 
understanding.105
By the late 1990s, once the doctrine had been assimilated, this problem had largely 
disappeared.  Lt. Gen., now Gen. Sir Peter Wall recalls that doctrine’s utility during this 
period increased as “people at unit level thought about and used the handrails that 
doctrine provided and that they had been taught.”106
2.3.2 Theatre Instructions 
BMD included a fourth type of doctrine in the form of Theatre or Operation 
Instructions, which it described as “a vital supplement to doctrine.”107  These were to be 
sponsored by the relevant operational commander, and were intended to “impart both 
understanding and instruction concerning probable or existing operations and will 
define the levels of command.... within the theatre.”108  Theatre and Operation 
Instructions were to be based closely on Military, Higher Level and Tactical Doctrine, 
and adapted to fit the particular conditions of the theatre for which they were written.  
Unlike the other strands of doctrine, some or all of these instructions were likely to be 
highly classified.   
The use of Theatre Instructions, and specialist training centres to teach theatre-specific 
skills was already well-established.  The Malayan campaign set the standard with the 
formation of the Jungle Warfare School and the publication of The Conduct of Anti-
Terrorist Operations in Malaya (ATOM)109 in 1952.  ATOM was the Army’s first really 
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 comprehensive counterinsurgency theatre handbook.  Written at the personal direction 
of Gen. Sir Gerald Templer, the High Commissioner and Director of Operations, ATOM 
was the authoritative pamphlet for the campaign and the repository of experience and 
best practice from jungle operations.  It explained the background to the campaign, the 
emergency legal powers available to the security forces, operational design, 
intelligence, psychological warfare, and the tactics to be used, and was used as the basis 
for all training that units arriving in Malaya had to undertake. The framework of 
operations it described, very much echoed that suggested by Charles Callwell  in Small 
Wars:  framework operations to provide routine day-to-day activities such as patrols, 
cordons and searches, and ambushes; mopping up operations to “complete the 
destruction and prevent revival” of communist terrorists; conducting deep jungle 
operations to deny terrorists the opportunity to rest and retrain; and State Priority 
Operations and Federal Priority Operations “to exploit opportunities in specific 
areas.”110   
Well written, relevant, and with full endorsement from Gen. Templer, ATOM became 
highly regarded, and later formed the basis for Keeping the Peace,111 the doctrine used 
during the Aden campaign.  ATOM proved to be so useful that Gen. Erskine, Director of 
Operations in Kenya, had his own version produced the following year.  A Handbook on 
Anti-Mau Mau Operations112 was written to assist in the training and operations of 
troops involved in the Mau Mau rebellion.  Anti-Mau Mau Operations covered similar 
material to that provided in ATOM, and it too formed the basis of in-theatre training at 
the East Africa Battle School, where “fieldcraft, jungle tactics and the correct use of 
native trackers and war dogs are taught.”113  This format is clearly recognizable in 
subsequent doctrine publications.114  In the same vein, standardized operating 
procedures were developed in Northern Ireland (NISOPs).  Like ATOM, NISOPs 
formed the basis for both training and the conduct of operations, and they were adapted 
as terrorist tactics changed, or as new equipment was brought into service.115  No such 
theatre instruction was issued for Iraq. 
2.3.3 Reviewing and Revising Doctrine 
BMD raises the paradox of doctrine’s nature being both “enduring yet dynamic”.  On 
the one hand its enduring basis stems from “the hard won and often bitter experience 
gained in war”.  On the other, it has to be dynamic enough not just to respond to debate 
within and outside the Army, where “constructive criticism and assessment [was] to be 
encouraged”, but to external influences.  Kiszely notes the difficulties such a position 
might create between doctrine as an authoritative statement of the Army’s thinking and 
the requirement for it to be kept relevant and up-to-date: 
[The] official sanction required to implement doctrine can transform it into 
dogma and ossify it; but without that official sanction it is liable to become 
ignored and irrelevant. Moreover, if too much criticism of it is encouraged, the 
doctrine may lack credibility; but if some criticism is not made, it will not 
remain dynamic.116  
BMD identified several specific areas that may prompt change:  defence commitments 
and resources, technology, the threat, research, development and experiment, and 
experience on active service and trial on exercise.117  The inference from this discussion 
is clear:  while the General Staff, specifically DGD&D had responsibility for the 
development and dissemination of doctrine, and that it was to be “reviewed every five 
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 years and if necessary reissued”, the Army in general had to be attuned to the possibility 
of change.  Changes to doctrine were to be expected, dynamism was part of its nature, 
and doctrine writers had to be prepared accordingly.  Although not expressed in these 
terms, this identified and codified Step 1 of the Institutional Learning Cycle – Attention 
to Events.  Given that BMD is specific in identifying factors for change, it is interesting 
to compare the factors Richard Overy subsequently identified as drivers:  experience of 
combat, introduction of new technology, political influences, personality, inter-service 
rivalry, nature of potential enemies, state of public opinion.118  He highlights the human 
side of doctrine-writing and policy-making, and the inevitable tensions that come with 
them, which an official publication could not. 
2.3.4 Re‐Establishing the Army’s Philosophy 
BMD established doctrine as the source of the Army’s philosophy and the principles by 
which it should conduct operations.  The ADPs provided the link between philosophy 
and practices and procedure, the last contained in the AFM.  The idea of a military 
philosophy was introduced through the concept of Fighting Power, with its physical and 
moral components – the means to fight, and the ability to get people to fight – and the 
conceptual component which provided “the thought process behind the ability to 
fight”.119  BMD used Clausewitz to explain its relevance: 
Theory exists so that one does not have to start afresh every time sorting out the 
raw material and ploughing through it, but will find it ready to hand and in good 
order. It is meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more 
accurately, to guide him in his self-education; not accompany him to the 
battlefield. 120
The similarity between this statement and Gen. Sir John Chapple’s view that “there are 
some who say battlefield is not a place to where we could hope to succeed by muddling 
through”121 is evident (Chapple, as Bagnall’s successor as CGS, actually published 
BMD). 
Haig established the importance of principles of war in Field Service Regulations, 
developed subsequently by Fuller, and BMD affirmed that the conceptual component 
comprised the principles of war, military doctrine and development.  Development 
required “an innovative approach to all aspects of Fighting Power”122 and the views of 
commanders at all levels were recognized as a major influence on the development of 
the ability to fight.  The author of BMD therefore recognized the role for experience in 
shaping doctrinal developments which, in turn, would affect the way in which the Army 
was to fight.  BMD includes a diagram that shows the link between doctrine, command, 
the basis for success in fighting a war, organizations and systems development and 
training.  Unfortunately, no textual explanation is provided, so the reader is left to 
deduce the significance of what the diagram shows, namely the inseparable bond 
relationship between philosophy (doctrine) and practice (experience).  The diagram is 
reproduced in Figure 2 below as the ideas it illustrates represents a valuable analytical 
framework against which doctrine in general can be judged. 
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Figure 2 - Military Doctrine:  Philosophy Informing Practice 
Source:  British Military Doctrine, p. 32. 
Notwithstanding the incomplete explanation of the relationship between doctrine and 
practice, the manoeuvrist philosophy which BMD introduced had an important bearing 
on the way in which Bulloch subsequently developed the principal ideas in Counter 
Insurgency Operations.  Writing of BMD, the author of ADP Operations says “This 
approach to warfighting is not new.  It... is rooted in the writings of von Clausewitz and 
Fuller.”123  Less evident is the influence of Brig. Richard Simpkin, widely regarded in 
the Army at the time as a genuine military theorist.  In Race to the Swift,124 Simpkin 
articulated ideas on operational manoeuvre in which he had successfully incorporated 
Soviet concepts into his theory to update the Jominian-style battlefield geometry then 
espoused by the U.S. military.125  Simpkin’s analysis of the attrition-manoeuvre 
dichotomy and his development of manoeuvre theory were central to BMD’s 
philosophical underpinning.  His concepts of deep operations and operational 
manoeuvre are clearly recognizable in the forms of manoeuvre described in BMD.126  
BMD is significant because it re-established an Army-wide doctrine, it established the 
general philosophy behind it, it introduced the philosophy of the manoeuvrist approach 
and mission command, it started the process of translating philosophy into practice, and 
it established how the Army would use and revise its doctrine.   
2.3.5 ADP Operations:  Bridging Philosophy and Practice 
Although BMD described forms of manoeuvre and the approach to general war, as 
Military Doctrine it was not written to be used in a practical sense.  This was the 
purpose of ADP Operations, published in 1994.  It set out the Army’s approach to 
fighting in future conflicts, reflecting the post-Cold War environment and the doctrinal 
developments that the Gulf War prompted in the U.S. and at home.  Operations 
provided “the bridge between the essentially timeless content of the British Military 
Doctrine... and the tactical level Field Manual series which describes how the doctrine 
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 should be put into practice.”127  Echoing Fuller’s concerns about an institutional 
reluctance to assimilate Field Service Regulations, Lt. Gen. Peter Duffell urged that 
ADP Operations “must, however, be read and understood by all and not allowed to 
gather dust on coffee tables, bookshelves or in pamphlet libraries.”128  This was 
important advice because ADP Operations established a fundamentally new approach 
to the conduct of operations.  As such, it contained some important changes.   
First, it described operational design of integrated joint and multinational capabilities in 
new terms, albeit that they had strong Clausewitzian overtones.  Objectives, end-states, 
centres of gravity, decisive points and lines of operation defined the new geometry 
along with discussions about the nature of the political-military interface at the 
operational level.129  The doctrine stressed the enduring imperatives of intelligence, 
public information, effective security measures and psychological operations and it 
introduced the Functions in Combat – Command, Information and Intelligence, 
Firepower, Manoeuvre, Protection and Combat Service Support.  These were to become 
the established checklist for commanders when considering tactical problems and 
identifying possible solutions, reflected in the AFM.   
Second, it further developed the concept of the manoeuvrist approach, describing 
campaign success not in terms of victory or defeat, “which is not an absolute condition 
but a matter of degree”,130 but in terms of the achievement of end-states and degrees of 
success.  Although it acknowledged that some physical destruction of the enemy would 
be necessary and possibly unavoidable, the doctrine concentrated on ways to “damage 
the enemy’s belief in his ability to win”.131  This would be achieved through pre-
emption, dislocation, and disruption,132  making the point that “disruption requires 
sound intelligence”.133  Interestingly, in a publication which drew on classic British, 
German and American examples of manoeuvre and decisive action, it used Northern 
Ireland to illustrate the difficulties of identifying a suitable target:  “at one critical 
vulnerability of the Provisional IRA is the support it enjoys within the Republican 
Community but it is another thing to get at it, by military means alone.”134  This is the 
essence of the counterinsurgency problem, and one which was to test far more 
commanders in Iraq than ADP Operations could anticipate. 
Third, the Core Functions of Find, Fix and Strike were identified as the fundamental 
elements of operations.  These could be “carried out consecutively as they were in the 
Gulf War, or concurrently as they are in Northern Ireland.”135  Fixing operations denied 
the enemy his goals, distracted him and thus deprived him of freedom of action.  Strike 
operations used the freedom of action gained by fixing the enemy to manoeuvre (“that is 
to get into a position of advantage in respect of the enemy from which force can be 
threatened or applied”136) or hit the enemy “unexpectedly, or in superior force, at the 
point selected in order to defeat him.”137   
The fourth change came in the way the core functions were integrated simultaneously at 
the tactical and operational levels across the battlefield.  This was through the 
Operational Framework of Deep, Close and Rear operations, a concept that described 
how operations related to each other by function (that which was to be achieved) and 
geography (where they were to achieve it).  Deep Operations were characterized as 
long-range, often protracted activities that sought to find, interdict or deceive the 
enemy, to prevent him from achieving his objectives, and to create favourable 
conditions for our own operations.  ADP Operations emphasises the need to “focus 
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 selectively on key vulnerabilities.  They may well also have a psychological or moral 
flavour seeking, for example, to influence the enemy’s will to fight through his media, 
public support and undermining his confidence by a series of carefully targeted blows; 
this is especially so in operations other than war.”138  It cites the example from Northern 
Ireland of deterrence patrolling and vehicle check points which “influence where 
terrorists choose to operate but are not themselves likely to lead to planned contacts.”139  
Close Operations were characterized as quick, simultaneous and violent, non-
contiguous actions within a distributed area of operations, with a primary purpose of 
striking “the enemy in order to eliminate a discrete part of his combat power: the means 
range from destruction to arrest.” Deep and Rear Operations were intended to create the 
conditions for favourable close combat.  Close Operations were about winning current 
battles and engagements, “fought by forces in immediate contact with the enemy.”140  
Rear Operations receive comparatively little coverage.  Their significance for 
counterinsurgency operations, with its strong psychological component, is clear now but 
not emphasised in the text:  “ensure freedom of action by protecting the force, 
sustaining combat operations and retaining freedom of manoeuvre of uncommitted 
forces.”141
The publication of ADP Operations was a significant event for the Field Army.  It made 
the link between the philosophy of BMD and the tactics required to conduct 
manoeuvrist operations.  It established the framework of Deep, Close and Rear 
Operations, and the core functions of find, fix and strike.  The challenge for Gavin 
Bulloch would be to fit the conventional counterinsurgency approach into the new 
framework introduced by ADP Operations.   
2.4 Doctrine Writers and Writing Doctrine 
Doctrine, like history, is not written in a vacuum.142  Doctrine writers have to decide 
how contemporary influences and historical precedents are best blended to provide 
doctrine’s timeless, practical and predictive elements.  This requires two often quite 
difficult judgements to be made: one about the most likely future trends in conflict, and 
another concerning what, from the body of experience, remains relevant to those future 
trends.  The writer’s intention should be to produce relevant, practical doctrine but, 
against the two main decisions, the question is to what extent the doctrine writer’s 
interpretations of fact (the enduring lessons and principles) and influence (future trends) 
are valid.  Here Carr’s observation about the process of writing history has some 
bearing.  He notes that the two processes of acquiring material and writing are not 
discrete steps but one process where the two go on simultaneously:  “the more I write, 
the more I know what I am looking for, the better I understand the significance and 
relevance of what I find.”143  The same can be said of the doctrine writer, who can draw 
on operational reports, personal accounts and historical and scientific analysis.  The 
doctrine writer’s task, however, is not just to create a cogent analysis of past actions and 
future trends, but to create something which can then be converted into tactics and 
procedures. 
In general terms, the process of circulating doctrine for comment and approval – in the 
Downie model, the stage which seeks to achieve sustained consensus – provides the 
checks and balances on the writer’s interpretations.  Bulloch felt that “it is best for the 
doctrine writer to develop a central idea and then to get the experts to advise and correct 
it.  In reality this means starting at about the 60% level, and then using experts to get it 
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 to about 90% before widening the debate to get it formally accepted and finally 
published.”144  He recognized the main difficulties faced when writing doctrine were 
maintaining up-to-date knowledge of the broad range of subjects, recognizing that 
doctrine does not change as quickly as tactics, knowing where to look for information, 
and having the contacts and the connections to develop ideas, test them and then have 
them validated by a broader audience.  He also stressed the issue of the doctrine writer’s 
reputation and authority:  “Views are fiercely held.  The writer has to be reasonably 
senior and well-versed in the Army and its ways.  Developing doctrine is as much about 
selling an idea as it is writing it.” 
Grant also identified the pitfalls of this approach.  First, writing remains a laborious 
process which takes time.  Second, it can become a victim of ‘word-smithing’ as 
successive contributors to the review process make minor adjustments, and finesse the 
language to reflect their own style.  This can add significant delay and when added to 
the time it takes to write and review doctrine, risks devaluing doctrine’s practical value 
to those who have to use it.  Fourth, expert advice is necessary but “they can derail 
production if the doctrine falls into the hands of a zealot.”  Finally, writers should have 
very recent operational experience if the doctrine is to provide the bridge between the 
writer and the practitioner.145   
Grant’s observations reflect their position in time, both when they were made (2007) 
and the time to which he referred (the late-1990s).  Then, experiences from the Gulf 
War and Bosnia were still fresh, and although few of the doctrine writers at DGD&D 
had served in Northern Ireland in the early years the corporate memory was strong.  No 
one, however, had any experience of counterinsurgency in the expeditionary context in 
which doctrine in general was to be re-written.  SDR had made clear that the threat was 
“no longer all-out war in Europe but a major regional crisis involving our national 
interest, perhaps on NATO’s periphery or in the Gulf.”146  Future operations would be 
conducted abroad, outside the political and military infrastructure of NATO, yet the 
doctrine for counterinsurgency continued to draw on colonial, post-colonial and 
domestic experience.  This did not appear to fit the expeditionary context DGD&D’s 
development themes had identified.  Nor, in the context of a renewed organisational 
interest in manoeuvrist approach and conventional warfighting, prompted by ADP 
Operations, could counterinsurgency generate the interest necessary to warrant further 
work.  Both Grant and Bulloch recall that DGD&D’s efforts in the mid-1990s 
concentrated on completing the ADP series, in particular those parts of the AFM 
concerned with conventional, manoeuvrist operations; formation and battlegroup 
tactics, and command and staff procedures.   
As a doctrine writer, Bulloch’s position in DGD&D was unique.  Although initially 
there was a large team of Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels to develop ideas and 
concepts, Bulloch was the only doctrine author.  As such, he considers that he was 
given an unusually free hand to do what he felt necessary, which with hindsight he felt 
was not ideal.147  He was not in the same position as Montgomery with Infantry 
Training, nor did he have the same editorial direction and authority as the author of 
BMD.  In that case, direction came direct from CGS to the author, the then Colonel Tim 
Granville-Chapman, a student on the first HCSC, who was told to produce a first draft 
very quickly.  He wrote it in three months, took the draft back to Bagnall, between them 
it was reviewed twice more, and then published without any general discussion and 
attempt at ‘achieving sustained consensus.’  As Bulloch describes it, “It was all done 
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 and dusted.”148  The only minor problem was that the publisher did not follow approved 
staff duties for page and paragraph numbering so it was not a good example to be held 
up at the Staff College of service writing conventions.  Nonetheless, in Bulloch’s view 
the example of BMD is by far the best way to publish doctrine:  start the process at the 
top, and get the highest level of support possible.149  In the case of BMD no one was 
going to gainsay CGS.  General David Petraeus took a similar approach when it came to 
revising the U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine. 
2.5 Doctrine Networks 
Daddow sets the doctrine writer’s work in the context of broader military and political 
structures which are “integral to any thorough account of the doctrinal process.”150 
Although he makes reference to the sharing of ideas between those responsible for 
single service doctrine and those responsible for doctrine on a joint-service basis, no 
such tri-service organisation existed.  DGD&D’s links were more international, with its 
link to TRADOC being particularly important.  Melvin gives an indication of this 
relationship, referring to the “privileged insight” TRADOC gave DGD&D “into how 
the U.S. Army intends to fight and win wars in the 21st Century” when its 
representatives attended the U.S. Army’s first Army After Next wargame in 1997.151
The principal think tanks have been mentioned already.  Much was gained from the 
personal involvement of academics, both British and American, during the 1990s.  
Brian Holden Reid, John Gooch, Williamson Murray, and Edward Luttwak were 
regular contributors to DGD&D debate and its development work.152  Responsibility for 
the ideas the doctrine presented rested, however, with the doctrine writer who, in turn 
was responsible to DLW and his director general for its content. 
The committee remains the Army’s preferred method of reviewing and agreeing 
doctrine.  The Army Doctrine Committee, chaired initially by DLW, then DG DGD&D, 
was formed from the Army’s major generals and brigadiers whose appointments had a 
vested interest in doctrine.  They included commanders of the Army’s deployable 
division, those responsible for training, and policy, the equipment programme and 
personnel.  It met twice yearly to ratify doctrine pamphlets for publication and to 
discuss emerging concepts.  Reaching agreement on doctrine publications required 
DGD&D to circulate around the Army draft documents, developed as Bulloch 
described, for comment and agreement.  Grant, Bulloch and Lt. Gen. Bill Rollo, an 
ADC member and the first chairman of the Army Doctrine and Concepts Committee 
(ADC’s successor since April 2006), consider ADC an essential part of the doctrine 
process:  “ADC worked.”153  Bulloch found it useful to alert ADC of developing ideas, 
and to test any developing framework, gain its advice and, most importantly, its support.  
ADC’s working assumption was that the Army could write doctrine.154  Grant considers 
that achieving consensus and enlisting two-star support was a key step in getting the 
Army to accept and to use the doctrine DGD&D.  As the ADP and AFMs were 
completed during the 1990s, Grant and Bulloch recall how ADC’s business gradually 
moved away from doctrine.  Future concepts work took on an increasing importance, 
primarily because of their resource implications for the Army in terms of people, 
equipment and training, as it defined the nature of future conflict and then explained 
how it would fight future wars.  ADC’s business was not all hypothetical discussion; for 
example, the Future Army Concepts paper resulted in organizational changes to 
rebalance the Army.155  Bulloch and Grant both note that ADC’s discussions 
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 increasingly centred on current issues, not just doctrine.  Nevertheless, it was Army 
policy that ADC’s principal function was to endorse its doctrine.  The general view is 
that it was an effective reviewing body.  Just as importantly, it kept a very influential 
group of senior officers informed of, and allowed it to shape developments in the 
doctrine and future concepts area to a degree not previously enjoyed.   
2.6 The International and Domestic Context 
It is evident that the main international and domestic influences on the development of 
doctrine in the 1990s were closely intertwined.  Outcomes in one area were dependent 
on another.  Force structures, for example, depended on policy, and, in turn, policy was 
influenced by doctrine’s future concepts.  This meant that the process of writing 
doctrine remained more evolutionary than revolutionary, despite the rapidly changing 
context of the strategic environment, particularly the United Nations and subsequent 
NATO operations in Bosnia. Many within the Army believed that peace support 
operations in the Balkans framed a new paradigm of military interventions short of 
general war based on the notion of consent.156  New doctrine was quickly produced.  
First Wider Peacekeeping was published in 1994 and then Peace Support Operations in 
1998.157  Both reflected recent experiences and much operational analysis.   
It was, however, the Labour Government’s Strategic Defence Review (SDR) process 
started in 1997, which was to have the most profound influence on the Army’s view of 
its future role and the posture it should therefore adopt.158  At the same time, the 
potential technical and warfighting advantages offered by what was then referred to as 
the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) was another important influence on doctrine 
development.  The former reinforced the Army’s requirement for a warfighting 
capability, the latter forced fundamental questions to be raised about how to improve 
the conduct of operations by the introduction of information technology.  Strangely, 
despite the increasing attention future concepts attracted as a result of the SDR and 
information technology, Colin McInnes considers that doctrine “rather surprisingly 
perhaps, remained relatively constant despite the radical change in the nature of 
probable future Army operations.”159
Nevertheless, during the 1990s, it is clear that the Army made a substantial effort to 
change its mindset away from that of the Cold War to a more manoeuvrist approach, 
seen to be better suited to the strategically uncertain strategic environment.  Despite the 
apparent reluctance to write, read, understand or apply its doctrine, the changes which 
followed the publication of BMD were significant.  Writing in 1998, Mungo Melvin 
observes that while “the few remaining sceptics may still associate doctrine wrongly 
with ‘dogma’, the developments of the last ten years (manifest in the publication of 
[British Defence Doctrine] and the formation of the [Joint Services Command and Staff 
College]) are now taking root.”160   
However, while the development of manoeuvrist tactical doctrine proved reasonably 
straightforward, striking the right balance between doctrine’s enduring and predictive 
functions proved much more challenging.  Melvin makes clear that, at the time, 
“[o]pinions still differ over what form doctrine should take, and in particular whether it 
should be retrospective (best practice to date) or more progressive (most likely future 
practice).”161  Grant recalls the debate never really ended.  It posed the biggest problem 
during the discussions leading up to, and during the Strategic Defence Review, which 
centred on identifying the ‘most likely’ and the ‘most dangerous’ threat the armed 
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 forces would face.  Debate split between a conventional armed threat, along the lines of 
the Gulf War, which was seen to be the most dangerous, and a more asymmetric threat, 
similar to that seen in the Balkans or the U.S. intervention in Somalia, which was seen 
to be the most likely.   The former relied more on the retrospective view of doctrine, 
where the historical importance of manoeuvre and the indirect approach would be 
central.  The latter required a more progressive, predictive approach, drawing on the 
visions of future warfare emerging from the RMA.162
2.6.1 The RMA  
In 1995 Metz and James Kievit163 characterised an emerging idea of a revolution in 
military affairs in terms of extremely precise, stand-off strikes, dramatically improved 
command, control, and intelligence, and Information Warfare.  They also noted some 
likely risks:  that an information-centred RMA could not generate or guarantee 
increased combat effectiveness against the most likely or most dangerous future 
opponents; that an American pursuit of the RMA would encourage opponents or 
potential opponents to seek countermeasures; that it might lead the U.S. towards over 
reliance on military power; and that, in broader terms, vigorous pursuit of the RMA 
might increase problems with friends and allies.  Discussion over a possible revolution 
continued for several years.  Much of it was fuelled by a desire in the U.S. to divest the 
Armed Forces of their Cold War legacy structures, equipment and approaches and 
transform them into highly mobile, agile and potent organizations.  This would depend 
on the RMA’s promises being delivered.164
The 1997 U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review formally acknowledged the intention to 
harness the as yet unproven hypothesis of an information-led RMA.165  By 1999, in the 
final months of the Clinton Administration, Secretary of Defense William Cohen was 
more definite in what he had in mind, the transformation of the U.S. armed forces, a 
process he described as being “when a nation’s military seizes an opportunity to 
transform its strategy, military doctrine, training, education, organisation, equipment, 
operations or tactics to achieve decisive results in fundamentally new ways.”166  The 
U.S. vision was of unmatched armed forces that would deal decisively with any peer or 
near-peer competitor who were described in clear if somewhat distant terms.  Cohen had 
no guarantee the process that he was starting would produce a military that could meet 
the demands of the 21st Century’s strategic environment.  He certainly could not have 
known that within four years, the U.S. would be fighting highly unconventional, 
irregular enemies in Afghanistan and Iraq.  The prospects of an RMA and 
Transformation, however, captured the imagination of policy makers and defence 
planners and the then Presidential Candidate George W Bush promised in 1999 to 
implement transformation through a “comprehensive review of our military – the 
structure of its forces, the state of its strategy, the priorities of its procurement … to 
challenge the status quo.”167
For a while, Transformation introduced a new grammar of war into doctrine and policy.  
New concepts were introduced: Full Spectrum Dominance, Network Centric Warfare, 
Shock and Awe, 168 and a vision depicted of U.S. military operations of the future where 
new capabilities enabled the “interdependent application of dominant maneuver, 
precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection”.169  
Proponents for Transformation promised it would be the catalyst to deliver a 
revolutionary step change in the way wars could be fought.  Changes would be so 
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 fundamental and so dramatic that the U.S. re-cast its National Security Policy, National 
Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy on the expectations the RMA created.  
Policy statements talked about a new form of decisive war such that “[if] deterrence 
fails, decisively defeat an adversary.  Such a decisive defeat could involve changing the 
regime.”170  Strategic pre-emption against state and non-state actors using “full 
spectrum dominance – the ability to control any situation or defeat any adversary across 
the range of military operations”171 would be the New American Way of War.172   
2.6.2 The Future Army and its Effect on Doctrine 
In the UK, although the 1991 Defence Review Options for Change continued to distract 
discussion away from the Army’s future roles and structures to arguments about 
imperfections in its present organization, the need to examine the implications of the 
future battlefield more closely had been recognized.  Willcocks describes the first steps 
in re-casting conflict and war in more contemporary terms in 1994.173  Charles Grant, 
then the Colonel in DGD&D responsible for concepts, recalls that the second half of the 
1990s saw a noticeable shift away from Cold War ideas towards developing some more 
concrete views of the nature of future operations and their implications.   
The first step was an internal discussion paper called British Army 2000, written in 1994 
and agreed by the Executive Committee of the Army Board (ECAB) in 1995.  The 
paper’s aim was “to describe the capabilities likely to be required of the British Amy of 
the next century and the structural and doctrinal implications that result.”174  It 
reappraised the Army in the light of the changing strategic environment, technological 
change and its adoption of the manoeuvrist approach and mission command doctrine.  
Although the first edition was not surprisingly rooted in the Cold War, Grant notes that 
by the late 1990s, “considerable effort had been invested in establishing a new baseline 
on which the Army’s approach to future war could be built.”175  British Army 2000 was 
further revised in 1996 and re-titled The Future Army.  It became the principal focus for 
future development work and the major themes it examined are shown in Figure 3, 
(over) where the effort to create a doctrinally coherent force structure and supporting 
functions is clear.   
Future Army offered two speculative views of conflict which were intended to 
crystallize thought, to prompt further study and to generate debate.  Written by then Col. 
Robert Baxter (later to return to DGD&D as its last Director General), they drew on 
U.S. Army work through the by now well-established links with Training and Doctrine 
Command (TRADOC).176  View 1 extrapolated contemporary views of so-called 
symmetric, regional conflict to describe a situation in which the UK was an alliance or 
coalition partner, involved in an expeditionary campaign.  The fighting would be short, 
high tempo, and brutal, and deep manoeuvre was essential for success.  It also assumed 
that the conflict phase would be followed by a period of post-conflict stabilization.  
View 2 was so-called asymmetric conflict.  The similarity between what it describes, 
and those which the Army subsequently faced in Iraq are astonishingly similar:   
In this model a modern, professional army, or coalition, will be opposed by 
armed forces directed by social entities which are not necessarily states, 
conducted by organisations that are not necessarily armies and fought by people 
who are not necessarily soldiers in the conventional sense of the term.  Such 
irregular forces may be associated with criminal enterprises, drug cartels, 
religious sects and pressure groups, while their aims may often have an anarchic 
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1998, p. 60. 
and unpredictable flavour.  They can be expected to operate with few moral or 
political constraints; indeed it will be the very lack of constraint that gives them 
strength and credibility.  Primary targets will be the people and civil 
infrastructure, as well as the military.  The distinction between civilian and 
soldier will be blurred, often as a deliberate tactic.  Opponents will have an 
ability to attack [computer networks] ... with technology widely and cheaply 
available on the open market.  Irregular forces will be prepared to wage a 
protracted war of skirmishes, raids, ambushes, bombings and massacres, striking 
suddenly, briefly and unpredictably, compounding the difficulties of 
distinguishing friend from foe.  In this model, our forces are likely to be 
operating in an environment in which they are surrounded by the host population 
that will both constrain the use of force and also make the gaining of 
information much more complex.  We believe that we as a nation and as an army 
have an experience and a record of success in such asymmetric forms of warfare 
that is rare amongst our principal allies.177
The questions this raises are to what extent was note taken of the risks inherent in a 
View 2 form of conflict, and to what extent were they reflected in doctrine?   
It is important to take note of the view expressed by then Col. Dick Applegate, 
responsible for Force Development at DGD&D, that the Army in 1997 was still “in a 
state of transition from a largely continentally based force designed to deter a Soviet 
threat, to an expeditionary power-projection force better suited to the more complex 
international security environment.”178  While implications for force development were 
being identified, their real impact could not yet be fully determined nor ideas tested in 
55 
 
 the field.  Nevertheless, the Army continued to address the uncertainties raised by View 
2, and the implications of General Charles Krulak’s view of 3-Block War, proposed in 
1999, where armed forces are “confronted by the entire spectrum of tactical challenges 
in the span of a few hours and within the space of three adjacent city blocks.”179  U.S. 
operations in the Balkans and Somalia had proven to be complex, volatile and highly 
unpredictable, and outcomes hinged “on decisions made by small unit leaders and by 
actions taken at the lowest level.”180  It was Krulak’s view that a Cold War focus on 
major regional warfare did not take enough account of what U.S. Marines were actually 
facing and that it did not help prepare them for future stresses and dangers they would 
face.   
British experience in Bosnia backed this up and Bulloch considers that the lessons from 
the close, high intensity, highly irregular fighting among the factions in Sarajevo 
provided ample evidence to point the Army in the right direction.181  DGD&D 
examined View 2 and 3-Block War more closely to identify their implications on force 
structures, equipment and the moral component, including using CGS’s Future Army 
Study Periods to air findings more widely.  However, discussions never properly settled 
on what adjustments were necessary.  It was implicit in View 2 that the Army would 
have to readjust to match the operational challenges it posed, but Grant recalls that 
“there was understandable hesitancy to go too far because Options had been such a 
focus of attention and disquiet.”182  Kiszely, at the time Assistant Chief of the Defence 
Staff (Resources and Programmes) highlights use made of doctrine in the MoD to 
justify expenditure:   
During my time as ACDS RP, there was a great deal of debate.  View 1 was still 
driving the main part of the Equipment Programme because it was perceived 
that whilst there was a requirement for View 2, in the longer term we would still 
need to retain the means to fight on the battlefield.  It was a matter of foresight 
and balance of risk against the likelihood of involvement.  This is a debate 
which continues.183   
Thus attention continued to focus on the View 1 work and the RMA.184   
By the late-1990s, policy confirmed that expeditionary warfare was the principal option.  
Although British Army 2000 paid little regard to it in its first edition, by the 1999 
edition and following SDR, it was the driving force.  It is clear that View 1 and View 2 
provided very useful, readily identifiable models, and effective settings for DGD&D’s 
work in the late-1990s.  Grant thought that experience from the Balkans added to the 
Army’s understanding but, of note, “it did nothing to invalidate [Views 1 and 2].  
Instead, there was a general and increasing acceptance that what we would face was 
more likely to be a mix of the two.  It was not View 1 or View 2, but something of 
both.”185  However, when it came to informing decisions on the Army’s force structures 
and the equipment programme View 1 had the greatest relevance.  Symmetric, high 
intensity conventional warfare would be the most dangerous form, it was for that threat 
which the Army would be structured, equipped and trained, and doctrine would provide 
the approach to follow.  Gen. Sir Peter Inge, then CGS, articulated the Army’s position 
and its concern about posture and capabilities: 
At the top end of the spectrum, it is fundamentally important that we retain the 
capability to fight at the highest intensity levels of conflict.  In other words we must 
retain the military capability to go and fight a war. I think there was a danger for a time 
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 that the importance of retaining this warfighting capability was not fully recognised. 
There was a feeling that peace support operations were the way ahead for the future and 
that high intensity combat was a thing of the past. I am convinced that once you lose a 
warfighting capability, it takes years and years to get it back, both in terms of expertise 
and in terms of equipment.... Forces trained for high intensity combat can adapt to peace 
support operations but the reverse is not the case.186  
The Army’s fear that it would lose the ability to fight a war is evident; having a 
warfighting doctrine was one way of supporting the case for retaining the ability.  Here, 
an interesting comparison can be made between the assumptions that underpinned the 
ADPs and the supporting Field Manuals and the much earlier Field Service Regulations.  
David French notes that Regulations “paid lip-service to the fact that the army might be 
engaged in imperial policing or wars against a second-class enemy such as the Afghans.  
But the whole tenor of the doctrine it promulgated was designed for a war against a 
first-class enemy.  In the post-war era, when there was no one single obvious enemy to 
confront, it made sense to plan on a ‘worst-case assumption’, for if the army was 
prepared to fight a ‘big’ war, it could surely win a ‘small’ one.”187  The similarity 
between the position adopted in the inter-war years and the 1990s is plain.  Warfighting 
was the Army’s focus and it provided its raison d’être, as Gen. Sir Charles Guthrie 
confirmed: 
Let us be clear what armies are for. They exist to be able to fight – which is why 
in the British Army we define our doctrine in terms of fighting power. This 
must, and indeed does, bear on everything we do.  It defines our character and 
how we think (what we call the conceptual component) and therefore dictates 
our structure; it tells us how we get our people to do things (the moral 
component) and ... it tells us about the means to fight (the physical component) 
and about our size, our equipment, our sustainability and how we train and set 
our readiness.188
On the other hand, some account still required to be taken of View 2.  The threats it 
described were more closely aligned with counterinsurgency than with conventional 
high intensity warfighting, as it was then currently understood.  While the Army’s 
doctrine continued to be refined in the spirit of being a warfighting army, and its 
organizations, equipment and training developed to be able to fight; little attention was 
paid to the issue of counterinsurgency.   
By the late-1990s, DGD&D had been subjected to a process of almost continual review, 
and placed under pressure to reduce in size.  It lost several posts as a result.  This forced 
hard decisions to be taken on which doctrine was to be developed and where the focus 
of attention should be.  In 1997, the ADC changed its priorities from doctrine to future 
concepts, and Bulloch recalled that whole sections of staff at DGD&D switched to 
developing concepts.189  Narrower priorities coupled with a general feeling that not 
much had changed in the operational environment to warrant reviewing the 1995 edition 
– focus in Northern Ireland changed quite rapidly once the peace process started, and 
operations in the Balkans were viewed as Peace Support operations – meant that 
counterinsurgency doctrine had to take its place in the process of routine updating.190  
As a result, as Grant recalls, “COIN had to be put on the back burner because it was a 
lower priority to the work needed to develop, for example, Air Manoeuvre doctrine or 
the Future Army Concepts.  It was a simple question of resources.”191   
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 2.7 Antithesis:  The Difficulties of Writing Retrospective 
Doctrine 
This chapter’s examination of the Army’s doctrine would indicate that during the 1990s 
it re-learnt the importance of having a clearly stated conceptual component in the form 
of doctrine.  Through the process of doctrinal reform, it came to understand that a 
coherent, consistently written hierarchy of doctrine not only provided the philosophy, 
principles and procedures which were useful in practice and but also provided the 
intellectual backbone to underpin the design of the future army.  However, this is not a 
completely accurate picture.  Grant observed that, “Provided doctrine is recognised as 
being elastic, implicit in this is the need for a constant refreshing of what it says.  This 
will take into account new equipments being brought into service although doctrine and 
concepts should be the start point for procuring equipment, not the other way round.”192  
The Army introduced the Warrior Infantry fighting vehicle into service in the late 
1980s.  No doctrine was written to support its entry into service.  This caused initial 
difficulties as successive battalions to receive the equipment found different tactical 
methods to exploit the improved firepower, protection and mobility Warrior offered.  
Iain Johnstone summarized the Army’s difficulties: 
Warrior might have taken a long time to produce and it might have seemed 
reasonable had it developed from a doctrinal requirement rather than just 
appearing in a vacuum but it definitely offers a quantum leap in combat power 
to the Infantry.  But do we really know how to use it?  The introduction of the 
Army Tactical Doctrine Handbook (ATDH) has helped.  More specifically the 
draft TD Note 16, which deals with the tactical handling of Warrior and gives a 
first stab at trying to understand how we could best employ this new weapons 
system. However, the British Army has never properly understood the necessity 
of tactical doctrine in the first place and, despite ATDH, uses tactical terms 
without regard for their actual meaning. To date the vocabulary of ATDH is 
being used but procedures remain unchanged.193
The Attack Helicopter is a second case in point.  Its doctrine had to be written 
retrospectively, not to justify its procurement but to explain to the Army how it was to 
be used.  Bulloch recalls that ADC discussed issues such as how many Attack 
Helicopters a squadron should have, and how the regiment should be used, and the 
agreed position was very much on the lines of the Cold War U.S. Army Corps as a 
highly potent strike force of last resort.  Bulloch was subsequently asked to write the 
doctrine for the Attack Helicopter despite the fact that the Army had already bought 
them, “presumably with some idea in mind about how they were to be used.  And here 
was the nub of the problem:  if the corps commander or the divisional commander was 
going to use them, he should write the doctrine, but no one in 24 Airmobile Brigade or 
16 Air Assault Brigade could be tied down to write it.”194  The doctrine process was 
clearly not followed fully and the case of the Attack Helicopter -- a significant purchase 
and a complex weapon system -- shows hesitancy in addressing practical doctrine not 
seen in the development of future concepts. 
2.8 Effective Doctrine:  A General Framework for Analysis 
So far, this chapter has examined what doctrine is, what functions it performs and what 
influences shape its development.  During this discussion, some implicit assumptions 
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 have been made.  The first is every piece of doctrine has a clear purpose, with 
philosophical and practical value in terms of education and training, and the conduct of 
operations.  In other words, it is not simply a moribund treatise capturing ideas that have 
no real value to the soldier.  Is it safe to assume, however, that doctrine will be effective 
even if those assumptions are met, and safeguards are present within the doctrine 
process to ensure that they are?  Is the existence of doctrine proof enough that its ideas 
are valid and relevant?  Generally the accepted view is that doctrine is the product of a 
rational process designed to develop a sound approach which has a practical application 
in mind.  There are examples which support this assumption:  ATOM, which proved to 
be invaluable in standardizing military training and the conduct of counter-terrorist 
operations in Malaya after 1950, and A Handbook on Anti-Mau Mau Operations, which 
provided a similar function in Kenya. 
What is it that makes doctrine effective and what criteria does doctrine have to satisfy to 
establish its authority?  Is a formal statement in a preface, like that in FSR, enough?  
The literature concentrates on the effectiveness of doctrine’s application, rather than on 
the development of doctrine itself.  Nevertheless, some form of comparative 
methodology is required if Counter Insurgency Operations, its predecessors, and their 
U.S. counterparts are to be evaluated systematically.   
As part of the research, doctrine writers and practitioners – both commanders and 
principal staff officers – were asked to identify what in their view constituted effective 
doctrine.  All those interviewed were graduates of the Army Staff College at 
Camberley; some had instructed there, or at JSCSC; many were graduates of HCSC; 
some had worked at DGD&D, or on the General Staff where doctrine had played an 
important role.  Their responses linked directly into the issue of how doctrine was now 
being developed following the disbandment of DGD&D in April 2006 and the creation 
of the Defence Concepts and Development Centre (DCDC) at Shrivenham that month.  
The general view of those interviewed is summed up by the following observation, 
which infers of a gap between the doctrine writer and those who use doctrine.  There is 
a strong implication that sustained consensus continues to be difficult to achieve: 
Rather than codify practice, the doctrine writers are now trying to predict what 
doctrine will be, using far too speculative a view.  They have moved from what 
we know about conflict today, and from enduring principles, and from what its 
practitioners need, to a form of doctrine that the doctrine writers alone seem to 
think might be useful.195
The criteria interviewees identified fell into five broad categories: 
• Acceptability with the target audience 
• Endurability  
• Contemporary relevancy 
• Suitability as educational material 
• Accessibility and manageability 
2.8.1 Acceptability with the Target Audience 
Bulloch believes that doctrine is written for the guidance of those who have to carry it 
out:  “It provides them with markers, signposts across some blasted heath, without 
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 which they would be lost.  It provides a sense of direction.”196  Those who have to put 
doctrine into practice should be able to recognise, therefore, the value of the ideas it 
contains, their origin, and their applicability, and through education and training 
practitioners should be able to understand and assimilate the guidance it provides.  
Doctrine is, to repeat the definition in ADP Operations, the formal expression of military 
knowledge and thought that the Army “accepts as being relevant at a given time.”197  
This notion of acceptance refers rather more to the view arrived at by those who 
approve doctrine for publication, principally the ADC, rather than a general acceptance 
the Army as a whole may come to.  Barry Posen, referring to military doctrine, 
concluded that “changing doctrine takes time: it disorients a military organisation.”198 
The doctrine writer can reduce the period of disorientation by recognizing both the 
importance of securing the acceptance of the target audience, and where possible 
maintaining congruity with the general organizational approach.     
Those who have to approve doctrine and those who have to apply it should share a very 
similar view of doctrine.  The practitioner’s ready acceptance of what is approved and 
published is by no means guaranteed.  ADP Land Operations, the successor to ADP 
Operations, published in May 2005,199 is a case in point.   It shows that ready 
acceptance of a new idea cannot be guaranteed, and that the rejection of the idea by a 
general body of opinion can itself shape doctrine.  Grant set work in train at Upavon to 
thoroughly revise the ADP series with a view to producing one volume that contained 
the essence of Operations, Command and Training.  He handed the project over to his 
successor, Mungo Melvin.200  The invasion of Iraq provided ample evidence to validate 
the British philosophy of the manoeuvrist approach and mission command, and the 
American advance on Baghdad validated several U.S. operational concepts.  The 
authors of the new ADP reflected this in Land Operations.  It had been their intention to 
publish the new book in 2004, in the immediate aftermath of the Iraq war.  They were 
somewhat surprised to discover that their views of large-scale warfighting differed 
considerably from both those who took part in the invasion of Iraq, and the subsequent 
campaign, and staff and students at the JSCSC.  The Commandant of JSCSC raised 
formal objections about the general tone adopted in Land Operations and asked ADC to 
address his concerns because it was JSCSC’s view that the Army’s capstone doctrine 
risked being at odds with general views of the way operations should be conducted.201  
ADC in turn insisted that any inconsistencies in Land Operations had to be ironed out.  
This required two further drafts to be developed and circulated for comment.  Finally 
DLW invited Gen. Sir Mike Jackson, the then CGS, to approve it before publication.202  
Col. Richard Iron concludes that the problem was “not so much the idea which was the 
problem, but more the way the idea was sold.”203  Doctrine writers have a 
responsibility, therefore, to take account of how their readerships may accept what they 
write, a point that links very closely to Charles Grant’s belief that “doctrine must first 
and foremost meet the needs of the practitioner.”204   
Military practitioners form doctrine’s principal, but not sole audience.  Other 
government departments may also have an interest, and the volume of academic 
research provides clear evidence that doctrine generates interest that extends far beyond 
the military reader.  For example, academic notice of, and involvement with doctrine’s 
development was important during the 1990s.  More recently the role of doctrine in both 
Iraq and Afghanistan, and the debate surrounding the development and use of the U.S. 
Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine since 2006 have prompted much analysis.205  
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 Doctrine writers should, therefore, take account of the wider interest their work will 
generate, and be aware of the arguments it will inform, or of which it will form a part. 
Doctrine’s effectiveness therefore appears to be closely linked to how readily readers 
can place their experience and understanding in the context of what doctrine describes.  
They should be able to recognise the principles and ideas the doctrine contains, set them 
both against their own experience, and to then combine experience and theory to form a 
framework relevant to dealing with contemporary problems and tasks.  If they cannot, 
they will struggle to accept new doctrine.  This issue boils down to one of confidence 
about what is written.  As Brig., now Maj. Gen, James Everard observes: 
No one today [speaking of the Field Army] has any real confidence that our 
doctrine has been updated by someone who has been there and done it, and this 
problem is exacerbated by the volume of new doctrine that has been produced, 
and the basis on which change or the need for change has been determined.206  
2.8.2 Endurability  
From the first edition of FSR to ADP Land Operations, enduring principles have been 
important in British doctrine, along with the requirement for a process of continual 
reassessment and validation.  Doctrine, as Willcocks observed in 1995, has three 
functions:  it provides enduring principles, it offers practical tactics and procedures, and 
looks to the foreseeable future.  Doctrine has to work, therefore, on a number of levels, 
as Bagnall’s doctrine hierarchy demonstrates.  Philosophically, principles provide the 
starting point from which tactics can be developed and subsequently adjusted as 
circumstances change.  In this sense, doctrine provides both ‘How to think’ through 
principles and approach, and ‘What to think’ in terms of tactics and procedures.  The 
challenge for the doctrine writer is to ensure that enduring principles are just that; that 
they reflect received understanding of the problem; and that they continue to provide the 
intellectual underpinning for approach, tactics and procedures.   
Doctrine’s endurability is linked very closely, therefore, to the need for it to be 
acceptable to its main audience. The notion of doctrine’s principles being enduring 
places an onus on the doctrine writer to ensure that ideas that it contains are tried, tested, 
and can stand readership scrutiny.  This is not a straightforward task, nor one that can be 
solved by a simple authoritative preface.  As Gen. Sir Peter Wall notes, 
It takes time to develop the experience and understanding from which principles 
can be identified.  It is a process of evolution.  The important thing is that new 
doctrine must be tested and adjusted before it is enshrined and – and this is the 
critical thing – taught, used and embraced by the practitioner.  All this takes time 
and this aspect [referring to the proliferation of Joint Doctrine] has been 
forgotten.207
Everard goes further:  “our doctrine is much more than a handrail; it is the foundations 
of the approach we use.  For high intensity operations, it is still what is taught, a 
template.  In counterinsurgency, it is much more of a handrail than a template, 
providing both a common understanding and a common purpose.”208  
2.8.3 Contemporary Relevancy 
Callwell raised the issue of keeping doctrine relevant in 1906 when he said theory 
“cannot be accepted as conclusive when practice points the other way.”209  Relevancy 
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 remains a continuing theme because if doctrine is not seen to be relevant and up-to-date 
it will be ignored.  As Lt. Gen. John Cooper notes, “doctrine has to be recognizably 
relevant to operations today if it is to be embraced by those who should be using it.”210  
Effective doctrine would thus provide a framework of understanding relevant to the 
contemporary situation, not one which describes out-dated organisations and structures, 
weapons and equipment, terminology or practice.  The U.S. Army’s AirLand Battle is 
an excellent example of what can be achieved when close historical analysis and clear 
understanding of the contemporary environment are combined to provide doctrine 
relevant to current and likely tasks.211  This is the subject of Chapter 7. 
2.8.4 Suitability as Educational Material 
If doctrine is ‘what is taught,’ it follows, therefore, that it must be teachable and readily 
turned into teaching material.  This allows written doctrine to inform and shape 
discussion and debate.  Effective doctrine provides the framework which the student can 
use to examine and analyse a problem and then develop a practical solution.   The Army 
Staff College and JSCSC depend on doctrine to support teaching and, for the most part, 
the Army’s doctrine has been clear and unambiguous.  There have been cases, however, 
where some concepts and procedures have been badly expressed that this has hindered 
teaching.  The Estimate, or appreciation, central to the Army’s decision-making process, 
is an example.  The poorly expressed, overly complicated ideas it introduced in 1994 
proved difficult to teach and difficult for students to master, first at Camberley and then 
at JSCSC.212  Speaking of doctrine generally, Everard highlights why doctrine has to be 
teachable: 
Being able to understand doctrine and then being able to use it helps in its wider 
assimilation and prompts further development. If it is not understood, or worse, 
misunderstood, all that happens is that doctrine becomes an obstacle.  Whilst the 
practitioner will find a way around the problem in any case, it nevertheless 
results in a fractured approach to understanding and the application of our 
doctrine. 213
2.8.5 Accessibility and Manageability 
The final criterion for effective doctrine is that it must be accessible and manageable.  
Doctrine must be readily available to those who need it.  The means by which it is made 
available now includes electronic media as well as the traditional printed form.  The 
proliferation of media can create problems for those who are required to use it.  Everard 
is forthright on this issue: 
The volume of concepts and doctrine we have to read is staggering and the 
volume problem is exacerbated by technology which allows us to burn CDs and 
hang enormous amounts of work on websites, often with little guidance or 
direction on what is important, what is essential or what, quite frankly, can wait 
to be overtaken by the next turn of the wheel. The rate at which doctrine is being 
produced brings with it the real risk of it not being understood.  Promulgation is 
the issue.  It is too easy for the doctrine writer to produce something, send it out 
and then to assume that having published, the doctrine is accepted.214  
The reality is that overly prescriptive doctrine tends to be out of date the moment it is 
published.  From this point the interaction between the doctrine writer and the 
practitioner has to work to keep that what is published up to date.  It should be clear 
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 from this that the practitioner has to be able to both understand and assimilate the 
material that doctrine contains.  Ideas have to be expressed clearly, unambiguously and 
unequivocally, and a balance is required between providing too much theory or detail 
and not enough.  The doctrine writer has a careful balance to strike, therefore, between 
brevity and verbosity.  Too little explanation will raise more questions than it answers.  
Too much information risks overwhelming or confusing the reader, and moving 
doctrine from ‘How to think’ and into ‘What to think’ and the realm of dogma.  As 
Fuller so colourfully observed: 
[The] danger of a doctrine is that it is apt to ossify into a dogma, and to be seized 
upon by mental emasculates who lack virility of judgment, and who are only too 
grateful to rest assured that their actions, however inept, find justification in a 
book, which, if they think at all, is in their opinion, written in order to exonerate 
them from doing so. In the past many armies have been destroyed by internal 
discord, and some have been destroyed by the weapons of their antagonists, but 
the majority have perished through adhering to dogmas springing from their past 
successes – that is, self-destruction or suicide through inertia of mind.215
2.9 Conclusion 
This chapter identified and examined the principal influences when Counter Insurgency 
Operations was written.  By understanding the context in which it was written, it is 
possible to see why it contained what it did, and the purpose it was intended to serve.  
The chapter used the premise that if something is written it is relevant to ask how, why 
and in what context it was written.  Historiography, as postulated by E. H. Carr, has 
proved a valuable means of examining four key influences on doctrine writing:  the 
doctrine writers, the networks within which they operate, the domestic political 
environment within which they work, and the international context.  Downie’s 
Institutional Learning Cycle provided the framework against which the Army’s 
doctrinal responses to changing circumstances could be judged.   
Although ninety years elapsed between the publication of Field Service Regulations and 
BMD, they both display very similar qualities.  They provide the authoritative approach 
to the conduct of operations; they codify military ‘best practice’; they were developed 
with flexibility and pragmatism in mind.  Although the FSR generated some 
institutional resistance, the Army of the 1990s quickly adjusted to its new doctrine and 
soon overcame any initial criticisms of and institutional resistance that doctrine was 
little more than dogma.  The main steps of the process of doctrinal change are clearly 
identifiable in both the development of FSR and the BMD-inspired doctrine revision of 
the 1990s:  organizational performance gaps were identified, alternative responses were 
found, sustained consensus for the doctrine of the day, and the new doctrine became the 
basis for the Army’s training. 
Counter Insurgency Operations was written as part of the Army’s overall revision of its 
doctrine.  This process, initiated by the Bagnall Reforms of the 1980s, was crystallized 
in the publication of BMD in 1989, and reinforced by establishing DGD&D as the 
Army’s authority and focus for doctrine.  BMD explained to the Army what doctrine 
was and why it was important:  doctrine was to provide the intellectual foundation to 
guide military actions.  Its publication provided the startpoint for the first complete 
revision of Army doctrine since 1909.  A fresh, doctrine-based review of the Army’s 
approach to warfighting followed.  BMD’s publication set the scene for a full review of 
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 the Army’s existing tactical doctrine and the creation of a full doctrine hierarchy from 
philosophy to practical tactics and procedures, coherent in theme and approach.  The 
doctrine written during the mid-1990s provided the Army with the intellectual backbone 
for its battles to fund the structures, equipment and training it needed for future conflict, 
and the foundation for what was taught in training and education.  An inevitable and 
desirable outcome of this process was that doctrine received far greater attention than it 
had for very many years. 
Doctrine thus became an important organizational theme as the Army adopted a 
sustained process of production and review.   The manoeuvrist approach and the 
framework of operations introduced in ADP Operations provided the hierarchy of 
doctrine with a coherent theme and approach.  Deep, Close and Rear operations, 
couched in a new campaigning taxonomy, shaped subsequent tactical and operational 
thinking and ADP Operations introduced the concept of core functions (Find, Fix and 
Strike) and functions in combat.  Both became the main themes of tactical doctrine.  
Closer examination of the doctrine hierarchy reveals the role that Theatre or Operation 
Instructions were intended to play and their importance.  They were to set general 
doctrine in the particular circumstances, and against the specific demands of an 
operational theatre.  This approach had been proven in Malaya, Kenya and, eventually, 
Northern Ireland, and it raises the question of why no such doctrine was written for Iraq. 
During the 1990s, operational experiences from Bosnia, the SDR, and the discussion 
centred on a Revolution in Military Affairs influenced doctrine.  British operations as 
part of UNPROFOR and then the NATO Implementation and Stabilization Forces 
(IFOR and SFOR) changed the traditional view of peace-keeping.  The result was 
doctrine for what was termed initially Wider Peacekeeping, and then Peace Support 
Operations was produced relatively quickly.  The SDR examined the nature of Britain’s 
future defence requirements.  This required much more emphasis to be placed on future 
concepts.  It proved difficult to rationalize doctrine’s predictive function, and to 
integrate enduring principles with the discussions over visions of future warfare offered 
in View 1 (high intensity conventional warfare) and View 2 (asymmetric warfare).  The 
RMA and developments in U.S. military concepts influenced the predictive function to 
provide a vision of symmetric major combat operations.  While some account was taken 
of View 2, policy and doctrine focussed on the greater perceived military challenges of 
View 1.  View 2, it transpires, offered a prescient insight of the now contemporary 
operating environment.  The Army’s struggle, however, was to attend to the logic 
underpinning View 1.  Its doctrine was therefore developed and refined to reflect the 
MoD’s policy vision of expeditionary major combat operations, and the Army 
developed organizations, equipment and training focused accordingly.  The vision of 
View 1 and future conflict dominated and counterinsurgency from an organizational 
point of view received little more than cursory attention. 
The chapter examined the staff process required to write and publish doctrine, balancing 
the initiative and personal insights of the writer with the requirement for doctrine to be 
accepted and authoritative.  It is clear that the Army’s doctrine writing process 
depended greatly on the interests and judgement of its doctrine writers.  In general 
terms, the staff process and the final endorsement required from the Army Doctrine 
Committee safeguarded against an overzealous writer or an irrelevant or unfeasible 
piece of doctrine.  Taken as a whole, the approach produced the sustained consensus 
necessary to allow the wider Army to make use of the ideas doctrine contained.  
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 Nevertheless, the full process was painstaking, time-consuming, and vulnerable to the 
pressures from one quarter or the view of an individual.  In practice, it is evident from 
the insights provided by those working at DGD&D that they had to make often quite 
complex judgements to strike the right balance between doctrine’s enduring and 
predictive roles.  
The most contentious decisions concerned identifying the most likely future trends in 
conflict, and what, therefore, would be relevant to those future trends from the main 
body of military experience and doctrinal principles.  It is clear that doctrine’s enduring 
and predictive functions are not easily reconcilable, an issue first identified when the 
Army developed FSR in 1909.  Nevertheless, both functions make a crucial contribution 
to doctrine’s overall value.  Without reference to the past, future concepts would be 
simply assertions, and without taking some account of identified future trends, doctrine 
would simply be a specialist form of historical writing.  In reality, reconciling the 
tensions between the two provide doctrine with its dynamism.  They force writers to 
review constantly what the doctrine says against prevailing or emerging conditions.  It 
is the process of review which keeps doctrine relevant,and doctrine writers must remain 
attuned to the possibility of further change.  As part of the AFM, Counter Insurgency 
Operations is clearly a piece of formal doctrine and as such a product of the Army’s 
doctrine processes.   The issue now is to determine the extent to which its author 
balanced the enduring and predictive functions of doctrine, and whether the staffing 
process worked effectively. 
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 3 Counter Insurgency Operations 
 
Chapter 2 established the context in which Counter Insurgency Operations was written 
during the Army’s doctrinal reforms of the 1990s.  It examined how doctrine writers, 
the networks in which they worked, their review mechanisms, and domestic and 
international influences shaped the Army’s doctrine.  It showed the Army’s move to 
manoeuvre theory initiated a full review of its doctrine and its approach to the conduct 
of military operations.  It demonstrated that the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) 
gave the Armed Forces an interventionist, expeditionary focus, and the prospects 
offered by information technology, influenced the decisions the Army made about its 
equipment and structures to meet it.  Doctrine writers focussed their attention on 
conventional, high-intensity warfighting, a focus that successive Chiefs of the General 
Staff affirmed as the Army’s raison d’être. Yet in spite of the focus on major combat 
operations, the issue of counterinsurgency doctrine was not ignored entirely, and 
Counter Insurgency Operations was published in 1995 and republished again with 
minor amendments in 2001.  
This chapter concentrates on Counter Insurgency Operations, examining its key tenets, 
principles and method.  It looks closely at Gavin Bulloch’s approach, the sources he 
used and the principal influences on his work.  It will examine how well the Army’s 
standard practices suited the publication’s needs, identify what, if any, adaptation was 
necessary, and determine what impact its publication had.  Finally, it will use the 
criteria for effective doctrine established in Chapter 2 to provide an assessment of 
Counter Insurgency Operations as a piece of doctrine. 
3.1 Doctrine for Counterinsurgency:  Counter Insurgency 
Operations (1995) 
Since The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya was published in 1952, 
British doctrine for counterinsurgency has generally covered the themes of insurgency, 
counterinsurgency, principles, tactics, techniques and procedures.  Counter Insurgency 
Operations (1995) was published in four parts.  Part 1 described insurgency, its 
historical development, characteristics, aims, conduct of and likely tactics.  Part 2 
encapsulated the British approach to counterinsurgency.  Its central themes were the 
general approach, principles, the legal aspects of counterinsurgency, a concept of 
operations, a method to co-ordinate a campaign at the strategic level, campaign design, 
the conduct of military operations, the psychological dimension, and civil affairs.  Part 3 
covered counterinsurgency tactics, and Part 4 provided guidance on detailed techniques 
and procedures, including search techniques, road blocks and crowd control.  Taken as a 
whole, the span of material and guidance covered by Counter Insurgency Operations 
(1995) was considerable:  from the theory of insurgency, to the practices of 
counterinsurgency; from strategic-level governmental factors and concerns, to the 
detailed tactics and procedures for the use of riot-control weapons.  As such, it was in 
keeping with the approach adopted for ATOM and later followed in most subsequent 
publications. 
From the outset, it was Bulloch’s intention that the new counterinsurgency doctrine 
should be based on the Army’s new manoeuvrist doctrine published in ADP 
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 Operations.1  Counter Insurgency Operations (1995) therefore followed the same 
“thrust, direction and sequence.”2  ADP Operations described insurgency and 
counterinsurgency concisely in the context of the spectrum of military operations and 
the Army’s manoeuvrist approach to warfare, and it laid out broad guidelines for a 
campaign.  It posited that future counterinsurgency operations “may be conducted 
unilaterally to protect a United Kingdom Dependent Territory, or multinationally at the 
invitation of the threatened state.”3  It gave no indication about just how complex the 
latter would be if the classic counter-revolutionary warfare and counter-terrorist 
techniques – in particular unified command - developed by the British were followed.  
ADP Operations followed accepted counterinsurgency thinking by recognizing that it 
required political, psychological, socio-economic and military means, and that “the 
legitimacy of the state authority and its control of the infrastructure will dictate the 
direction of the campaign, not purely military requirements.”4   
In early 1994, Bulloch called on the Staff College to assist.  Maj. Gen. Paul Newton, 
then a Lt. Col. and a member of the Directing Staff recalls, 
I was on the Operations Other Than War Team at Staff College when John 
Kiszely was the Director of Studies.  He was determined to put everything we 
were teaching into a manoeuvrist framework.  I was given one term to ‘sort out’ 
the COIN material, which was badly dated.  The result was a thin 20-30 page 
reader and a long presentation that I gave at the start of the phase.  I bounced my 
ideas off Patrick Mercer and I also drew on a paper by Jon Riley.5
Newton used the themes of ADP Operations including the design for operations of 
Deep, Close and Rear Operations,6 and the core functions of Find, Fix and Strike, to 
provide a contemporary framework for counterinsurgency.  This brought 
counterinsurgency doctrine in line with mainstream thinking and tactics.  More 
importantly, it moved doctrinal thinking beyond what had previously been a somewhat 
linear approach to counterinsurgency.  Newton neatly summarized the balance 
commanders required to strike between framework operations and the core functions, 
and he blended them with well-established counterinsurgency precepts, such as 
intelligence and psychological operations: 
The overriding factor will be the need to gain maximum intelligence about the 
insurgents (finding them), without which no focused operations can be mounted. 
The design of military operations will then aim to separate the insurgents 
physically from both their internal and external support; appropriate tactics will 
frustrate their plans and restrict their freedom of movement by means of deep 
operations (fixing them), while selectively destroying them in close operations 
through physical and psychological attack, and legal action (striking them). At 
the outset of an insurgency, the population will tend to hesitate before deciding 
whether to support the government or the insurgents. Hence, although the 
commander will be keen to secure his base areas (rear operations) as a priority, 
he will also need to initiate action throughout the framework of operations, at 
the earliest opportunity, to seize the initiative in the ‘hearts and minds’ battle.7 
The manoeuvrist approach placed emphasis “on the intellectual and psychological 
aspects of operations, not simply the material,” and focussed on people and ideas, not 
just on the traditional view of taking and holding ground.8  Newton recognized that this 
was highly relevant to counterinsurgency, as was his conclusion that manoeuvre theory 
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 and successful insurgencies had a great deal in common.9  “The military planner 
steeped in this,” he observed, “is more likely to cope with the inherent complexities of 
COIN.”10  Herein lay a potential problem.  Much depended on military planners and 
commanders being ‘steeped’ in counterinsurgency, presumably through education and 
training, and operational experience.  At the time Bulloch prepared his first draft of 
Counter Insurgency Operations, and Newton rewrote the Course COIN reader, the Staff 
College taught a very comprehensive package, and the Army institutionally had a great 
deal of experience almost entirely from Northern Ireland.  This raises the question of 
what would the effect be if education and training did not cover counterinsurgency to 
the level highlighted in previous editions of doctrine, and on which Kitson had placed 
such emphasis in Low Intensity Operations? 
ADP Operations established that conflict was “either resolved or terminated... Defeat is 
not an absolute but a matter of degree...winning is definable, given an understanding of 
the approach to operations.”11 Counter Insurgency Operations picked up this theme in 
its discussion of what constituted success.  Here Newton was provocative because he 
moved the discussion away from the notion in ADP Operations of a military victory per 
se to the long-held view of counterinsurgency theorists that military operations had to 
be set in the context of the overall politically-led campaign with explicit political 
objectives.  This, the doctrine notes, “may equate to handing over an internal security 
problem to the civil police, or simply not losing.”12  In other words political progress 
may be made without necessarily defeating an insurgency militarily.  This view is very 
different from that of fighting to win a military campaign where armed forces would 
seek to so “diminish the effectiveness of the enemy... that he is ... unable to participate 
in combat.”13  Using the logic presented in Counter Insurgency Operations, military 
operations would take place to enable political progress, not simply to deal with the 
direct effects of an insurgent threat.  This means that political progress, reconciliation 
and accommodation may remove the cause of the violence without the military 
campaign attaining all of its objectives.  The raison d’être for military operations may 
be removed whether or not they have defeated an insurgent group.  The doctrine makes 
this point clear, however counter-intuitive it may be to conventional military thinking. 
Linking to this, the Manoeuvrist Approach in ADP Operations asserts that success is 
achieved by attacking the enemy’s will and cohesion, through destruction, suppression 
or neutralization using firepower, tempo (the rate of activity compared to the enemy), 
simultaneity (overloading the enemy commander), and surprise.14  Newton recognized 
that these were just as relevant in counterinsurgency, but widened the context from 
application of force alone to what he referred to as ‘soft’ methods such as evidence 
gathering, arrest and legal action, and physical separation through the imposition of 
control measures.15  He also noted that “minimum force is a well proven COIN lesson... 
sound judgement and close control will need to be exercised over the degree of [force to 
be used],” again, a message included in doctrine since 1909.16   The example he used is 
also of note.  While he had Northern Ireland in mind, the problem of legitimacy of 
action, not simply the legality of the action, but how that action is interpreted by those 
involved and observing, would prove to be very difficult for British forces to reconcile 
in Iraq: 
The killing of a teenage gunman could be justifiable in military terms but its 
possible impact on his community could jeopardise a potentially far more 
significant though less spectacular Hearts and Minds operation.17
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 Newton developed the ideas of ‘soft’ power and the indirect approach in the guidance 
provided on attacking the insurgents’ will and cohesion, where he explained that 
psychological operations, the effective use of the media, and civil action should be 
incorporated into a deliberate ‘Hearts and Minds’ campaign.  Simultaneity could be 
achieved through the close co-ordination of a wide range of government agencies, a 
concept which he then developed much further in the principle of Co-ordinated 
Government Machinery.  Table 2 illustrates the conceptual link between the operational 
framework, the purpose of each type of operation and the tasks which could be 
undertaken to achieve the overall effect desired.  
Operation Purpose Possible Tasks 
Deep To find and fix the enemy 
To delay, divert, disrupt and deter 
To keep the enemy from his 
objectives 
To constrain enemy freedom of 
action  
Long-term surveillance 
Deterrence patrolling 
Control of movement 
Criminal investigations aimed at 
insurgent financing 
Public information and 
psychological operations 
Close To strike the enemy in order to 
eliminate a discrete part of his 
combat power 
Arrest operations 
Ambushes 
Rear To ensure freedom of action by 
protecting the force, sustaining 
combat operations and retaining 
freedom of manoeuvre of 
uncommitted forces 
Securing political and popular 
support; public information; 
protecting key installations; training, 
mentoring and supporting 
indigenous forces 
Table 2 - The Integration of Operations 
Source:  ADP Operations. 
With a clear reference to the three tenets of Army policy in Northern Ireland – 
deterrence, reassurance and attrition – Counter Insurgency Operations explained that 
“over and above the integration of deep, close and rear operations, there is a discrete 
and undefined balance between the application of deterrence, reassurance and 
attrition.”18  The Army’s own analysis of operations in Northern Ireland helps to 
provide some substance to what doctrine described in somewhat opaque terms: 
Most of the attrition took place through arrest and conviction. Overt operations 
probably killed at most a dozen terrorists during the 1980s. The number killed in 
covert operations was in absolute terms not much greater. In any case attrition of 
individual terrorists of itself had little effect on the outcome of the campaign. 
However, PIRA seem to have been brought to believe that there was no answer 
to Army covert operations, and that they would not win through violence. That 
was probably a key factor.19 
This example makes clear the role of military operations enabling political progress.  In 
this case, British military operations – in particular its covert operations – became so 
effective and took on an air of semi-permanence that PIRA was eventually limited to 
ostensibly political options.  In Iraq, almost at the point of defeat in late 2006, Coalition 
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 operations in Iraq adopted and followed this approach. 
It is important to note just how little emphasis Counter Insurgency Operations places on 
multinational operations, even though they had been the framework under which British 
military operations had taken place in the Balkans.  They were a key tenet of the 1998 
SDR, which made clear that “with the exception of national commitments such as 
Northern Ireland and the security of our Overseas Territories, future operations will 
almost always be multinational.”20  It would be reasonable to expect doctrine written 
subsequently to reflect this key aspect of defence policy, yet the approach adopted in 
Counter Insurgency Operations gives the impression that future operations would be 
predominantly British-led.  This was in spite of SDR and ADP Operations’ point about 
multinationality, and the very multinational character of operations in the mid-1990s.  
Some guidance further was certainly warranted.  It was not provided.  Bulloch explains 
this omission in the context of the day: 
At that time there was no talk of coalition operations.  Our operations in Bosnia 
had been conducted first under the UN banner and then NATO.  We had 
doctrine for peacekeeping and the general mood of the moment was for what 
was referred to as wider peacekeeping and Operations Other Than War.  The 
peacekeeping doctrine included points about working with UN partners but the 
guiding principle up to then was that Army doctrine was written primarily for an 
Army audience and British doctrine was written on the assumption that British 
Forces had the lead.  Whether that was realistic is now questionable, but that 
was how we had approached writing our doctrine.21
The relatively slow tempo of operations in Bosnia after 1996 may have masked the 
inherent political and military tensions in alliance operations, even alliances as well 
established as NATO.  In the face of multiple forms of insurgency, high tempo coalition 
operations in Iraq were to expose such tensions, which clear doctrinal thinking and 
training might have ameliorated.  
3.2 Principles 
The opening statement of Counter Insurgency Operations is important:  “there has 
never been a purely military solution to revolution:  political, social, economic and 
military measures all have a part to play in restoring the authority of a legitimate 
government.”22  This one statement places military operations – however intense, 
difficult and sometimes unfamiliar they may be – fairly and squarely alongside the 
range of other government tasks necessary to counter an armed insurgency, those 
“military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civil actions taken by the 
Government to defeat insurgency.”23  Counter Insurgency Operations was therefore 
congruent with all previous mainstream counterinsurgency theorists and all British 
doctrine since the 1930s.   
Its next point, identifying the link between the insurgent, the population and the 
psychological dimension of insurgency and counterinsurgency, is also fundamental: 
Theories, strategies and tactics come and go depending on circumstances or 
merely intellectual fashion... What remains constant is the fact that insurgency 
and counterinsurgency are essentially about the battle to win and hold popular 
support, both at home and in the theatre of operations... If the strategic focal 
point is public opinion, both domestic and international, most initial military 
78 
 
 tactical efforts will be focused on breaking the link between the insurgent and 
the people. If the insurgent can be isolated, it is then theoretically a relatively 
simple matter to eliminate him and his cause.24
The ‘relative simplicity’ has proved harder to realize than the doctrine implies.  
Nevertheless, Counter-Insurgency Operations encapsulated the essence of the 
counterinsurgency problem, and set it in the broad, politically-dominated context, the 
correct understanding of which was so important to developing a successful campaign.  
Having identified the constituent parts of the problem, the doctrine sensibly urged 
caution:  there was not, it made clear, a British template for counterinsurgency, and 
there was no “general antidote to the problem of insurgency.”25  The inference is clear.  
Each response had to be different because each insurgency would be different.  Each 
would have to be put in the correct context through careful analysis of the problem and 
the sensible application of counterinsurgency principles.26  As Kitson had observed, “if 
you had eighty different insurgencies, there were eighty different ways to defeat 
them.”27  
Counter Insurgency Operations introduced the idea that principles were of value to all 
those involved in the campaign, not just military commanders.  Importantly, in terms of 
doctrine’s evolution, it established a clear link between the work of Kitson and 
Thompson and the new principles it presented.  Unlike previous manuals where 
principles were listed, Bulloch arranged them into a logical sequence to provide “a 
government with a general pattern on which to base and review its COIN strategy.”28  
The new principles were: 
• Political Primacy and Political Aim, which established the government’s 
responsibility to identify the causes and consequences of the insurgency and to 
produce the plan which harnessed the political, legislative, economic, security 
and long-term measures necessary to deal with it. 
• Coordinated Government Machinery, based on the prerequisite of unity of 
effort, sought to overcome the different philosophies and approaches of 
government departments and agencies, and harness their efforts.  In terms 
redolent of doctrine from the 1950s and 1960s, it proposed the ideal of a 
campaign director, a unified command system, a committee system at every 
level of government, similar to that used in Malaya, and a “coordinated national 
plan [to]... cover the entire national, economic, administrative, operational and 
intelligence fields.”29  Through such a plan priorities would be allocated 
between the main fields of activity, and roles and responsibilities between 
government departments identified.  The principle called for “careful planning 
and coordination ... to ensure that when areas are brought under military control 
they can be administered and supported economically in order to avoid them 
falling back into insurgent control again.”30  This was central to the method the 
doctrine described for bringing an area back under government control, although 
it noted that “distant areas may have to be abandoned for the time being in order 
to secure a base and expand control into... more important areas.”31 
• Intelligence and Information.  “Good intelligence,” the doctrine made clear “is 
perhaps the greatest asset for a government combating an insurgency.  Without it 
the security forces work in the dark and random offensive operations on this 
basis produce nothing positive and much negative reaction amongst the 
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 population involved in the theatre from within the international forum as a 
whole.”32  Random, untargeted, speculative operations carried considerable risks 
in terms of alienating local and international support.  Knowledge of the 
situation, the country, the political situation, and the society takes time to 
develop and was essential “because intelligence relies on an ability to discern 
patterns of change in behaviour.”33  This highlighted the importance of language 
skills and that the police, not the Army should be the prime agency for providing 
intelligence and information.  
• Separating the Insurgent from his Support would deny him information, 
logistics, recruits, safe bases and popular support.  This would be achieved 
through physical separation and by developing government control by 
expanding it from a firm base into a series of increasingly more secure areas.  A 
co-ordinated effort to win the psychological campaign for hearts and minds 
would be integral to this process, linked directly “to the need for the government 
side to retain legitimacy.”34   
• Neutralising the Insurgent.  Isolated from support, the insurgent could be 
neutralized directly, through arrest or as a result of military strike operations to 
kill, capture, demoralize and deter insurgents, and promote desertions, or 
indirectly, by deterrence operations such as an increased security force presence; 
and psychologically, through information and counter-propaganda.  The aim 
would be “to defeat the insurgent on his ground using enough but no more force 
than is absolutely necessary.”35 
• Longer Term Post-Insurgency Planning.  Governments would have to make 
long-term plans to improve the economic and social life of its population to 
reduce or eliminate the political causes of the insurgency.  The announcement of 
such government initiatives was seen to play a key role in winning the hearts 
and minds of the local population during a campaign and this principle was seen 
as “probably hold[ing] the key to the effective application of the other five.”36 
Of particular note is the remarkably understated Counter Insurgency Operations  
affirmation that “British doctrine adheres strictly to the additional mandatory guidelines 
of minimum necessary force and legitimacy.”37  These two points are critical to the 
British approach to counterinsurgency and have underpinned it since Duties in Aid of 
the Civil Power was published in 1923.  For Counter Insurgency Operations to 
downplay their significance to such an extent assumed that the reader was ‘steeped’ in 
the British approach, their practical application in Northern Ireland, and therefore knew 
something of their value.38  To the general reader, not so well versed in effective 
counterinsurgency theory, and who simply gave the doctrine a cursory glance, the 
message would be missed.  Similarly, legitimacy per se is not explained at all, neither is 
the need for British forces to safeguard their own legitimacy through their conduct, nor 
the evident problems of maintaining, if not re-building legitimacy faced by a 
government dealing with an insurgency.  Minimum force is at least explained, albeit 
rather briefly: 
No more force may be used than is necessary to achieve a legal aim. The amount 
used must be reasonable and it must not be punitive.  Directly the aim is 
achieved no more force may be used.39
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 It also made clear that minimum force should not “be confused with deploying the 
minimum number of troops.”40  It referred to the deterrent value of a strong presence of 
troops when the situation warranted it.  The assumption underpinning this statement was 
that there would be adequate troop levels generally, and that force levels would be 
increased to deal with more localized problems.  The implications of what might happen 
if adequate force levels were not available were not explored.  The assumption was 
based, again, on the experience of Northern Ireland, where troop levels were adjusted as 
the situation demanded.  For example and most notably, reinforcements from Germany 
were used to bring the force level up to 28,000 in July 1972 in preparation for Operation 
Motorman, which cleared no-go areas in Catholic areas of Belfast and Londonderry.41  
Here, again, the author’s assumption was that the Army would maintain its familiarity 
with counterinsurgency.  Of course there would be adequate force levels, of course 
soldiers would understand the principle of minimum force, of course they would seek to 
maintain legitimacy.  All three, after all, were by 1995 implicit in the way the campaign 
in Northern Ireland was being conducted, so would this level of understanding not be 
maintained, and why was it necessary to spell it out to the Army of the day? 
3.3 A Concept of Military Operations 
The aim of military operations, Counter Insurgency Operations explained, was to “help 
the government to re-establish control throughout the country so that the civil 
administration can exercise its proper function.”42  It considered two possible situations, 
one where military operations provided support to “an existing government structure in 
areas which are nominally under its control.”  In the second, they would “restore areas 
under hostile control to the government’s authority.”43  The doctrine emphasized the 
importance of the government recovering insurgent held areas, if not, it risked a 
collapse in its authority and being unable to achieve its objectives on its terms.   
Counter Insurgency Operations provided a simple concept in keeping with previous 
doctrine, sometimes referred to as the Tache d’huile or ‘Oil Spot’ method.   
Tache d’huile was developed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by two 
French officers, Galliéni and Lyautey, and used in Algeria, Morocco, and French Indo-
China.44  The British in Malaya referred to it as the ‘ink spot’ method.  Both forms were 
based on the assumption that a dual military-political strategy – in the British case 
administered through a joint committee system – would extend government control 
more effectively through an insurgent-held area.  Whether ink or oil, the key element 
would be having enough troops to establish a significant presence in the first place, and 
a reasonably tolerant population through which government influence could spread.  
While Counter Insurgency Operations described a conventional method for re-
establishing government control of an insurgent area, it broadened the context in which 
future operations would take place, making clear, for the first time in British 
counterinsurgency doctrine, this would be on an expeditionary basis in unfamiliar 
circumstances. 
The British sequence of approach was first described in embryonic terms in 195945 and 
was for many years central to teaching at the Staff College.  It would be this model, 
later informed by Thompson’s work, and the method put forward by David Galula 
which would influence U.S. doctrinal thinking.  The assumptions which underpinned it 
were intelligence, which was needed to focus security force operations when 
establishing an operating base and securing a controlled area; the forces and resources 
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 to establish control quickly and to re-introduce good governance effectively; and a 
transition plan to return each area to the full control of the civil administration as 
conditions allowed.  Briefly, the sequence is: 
• Secure a Base Area, from which the operation could be mounted and the 
government could demonstrate its ability to govern effectively. 
• Establish a Firm Forward Operational Base, typically in an area where 
government control could be re-established quickly, consolidated, and from 
which further operations could be mounted.  The important task would be to 
ensure that the population was “secure from an insurgent offensive and serious 
terrorist attack;”46 which implied a strong security force presence and having the 
non-military resources lined up to help consolidate the area promptly. 
• Secure a Controlled Area.  Once a firm base was established, military 
operations would concentrate on “just one or a selected few areas in turn,”47 to 
“seize the initiative ... by separating the insurgent from his support and then 
neutralizing him and his cause.”48  In securing a government-controlled area, 
framework operations would be undertaken “to clear, secure and pacify” it.  The 
aim was to separate the insurgents from their supporters, resources and 
information and intelligence.  The doctrine highlights that such operations were 
“essentially offensive in nature as they aim to wrest ... the people ... from 
insurgent control,” and it anticipated that the enemy would react and fight back.  
Emphasis was placed on intelligence preparation, sound planning, and the use of 
Special Forces to strike valuable targets.49 
• Consolidate the Controlled Areas.  Consolidation required the civil 
administration to be re-established, and the process of transition to start from 
military- to police-led operations.  Local auxiliary forces would be trained so 
that they could provide the police with further support, freeing up police to 
conduct normal police tasks. 
• Continue to Extend Controlled Areas, using consolidated controlled areas as 
the base from which operations could extend “gradually across the entire 
country” to restore government control. 
The doctrine emphasized that “all subordinate headquarters throughout the theatre 
[were] to ensure that detailed tactical plans are appropriate at local level and accord with 
the overall purpose.”50  Again, the assumption was that this would be a British-
controlled operation, so there was no discussion of the implications of a multinational 
operation.  Previously, Thompson, Kitson and British doctrine in general had 
emphasized the importance of co-ordination, but only Kitson had offered any 
suggestion on how this might be achieved in a multinational setting.  He asserted that 
the underlying principle in such cases was that the ally’s needs should “always take 
second place to the host country.”   In other words the sovereignty of the host nation 
had to be respected and reinforced.  He also provided five guidelines for the relationship 
between ally and the host government. 
Kitson’s first guideline was that “no arrangement will work unless that host country 
itself has a properly ordered system for prosecuting the war.”  Kitson suggested a 
supreme council or committee, along the lines followed in Malaya, and subsequently 
laid out in British doctrine.  Next, the ally should be able to coordinate its aid through 
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 one individual who could represent it on the host country’s supreme council to help 
formulate overall policy.  Third, the ally needed to be represented at every level of 
government, “but always subordinate to the host country and in an advisory capacity.”  
Fourth, the key was full co-operation between the host country and the ally and full 
integration of the full range of civil and military efforts.  Finally, and specifically with 
coalition operations in mind, Kitson identified that allied efforts must mirror all four 
guidelines and that “the various contingents must have a common understanding of the 
problem.”51  The complex co-ordination, communication and consultation necessary to 
achieve Kitson’s guidelines are only hinted at.  No doctrine writer subsequently 
developed them. 
3.4 The Tenets of Counter Insurgency Operations 
The British approach, developed from experience and reflected in doctrine, recognizes 
that counterinsurgency operations take time, years rather than months; that tactical 
actions can have strategic consequences, both positive and negative; that for the soldier 
countering insurgency is a rather unsatisfactory, unglamorous task which must deal with 
unseen threats and undermining propaganda.  The soldier may have to act as policeman, 
administrator, aid worker, development planner, and diplomat.  Although for the most 
part military effort focuses more on defensive rather than offensive military tasks, 
isolating and neutralizing insurgent groups requires flair and initiative and the use of 
‘soft’ methods and the indirect, manoeuvrist approach as well as military skills such as 
patrols, searches, and ambushes.  
Counterinsurgency is also a matter of balance.  As the doctrine asserts, there has never 
been a purely military solution to revolution or insurgency.  Political, social, economic 
and military measures all have a part to play in restoring the authority of a legitimate 
government.  The security forces’ role is to act to support the civil authority in an 
environment in which there is less certainty than in conventional war.  The weaker the 
instruments of state in a country beset by insurgency, the greater its vulnerabilities, and 
destabilisation is likely to be manifest in many dimensions, all requiring cross-
government effort if the root causes are to be addressed and the situation stabilised.  
Difficulties are further magnified by cultural and social differences, which place a 
premium on understanding underlying cultural dynamics and recognising the lesson 
from history that post-conflict reconstruction is most effective if rebuilt institutions 
reflect the culture and society which they will serve.   Military actions have to strike a 
difficult balance between imposing will and maintaining support.   
3.5 Developing Counter Insurgency Operations 
The creation of DGD&D in 1993 was an important step in re-orientating the Army from 
being Warsaw Pact-focussed to being manoeuvrist in approach and more expeditionary 
in outlook.  After forty years in Germany, the tactical doctrine of the late 1980s 
reflected NATO’s positional, ordered approach and all it had developed in terms of 
approach.  It had a very particular sense of order which could be traced back to 
Montgomery, where “formations and units found themselves planning positional battles 
and a slogging match — how best to absorb the shock of the enemy attack rather than 
avoid it, and requiring defence of ground to the last man.”52  As the result of Bagnall’s 
reforms, all this had to be changed which included revising existing tactical doctrine to 
make it coherent with the ideas introduced by BMD, in particular the manoeuvrist 
approach.   
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 For the doctrine writers at DGD&D, the first task was complete the higher level 
doctrine series, its ADPs.  Bulloch rationalized the existing nine-volume AFM series 
into a more manageable two-volume publication that covered combined arms doctrine 
in one and environmental doctrine – jungle, desert, mountain, and arctic warfare – in the 
other.53  Both volumes would have to reflect the manoeuvrist approach and mission 
command.54  His plan was further prioritized to first revise the Army’s conventional 
tactical doctrine, and then to revise the environmental pamphlets. 
By 1993, the Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine was fifteen years old and in need of 
review.  Land Operations Vol. III Counter-Revolutionary Operations55 was last 
published in 1977, a revision of the 1969 edition.  Counter-Revolutionary Operations 
(1977) described those operations “British forces may have to undertake when 
maintaining and restoring law and order in an internal security or revolutionary war 
setting.”56  Like ATOM it was published in two parts; Part 1 which explained general 
principles, and Part 2 which described detailed tactics, procedures and training.    
The influence of previous campaigns was evident.  Even in the 1977 edition, strong 
impressions of Malaya and Aden came through in descriptions of the legal framework 
for operations overseas, the context in which patrol and ambush tactics were set 
(mentioning jungle training and tactics57), and the general guidance issues such as 
crowd control.  Not surprisingly, Bulloch commented that the manual “still contained 
the heavy scent of the jungle and rural operations in far away Colonial territories.”58  
While the 1977 edition made no specific mention of operations in Northern Ireland, it 
was influenced by them.  It included new sections on subjects which had evolved 
considerably in Northern Ireland since 1969, including urban and covert surveillance 
operations, non-lethal riot control measures, and improvised explosive devices.59
A comparison of the two versions of Counter-Revolutionary Operations reveals a 
change in tone.  Previous doctrine, particularly the 1969 manual, conveyed a tangible 
sense of purpose and gave the impression that the tactics they described would be used.  
The 1977 doctrine lacked that sense of purpose, despite reflecting tactical developments 
in Northern Ireland.  Editing may account for this, but the 1975 Defence Review greatly 
influenced the mood.  It focussed the UK’s defence effort on NATO and reinforced the 
Army’s commitment to Northern Ireland “for as long and in such strength as is 
necessary.”60  The Defence Review revealed plans to withdraw forces from Malta and 
the few still stationed in the Far East, and made no mention that the Army might have to 
intervene outside NATO’s area of operations.  The Royal Navy had the responsibility of 
being prepared to “deploy worldwide as allied or national interests require,”61 but no 
such task was laid on the Army.  Defence policy did not require the Armed Forces to 
foster either an internal security or wider counterinsurgency capability.   
With no readily identified prospects for counterinsurgency and with no policy 
requirement to consider it to any extent, Counter-Revolutionary Operations (1977) 
lacked its predecessor’s focus.  While it covered all the essentials of theory, the tangible 
sense of purpose conveyed in 1969 was absent.  Kitson’s fears that the Army would lose 
sight of the particular skills required for effective counterinsurgency, expressed so 
clearly in Low Intensity Operations,62 had been realized through a Defence Policy 
which no longer emphasized an interventionist counterinsurgency capability for the 
Army. 
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 3.6 Adapting the Doctrine Writing Process 
In general terms, Bulloch notes that when he started at DGD&D the AFM Series was 
incomplete.  John Sellers, his predecessor, enjoyed the freedom to choose where to 
focus his attention.  Although it had always been Sellers’ intention to write a new 
counterinsurgency pamphlet, he was unable to start the task before he retired.63  The 
need for a new manual was evident to Bulloch because so much had changed since 
1977.  Operations in Northern Ireland had continued to evolve as PIRA’s campaign 
intensified, particularly in West Belfast and South Armagh.  In the Balkans, links were 
starting to be made as well between operations in Bosnia in the early 1990s and 
counterinsurgency.  Meanwhile, the Army now had a manoeuvrist doctrine which 
needed to be reflected in all its publications.  Grant confirms that it was Bulloch’s 
decision to update Counter-Revolutionary Operations.64   
Before starting work on counterinsurgency doctrine, Bulloch tested the process of 
writing and publishing doctrine by revising the Jungle Operations manual.  Jungle 
operations had long been closely linked with the tactics and procedures in previous 
counterinsurgency campaigns so Bulloch’s decision to rewrite environmental doctrine 
was of considerable relevance.  Although Bulloch found the experience of writing a 
pamphlet important practice, the key lesson he drew from it was that the Army’s 
process of circulating drafts for comment did not work.  His response to this procedural 
problem was to have an important bearing on how counterinsurgency doctrine was 
subsequently developed and published.   
DGD&D’s standard practice was to circulate draft publications for comment to a set list 
of thirty-six addressees who had organizational responsibility for, rather than personal 
interest in what doctrine should contain.  This method was intended to achieve 
consensus over what doctrine said and the way its ideas were presented.  Through 
discussion, debate, development and eventual agreement, successive drafts ought to 
have incorporated suggestions and ideas so that the final version would be a true 
reflection of the Army’s position on the subject.  This was what Downie describes in his 
Institutional Learning Cycle as achieving sustained organizational consensus. 
Jungle Operations prompted only three replies, of which one pointed out minor 
typographical errors, and another expressed curt disinterest.  Bulloch recognized that 
this approach would not work, particularly with as complex a subject as 
counterinsurgency.  He needed to get greater involvement from those who had either a 
clear interest in the subject, or a clear responsibility for jungle operations, so he worked 
out who those people were and invited them to contribute.  This was an improvement.  
He got the information he needed, and he published Jungle Operations without further 
consultation and without taking it to the ADC.  It was well-received by the Army, 
particularly at the JWS where it was the core instructional text – doctrine was what was 
taught.65  As a direct result of writing Jungle Operations, Bulloch followed the same 
approach with counterinsurgency doctrine.  He would consult only with those who had 
something to contribute and publish it when he was happy with the doctrine.66
The challenges Bulloch encountered with Jungle Operations and a clearly moribund 
staff process were not new.  Montgomery faced similar problems when developing 
Infantry Training in 1929, and Haig had had similar difficulties when gaining consensus 
for Field Service Regulations.  Both cases were examined in Chapter 2.  They are not 
alone, as Downie illustrates in his examination of the U.S. Army’s response to doctrine 
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 for low intensity conflict following the Vietnam War and U.S. operations in El Salvador 
and Colombia. 
3.7 Revising Counter‐Revolutionary Operations (1977) 
By April 1994, Bulloch had developed a plan for the new counterinsurgency doctrine 
and he discussed it with the new DLW, Brig. (later Lt. Gen. Sir) Alistair Irwin.  Irwin 
came to Upavon from Belfast having commanded 39 Brigade where he had been 
instrumental in introducing contemporary doctrine into Northern Ireland.  Both Bulloch 
and Irwin recognized the need to capture the general experience from Northern Ireland 
but neither wished to compromise specific tactics or techniques.  Neither did Bulloch 
want to leave the door open inadvertently for someone to be prosecuted, or for a claim 
to be brought because of either what the doctrine said or because someone had not 
followed it to the letter.67  He reflected this concern in Counter Insurgency Operations 
(1995): 
It is therefore necessary ... to state unambiguously that this publication deals 
only with military operational and tactical principles and procedures.  It is not, 
and should not be perceived as a legal work, and all words, terms and phrases 
are used in their military sense and within a military context rather than in their 
legal sense if this is different.68
Bulloch started with Counter-Revolutionary Operations (1977), and with Sellers’ 
considerable collection of notes and articles and produced a contents list for the new 
manual, to which he gave the working title of Counter-Revolutionary Warfare – 
Concepts, Constraints and Countermeasures.  He identified those areas he thought 
required to be outdated, for example the relationship between public relations, and 
information and psychological operations had become blurred and needed to be 
redefined.69  He then expanded sections on the concepts of insurgency to provide a 
sound theoretical base for the analysis of insurgencies.  In this he drew heavily on Bard 
O’Neil’s work on insurgency and terrorism.70  In Part 2, which covered 
counterinsurgency, Bulloch drew in the Army’s new doctrine of Manoeuvre Warfare, 
the operational concept of Deep, Close and Rear operations, and the core functions of 
Find, Fix and Strike in a revised approach to counterinsurgency. 
Bulloch’s personal initiative to rewrite Counter-Revolutionary Operations was clearly 
at odds with the general mood of the period.  By 1994, as Grant confirms, DGD&D’s 
principal focus was the development of the ADP series, and “there was a conscious 
effort at Upavon to concentrate on the operational and strategic levels of command.”71  
The programme of doctrine writing focussed on developing manoeuvrist warfighting 
doctrine for future large-scale, high-intensity, conventional warfare, not a protracted 
counterinsurgency campaign where troops might be committed “to buy time in which to 
address particular grievances,” where “dramatic tactical military success may in fact be 
counter-productive,” and where “it may not be possible to predict how long 
involvement may last, so the campaign may not be planned in the decisive, coherent 
fashion to which military commanders aspire.”72  The idea of developing 
counterinsurgency doctrine ran against the general thrust of the doctrine-writing 
programme, and the general view was that it was by then anomalous to on-going peace 
support operations in Bosnia.  Furthermore, Bulloch followed the unorthodox approach 
he used to publish Jungle Operations.  He ignored the stilted prescribed method so that 
he could gain advice from those he felt best informed to help him, and he avoided the 
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 formalities to get it published.  Without Bulloch’s personal intervention, it is clear that 
British counterinsurgency doctrine would not have been developed at all. 
3.8 Revising the Principles of Counterinsurgency 
Chapter 2 established that principles are a long-standing essential part of doctrine.73  
Since the first distinct doctrine for “operations for the maintenance or restoration of 
internal peace” were published as Notes on Imperial Policing (1934), one of the main 
objectives of doctrine has been to “define the principles governing operations of this 
nature, and to indicate the methods of applying them.”74  Every successive publication 
has done that and every time the doctrine has been revised, so too have the principles.  
Close examination of the published doctrine reveals a remarkable consistency in each 
set of principles identified by successive writers.  This is despite each publication being 
the product of its time and each reflecting recent campaign experiences and lessons 
learnt.  Recurring principles centre on civilian primacy and civil-military co-operation; 
on developing a sound intelligence system; on using the minimum level of force; on 
operating in accordance with the law; on maintaining popular support; and on securing 
and safeguarding the population.  Table 5 shows the development of principles with 
each edition of British doctrine, and the consistency within them is evident. 
The principles described in Counter-Revolutionary Operations (1977) were police and 
military co-operation, the Law, minimum necessary force, political awareness and 
popular support.75  As such, they were entirely in keeping with the progression of 
principles since Notes on Imperial Policing (1934).  Counter-Revolutionary Operations 
(1977) did make clear for the first time in British doctrine the requirement for a multi-
disciplinary approach to counterinsurgency when it established that, 
There has never been a purely military solution to revolution:  political, social, 
economic and military measures all have a part to play in restoring the position 
of the civil authorities.  Furthermore, the military contribution although 
important is only one element in the government’s reaction to the crisis.76
Counter-Revolutionary Operations’ author quite clearly reflected Frank Kitson’s belief 
that there is no such thing as a purely military solution because insurgency is not 
primarily a military activity.  Thompson’s influence is also apparent in terms of his five 
principles, the third of which states that the government must have an overall plan.  
Such a plan, Thompson explained, “must cover not just the security measures and 
military operations.  It must include all political, social, economic, administrative, 
police and other measures which have an influence on the insurgency.”77  In this one 
statement, Counter-Revolutionary Operations captured the essence of the central 
argument presented by the two most influential British theorists:  that military action 
may be necessary to restore order in a dangerous situation, but military action can only 
deal with a symptom of a more deep seated problem. 
3.8.1 Co‐operation 
Police and military co-operation was a theme en passant in Notes on Imperial Policing 
(1934), but was covered more fully in Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil 
Power (1949).  Under the heading of General Principles, it established that “mutual 
confidence between the civil, the police and the military authorities at all levels is of the 
first importance.”78  It went on to elaborate: 
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 The more congenial the relations between civil and military authorities the 
better.  If these are, for reasons which need not be discussed here, soured, they 
must be made sweet even if this involves the changing of individuals.  Personal 
knowledge of individual government and police officers on all levels breeds 
mutual confidence, ensures mutual understanding and will go far towards 
ensuring that the military commander is well in the picture, and consequently 
prepared, before he is called upon actively to intervene.79
Its guidance sought to ameliorate the inherent tensions in the civil authority’s 
recognition that it had failed to contain the situation, and that it had to resort to the 
armed forces to help restore order.  Gwynn had identified this in his book Imperial 
Policing: 
When unity of control, which is perhaps the most important result of 
proclaiming martial law, is not provided, the necessity of close co-operation and 
of mutual understanding is all the more important. Anything in the nature of 
jealousy or competition to secure credit is certain to lead to lack of co-ordination 
in courses of action.80 
Counter-Revolutionary Operations (1977) introduced a sense of pragmatism, noting 
that the decision to ask for military assistance would “seldom come as a bolt from the 
blue,”81 but it may be surrounded by uncertainty over the gravity of the situation, the 
capability of the police to contain it, and general unfamiliarity over “the unpalatable 
decision to call for [military] assistance.”82  Maj. Gen. Anthony Farrar-Hockley 
provided some context which supports this when he observed that, 
In the majority of internal security campaigns in which the United Kingdom has 
been engaged since 1945, political subversion and terrorism have reduced the 
credibility of government to a critical point and the police to near exhaustion 
before troops have been called in.  It is bound to be so in a democratic society 
threatened by insurgency because ... government must first employ all civil 
means at their disposal before taking the extraordinary step – itself an admission 
that its authority is threatened – of using armed force to coerce members of the 
populace.83
By way of an example, Farrar-Hockley cited the opening narrative of the Staff College 
examination Tactics ‘C’ Paper which began with, 
You are commanding 1 LOAMSHIRES and have just arrived in the NW District 
of BONGOLAND.  Immediately, you are called into a conference with the 
district commissioner and the Superintendent of Police.  The former says.  “I am 
delighted to see you. Confidence in the government is waning fast and it is 
essential that we restore it without delay. Please round up all the local terrorists 
in the forest/mountains/desert as quickly as you can and meantime put guards on 
all government and commercial centres, residential areas and the girls’ school.” 
‘The police superintendent adds, “And please relieve my men from all external 
duties for the next week.  Particularly riot dispersal and prevention as we are 
exhausted.”84
Both Kitson and Farrar-Hockley were intimately familiar with such a problem, and 
Kitson highlighted the often considerable challenges that the soldier faced when called 
upon to intervene.  He recognized the critical importance of close civil and military co-
88 
 
 operation, stressing in Low Intensity Operations that “only by a close combination of 
civil and military measures that insurgency can be fought.”85  This, he explained, placed 
an onus on the Army to ensure that its soldiers were well-prepared for their military 
tasks in this complex form of operation and to inform and educate their civilian 
counterparts: 
It is logical to expect soldiers whose business it is to know how to fight, to know 
also how to use civil measures in this way. Not only should the army officers 
know about the subject, they must also be prepared to pass on their knowledge 
to politicians, civil servants, economists, members of the local government and 
policemen where necessary. The educational function of the army at these 
critical moments is most important. Amongst senior officers in particular, 
ignorance or excessive diffidence in passing along such knowledge can be 
disastrous.86
3.8.2 The Law 
Kitson advocated a ‘legal system adequate to the needs of the moment,’ and 
Thompson’s second principle was that the government must function in accordance 
with the law.87  He was not the first to highlight the paramount requirement for the 
government and its agents to uphold the law, or “forfeit the right to be called a 
government.”88  Notes on Imperial Policing (1934) provided considerable guidance on 
the legal framework, in particular the imposition of Martial Law, the justification for it, 
the machinery for its administration and its withdrawal.89  The 1949 manual went 
further, explaining the legal authority for soldiers to act in aid of the civil authorities, 
the issue of acting in self-defence, suppression of riotous and unlawful assemblies, the 
use of firearms, and powers of arrest.   
3.8.3 Minimum Necessary Force 
Counter-Revolutionary Operations (1977) described minimum necessary force as a 
“useful catchphrase,”90  which was something of an understatement since Minimum 
Force had been a cornerstone of the British approach since Duties in Aid of the Civil 
Power (1923).  In line with previous manuals, the 1977 doctrine provided guidance on 
the “necessary and reasonable” use of force.  It emphasized that force must not be used 
at all unless it is necessary, that no more force may be used than is both necessary and 
reasonable in the circumstances, and that force must not be used for a punitive purpose 
or to act as a deterrent.91  Its author recognized the difficulty of laying down hard and 
fast rules about the degree of force which was reasonable.  However, the guidance it 
provided was less than helpful and failed to capture the inherent difficulty soldiers have 
consistently found in striking the right balance. 
3.8.4 Political Awareness 
Duties in Aid of the Civil Power (1949) introduced the idea of politically motivated 
insurgency, and Counter-Revolutionary Operations (1969) recognized that 
counterinsurgency required military, para-military, political, economic, psychological 
and sociological measures to defeat insurgency.  Implicit in both these ideas was a need 
for the soldier to be aware of the situation as a whole; indeed one of the principles 
introduced in 1949 was ‘Knowledge of the background to unrest.’  Counter-
Revolutionary Operations (1977) went much further than before, formalizing the need 
for all servicemen to be aware of the government’s political aims and its measures to be 
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 implemented so that operations could be planned “in accord with government 
intentions.”92  Soldiers also had to be aware of revolutionary propaganda.  It offered a 
word of caution in that “political neutrality and complete impartiality in upholding the 
law continue to be ... fundamental to military conduct.”93  This had become an 
important aspect of military operations in Northern Ireland, and was one of the 
conclusions in the Army’s campaign analysis:  while the political context would dictate 
what the military could achieve and what limitations were imposed, “the requirement 
for strategic and operational commanders to guide and inform political decision-making 
is clear.”94  This principle was one which carried over readily from the specific into the 
more general Counter-Revolutionary Operations. 
3.8.5 Popular Support 
The principle of gaining popular support was developed in the 1959 and 1963 editions 
of Keeping the Peace and Counter-Revolutionary Operations (1969).  The 1977 manual 
concentrated on the effects of insurgent threats and propaganda on a population’s 
willingness to support its government actively.  It identified the requirement to establish 
effective security for the population as a key condition:  “Until the people can be 
protected from [insurgent propaganda, coercion and terror], fear and self interest will 
dominate their actions and the security forces will encounter a barrier of both active and 
passive resistance.”95  This explicit statement of requirement, that military operations 
had to protect the population, was to become the cornerstone of the U.S. Army’s 
doctrine and its tactical approach in Iraq from 2007. 
To help counter insurgent propaganda, Counter-Revolutionary Operations echoed 
Kitson’s call for the Army to be better prepared for counterinsurgency operations and 
established the need for effective ‘information and counter-propaganda’ policies to be 
prepared ahead of an intervention.  The practical difficulties this would create – 
identifying the right audiences, taking due account of cultural and social differences – 
clearly had not been fully considered, but the difficulty soldiers faced when having to 
act unprepared was well made in the doctrine: 
The local police may well need a respite to reorganize and rest, and their duties 
will then have to be taken up at short notice by British forces.  The sudden 
exposure of military units to close contact with the local population, possibly 
without adequate preparation of popular opinion ... may lead to situations which 
can be distorted, misrepresented and exploited by revolutionary propaganda.96
3.9 Developing New Principles for Counter Insurgency 
Operations 
Bulloch’s revision of counterinsurgency principles was one of the important changes he 
made to British doctrine.  In this work he took advice from Dr John Pimlott, then a 
senior lecturer at RMA Sandhurst with a recognized interest in counterinsurgency.97  
They used Thompson’s five principles (the government must have a clear political aim; 
function in accordance with law; the government must have an overall plan; give 
priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas; in the guerrilla phase, 
secure base areas first98) to review the principles described in Counter-Revolutionary 
Operations (1977).  They also used Kitson’s operating framework of “coordinating 
machinery at every level for the direction of the campaign, arrangements for ensuring 
that the insurgents do not win the war for the minds of the people, an intelligence 
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 organisation suited to the circumstances, and a legal system adequate to the needs of the 
moment.”99
Given the general level of awareness of legal considerations resulting from service in 
Northern Ireland, Bulloch thought it was safe to assume that the Army generally knew 
its legal responsibilities and would operate in accordance with the law.  Thus while the 
legal dimension would be covered in detail in the new publication, it did not warrant 
being a principle in its own right.   Pimlott and Bulloch decided to develop a balance of 
political, military and intelligence principles, and introduced a sixth, that of long-term 
planning.100   
Counter-Revolutionary Operations (1977) included a short chapter entitled Information 
and Counter-Propaganda which recognized the role that communications technology 
had to play in shaping opinion in a wide range of audiences:   
Advances in technology, education and the economy have resulted in large 
captive audiences for the media... Improvements in communications... have had 
the effect of minimizing time and space, giving greater immediacy to 
events...[which] increases the influence of the median and with it the 
opportunity for presentation of government policy, facts and events.  The 
opportunity for misrepresentation is also present.101
In general terms, however, Bulloch thought that existing doctrine did not place enough 
emphasis on the role of public information or psychological operations.  This was an 
important omission, certainly if Kitson’s view was accepted that “wars of subversion 
and counter-subversion are fought, in the last resort, in the minds of the people.”102  
Since Kitson also emphasized the importance of public information to ensure that “the 
insurgents do not win the war for the minds of the people,”103 Bulloch concluded that 
the psychological dimension could not be ignored and therefore incorporated it into the 
principle of separating the insurgent from the people.104   
Counter-Revolutionary Warfare (1977) described the military tasks as offensive tasks to 
eliminate the threat, and defensive tasks to contain the situation.  Offensive tasks 
included patrols, ambushes, cordon and search operations, and defensive tasks included 
guards, police protection, road blocks, crowd dispersal and community protection.  
Although the doctrine went on to describe tactics for protecting key points, population 
control measures and crowd dispersal – the whole of Part 4 is devoted to the basic 
procedures and techniques – no further mention is made of community protection.105  
This is an indication of the extent to which military thinking had been shaped by 
Northern Ireland.  The population security tasks outlined in the 1963 edition of Keeping 
the Peace, and so clearly influenced by operations in Malaya – area and collective 
measures of control, curfews, restrictions on movement, and control of supplies106 – 
appeared to be no longer relevant in the context of Northern Ireland.  As a result, 
Counter-Revolutionary Warfare (1977) made no reference to them at all.  Yet 
establishing security had been a central tenet of all previous post-war doctrine, and 
although the tactics described in Counter-Revolutionary Warfare were intended to 
contain or eliminate insurgents, they did not address the problem of insurgency as a 
whole.  This was an important omission, and was based on an assumption which by 
2003 was no longer valid:  Northern Ireland was not the campaign it once was, and 
education for staff officers and commanders did not emphasize small wars at all. 
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 It was evident to Bulloch that action had to be taken against the insurgent, both 
physically and psychologically, and the root causes of the insurgency required to be 
addressed in the short- and longer-term.   As a result, he developed two new principles 
which were Separating the Insurgent from the People, and Neutralising the Insurgent.  
As such, there was nothing new in what he described but he made both issues much 
more explicit, and he returned to ideas that had been first identified but not fully 
articulated in Notes on Imperial Policing in 1934: 
(i)   To prevent interference with the normal life of the affected district, i.e. to 
maintain communications in operation and to protect life and property. 
(ii)  To get to grips with the hostile elements and bring them into subjection.107
Bulloch decided that the principles would be of more utility to commanders and 
planners if they were arranged in a logical sequence.  Pimlott thought that the sequence 
was left rather open-ended and suggested that planners ought to look beyond the 
immediacy of the security situation to the conditions a government should seek to 
establish and maintain into the longer term to prevent a reoccurrence of the problem.  
This discussion resulted in the development of the principle of Longer Term Post-
Insurgency Planning.108  The six principles published in Counter Insurgency 
Operations, and which were the cornerstone of the British approach were: 
• Political primacy and political aim 
• Coordinated government machinery 
• Intelligence and information 
• Separating the insurgent from his support 
• Neutralising the insurgent 
• Longer term post-insurgency planning 
The final version was ready for publication in 1995.  Irwin double-checked the final 
draft to make sure it captured the experience of Northern Ireland but not the specifics.  
In terms of the Downie model of Institutional Learning, it is important to note that 
although Bulloch had kept the Army Doctrine Committee informed of his work on 
counterinsurgency he did not take it to the Committee for final approval or circulate it 
for comment.  He simply published the manual without any further discussion, debate or 
disagreement.  In the context of the mid-1990s, where doctrine for major combat 
operations and peace support were the focus, counterinsurgency doctrine may not have 
been a pressing or a contentious issue.  In spite of this emphasis, Bulloch revised and 
updated the Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine and circumvented having to achieve 
organizational consensus to have it published.  Ten years later, what Bulloch published 
in Counter Insurgency Operations would be one of the Army’s central debates while it 
was embroiled in Iraq. 
3.10 Counter Insurgency Operations:  Effective Doctrine? 
The criteria for effective doctrine identified in Chapter 2 were:  acceptability with the 
target audience; endurability; contemporary relevancy; suitability as educational 
material; and accessibility and manageability.  Is Counter Insurgency Operations 
effective doctrine?  Answering this question will allow any notable strengths or areas of 
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 potential weakness to be identified which might subsequently explain its usefulness 
there. 
For Counter Insurgency Operations, the criteria for effective doctrine are inextricably 
linked.  This has much to do with the way it was developed, and the target audience 
Bulloch had in mind, which was principally the student at Camberley.109  For the Army 
of the 1990s, Malaya, The Oman, and Northern Ireland were the staple campaigns at 
Sandhurst and the Staff College, and the campaign in Northern Ireland had continuing 
operational relevancy.  Counter Insurgency Operations therefore struck no discordant 
notes.  This is because Bulloch built on the enduring themes of British 
counterinsurgency and integrated the main themes of the new manoeuvrist doctrine.  
While it is now reasonable to judge that the attempts to set it in a more contemporary 
context were incomplete, nevertheless it offered the right pointers towards future 
operations.  The new manual was well-suited as educational material, having been 
written and developed with Staff College students in mind, and the Advanced 
Command and Staff Course (ACSC) used the draft edition as the course text in 1994.110   
For the Staff College student and the wider Army, Bulloch’s introduction of material 
from ADP Operations provided it with a distinctly contemporary doctrinal feel, even if 
the operational setting seemed to be more of the 1960s than the last years of the 
twentieth century.  
While the Staff College continued to use Counter Insurgency Operations to teach 
counterinsurgency, rather unusually, for some time, the Staff College was one of the 
few places in the Army which had copies.  This was entirely due to when the decision to 
publish was taken.  Bulloch had expected that the manual would be distributed widely 
throughout the Army as was usually the case with Field Manuals.  However, the scale of 
distribution was changed following an intervention by Lt. Gen. Sir Michael Rose.   Rose 
had been Commandant at the Staff College between 1991 and 1993 when Camberley 
had been responsible for Army doctrine under the old system, and later commanded 
UNPROFOR in Bosnia.111  He suggested that no one would be interested in 
counterinsurgency because peace support operations were now the focus.  As a result, 
Bulloch decided to publish Counter Insurgency Operations on a very limited 
distribution, “with enough copies being printed to provide the Staff College with 
teaching material and some copies for senior officers who might have had an 
interest.”112   
Bulloch’s decision effectively limited accessibility to Counter Insurgency Operations to 
students at Camberley.  They alone were taught its precepts in any detail, and while the 
main themes of the Army’s manoeuvrist doctrine had migrated to Northern Ireland, it 
used its own theatre-specific doctrine.  This problem of limited distribution persisted 
until the Army published an Electronic Battlebox in 1999, in which DGD&D included 
all the Army, joint service and allied doctrine on CD-ROMs on a very wide distribution.  
This gave every unit access to all the current doctrine and, for Counter Insurgency 
Operations, it overcame the Staff College-only problem, but it did not overcome the 
problem of much reduced teaching of counterinsurgency doctrine. 
While Counter Insurgency Operations had been written to be taught, how it was taught 
became the issue.  In Kitson’s view, “Military commanders in counter-insurgency 
operations cannot do without a real understanding of this sort of war in the widest 
sense... Unfortunately the level of understanding and training in the sphere of counter-
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 insurgency has not always been good enough for the system to operate effectively.”113  
He saw education in counterinsurgency as a crucial prerequisite for success, and 
certainly the Staff College met his imperative until 1997, when the three service staff 
colleges merged to form the Joint Services Command and Staff College.  Up to then, 
students on ACSC at Camberley spent Term 4 (of five) studying counterinsurgency “in 
order to gain a detailed understanding of joint operations, peace support operations and 
counter insurgency.”114  The key themes the course examined included the higher level 
planning and command, the complex mix of international, British and host nation laws 
with which forces would have to comply, the challenges of mass media interest, and the 
psychological dimension of such operations.  It was all intended to develop officers who 
“are resourceful and capable of improvisation... [solving problems] by applying 
principles, rather than attempting to impose previously learnt practice.”115   
The Camberley counterinsurgency module was three weeks long, and included 
counterparts from the Police Staff College at Bramshill.  The syllabus was 
comprehensive, reflected doctrine, and covered insurgency and its causes, the use of 
force, counterinsurgency, the role of the police, terrorism and counter-terrorism, and 
counterinsurgency in the geo-political context.  Students examined case studies of the 
development of British counterinsurgency theory, and studied the wars in Algeria, 
Vietnam, and Dhofar to draw out the main campaign lessons.  The module ended with a 
four-day Northern Ireland study period, during which the Chief Constable, GOC, 
politicians from the major parties except Sinn Fein, a brigade commander, and the 
media presented.  Students also had to research and give a presentation on either the 
Huk insurgency in the Philippines or the Shining Path in Peru, and a presentation on a 
Northern Ireland-related topic.  All discussions were based on the draft doctrine, and all 
the teaching materials and course notes referred consistently to the new British 
principles, the minimum use of force, the legal position, the importance of intelligence, 
and the psychological dimension of counterinsurgency.116  Of note, and somewhat 
counter to the popular view of the Army’s obsession with it, very little mention was 
made of the campaign in Malaya, instead attention focussed on the British campaign in 
the Oman, principally because Gen. Akehurst, who commanded there, had been the 
commandant at Camberley and lodged his papers with the library. 
The depth of study undertaken at Camberley, and the heightened level of understanding 
in counterinsurgency it provided, ended in 1997 when the Single Service Staff Colleges 
closed and JSCSC opened at Bracknell before moving to Shrivenham.  The Joint course 
had three terms, the second of which was undertaken on a single service and land, 
maritime or air basis.  Soldiers on the JSCSC studied land warfare in toto for twelve 
weeks, compared to the forty weeks their predecessors had spent at Camberley.  On the 
new course, counterinsurgency was one of three topics covered in the three days 
allocated to the ‘Other Operations’ stage.  It warranted just one of the three central 
lectures which introduced ‘Other Operations,’ and five periods where teams of three 
students gave presentations on a counterinsurgency case study they had researched in 
their study time.  Until 2004, when the setting changed to a post-conflict insurgency, 
they also took part in a day-long map-table exercise set in Brunei, on the same basis that 
Farrar-Hockley recalled of the Army having been called in to support an exhausted 
police force deal with a revolutionary insurgency.  The low priority and little time 
allocated to study such a complex subject as counterinsurgency meant that the 
educational value of what was taught fell far below Kitson’s demands, and was far 
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 removed from the approach followed at Camberley.  It meant that the intention behind 
the stage was hopelessly ambitious: 
To develop understanding of expeditionary intervention operations with an 
emphasis on contemporary PSO and historical COIN operations at the Land 
Component level.  In particular it focuses on the principles and characteristics of 
a complex intervention operation, the operational framework and core functions 
as they relate to these types of operation.117
While the ACSC counterinsurgency study has been overhauled, updated and expanded 
since 2008, it is important to note that for a decade, the only officers to get any 
instruction on counterinsurgency were Army students at JSCSC.  When compared to the 
teaching provided at Camberley, for ten years coverage on the flagship ACSC was 
perfunctory and, even in the most basic educational terms, fell woefully short of its 
stated intention.  Graduates from JSCSC got nothing more than an introduction to the 
theory and history of counterinsurgency, the very issue that Frank Kitson had stressed 
and laid out so carefully in Low Intensity Operations, and fostered throughout his 
career.  Counter Insurgency Operations may have been sound doctrine but the issue was 
it was not taught.  Instead attention focussed on preparing staff officers of all three 
services for UK-led intervention operations, and the UK-led campaign planning process 
needed to undertake them.  For what followed in Iraq, until UK military operations 
ended in May 2009, the principal doctrine, which reflected the essential themes of 
British counterinsurgency experience and thinking, had been a reference on a staff 
college reading list and for which no teaching had been provided. 
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 4 The Evolution of British Counterinsurgency Doctrine 
 
Chapter 3 established the essential tenets of the Army’s doctrine for counterinsurgency.  
It was the most recent of a series of manuals which can be traced back to 1909, and 
which has addressed first ‘small wars,’ then successively imperial policing, aid to the 
civil power, counter-revolutionary warfare and finally counterinsurgency.  With every 
new publication, as Bulloch observes, British thinking evolved and developed into the 
next form.1  If Bulloch’s view is accepted that Counter Insurgency Operations is the 
product of an evolutionary process, one which is prompted by changing threats and 
operational and tactical developments, such a process must then be examined to identify 
the key developments and influences in the process and to determine how doctrine 
evolved.  This will allow what Counter Insurgency Operations contains, in particular 
the principles and methods which characterize the British approach, to be set in context 
against the general themes of British counterinsurgency doctrine.   
This chapter examines how British counterinsurgency doctrine evolved.  It examines the 
influences on it as it evolved, the role of the main British theorists, and the principal 
military campaigns.  It examines how doctrine developed in Northern Ireland to show 
the interaction between mainstream doctrinal reform and bespoke theatre doctrine, and 
their link to Counter Insurgency Operations.  The intention is to establish the enduring 
themes of doctrine. 
Field Service Regulations provided the Army’s first formal doctrine, and its first, albeit 
brief, guidance on what it referred to as ‘Warfare in Uncivilized Countries.’  At the time 
FSR were published, the general term in use was ‘small wars,’ what Charles Callwell 
defined as “operations of regular armies against irregular, or comparatively speaking 
irregular, forces.”2  Other than official doctrine, Callwell was one of a number of writers 
whose books provided detailed practical, tactical guidance for those training for small 
wars,3 in particular “campaigns for the suppression of insurrections or lawlessness.”4  
FSR were the start point for formal small wars doctrine.  It made the important point 
that the markedly different conditions in which small wars took place required that “the 
principles of regular warfare be somewhat modified.”5  In this regard, FSR echoed 
Callwell’s conclusion that,  
the conditions of small wars are so diversified, the enemy’s mode of fighting is 
often so peculiar, and the theatres of operations present such singular features, 
that irregular warfare must generally be carried out on a method totally different 
from the stereotyped system.  The art of war, as generally understood, must be 
modified to suit the circumstances of each particular case.  The conduct of small 
wars is in fact in certain aspects an art in itself, diverging widely from what is 
adapted to the conditions of regular warfare, but not so widely that there are not 
in all its branches points which permit comparisons to be established.6
This was a point which Frank Kitson would further emphasize in the 1970s. 
After the First War, when Britain’s imperial responsibilities increased, the Army’s 
doctrine to deal with insurrection and lawlessness followed two paths.  The first covered 
possible military actions in the United Kingdom in the event it was called upon in 
response to widespread civilian unrest.  This was published as Duties in Aid of the Civil 
99 
 
 Power in 1923.  The second followed the theme of small wars and ‘Wars in Uncivilized 
Countries,’ and dealt with the more complex issue of imperial policing, with which so 
much of the Army would be involved in the years following the end of the First War. 
4.1 1923:   Duties in Aid of the Civil Power and the Principle of 
Minimum Force 
Duties in Aid of the Civil Power explained the Army’s lawful responsibilities to “aid in 
suppressing disturbances with which the civil power itself was unable to cope.”7  A 
short 50-page pamphlet, it provided some general principles and guidance on how 
Common Law and Military Law related to the Army’s duty to act in support of the civil 
power in the face of widespread civil disorder as the result of trades union and 
employment-related unrest.  It did not link this type of disorder to other forms of 
political subversion, or to wider attempts to seize political power, despite the Bolshevik 
Revolution and general political unrest in the immediate post-war years. 
Duties in Aid of the Civil Power (1923) marks an important step in the development of 
doctrine because it was the first pamphlet to examine the factors affecting the decision 
to use force to restore law and order.  It codified the principle of minimum force to offer 
guidance on the use of lethal force.  This is now judged by many as one of the defining 
principles of the British approach to counterinsurgency.  Thomas Mockaitis, for 
example, considers minimum force to be central in what he describes as “the most 
effective approach to counter-insurgency yet devised.”8  Rod Thornton goes further 
when he suggests that it informed “virtually all of the actions carried out by the British 
in COIN operations... The principle is … deeply rooted and therefore quintessentially a 
guiding philosophy for British COIN techniques.”9
All doctrine published since 1923 echoes its guidance on minimum force.  Duties in Aid 
of the Civil Power made clear that a range of options existed, from the act of putting the 
soldiers onto the streets to, if the situation so warranted, the use of lethal force.  It 
examined the two difficult decisions which a military commander faced:  was force 
justified, and just how much force should be used?  Both decisions required judgement 
and care: 
The degree of force to be used is to be just so much and no more than is 
essential to deal with the immediate situation. In certain cases the mere display 
of force may suffice; in others it may be necessary to use lethal weapons for 
protecting person or property from violent crowds, or for dispersing a riotous 
crowd which is dangerous unless dispersed.  An officer must exercise all care 
and skills with regard to what he does, and the use of extreme force must be 
conducted without recklessness or negligence, care being taken to produce no 
further injury that is absolutely unavoidable for the purpose of protecting person 
and property.10
There is little difference between the 1923 definition and that published in Counter 
Insurgency Operations (1995) which said, “No more force may be used than is 
necessary to achieve a legal aim.”11
The principle of minimum force predates Duties in Aid of the Civil Power.  It can be 
traced back to the 1912 edition of the Manual of Military Law which described the 
armed forces’ legal position and their relationship with the civil authorities when called 
on to support the civil power.  It established that force could be used legally to restore 
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 law and order, but the crucial issue was whether the situation was a riot, or whether it 
was an insurrection, where the authority of the Crown was challenged directly.  Military 
Law distinguished between the two.  If it was a riot, only that force necessary to restore 
law and order could be used, if it was insurrection, “the law permitted ‘any degree of 
force necessary.’”12  In theory the distinction was clear; in practice it proved to be far 
less so. 
The emphasis Duties in Aid of the Civil Power placed on minimum force has much to 
do with when it was published.   In 1923 the Army was still in the shadow of the 
infamous Amritsar Massacre, in the Punjab on 13 April 1919.  How Brig. Gen. Dyer 
interpreted his powers to use lethal force was to have a profound effect on the Army, 
and on the way the armed forces would be used in future to support the civilian 
authorities.  The critical issue was the distinction made in Military Law between a riot 
and an insurrection, and the level of force that each situation permitted.  Dyer believed 
he faced an insurrection, and was thus justified in using lethal force.  Simply firing to 
disperse the crowd was not enough: he needed to show firmness to discourage 
insurgents more widely.  He therefore ordered soldiers to open fire on some 10,000 
unarmed protestors, killing 379 and wounding over a thousand.  Widespread outrage 
followed, martial law had to be imposed, Dyer was relieved of command, and Indian 
nationalist politics passed an irreversible turning point.   
Lord Hunter’s enquiry into events at Amritsar concentrated on the legal distinction 
between rioting and insurrection and concluded that both Dyer’s decision to order his 
troops to fire on the crowd without warning, and for those troops to continue to fire as 
the crowd dispersed were unjustified.13  The British Government confirmed Hunter’s 
findings, and the direction it issued established minimum force as a cornerstone of the 
British approach in small, internal wars:   
The principles which have consistently governed the policy of His Majesty’s 
Government in directing the nature, and the methods employed in the course, of 
military operations against a foreign enemy, may be broadly stated as the 
employment of no more force and destruction of life than is necessary for the 
purpose of forcing the enemy to subdue himself to the Military Commander’s 
will. This principle has governed their policy still more rigidly when military 
action against enemy non-combatants is concerned; a fortiori it is, and His 
Majesty’s Government are determined that it shall remain, the primary factor of 
policy whenever circumstances unfortunately necessitate the suppression of civil 
disorder by military force within the British Empire.14
The Army found the whole business of adapting to change because of Amritsar 
institutionally bruising.  It was divided over the way in which Dyer was dealt, and the 
minimum force policy did nothing to remove the inevitable tensions which resulted 
between the Army and the civil authorities, who were now to monitor more closely the 
military when operating under their control.  Hew Strachan notes that one consequence 
of Dyer’s actions, and the imposition of the principle of minimum necessary force, was 
that “the inter-war army came to argue that military force was a weapon of 
discrimination and restraint,”15 qualities that added authority to the Army’s position, 
and provided a benchmark against which its actions could be judged.  Minimum force 
became, as Rod Thornton suggests, “a pragmatic response to dealing with insurgents 
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 and terrorists…. the vital ingredient in separating both of these from their support 
base”.16   
While minimum force was codified in doctrine, it would not be right to assume that it 
was always followed in practice.  Hew Strachan suggests that the ‘Hearts and Minds’ 
approach of the 1950s and 1960s were accompanied by “coercion, collective 
punishment and compulsory resettlement.”17  The forced resettlement of the Chinese 
population in Malaya,18 and incidents such as the Batang Kali massacre on 12 
December 1948 – in which it was claimed that fourteen members of the Scots Guards 
fired on and killed twenty-four unarmed Malayans19 – would support this.   Hew 
Bennett has critically re-evaluated the Army’s conduct in the Mau Mau rebellion, 
arguing that the British government’s deliberate exclusion of international law from 
colonial counterinsurgencies allowed the army to suppress opponents with little 
restraint.20   Minimum force may have been policy, and it may have been published in 
doctrine, but its day-to-day application depended greatly on leadership, training and 
judgement from often quite junior commanders.  More significantly for legitimacy and 
gaining popular support, it could not account for any government policy which might 
enable or condone military operations, as appeared to be the case in Kenya, that stepped 
outside its ideals. 
4.2 Gwynn and Imperial Policing 
A link between Duties in Aid of the Civil Power, the issue of minimum force and 
imperial policing is provided by Maj. Gen. Sir Charles Gwynn, Commandant at the 
Staff College 1926-30.  He published Imperial Policing in 1934, the same year that the 
War Office published Notes on Imperial Policing.21  Although Gwynn’s book was not 
doctrine per se, it identified four principles for imperial policing and discussed the 
training necessary to prepare soldiers for the inherent problems they would face in 
dealing with an insurrection.  It was doctrine in all but name.  Gwynn’s principles were 
intended to be applied across the range of military tasks which the Army could be 
required to perform in support of the police.  His principles were:  questions of policy 
remain vested in the civil Government; the amount of military force employed must be 
the minimum the situation demands; firm and timely action is needed to discourage 
further disorder; and co-operation.22  In his last principle, Gwynn emphasized that the 
task of restoring order did not rest on the Army alone.  Unity of control, close co-
operation and mutual understanding between the civil authority and the military were all 
important but the civil authority retained overall responsibility.   
Gwynn focussed on the principle of minimum force throughout Imperial Policing, 
weaving it into the supporting narrative for each of his four principles, and drawing out 
lessons on the use of force in each of the nine (later expanded to eleven) British 
campaigns with which he illustrated his theory.  He returned repeatedly to the paradoxes 
created by the use of force in support of ostensibly peaceful, stable government, in 
particular how to balance the effect of using force against its longer term consequences.  
Using too much force, he recognized, risked alienating the population and delaying the 
re-establishment of normal conditions, using too little could be seen as weak:   
...the power and resolution of the Government forces must be displayed. 
Anything which can be interpreted as weakness encourages those who are sitting 
on the fence to keep on good terms with the rebels. In less serious cases, where 
armed rebellion is not encountered but disorder is of the nature of riots, 
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 communal or anti-Government, which have passed out of civil control, there is 
the same necessity for firmness but an even greater necessity for estimating 
correctly the degree of force required. 
... Mistakes of judgment may have far-reaching results.  Military failure can be 
retrieved, but where a population is antagonized or the authority of Government 
seriously upset, a long period may elapse before confidence is restored and 
normal stable conditions are re-established.23
4.3 1934:  Notes on Imperial Policing 
Ian Beckett suggests that Gwynn may have been the author of Notes on Imperial 
Policing.24  If this was the case, it lacks the nuanced tone of Gwynn’s discussion of 
minimum force in Imperial Policing.  Nevertheless Notes on Imperial Policing marks a 
second important step in doctrinal thinking.  It broadened the perspective on civil 
disturbances provided by Duties in Aid of the Civil Power, introducing a clear sense of 
the complexity of the problem which widespread insurrection posed, and recognizing 
that it may be prompted by agitation or conspiracy, “or it may arise out of local 
discontent or religious or industrial unrest.”25  The inference was clear:  civil disorder 
was a symptom of a wider political problem that military action alone could not solve.  
Notes on Imperial Policing recognized that military action therefore had to be part of an 
overall, co-ordinated, civilian-led plan, the conduct of which would be protracted and 
difficult.  Widespread unrest could “no longer be dealt with by a series of isolated 
[military] actions in aid of the civil power, and the suppression consequently demands a 
concerted military plan of operations, the execution of which may extend over a 
considerable period.”26   
Notes on Imperial Policing also made the important step of acknowledging that 
complex, politically-motivated unrest presented a twofold problem.  On the one hand, 
normal life had to be protected; on the other, insurgents had to be dealt with.  This is the 
first discussion that went beyond protecting people in the face of rioting to include a 
sense of a more permanent presence to protect civil life in general.  The role of the 
military, the doctrine explained was: 
(i) To prevent interference with the normal life of the affected district, i.e. to 
maintain communications in operation and to protect life and property. 
(ii) To get to grips with the hostile elements and bring them into 
subjection.27 
While the twofold nature of the military role would be highlighted in subsequent 
doctrine, it was not always explained so clearly.  Doctrine had to wait until Counter 
Insurgency Operations (1995) when they both formed the core of two principles of 
counterinsurgency; separating the insurgent from his support, and neutralizing the 
insurgent. 
4.4 1949:  Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power 
In 1949, Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power were merged into one 
pamphlet that dealt with the “maintenance or restoration of internal peace in British 
Colonial dependencies or in an occupied country... [or] during a state of emergency in 
the United Kingdom.”28  It introduced the idea of fundamentals, which if not recognized 
would “lead to muddled thinking, ineffectual action and delay, and possibly complete 
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 failure to achieve the object.”29  The fundamentals it identified were the relationship 
with the civil government, knowledge of the background to unrest, identifying the 
dissident elements, a sound intelligence system and good topographical knowledge, and 
a deeply rooted sense of the importance of security.  The section provided on the 
background to the unrest shows how the character of the problem had widened and now 
reflected the post-war realities of British Colonial responsibilities, and the rapidly 
changing strategic situation: 
The background may be economic or political; it may be racial or religious; or it 
may have its roots in a wave of misguided but excessive national feeling either 
by a majority or by an ardent dissident minority.  The movement may be 
supported by the mass of public opinion or it may run strongly counter to public 
opinion.  It may appeal to youth only, or be confined to labour, student, 
intellectual or other classes.  It may be strongly but secretly supported from 
outside and its consequences may produce serious international repercussions.30
Given the Army’s bloody and difficult campaign in Palestine had ended a year before 
publication, and the campaign in Malaya was already underway, somewhat surprisingly, 
the 1949 manual is lacking in any contemporary context.  Later publications would be 
criticised for being too redolent of the last campaign, but the 1949 edition is noticeably 
sterile.  There is one exception and that is in its analysis of patterns of unrest, disorder 
and crime in which it introduces external influences, principally Communist, racial and 
religious motivation, and “relics of underground organizations left over from a great 
war.”31  This last category was an obvious reference to the Malayan Races’ Liberation 
Army (MRLA), which grew from anti-Japanese insurgents during World War II. 
The most significant development in this manual, however, was its recognition of ‘The 
New Pattern’ of resistance to law and order.  This, it explained, included practical, 
political and propaganda support from external influences which were likely to result in 
a “more vigorous, more prolonged” challenge.  The new pattern of politically-
motivated, Communist-inspired unrest had four distinct phases:  terrorism, the 
development of limited areas under insurgent control, the complete control of large 
areas, and finally the ejection of Government forces and control from the country.  The 
government response would therefore have to place emphasis on police-led intelligence 
operations in the early stages, increased emphasis on psychological warfare and 
counter-propaganda which would require very close co-ordination between the civil 
authorities and security forces.32   
Although the 1949 publication acknowledged that co-ordination was necessary between 
the civil administration and the security forces, the manual failed to develop the point 
made in Notes on Imperial Policing that civil disorder was a symptom of a wider 
political problem which required more than simply a security response.  The section on 
operations to re-establish control of an affected area briefly examined the legal 
implications of collective control measures, such as curfews.  It also recognized the 
need for a civil affairs organization to maintain essential services.  However, it did not 
explain that the military campaign should be set within a more general plan.  Despite 
the emphasis it had received in preceding doctrine and in Gwynn’s work, political aims 
did not appear to have primacy.  Events that were to unfold in Malaya would change 
this.  
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 4.5 The Malayan Emergency:  Crystallizing Counterinsurgency 
and Formalising Campaign Doctrine 
The eight years that followed the publication of Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of 
the Civil Power (1949) saw an important, arguably the most significant change in 
British understanding of counterinsurgency.  The catalyst was the campaign in Malaya, 
a brief description of which is necessary to explain how this affected doctrine.  Malaya 
demonstrated the importance of recognizing the political not just security aspects of 
restoring law and order, the importance of developing and implementing a 
comprehensive government-led plan, the importance of addressing political, security, 
social and economic factors, and the value of developing bespoke military doctrine and 
training for the theatre of operations. 
The Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960 is one of the most closely analysed and oft 
cited of Britain’s small wars.  Despite a poor start, Malaya was a success.  The co-
ordinated, politically-led campaign enacted from 1950 contained and ultimately 
defeated the Communist insurgency, and the country achieved independence in line 
with Her Majesty’s Government’s plan.  For the Army, Malaya left a lasting impression 
on its tactics, approach, training, and doctrine for counterinsurgency.  Given the extent 
to which the Army assimilated all these changes, it is not surprising that Beckett 
highlights “an obsession with Malaya continued to determine the Army’s institutional 
memory well into the 1980s.”33
The Federation of Malaya was poorly placed to deal with the Communist insurgency 
which broke in 1948.  For the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), the British Military 
Administration established at the end of the war blocked any possibility it may have had 
of taking over as the post-war, post-colonial government as it had hoped.  The MCP was 
firmly rooted in Malaya’s Chinese population and it provided resistance fighters during 
the Japanese occupation, forming the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army.  After the 
war, and with little likelihood of achieving any mainstream political success, the MCP 
attempted to infiltrate government departments, and to take control of trades unions.  
Malaya’s economic and political recovery further limited the MCP’s options.  In late 
1947 it decided to initiate a violent anti-government campaign and during the months 
that followed, it incited strikes, civil unrest, and murdered British plantation and mine 
owners, and Chinese, Malay and Indian employees.  The Government of the Federation 
declared a state of emergency on 18 June 1948 and enacted Emergency Powers to deal 
with the violence.34
The civil administration, in particular the police, had suffered badly at the hands of the 
Japanese and the police intelligence service was unable to cope with the sudden upsurge 
in violence.  It found it difficult to obtain information from the essentially closed 
Chinese community.  The Police Commissioner had overall command of the 
Government’s response, and the Armed Forces were placed in a supporting role.  Initial 
results for the Government were disappointing, largely due to poor intelligence, poor 
co-ordination, and inappropriate military tactics and poor jungle skills.  Daniel Marston 
showed that, in the few years following the end of the Second World War, the Army 
forgot its hard-learnt lessons of jungle fighting.  He cites Lt. Gen. Walter Walker who 
recalled in 1976 that, 
the fundamental trouble was that within two years of defeating the Japanese in 
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 Burma, all our military training and thinking had become focussed on nuclear 
and conventional tactics for the European theatre... so when the Malayan 
Emergency broke out, we had forgotten most of the jungle warfare techniques 
and expertise, learned the hard way at such cost in the Burma Campaign.35
The result was that when the Army deployed into the jungle to deal with Communist 
Terrorists, it struggled.  As Riley Sutherland observed in 1964, “troops [were initially] 
completely dependent on the police for information on and identification of guerrillas; 
lack of information [was] the greatest handicap; and the guerrillas [were] expert at 
ambush and minor tactics.”36   
The Army’s initial response was to resort to large-scale, largely unsuitable tactics, 
known colloquially as ‘Jungle Bashing,’37 and although they had some early successes, 
once the Communist Terrorists regrouped in the jungle, the number of incidents per 
month increased from 200 in 1948 to 400 in early 1950.38  Very early in the campaign, 
Gen. Sir Neil Ritchie, Commander-in-Chief of Far East Land Forces, ordered the then 
Lt. Col. Walter Walker (later, as a major general, Walker commanded military 
operations in Borneo) to set up what eventually became known as the Jungle Warfare 
School (JWS) to train expected reinforcements from the UK.39  Walker was an expert in 
jungle tactics, having fought the Japanese for three years.  Every battalion that deployed 
to Malaya had to pass through JWS to complete a demanding six-week course of 
instruction and practical exercises in jungle navigation, marksmanship, patrolling, 
jungle tactics, ambushes, tracking, and living in the jungle.  The final exercise took 
place in areas where guerrillas were known to be operating.  Scott McMichael notes that 
the “improvement in tactical operations by battalions trained at the JWS forced the 
MRLA to call off its large-scale operations and form into smaller, hit-and-run units 
known as Independent Platoons.”40  The Army’s better training and tactics started to get 
results.  As Richard Stubbs observes, by the end of 1952,  
with rapidly moving intelligence, the security forces were able to frame 
localities where insurgents were known to be operating, flood the area with 
patrols, and set ambushes of their own rather than be ambushed.  The [insurgents 
were] steadily pushed back onto the defensive and its numbers reduced.41
While focussed training improved the Army’s tactical efficiency, several other 
important steps were necessary to put the campaign as a whole on track.  The first was 
to unify civil and military efforts.  Doctrine had previously talked of police-military co-
operation but the situation in Malaya warranted much more than co-operation.  The 
Government’s efforts had to be unified, and this was achieved in April 1950, when, at 
the request of the High Commissioner, the new post of Director of Operations was 
created with “full powers of co-ordination of the Police, Naval, Military and Air 
Forces.”42  Sir Harold Briggs, a retired Lt. Gen., was the first Director.  He quickly 
assessed the situation and concluded that military operations alone would not solve the 
problem.  Long term success could only be achieved if the insurgents were separated 
from the Chinese community from where they drew their support and intelligence.  The 
Chinese would have to be brought under Government administration, which then, in 
turn, had to gain their support: 
Successes against bandit gangs, though essential to security and morale, were in 
effect only a ‘rap on the knuckles’.  It is at this “heart” that we must aim, to 
eliminate the Communist cells among the Chinese population to whom we must 
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 give security and whom we must win over.  By doing so and by removing the 
bandits’ sources of supply and information the task of the Security Forces would 
be simplified and the enemy forced to fight for these in areas under our control.  
Thus only can the initiative be wrested from the bandits.43
Briggs’ brief summary of the problem provided the underpinning logic for what was to 
become known as the Briggs Plan.  The key tenets of the Plan required full civil-
military co-operation under a unified command structure through a system of joint 
committees from national to district level, the police to secure the population and gain 
information, and the Army to operate in the jungle to locate and destroy insurgent 
gangs.  The Administration’s role was to extend good governance to the whole 
population.  This was the central task of the campaign: 
The Administration will strengthen to the utmost extent possible their effective 
control of the populated areas ... to ensure that all populated areas are effectively 
administered ... by stepping up to the maximum extent possible ... the provision 
of the normal social services that go with effective administration, e.g., schools, 
medical and other services.44
This was and remains the essence of effective counterinsurgency.  Although later 
characterized as ‘Hearts and Minds’, the ideas contained in Briggs’ plan have not been 
contradicted by any theorist since:  secure the population and gain its support, extend 
good governance across the country, and neutralize the insurgent and his cause 
psychologically and physically. 
Briggs put his plan into action in June 1950 and it had an immediate but not dramatic 
effect.  A marked increase in tempo followed with the second important step in the 
campaign, the selection of General Sir Gerald Templer as Briggs’ successor.  Templer, 
appointed as both High Commissioner and Director of Operations, energized the 
campaign.  His forceful leadership and insistence that the civil, military, and police 
agencies cooperated fully quickly galvanized the whole campaign.  His presence was 
felt across the country, politically, administratively and militarily.  Marston notes how 
Templer continued to encourage the Army’s tactical initiatives, including the 
introduction of a proper assessment process to measure the effectiveness of jungle 
operations.   
In 1952, at Templer’s direction, Walker, who was then commanding a Ghurkha 
battalion on operations, produced a handbook of best practice and tactics.  Walker wrote 
The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations (ATOM) in a matter of weeks and it was very 
well received.45  Templer strongly endorsed ATOM and stressed its value and 
importance in his foreword: 
I have been impressed by the wealth of jungle fighting experience available in 
Malaya...  At the same time, I have been disturbed by the fact that this great 
mass of detailed knowledge has not been properly collated or presented to those 
whose knowledge and experience is not so great.  This vast store of knowledge 
must be pooled.  Hence this book. 
... The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist terrorists 
in Malaya.  This book shows in a clear and easily readable form the proven 
principles by which this can be done.46
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 Crucially ATOM addressed the principal areas of concern felt early in the campaign and 
provided clear guidance on intelligence, co-ordination between the civilian, police and 
military, and jungle tactics adjusted for counterinsurgency, all of which had been 
lacking at the start.  What was taught at JWS thus became doctrine, and what Walker 
produced was to have a major impact on the British doctrine which followed.  
Gregorian considers that the “publication of such a timely and useful manual was a 
harbinger of a new, more formal approach to tactical doctrine,”47 referring to the 
Handbook on Anti-Mau Mau Operations, produced for the revolt in Kenya and which 
clearly acknowledges its link to ATOM.   
ATOM’s impact on Army doctrine proved to be long-lasting.  It established the 
tremendous value of campaign-specific doctrine, written by and for the theatre of 
operations.  Its symbiotic relationship with training at JWS, and its use of best practice 
from operations, established the need for theatre-specific training.  Its comprehensive 
coverage of the threat, counterinsurgency strategy, the integration of civil, police and 
military measures, legal considerations, intelligence, psychological warfare and tactics 
provided the template for future doctrine.   
4.6 1957:  Keeping the Peace (Duties in Support of the Civil 
Power) and the Malayan Influence 
ATOM marked a significant step forward in doctrinal terms because it linked the 
campaign in general to the tactics developed specifically for the theatre of operation.  
The 1957 publication Keeping the Peace (Duties in Support of the Civil Power), like the 
1949 manual, covered military intervention to restore law and order both at home and in 
overseas dependencies.  Experience from the Malayan campaign is evident.  In keeping 
with previous doctrine, it provided guidance on legal aspects of military support to the 
civil power, the issue of suppressing unlawful assemblies and riots and the role of 
troops in maintaining essential services.  The six marked differences between it and its 
predecessor are evidence of a considerable development in understanding and practice 
in counterinsurgency.   
First, Keeping the Peace (1957) developed the idea, first introduced in 1949, of 
widespread politically-motivated, externally supported revolution, which unless 
contained would result in the “complete overthrow of the established government.”48  
Very much reflecting the central theme of the Briggs Plan, doctrine emphasized that 
such a threat “created a problem of maintaining law and order [which] to overcome ... 
requires full scale counter-measures and the closest co-operation between the security 
forces and the civil authorities.”49  Second, Keeping the Peace, formalized the need for 
flexibility, recognizing that troops would generally be outnumbered, “the ability to 
counterbalance this disadvantage depend[ing] on good leadership, training, discipline 
and, in the last resort, skill in using weapons in such conditions as to produce exactly 
the effect which is needed.”50  This was then codified in the principle of Adaptability, 
with its echoes of FSR, when it explained that “there is no place for a rigid mind...  
Although the principles of war generally remain the same, the ability to adapt and 
improvise is essential.”51  Its observations about learning and adaptation is the doctrinal 
startpoint of what Mockaitis was to describe as one of the defining principles of British 
counterinsurgency, Downie puts at the heart of the Institutional Learning Cycle, and 
Nagl identifies as central to British success in Malaya: 
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 Flexibility is also essential since terrorists very quickly learn the tactical 
methods which troops are using against them and take action accordingly.  
Therefore constant changes in method are essential if success is to be achieved.  
This calls for originality and imagination.52
Third, Keeping the Peace (1957) formalized the requirement for a training centre in the 
theatre of operations.  Its responsibilities “to teach the applicable tactical methods and to 
undertake trials and research and evolve new techniques” mirrored JWS exactly, as did 
other possible tasks: 
(a) To run courses to introduce advance parties and newly arrived officers and 
NCOs to the theatre. 
(b) To run periodical discussion groups for military and police officers of 
equivalent rank to build up a pool of expertise and to keep up to date.53 
Fourth, Keeping the Peace (1957) offered much clearer guidance on what it described as 
‘Keeping the Peace in Overseas Dependencies.’ Here it explained a generic form of 
governance and administration in British dependencies, the functions of government, 
and the organization and role of colonial police forces.  Its detailed examination of 
patterns of unrest placed much greater emphasis on the political dimension of civil 
disturbances, insurrection or general rebellion, any one of which might be due to 
“political, labour, religious and racial disputes... attempts to hasten independence and 
self-government... or rebellion against British sovereignty or even westernization.”54  
Whatever the cause and the intention of the unrest, the direction Keeping the Peace 
(1957) then offered is plainly drawn from the Malayan experience: 
The overall responsibility for restoring law and order rests fairly and squarely 
with the civil government, as long as one exists, but the necessary  action needs 
to be initiated and conducted by the civil, police and military commanders 
together at all the appropriate levels.  This can be done at the top level either by 
the appointment of a director of operations or by a form of war council.55
The codification of the need for a director of operations was a major departure from all 
previous doctrine and is clearly taken from the Briggs/Templer model; a conclusion 
reinforced how Keeping the Peace describes the appointment: 
The responsibility for dealing with the emergency may be assumed by a director 
of operations, who is appointed by the governor.  If the governor himself is a 
soldier, he may decide to act in a dual capacity as head of the civil 
administration and director operations.56
Fifth, Keeping the Peace (1957) presented a method to restore “law and order in a 
disturbed area,”57 that contained the essential elements of the tactical approach used in 
Malaya, and which Thompson would later present in his tactical method of Clear-Hold-
Winning-Won.58 This is the method more generally referred to as the Ink Spot or Oil 
Slick method.  ATOM had laid out the basic pattern of framework operations to provide 
routine day-to-day activities such as patrolling, cordons and searches, and ambushes; 
mopping up operations to “complete the destruction and prevent revival” of communist 
terrorists; deep jungle operations to deny terrorists the opportunity to rest and retrain; 
and State Priority Operations and Federal Priority Operations “to exploit 
opportunities.”59  It differs little in principle from Callwell’s approach which was to 
drive an insurrection to failure by taking control of an unstable, insecure area in such a 
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 forceful way that it deprived both the enemy and the local population of the means to 
survive, establishing a network of strong points and operating bases, and using highly 
mobile columns to patrol the area and close with the enemy.60   
Although Keeping the Peace (1957) provided expanded guidance on patrols, searches, 
road blocks, curfews and riot control, it somewhat surprisingly failed to capture the 
overall framework of operations so concisely described in ATOM.  In particular it made 
little mention of any overall plan or the sequencing of activities in relation to campaign 
progress. What it did introduce, however, was the concept of separating the insurgent 
from the population.  This was another crucial step forward in the development 
doctrine.  Having listed the principal reasons why it was necessary to bring an area back 
under government control – a task it acknowledged would require a “high level of 
agreement between civil and military authorities [and]... must be pre-planned in detail 
and in secret”61 – it developed the idea of separating the insurgent from his support: 
(a) Placing an inner cordon round a locality known to contain terrorists, with 
the aim of isolating them in a restricted area in which they can then be 
engaged. 
(b) Raids and searches on villages, etc., suspected of harbouring terrorists. 
(c) The introduction of measures to prevent terrorists obtaining food, clothing, 
medical supplies and money from the local population.62 
Finally, Keeping the Peace (1957) gave some substance to previous doctrinal discussion 
of the psychological dimension of counterinsurgency.  It made the explicit link between 
sustaining British policy with “an efficient information service pursuing a sound, 
constructive and positive programme through the medium of newspapers, broadcasts, 
loudspeaker vans,” and the need to counter “subversive propaganda and agitation.”63  
Crucially, it recognized the insurgents’ need for popular support, from which they had 
to be isolated: 
No subversive or terrorist movement can exist without support from the people. 
The support may be popular and voluntary or it may be involuntary through fear.  
Psychological warfare seeks to deny the movement the support which it 
requires, as well as to undermine terrorist support,64
Keeping the Peace (1957) drew all the recognizable threads of counterinsurgency 
together:  a co-ordinated cross-government, unified plan; sound, integrated intelligence; 
tactical adaptability; recognition of the psychological dimension; and the need to secure 
the population and isolate the insurgent.  Each element had been tried, tested and 
developed in Malaya.  By drawing the lessons from Malaya into general military 
doctrine, and by making clear the procedural and operational benefits of unified 
command, Keeping the Peace (1957) recorded and institutionalized validated best 
practice.  Its use in future operations, however, would depend on the civilian authorities 
to adopt it again.  It was not, given British democratic sub-ordination of the military to 
its government, a model upon which the military could insist.  Here was its weakness:  
the strengths of the approach and the method of command and control may have been 
proven and self-evident but they could only be realized if the civil administration both 
recognized them and considered the doctrinal model was appropriate to its particular 
circumstances.  Successive generations of officers would be taught the value of the 
Briggs/Templer model but there was no apparent requirement for politicians or civil 
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 servants to either know about, or still less resort to a military-fostered idea.  Frank 
Kitson would raise the same theme – educating all those required to plan and conduct a 
counterinsurgency campaign – over twenty years later: 
In this case the problem is more difficult because so many of the people who 
will be most influential in determining success or failure are not in the armed 
forces at all.  They are the politicians, civil servant, local government officials 
and police, in the area where the insurgency is taking place, and, as I said earlier, 
that may be in someone else’s country.  It is difficult to see how they can be 
prepared in advance to exercise the responsibilities that will be thrust upon 
them.65
His solution depended on military doctrine and officers trained in its precepts to keep 
the idea alive.  It did not overcome the problem, however strident officers may be about 
its value, that it depended on civil servants to accept an approach recognized by the 
Army as best practice: 
Service officers must be taught how to fit together a campaign of civil and 
operational measures:  they must know what is needed in terms of intelligence, 
and the law, and of moulding public opinion.  Finally, they must be prepared to 
pass their knowledge on when the need arises and go on agitating for suitable 
action until all concerned are aware of what is required of them – or more 
probably until they are sacked for being a nuisance.66
4.7 1963:  Keeping the Peace – Separating Insurgents from Their 
Support 
The second edition of Keeping the Peace was published in 1963.67  In a two-part 
publication, it developed the main themes of the 1957 edition to present doctrine, tactics 
and training for military tasks which ranged from suppressing an unlawful assembly to 
operations against a Communist insurgency.  It acknowledged publicly, for the first 
time in such doctrine, the value of experience from campaigns in Cyprus, Malaya, 
Kenya and elsewhere in developing the “legal, command and intelligence aspects as 
well as ... current tactical doctrine.”68  Also for the first time, it introduced the term 
‘insurgent’.  In many ways, the 1963 edition was much closer to ATOM in its coverage 
of tactics and training methods, and in the types of operations it described of 
framework, mopping-up, priority and special operations, all of which formed the 
operational framework in Malaya.69   
In general terms, the new edition provided more detail than it did revised thinking.  But 
there was a notable exception.  It showed that thinking continued to develop beyond 
simply dealing with insurgency in purely military terms alone.  Countering insurgency 
was not simply a question of defeating the enemy militarily.  First of all, the population 
had to be brought back under government control and given effective security.  Once 
measures were in place to protect the population, insurgents could be physically 
separated from their supporters, and practical and psychological support, and security 
forces’ efforts could then focus on dealing with the terrorists and dismantling their 
support system.  These steps were made clear in the list of military tasks the doctrine 
now included: 
(b)  To bring areas under military control, thereby providing security for the 
law abiding public and re-establishing its confidence in the administration. 
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 (c) To isolate the enemy from the rest of the community by disrupting all his 
contacts. 
(d) To maintain a continual attack on the periphery of the enemy 
organization to eliminate the rank and file and to open up opportunities for 
deeper penetration.70
The doctrine then developed the concept of separating the enemy psychologically from 
the population.  This would be through the use of strategic and tactical psychological 
operations and military operations intended to consolidate the government’s position “to 
gain the co-operation of the people and to counter enemy propaganda activities, thus 
helping military operations.”  In all cases the aims included: 
(iii) To drive a wedge between enemy elements and the people and to 
develop resistance to the political ideologies of the former. 
(iv) To increase the people’s confidence in the government. 
(v) To encourage active participation in the fight against terrorism.71 
Taken together, the three tasks (a) to (c) and the three aims (iii) to (v) above, describe 
the essence of the military role in counterinsurgency.  Government authority has to be 
re-established in an insurgent controlled area so that the security forces can protect the 
population; the insurgent has to be physically separated from his support, at the same 
time and government action and public information are used to isolate the insurgent 
psychologically from the population.  These ideas would be translated by Bulloch into 
the principles published in Counter Insurgency Operations of ‘Separating the insurgent 
from his support’ and ‘Neutralising the insurgent.’72
4.8 1969:  Counter‐Revolutionary Operations – Doctrine’s 
Expanding Torrent 
British doctrine had one more important step to take.  It resulted in the 1969 edition of 
Counter-Revolutionary Operations.73  If the 1957 edition of Keeping the Peace 
represented a crack in the doctrinal dam, Counter-Revolutionary Operations (1969) was 
the equivalent of what Liddell Hart described as the ‘expanding torrent.’74  It was the 
most comprehensive doctrine the Army had thus far produced and represents the 
doctrinal high water mark of counterinsurgency thinking. Although set against a 
Communist threat, its author recognized that the Communist revolutionary model which 
relied “mainly on popular support for its success... proved successful when it [was] 
correctly used ... [would be] understandably attractive to nationalist leaders who aspire 
to promote revolution ... [but] may not follow communist doctrine exactly.”75  It 
established the “inter-relationship between internal security and counter insurgency 
operations,” and it emphasized the need to understand the threat and the insurgent, the 
value of intelligence, civil affairs, psychological operations, training, air support and 
public relations in every phase of the campaign.76
Previous doctrine had mentioned ‘insurgency’ but without defining the term.  Counter-
Revolutionary Operations (1969) provided a definition which brought together disorder 
and violence with armed force and terrorism, and merged the ideas which doctrine had 
previously kept separate: 
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 A form of rebellion in which a dissident faction that has the support or 
acquiescence of a substantial part of the population instigates the commission of 
widespread acts of civil disobedience, sabotage and terrorism, and wages 
guerrilla warfare in order to overthrow a government.77
It then explained insurgency’s potential causes:  nationalism, communism, racial or 
tribal rivalry, religious differences, maladministration and corruption of government, 
famine and poverty, lack of agricultural, educational and social planning, and eviction 
of foreign troops and bases.78  In recognizing the broad range of possible causes, 
Counter-Revolutionary Operations (1969) identified the need for an equally broad 
response.  A government would therefore have to apply “those military, para-military, 
political, economic, psychological and sociological activities undertaken ... to prevent or 
defeat subversive insurgency, and restore the authority of the central government.”79  
The conclusion to be drawn from this statement is clear:  where government authority 
had waned or been replaced by insurgent control, government authority had to be 
restored.  This would require a political response, within which the military contribution 
was but one, albeit essential part.  In this respect, the definitions of insurgency and 
counterinsurgency show how far British military thinking had matured from the early, 
military-centric doctrine of the inter- and immediate post-war period.  It now clearly 
recognized both the problem and the solution.  The doctrine went further.  In its 
description of the basis for counter insurgency action, it said: 
The aim of our forces is therefore to re-establish stable civil government, which 
at the local level means the normal civil/police system... The major task is the 
re-establishment of a cohesive system of local government rather than the defeat 
of an enemy. 
Individual operations must not only be directed to clearing away insurgents to 
allow the normal civil machinery to operate, but carefully co-ordinated to ensure 
that the results of military action are fully exploited.  In this respect the armed 
forces must be prepared to give positive help on the civil front to fill any 
vacuum that may have been created [by the absence of effective government 
while an area was under insurgent control].80
Counter-Revolutionary Operations’ much more developed understanding of the whole 
political-socio-economic challenge posed by revolutionary warfare was further reflected 
in a new set of principles.  Its preamble to ‘General Principles of Government Action’ 
clarified that counter-revolutionary operations was “not purely a matter of soldiers 
killing insurgents.” Although it did not hint at just how difficult that might be, it 
asserted that counter-revolutionary operations must first contain and then eradicate the 
insurgent movement and its subversive support organization, after which they had to 
“rectify any political and social wrongs.”81  The inference is clear and fundamental to 
the notion of a political rather than a military solution:  successful counterinsurgency 
now no longer meant returning to the status quo ante.  Political change was a 
prerequisite for successful resolution of the problem, and some form of accommodation 
would have to be reached between the protagonists.  Whether the doctrine writer meant 
this inference to be drawn is not clear.  It does not matter.  The acknowledgement that 
part of the counter-revolutionary campaign involved a government rectifying political 
and social wrongs was a considerable step forward in the development of thinking on 
the subject.  Inter-war doctrine, by comparison, made no direct reference to the political 
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 dimension of disorder and armed insurrection or any broad-based approach to it.  
Instead it gave the impression that rebellion would be crushed, its leaders and 
supporters punished, and order restored through military action.   Counter-
Revolutionary Operations (1969) fundamentally changed the Army’s doctrinal position. 
Having established a much more sophisticated approach to military operations, the new 
doctrine introduced principles for government action.  The first principle was the 
requirement for a national plan.  The logic was based on experience:  “The outstanding 
lesson from past revolutionary was that no single programme – political, military, 
psychological, social or economic – is sufficient by itself to counter a determined 
revolutionary movement.”82  This would require passing emergency legislation to 
support the campaign; implementing political, social, and economic measures to “gain 
popular support and counter or surpass anything offered by the insurgents;” setting up 
an effective organization to co-ordinate civil, police and military action at all levels; 
establishing an integrated, national intelligence service, building up the police and 
armed forces; and imposing whatever control measures were necessary “to isolate the 
insurgents from popular support.”83
The second principle was that good government was required.  This recognized that any 
“permanent solution must be based on the provision of good government by an 
administration that is aware of, and in sympathy with, the aspirations of the mass of the 
people.  The importance of this is highlighted by the fact that all measures taken to 
provide good government will be viciously and continuously attacked by the 
revolutionaries.”84  Good government required government action to be co-ordinated:   
The legal government must be firmly established and be seen to govern.  This is 
not always the case, and weak central government is frequently a contributing 
factor to the uprising...  It is the government’s duty to formulate its political aims 
and make them known to everyone.  Without a clearly stated policy, effective 
co-ordinated action is unlikely.85   
It then suggested a wide range of problems that co-ordinated government action might 
have to address.  Once again, when compared with the correct but politically sterile pre-
war doctrine, it is interesting to note how far doctrinal thinking had advanced.  The 
potential problems it identified included the removal of whatever social, political or 
economic grievances rebels used to justify cause, particularly in an inequitable system 
of land tenure; political reform to franchise the population, giving freedom of political 
expression; respect and support for local religions and minorities; an education system 
which was open to all; moulding of public opinion in support of the national 
programme; an amnesty plan for the rehabilitation of surrendered insurgents; and 
ensuring impartial, humane and honest administration of justice.  This was so much 
more than military operations to kill or capture terrorists.86   
The third principle was popular support:  “unless popular support is regained, however, 
purely military actions will fail to have any permanent effect.  The whole national plan 
must therefore be directed to winning this support.”87 There were several aspects to 
this.  The first was the need for the government to communicate effectively with the 
population and for it to “keep its finger on the pulse of public opinion” so that it knew 
of and could address the population’s grievances.  This was coupled to the requirement 
for an effective intelligence service.  Justice was the third factor, with its 
maladministration being cited as a frequent cause for discontent, and the onus was 
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 placed on the government to deal with cases quickly, fairly and publicly.  Finally, the 
doctrine raised the need for the security forces to maintain popular support through their 
efficiency, “their behaviour in the discharge of their duties and in their day-to-day 
contact with the people, and their ability to protect them.”  It would be in these areas 
“that success or failure will rest.”88  These conditions were to form one of the 
fundamentals – the principle of legitimacy – in the U.S. Army’s revised approach to 
counterinsurgency, which its forces put into practice in Iraq through 2007, and proved 
crucial in turning around Iraq’s security situation. 
Counter-Revolutionary Operations (1969) is also significant in that it provided detailed 
guidance on the ink spot method of re-establishing control, first mentioned in 1949.  In 
so doing, it laid the foundations for an approach which would be developed and refined 
in all subsequent doctrine, up to and including Counter Insurgency Operations (2001).  
The method was designed so that operations would systematically regain government 
control of insurgent areas.  The first step was to establish a base and forward operating 
bases, from which the second stage would be undertaken to establish controlled areas.  
Insurgents would then be cleared out, a framework of protective measures would be put 
in place, and “orderly government” re-established.89  This, the doctrine acknowledged, 
would take time and resources, and considerable co-ordination.  However, the method 
had “the great merit of ensuring that a progressively greater part of the nation is freed 
from insurgent influence and, once freed, remained so.”90  The ‘ingredients of success’ 
for this approach were laid out in Part 3-Counter Insurgency.  They included joint civil-
military control, intelligence, seizing and holding the initiative, and the military 
standards of surprise, speed, mobility and flexibility.  The most notable ingredient was 
‘Hearts and Minds’, which were defined for the first and only time in doctrine in 
Counter-Revolutionary Operations (1969).  Although the term was famously coined by 
Templer in Malaya when he argued that “the answer lies not in pouring more troops into 
the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the people,”91 and after which it entered the 
language of counterinsurgency, no-one actually defined it.  The author of Counter-
Revolutionary Operations, however, provided an important link between the expression 
and the twofold aspect of successful counterinsurgency; separating the insurgent from 
his support and neutralizing him, and securing the population and its support: 
Unless the trust and confidence and respect of the people are won by the 
government and the security forces the chance of success is greatly reduced.  If 
the people support the government and the security forces, the insurgents 
become isolated and cut off from their shelter, supplies and intelligence.92
This is the one thread which links a widely used term with British practice.  ‘Hearts and 
Minds’ would become discredited as a result of U.S. policy in Vietnam,93 and did not 
receive any further explanation, if explanation was necessary, in British doctrine.  
Nevertheless, it became synonymous with the British approach to counterinsurgency. 
Counter-Revolutionary Operations (1969) also provided detailed guidance on tactics for 
internal security and counter insurgency.  The former dealt with civil disobedience, 
unlawful assemblies, riots, and armed terrorist activities in urban areas.  Counter 
insurgency doctrine provided guidance on tactics for the wider challenge of 
revolutionary warfare in a rural setting: countering subversive elements, terrorism and 
guerrilla warfare.  Internal security doctrine concentrated on the issues of law and order, 
and the use of force in relation to military operations among the population.  Both rural 
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 and urban tactics were underpinned by the principles for the use of force, drawn largely 
from Keeping the Peace (1963):  justification, prevention, minimum force, compliance 
with the law, safeguarding loyal citizens, maintenance of public confidence, and 
recording accurate evidence. 
Tactics for rural and urban operations were covered in considerable detail.  As with the 
thinking behind the approach in general, the doctrine demonstrates that the Army 
understood the nature of the problem it was facing and knew what to do about it.  The 
issue for those having to use the 1969 doctrine would be the context in which future 
operations would be set.  There is nothing new in this problem, stemming as it does 
from doctrine’s largely backward looking component and its requirement to establish 
enduring principles based on best practice.  The principles presented in Counter-
Revolutionary Operations were sound, were based on careful analysis of successful 
practice, and they remain valid.  The tactics may also have been best practice but they 
were best practice for the campaigns in Aden, Cyprus, Borneo and Malaya.  What the 
doctrine writer could not predict was the context in which such tactics would have to be 
applied in future campaigns.  This may have been acknowledged fleetingly in the 
introduction, which made clear that the doctrine gave general guidance on “the methods 
most likely to be used by the instigators of disorders, revolts and insurgency,”94 but the 
writer could not predict that the next campaign would be within the United Kingdom. 
Critical attention has focussed on the context in which Counter-Revolutionary 
Operations (1969) was set and how incongruous its tactics proved to be in the domestic 
setting of Northern Ireland.95  The photographs and diagrams used to illustrate the 
publication were of Aden, and featured open-topped land rovers, and soldiers in shirt 
sleeves facing hostile crowds.  The section on the legal position of the armed forces 
explained the principles of English law in order to “help... understand local law in 
overseas territories,”96 which, it would appear safe to assume, was based on English 
law.  Annex N provided the sequence of events and words of command for crowd 
dispersal.  It is here that the gap between doctrine – best practice up to that point – and 
the reality of a new environment is most evident.  The sequence followed the principles 
laid out since 1923 of gradual escalation of measures from non-violent methods to 
opening fire.  The non-violent measures described in 1969 included “using loud hailers, 
bugles, banners and powerful public address equipment,” photographing ringleaders, 
and the use of riot control agents.  They also included the “steady advance of a line of 
soldiers with fixed bayonets,” and, reminiscent of Amritsar, the “ostentatious display of 
an armoured vehicle with a machine gun mounted ready for action.”97  If these 
measures failed, the orders for opening appeared to be straightforward: 
(1) Warn the crowd by all available means that effective fire will be opened 
unless the crowd disperses at once.  This can be done by a call on the bugle 
followed be the display of banners showing the necessary warning in the 
vernacular, and an announcement over a loud speaker, megaphone or public 
address equipment. 
(2) The commander of the force personally orders the fire unit commander 
concerned ... to open fire, indicating the target and the number of rounds to 
be fired, which must be the minimum to achieve the immediate aim.98 
116 
 
 4.9 Robert Thompson, Malaya, Defeating Communist 
Insurgency and Counter‐Revolutionary Operations 
After Keeping the Peace was revised in 1963, the next significant development for 
British doctrine was the publication in 1966 of Sir Robert Thompson’s Defeating 
Communist Insurgency.  It became, as Ian Beckett observes, “undeniably influential in 
the British Army’s belated recognition of the need to codify its counter-insurgency 
practice given the increasing prevalence of the global insurgent challenge since 1945.”99  
Thompson was a senior civil servant in the Malayan Government during the 
Emergency, serving first as Briggs’s Staff Officer (Civil) and then as the Permanent 
Secretary of Defence.  As such he was very closely involved with the development, and 
then the conduct of the campaign.  Thompson wrote Defeating Communist Insurgency 
soon after returning from leading the British Advisory Mission to South Vietnam, and 
he based his conclusions on his observations of both campaigns, although he 
acknowledged his book was incomplete, since neither had ended.100
Thompson recognized that the sooner an insurgency was defeated, ideally in its 
subversive stage, the better.  This depended on an effective intelligence system.101  His 
book was “heavily weighted on the administrative and other aspects of an insurgency 
rather than the military,” and so he emphasized the importance of effective governance, 
pointing out that government weakness and poor administration aided the insurgents 
and contributed to the conflict: 
The correction of these weaknesses is as much a part of counterinsurgency as 
any military operation. In fact, it is far more important because unless the cracks 
in the government structure are mended, military operations and emergency 
measures, apart from being ineffectual, may themselves widen the cracks and be 
turned to the enemy’s advantage.102
Thompson’s greatest and most enduring influence, however, was through his five 
principles which “became the centrepiece for British Army thinking.”103  The first four 
were political, in keeping with the bias of the book:104  the government must have a 
clear political aim; it must function in accordance with law; it must have an overall 
plan; priority should be given to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas; 
and in the guerrilla phase, secure base areas first.105  The theme Thompson followed, 
like Callwell and Gwynn before him, was that a counterinsurgency campaign had to 
address the political character of the problem.   
Counter-Revolutionary Operations (1969) reflected Thompson’s thinking in both its 
principles for government action and its observations on effective administration of 
justice.106  In explaining the principle that the government must function in accordance 
with the law, Thompson observed how the Malayan government had modified, adapted 
and developed existing legislation which then enabled it to follow a broad approach to 
deal with the insurgency.  Thompson was adamant that the law “must be effective and 
be fairly applied,”107 that people must be brought to trial quickly to demonstrate justice 
in action, and that detention while a difficult issue was necessary to prevent the 
insurgent from acting.  On the government’s side, Thompson was equally clear that 
officials had to be held accountable for their actions.  Through this the government’s 
position could be maintained, its authority upheld, its reputation safeguarded, and the 
gap between it and the insurgent maintained if not widened.  Without such an equitable 
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 and accountable legal system, he argued, the population would find it difficult to 
differentiate between either side and the insurgent will benefit.108   
Thompson also placed considerable emphasis on intelligence, which he believed was 
central in countering insurgency effectively.  While this had been long recognized in 
doctrine, he made clear how difficult it was to develop good intelligence.  It took a great 
deal of effort in Malaya to both get the organization right and for the police who had the 
lead for intelligence work to gain the confidence of the population and to get 
information which they could then use.  Keeping the Peace noted that 
counterinsurgency was “not purely a matter of soldiers killing insurgents.”  Thompson 
went further: 
‘Let’s go out and kill some Viet Cong, then we can worry about intelligence.’  
This remark by a newly arrived general lends weight to the old gag that there are 
only two types of general in counter-insurgency - those who haven’t learnt it and 
those who never will!109
Thompson recognized that good intelligence increased the tempo of operations and, 
when managed correctly, it would produce a spiral of a increasing number of contacts 
with the population.  These would then provide more information, which in turn would 
allow yet more operations.  The more successful they were, the greater the population’s 
confidence, which would prompt more contacts and more successful operations.110     
The ink spot method had been introduced, albeit briefly, in doctrine.  Thompson’s 
operational concept was based on the method he had helped design and seen used in 
Malaya.  The intention was for the government and its security forces to take control of 
an insurgent-held area, re-establish security and control, and to extend good governance 
to the population.  He described this in a four-stage sequence of Clear, Hold, Winning, 
Won.  Starting on the premise that the government had a plan, it was dealing with 
subversion, and it was operating from secure bases, Thompson’s method started with 
intelligence-led military operations to take control of an area in order to clear insurgents 
from it.  Note the similarity between Thompson’s sequence and that described in 
Keeping the Peace.  Keeping the Peace’s sequence was isolation of a terrorist area, raids 
and searches to force them out, introduction of security measures to protect the 
population, and the gradual removal of restrictions as the population starts to co-operate 
with the government.111  The terms ‘clear’ and ‘hold’ were to be central to the U.S. 
Army’s revised doctrine of 2006: 
For clear operations…the first essential is to saturate it with joint military and 
police forces… ‘Clear’ operations will, however, be a waste of time unless the 
government is ready to follow them up immediately with ‘hold’ operations… 
The objects of a ‘hold’ operation are to restore government authority in the area 
and to re-establish a firm security framework…This ‘hold’ period of operations 
inevitably takes a considerable time and requires a methodical approach and a 
great attention to detail. It never really ends and overlaps into the stage of 
winning the population over to the positive support of the government. ‘Winning 
the population’ can be summed up as good government in all its aspects…When 
normal conditions have been restored, and the people have demonstrated by 
their positive action that they are on the side of the government, then, as the 
government advance has been extended well beyond the area…[it] can be called 
‘white’ [or won].112
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 Thompson’s purpose of writing was “to set out a basic theory of counter-insurgency as 
it should be applied to defeat the threat [of communist insurgency].”113 The assumption 
he made was that such operations would take place abroad.  His principles and his 
method of Clear-Hold-Winning-Won provided a clear, logical framework for a 
government to apply.   
4.10 General Sir Frank Kitson and Low Intensity Operations 
Gen. Sir Frank Kitson was the last major influence on British doctrinal thinking for 
counterinsurgency.  Although best known for his published work – Low Intensity 
Operations, published in 1972, and Bunch of Five, published in 1977 – his innovative, 
often controversial approach was influential from a relatively junior point in his career.  
As might be expected, Low Intensity Operations reflects the key themes of Counter-
Revolutionary Operations (1969), which was the principal doctrine of the day.  The 
doctrine which followed, Counter-Revolutionary Operations (1977), included, as 
Beckett observes, much “more of Kitson’s approach, especially his flexibility, [and] 
which freed the army from its fixation on Malaya.”114  An experienced practitioner, 
Kitson’s principal concerns were with intelligence, psychological operations and the 
need to train and educate soldiers for the complexities inherent in counterinsurgency.   
Bulloch recognized Kitson’s significant contribution to counterinsurgency in Counter 
Insurgency Operations (1995):   
We should acknowledge the work of General Sir Frank Kitson who, during his 
career and in his writings, influenced many with his grasp of the essentials of 
counter insurgency in several varied campaigns during a long period when 
official doctrine lagged behind.115
What Bulloch meant by his last comment is not clear because it is evident from analysis 
of both editions of Counter-Revolutionary Operations that doctrine kept up with both 
new British theories and operational practice.  Nevertheless, Kitson’s influence on 
counterinsurgency doctrine is indisputable.   
As a young captain, Kitson was attached to Special Branch in Kenya in the summer of 
1953, nine months after a State of Emergency had been declared following the Mau 
Mau rebellion.  By his own admission, he had no previous experience of intelligence 
operations, no knowledge of the local language, and no notable aptitude for such 
work.116  Kitson was assigned to what was thought to be a quiet district.  In fact it was 
the Mau Mau heartland, and Kitson soon realized that the conventional military 
approach to intelligence was entirely inappropriate for fighting an insurgency: 
The typical British battalion or company commander’s complaint that he did not 
have any information was based...on his misconception of the nature of 
obtainable intelligence in a guerrilla situation.  He counted on the intelligence 
staff to hand him precise advance knowledge of enemy movements and strikes – 
an impossible feat in this type of war.  He should, instead, have used whatever 
data the intelligence organization could furnish him as only a beginning, and 
then gone on to develop his own, more valuable intelligence from the mass of 
data known or accessible to him  For example, by reviewing past movements 
and actions of the gangs he was fighting, learning some of their tribal customs, 
etc., he could have established certain patterns of behaviour and operations and, 
after checking his theories against simple tangible evidence (such as tracks in the 
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 forest), could have put his patrols out selectively, rather that send them out at 
random or have them scour huge forest areas.117
Kitson noted that his approach of building the intelligence picture from the mass of low 
level information was “regarded as heresy in some quarters,”118 but it was pragmatic 
and it proved effective.  Later, using an idea similar to Orde Wingate’s ‘Night Squads’ 
in Palestine, he achieved considerable success by forming ‘pseudo-gangs’ of former 
Mau Mau fighters to infiltrate, disrupt and spread distrust and fear among active rebel 
gangs.119  Kitson went on to develop his approach to intelligence while serving as a 
company commander in Malaya, working very closely with Special Branch to nurture 
surrendered Communist Terrorists who then led him to locate and then eliminate “two 
communist party branches in a difficult area.”120
Kitson’s work was recognized in the U.S. following the publication of Gangs and 
Countergangs.  In 1963, he took part in a seminal symposium run by RAND as part of 
the Kennedy Administration’s efforts to refocus the U.S. military on counterinsurgency.  
All the participants were experts in the field with proven records of success, one of 
whom was Lt. Col. David Galula, the French officer to whose work the U.S. Army 
would return when it rewrote its counterinsurgency doctrine in 2006.  Kitson’s views on 
the broader approach required in counterinsurgency had quite clearly crystallized by 
then, as he made clear at the symposium “with an emphatic acknowledgement of the 
importance of the political and economic factors, and their inseparability from military 
considerations.”121
It is important to note the prevailing conditions when Kitson wrote Low Intensity 
Operations.  At the start of the 1970s, the Army’s focus was defending NATO’s Central 
Front against the Warsaw Pact, despite its large, growing commitment to Northern 
Ireland, for which there appeared to be no short term outcome.  In broader strategic 
terms, there remained the fear of revolutionary war in Africa and South-East Asia, 
pursued by the superpowers’ proxies.  Against this backdrop, the then Brig. Kitson 
undertook a Defence Fellowship at Oxford, the results of which he subsequently 
published as Low Intensity Operations.  He was concerned that the skills required for 
effective counterinsurgency were so specific that it was unreasonable to expect soldiers 
to pick them up without specific training.  He was right, as the Army’s early 
performance in Malaya demonstrated and later in Northern Ireland would reinforce.  He 
wanted to ensure that the Army’s extensive small wars experience was not lost as it 
concentrated on developing its conventional military skills.    
Kitson’s objective in Low Intensity Operations was to “draw attention to the steps 
which should be taken now in order to make the army ready to deal with subversion, 
insurrection and peace-keeping operations during the second half of the 1970’s.”122  
Kitson proposed radical changes to the Army’s structure, capabilities, training, and 
education to give it the capability necessary to react quickly to an insurgency anywhere 
in the world.  His considered approach brought together his operational experience and 
the intellectual rigour of the Oxford Senior Common Room.  The result was arguably 
the most significant military contribution to British understanding of counterinsurgency 
in the twentieth century, with Low Intensity Operations remaining the principal text of 
the Army’s counterinsurgency education and staff training for the next twenty years.  
In laying out his case, Kitson concentrated on four principal themes:  intelligence; 
organisation for, and the conduct of operations; the propaganda battle; and the special 
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 problems of peacekeeping by a neutral force.  Kitson emphasized the psychological 
aspect of the problem highlighting that “wars of subversion and counter-subversion are 
fought, in the last resort, in the minds of the people.”123   He stressed the importance of 
propaganda in this respect.  While he acknowledged the importance of civilian primacy 
and strong leadership in campaigns when dealing with internal unrest, his approach to 
intelligence was carefully argued but highly controversial.  The received view, 
stemming from Gwynn’s work, was that the police should retain responsibility for 
intelligence operations because they knew the local area and they ought to have an 
intelligence system already in situ.  Kitson argued that the police would be targeted by 
insurgents early in the campaign, thus when the Army had to respond, it would have no 
effective intelligence on which to act.  His proposal was that the Army should train a 
reserve of specialist intelligence officers which would then take charge of all 
intelligence operations in an emergency.124  This was a pragmatic response to what had 
certainly caused considerable problems in Aden, where “the terrorists shrewdly and 
deliberately set out from the start to neutralise the existing (Arab) Special Branch; and 
in this they were successful.”125  As a result, Brig. R. C. P. Jefferies, the last brigade 
commander there, concluded that “no [Internal Security] operations have ever before 
been carried out with so little operational information.”126
Kitson expanded his theories in Low Intensity Operations when he published Bunch of 
Five.  In it, he offered a framework for the planning and conduct of counterinsurgency 
operations, which was intended to allow a government to use military force in support 
of its objectives without damaging its position.  The framework had four closely 
interdependent and intertwined elements: 
...coordinating machinery at every level for the direction of the campaign, 
arrangements for ensuring that the insurgents do not win the war for the minds 
of the people, an intelligence organisation suited to the circumstances, and a 
legal system adequate to the needs of the moment.127
Without such a framework, he recognized, “it is highly probable that the use of force 
will do more harm than good.”128  He also emphasized that all four elements of the 
framework would have to be adapted as circumstances changed.   
Co-ordinated government machinery was needed to create the political conditions to 
enable the government to make best use of its strengths, and to prevent one government 
measure cutting across and disrupting other efforts.  This built on and broadened all 
previous doctrinal discussion of civil-military co-operation, and required vertical and 
horizontal co-ordination and for separate ministries not to cascade information in 
isolation.  Kitson returned to the psychological dimension by emphasizing the 
importance of moulding public opinion.  This required the government to consider 
public opinion constantly and to have the means to monitor and counter enemy 
propaganda.129  Kitson considered the issue to be so important that he suggested that a 
government might have to consider influencing the media either directly or indirectly.  
Such an option, he suggested, would come at a political price because of the impact it 
would have on basic rights and freedoms, and in the long term it could prove politically 
dangerous.  The government had, therefore, to work within the law.  This meant it 
having to decide how to use the law effectively, and how to use such emergency powers 
as were necessary to protect the way the law was upheld and enforced.130
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 Kitson’s final area of influence was education and training, what he highlights as the 
“genuinely educational function of attuning men’s minds to cope with the environment 
of this sort of war.”131  His reasoning was based on experience and personal 
observation: 
Military commanders in counter-insurgency operations cannot do without a real 
understanding of this sort of war in the widest sense.  Traditionally the British 
army has assumed that its officers are adequately trained in all current types of 
warfare, so that successful performance in an operational field has been regarded 
as an adequate reason for appointing a man to command in a different 
operational field.  Unfortunately the level of understanding and training in the 
sphere of counter-insurgency has not always been good enough for the system to 
operate effectively. 132
To deal with this, Kitson concluded it was important that education and training taught 
officers “how to put a campaign together using a combination of civil and military 
measures to achieve a single government aim.”  This included the use of “non-military 
ways of harming the enemy.”133  He went on to explain how officers ought to direct the 
training of soldiers, policemen and locally raised forces and the need for “explaining the 
right sort of tactical framework in which to use the techniques [covered in military 
pamphlets] to best advantage.”134  Finally, he emphasized the training system used to 
teach tactics, which had to select the right lessons to stress, and set the training in such a 
way “that it makes sense in the context of proper handling of information... within a 
realistic and instructive framework.”135  Although his conclusions were based largely on 
his experiences before Northern Ireland, he was not to know that for the first half of the 
1970s at least, officers would be required to rebuild the intelligence apparatus there, and 
adapt from the conventional mindset required on the North German Plain to the 
adaptive, well-trained approach which Low Intensity Operations sought to create. 
4.11 The Influence of Northern Ireland 
The Army’s experience of public disorder and terrorism in Aden strongly influenced the 
tactics published in Counter-Revolutionary Operations (1969).  It was those tactics 
which it quickly realized were inappropriate on the streets of Northern Ireland in 1969.  
The drawbacks of mass arrests, tear gas, and armoured cars to deal with widespread 
rioting quickly became apparent.  On 5 December 1969, Lt. Gen. Sir Ian Freeland, GOC 
Northern Ireland, held a study period to examine and discuss the very considerable 
problems forces faced in Northern Ireland in terms of crowd control, escalation of force, 
the gap between CS gas and opening fire and public relations.  Interestingly, in terms of 
understanding doctrine and the application of best practice, the study period agreed that 
“winning ‘Hearts and Minds’ [was] as vital as winning the tactical battle.”136  In terms 
of doctrine, the study period’s first conclusion amplified the challenge that doctrine 
writers continue to face in reconciling enduring themes with likely future options.  If the 
interpretation of the most likely is wrong, those who have to put doctrine into practice 
will find the gap between theory and reality difficult to close: 
...in Northern Ireland the Army is faced with a situation unlike that previously 
met elsewhere.  There are significant differences in the opposition, the 
circumstances, and the methods and tactics required.  The Army’s previous 
experience, training, and the techniques given in the pamphlets, do not fully 
cover this situation.137
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 For what was to become the 1977 edition of Counter-Revolutionary Operations, 
Northern Ireland became the most important operational influence.138  Given Northern 
Ireland’s profound effect on the Army’s approach to operations, it would have been 
strange had it been ignored.  The campaign’s longevity meant that very many soldiers 
saw service there, and the general tenor of the campaign permeated the whole army.  
The approach followed in Northern Ireland and the tactics and techniques, all of which 
evolved over the years, became institutionally ingrained in a way not seen since Malaya.  
Northern Ireland shaped attitudes among its commanders, and fostered what John 
Kiszely views as a ‘hearts and minds’ approach.139  Although the notion of ‘hearts and 
minds’ was familiar to the Army, drilled as it was into officer cadets at Sandhurst as 
they learnt about Malaya, the approach in Northern Ireland was never labelled as such.  
Indeed if there had been any recognition that ‘hearts and minds’ were important, the 
measures to win them in the early years were at best fitful.  As Kiszely notes, 
It is easy in the light of the later success of this campaign to forget the early 
mistakes that were made, and the time it took to rectify them. Among such 
mistakes were the seemingly unqualified initial support for a highly partisan 
police force, internment without trial, and large (up to brigade-size) cordon-and-
search operations on very   limited intelligence, often at the expense of the 
hearts-and-minds campaign.140
Thornton goes further.  He argues that the Army’s early errors contributed to what 
became a fully fledged insurgency.141  Kiszely suggests that it was not until the Army 
had brigadiers who had been brought up as platoon, company and then battalion 
commanders on the key tenets of Army policy – reassurance, deterrence and attrition142 
– that the value of hearts and minds was fully appreciated and had been assimilated.143  
By that point, ‘Hearts and Minds’ was no longer referred to as such in doctrine. 
While practical experience in Northern Ireland shaped both individuals and the Army as 
a whole, the campaign’s impact on doctrine was surprisingly limited.  For reasons of 
operational security, HQNI made every effort to protect and safeguard its tactics and its 
specialist capabilities.  As a result, very few unclassified records or reports were 
available to the Army as a whole.  By the time DGD&D was established, it could only 
draw on unit-level post-operational reports held by the Tactical Doctrine Retrieval Cell 
(TDRC) at the Staff College, although these were augmented by visits to the Province 
and by the writers’ personal experience.144   
Somewhat surprisingly, Bulloch’s start point, Counter-Revolutionary Operations 
(1977), made no reference at all to Northern Ireland.  In part, this can be accounted for 
by the British Government’s policy to describe the Army’s task in Northern Ireland as 
Military Assistance to the Civil Power (MACP),145 what BMD defined as the provision 
of military assistance,  
in the United Kingdom and Dependent Territories for the direct maintenance or 
restoration of law and order in situations beyond the capacity of the civil power 
to resolve in any other way. The military role is to respond to a request for 
assistance, resolve the immediate problem and then return control to the civil 
power.146
Northern Ireland was not, therefore, viewed officially as an insurgency and, officially, 
there was no call to link a discrete, domestic MACP task with wider, revolutionary 
warfare.  Instead, as Richard Iron observes, the British Government classified the 
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 Provisional IRA as terrorists and followed a strategy of criminalizing the organization 
to undermine its standing.  Whilst that was the Government’s official position, Iron 
more accurately concludes that “PIRA is best characterized as an insurgent group that 
used terrorist tactics.”147  For this reason Bulloch was correct in drawing on the 
experience from Northern Ireland when he drew up Counter Insurgency Operations.  
Indeed he reflects this in the doctrine, noting that the campaign provided many lessons 
to be learnt “because of the similarities between the MACA campaign in Northern 
Ireland and those COIN campaigns which may be conducted elsewhere.”148  
Importantly, however, he also urges caution:   
There are also significant differences [between Northern Ireland and other COIN 
campaigns].  Tactics, which from the perspective of Northern Ireland seem to be 
relics of a colonial past,... may be very relevant in a different operational 
setting.149   
The reverse was also true.  From the perspective of a different operational setting, 
tactics used in Northern Ireland may otherwise have become relics of the past.  While 
this is clearly implicit in the caution Bulloch offers, the tendency the Army showed to 
rely on Northern Ireland was to become contentious with the U.S. military in Iraq from 
2005.  As Thomas Mockaitis observes,  
Although the British ... enjoyed considerable success in countering insurgencies 
from Malaya to Northern Ireland, their approach has become quite controversial 
in recent years. American officers have been barraged with ungenerous, over-
simplified, and often glib comparisons between their supposedly ineffectual 
methods in Vietnam and the allegedly superior British approach employed in 
Malaya.150
4.11.1 Developing Doctrine in Northern Ireland 
Doctrine did not feature at all for the first twenty years of the campaign.  It first 
appeared in 1988 as the reforms instigated by Gen. Bagnall started to take effect.  Until 
then, the GOC and his brigade commanders issued directives and operation orders 
which provided the rationale, gave guidance and laid out the general framework of 
understanding for the campaign.   In the autumn of 1988, however, Lt. Gen. Sir John 
Waters, the then GOC, invited each of his three deputy brigade commanders to 
complete a study.  Col. Bruce Willing, Deputy Commander of 8 Brigade in 
Londonderry, was tasked to look at doctrine.    
Willing produced a very comprehensive report that reviewed every aspect of how the 
Green Army (overt military presence) and the Black Army (covert Special Forces and 
intelligence agencies) should be trained for duty in Northern Ireland, where the training 
should take place, and how the training should be co-ordinated.151  Willing also looked 
at the question of where ownership of doctrine, defined in the study as ‘that which is 
taught,’ should rest.  Willing highlighted that the existing situation was far from 
satisfactory.  Far too many people could claim some form of responsibility.  In theory, 
Northern Ireland doctrine was owned by Headquarters United Kingdom Land Forces 
(UKLF) at Wilton, near Salisbury, but practically all responsibility for it lay with the 
Northern Ireland Training and Advisory Team (NITAT) in Lydd in Kent and its sister 
organisation, the Security Operations Training and Advisory Team (SOTAT) in 
Germany.  The central recommendation was that it all had to be drawn together under 
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 one staff officer (SO2 Pre-Operational Tour Training) in Headquarters Northern Ireland 
who would manage the doctrine on behalf of the GOC.152
This was a major change.  Up to that point, Bryan Watters recalls, whoever commanded 
NITAT, and the instructors there, had the freedom to ‘pop up’ wherever they wished 
across the Province and, particularly after there had been a terrorist-related incident, go 
back and change procedures and tactics.  The reality was that no one actually owned the 
doctrine so ideas ebbed and flowed between the brigades and the training teams on the 
mainland and in Germany, often with little co-ordination between any of the parties 
involved.153  Willing recommended that all the doctrine should be collected from the 
brigades – each of the three brigades developed tactics and procedures that best suited 
its area of responsibility, so that there was a clear urban-rural and Londonderry-Belfast 
divide – along with the training notes produced by NITAT and SOTAT, and placed 
under the central control of HQNI. 
Waters accepted many of Willing’s recommendations and decided that he, as GOC, 
would take ownership of the doctrine.  SO2 Pre-Operational Tour Training would be 
responsible for its management.  The resulting Northern Ireland Standing Operating 
Procedures (NISOPs) were the first theatre-level doctrine in the campaign.  Signed off 
by the GOC, they covered the full range of staff responsibilities and procedures,154 and 
it included a classified NISOP that covered covert operations.  The NISOPs were not 
written from scratch but drew together the existing tactics taught by NITAT and 
SOTAT, which were published in NISOP Vol. 3.  This volume became the basis of 
what NITAT and SOTAT taught, in exactly the same way that in Malaya the Jungle 
Warfare School taught ATOM.   
The policy was now clear.  Doctrine, in the form of NISOPs, was that which was taught, 
and instructors, however well-intentioned, could no longer simply make things up.  
Where a need to change was identified, either by the resident brigades, or at NITAT, or 
as a result of terrorist actions, a recommendation would be made to HQNI where the 
proposal was examined in the context of the problem and the range of responses 
available.  What in the past might have resulted only in a change to tactics or procedures 
could now result, with HQNI’s oversight and ownership, in a much broader range of 
responses.  These included changes to organizations, training, tactics, equipment, 
weapons or the intelligence collection plan.  This new approach also allowed a greater 
exchange of information between overt and covert forces to ensure that a change in 
PIRA’s tactics or weapons, identified by either party, was not missed or dealt with in 
isolation.155  The development of NISOPs is another very good example of how 
effective establishing clear theatre-level responsibility can be for the development of 
doctrine, the standardization of training and the collection, validation and dissemination 
of lessons and best practice.  
While Northern Ireland’s influence on the Army became increasingly evident, 
particularly in terms of its counterinsurgency tactics, its approach to decentralized 
command, its emphasis on junior leadership, and its effective low-level training,156 
surprisingly little from Northern Ireland carried across into conventional campaign 
planning and management.  This could well be due to the surprising fact that the 
campaign had little to offer in formal planning terms, since “at no stage in the campaign 
was there an explicit operational level plan as would be recognised today.”157  Indeed, 
“below the level of Westminster White Papers there was no clearly-articulated strategy, 
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 or view of the future and how to achieve it which involved all the relevant agencies.”158  
As the Army gained confidence with its new doctrine, so its central tenets started to 
carry across into the campaign in Northern Ireland. 
4.11.2 Introducing the Army’s Doctrine to Northern Ireland 
A further important step was taken in 1992 when the then Brig. Alistair Irwin (later Lt. 
Gen. Sir Alistair Irwin, and GOC Northern Ireland) took command of 39 Brigade in 
Belfast.  Having been a student on HCSC No. 3 and then Colonel HCSC (a post which 
had responsibility for developing higher level doctrine) he was well versed in Bagnall’s 
doctrine and the operational level of war.159  On arrival in Belfast Irwin discovered that 
the system for directing the campaign was somewhat different from the doctrine for 
campaigning and mission command laid out in doctrine and then taught at the Staff 
College:   
I had no sooner sat down behind my desk than I asked the chief of staff to 
produce my orders from the GOC. He looked rather startled and departed at 
speed. Much later he shamefacedly returned literally blowing dust off a 
document called the Northern Ireland Operations Order. It was definitely a pre-
HCSC document for it instructed me and the other brigade commanders to do 
specific tasks, down to providing four men and an NCO to guard the entrance to 
the BT exchange building in the heart of Belfast. There was no hint of the 
context or of the effects that we were supposed to be achieving. In the written 
document there was no way of knowing whether for example we should be 
conciliatory or uncompromising in our activities, much less what was the 
ultimate aim.  In the same vein I inherited a set of brigade orders for the units 
under my command that were themselves a mere list of tasks, despite my 
predecessor in command having been a graduate of HCSC No 2!160
Irwin rewrote his brigade directive, making explicit reference in it to the Army’s extant 
Tactical Doctrine Note on Mission Command, and using ‘underlying principles’ to set 
military operations in the right context.  His principles emphasized the joint nature of 
operations; the complementary campaign goals of attrition and deterrence of the 
terrorists and reassurance of the public; that all operations are intelligence-based; the 
need for the rapid passage of information on an all-informed basis; the supreme 
importance of good community relations; the essential need to operate within the law; 
and the careful consideration of aspects of public information.  Finally, Irwin underlined 
the importance of conducting all operations as taught and practiced during pre-
deployment training.161  Irwin summarized the effect of introducing a doctrine-based 
approach: 
The appearance of these directives was an important element in the process of 
lifting the eyes from the day to day tactical issues and taking a longer view more 
consistent with the concept, if not the reality, of a campaign plan. It was a move 
in the right direction but did little to remove the curious fact that the British 
Army’s longest ever continuous campaign has been conducted without a plan.162
In due course HQNI produced its own operational directive which reflected the Army’s 
doctrine and subsequently shaped doctrine for operations within the Province.  From 
1994 until the end of the campaign each successive GOC produced a directive, in one 
form or another, that actually and genuinely influenced the way that everyone down to 
individual members of foot patrols carried out their duties.163
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 4.11.3 Applying Doctrine on Operations 
Throughout 1995, the arrival in Northern Ireland of staff officers or commanders trained 
at the Staff College helped to build on the doctrinal reforms prompted by Irwin.  They 
were imbued with the manoeuvrist approach, the philosophy of mission command, and 
the framework of Deep, Close and Rear operations.  They soon found that planning 
techniques intended for general operations were equally applicable to operations in the 
Province.  For example, an analysis method called Intelligence Preparation of the 
Battlefield, and a range of associated decision-making tools, quickly helped to improve 
already well-established mechanisms to co-ordinate and synchronize intelligence and 
surveillance assets, and ground and airmobile forces in the event of an incident or in a 
deliberate intelligence-led operation.   
Just as the campaign’s extensive influence on the Army affected Bulloch’s 
counterinsurgency doctrine, so the Army’s new doctrine started to influence the whole 
approach to the Northern Ireland campaign.  Far from being a series of abstract 
concepts, ADP Operations showed itself to be of genuine value when applied in 
Northern Ireland.  Furthermore, Counter Insurgency Operations (1995)’s re-
interpretation of the operational framework of Deep, Close and Rear operations in the 
context of counterinsurgency had practical relevance.164
4.12 Distilling the British Approach to Counterinsurgency 
This analysis of British counterinsurgency doctrine supports Bulloch’s view that at 
every stage, it was the product of an evolutionary process.  As such, for the most part, 
the themes of each successive publication have been logical when held up against the 
principal, often varied threats the Army faced, sensible in terms of the size of Britain’s 
armed forces at the time, relevant to its capabilities, and sensible in terms of the defence 
policy of the day.  The generally accepted approach to writing doctrine, examined in 
Chapter 2, and followed more recently by DGD&D, was to take enduring principles and 
the current best practice, to set them against the threats faced, and to write doctrine 
which dealt with what was known and what could be predicted.  Every doctrine writer 
might reasonably claim that this is what they achieved.  In this sense, the evolutionary 
approach to doctrine has served the Army well.  It is generally agreed that the British 
Army developed a sound philosophy for counterinsurgency.  But how could its 
approach be characterized, given that each manual was a product of its time, and each 
reflected contemporary influences and thinking of the day?  Is it possible to distil a 
‘British Approach’?   
The analysis presented in the chapter of the doctrine publications has identified the step 
changes made as doctrine evolved.  The first was the codification of the principle of 
minimum force in 1923.  The second important step was the acknowledgement in 1949 
that insurgency and revolution were politically-motivated.  The third major step was for 
doctrine to crystallize the principle of separating insurgents from their support in 1963, 
and the fourth step was to take account of the whole political-socio-economic problem 
posed by revolutionary warfare in 1969.  With each step came a change in the principles 
for counterinsurgency.  Table 3 (over) lays out those principles as they have developed 
since 1909 and is drawn from analysis of each publication which was undertaken as part 
of this thesis.  While each set of principles differs from manual to manual, when taken 
as a whole, a remarkable homogeneity in the themes that run through British Doctrine 
can be recognized.  
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Table 3 - The Evolution of Principles for Counterinsurgency 
Source: Author. 
 Several principles, such as intelligence, co-ordination, and political primacy, appear 
more than once, underlining their continuing importance.  Others, particularly those of 
the more general military application, make a fleeting appearance before being 
subsumed into the general text.  Nevertheless, together, they represent the essential 
elements of the British approach to counterinsurgency.  If duplicate references are 
removed, and closely-related principles are grouped together, the real value of the 
Kitson framework and Thompson’s principles becomes clear.  Where some of the early 
manuals listed what may be more accurately termed imperatives, Kitson and Thompson 
provide the central themes for a campaign, under which more general imperatives sit.  
Table 4 (below) shows how the reorganized principles fall into place. 
Political Primacy and Political 
Aim 
The government must have a clear political aim  
Civil authority must retain primacy 
There must be a clear national plan  
Longer Term Post-Insurgency Planning  
Give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the 
guerrillas 
Forces must be aware of the political situation 
Co-ordinated Government 
Action 
Establish co-ordinated machinery at every level for the 
direction of the campaign  
Ensure close co-operation between Civil and Military 
authorities  
Maintain effective intercommunication between departments 
and agencies 
The Law Maintain a legal system adequate to the needs of the moment  
Function in accordance with law  
Intelligence Set up an intelligence organisation suited to the circumstances 
Integrate Intelligence 
Understand the background to the unrest  
Identify the dissident elements 
Have good topographical knowledge of the area of operations 
Maintain a deeply rooted sense of the importance of security  
Employ effective security measures 
Separate the Insurgent from his 
Support 
In the guerrilla phase, secure base areas first 
 
Maintain Public Confidence Ensure that the insurgents do not win the war for the minds of 
the people 
Foster strong and popular Security Forces 
Safeguard civilians 
Security forces must maintain discipline 
Use the minimum force necessary  
Use publicity and counter-propaganda to influence  
public opinion 
Maintain relations with the Press 
Neutralize the Insurgent Ensure there is adequate provision of forces  
Forces must remain adaptable 
Location of Forces  
Maintain Offensive Action 
Ensure forces have mobility  
Maintain surprise 
Education and Training Ensure forces are trained for the theatre of operations 
Table 4 - The Essence of the British Approach 
Source: Author. 
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 From Table 4 it is possible to conclude that the British approach recognizes the political 
and psychological dimensions to the problem; the fact that there is no purely military 
solution to it; and that security operations require excellent intelligence, judicious use of 
force, and effective communications with those in the theatre of operations, regional and 
international audiences, and those at home.  The eight principal themes are as follows: 
Political Primacy and Political Aim.  The government must have a clear 
political aim, the civil authorities must retain primacy, priority must be given to 
defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas, there must be a clear 
national plan which should take account of longer term post-Insurgency 
conditions, and security forces must be aware of the political situation. 
Co-ordinated Government Action.  Co-ordinated government machinery must 
be established at every level for the direction of the campaign, close co-
operation is required between Civil and Military authorities, and effective 
intercommunication must be maintained between departments and agencies. 
The Law.  Maintain a legal system adequate to the needs of the moment, and the 
government and its agents must function in accordance with the law. 
Intelligence. An intelligence organisation must be set up suited to the 
circumstances to integrate intelligence into the co-ordinated government 
response.  Counterinsurgents must understand the background to the unrest, 
identify the dissident elements, have good topographical knowledge of the area 
of operations, maintain a deeply rooted sense of the importance of security and 
employ effective security measures. 
Separate the Insurgent from his Support.  In the guerrilla phase, secure base 
areas first.  This theme is closely linked to the next. 
Maintain Public Confidence.  Ensure that the insurgents do not win the war for 
the minds of the people, foster strong and popular Security Forces, and 
safeguard civilians.  Security forces must maintain discipline, and use the 
minimum force necessary to achieve their objectives.  Effective publicity and 
counter-propaganda are necessary to influence public opinion, and security 
forces must maintain relations with the Press. 
Neutralize the Insurgent.  The government must provide adequate forces.  
They must remain adaptable, maintain offensive action and surprise, and be 
mobile. 
Education and Training.  Ensure forces are trained for the theatre of 
operations. 
These eight themes encapsulate the British doctrinal approach to counterinsurgency and 
provide the framework against which Counter Insurgency Operations and the British 
campaign in Iraq can be analyzed.  In the light of events in Iraq, was the guidance 
provided in Counter Insurgency Operations therefore valid? 
                                                 
1 Bulloch, “The Development of Doctrine for Counter Insurgency – The British Experience”, p. 21.  
2 Callwell, Small Wars, p. 21.   
3 Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies, p. 35. 
130 
 
                                                                                                                                                
4 Callwell, Small Wars, p. 25. 
5 FSR, 1909, p. 171. 
6 Callwell, Small Wars, p. 23. 
7 Duties in Aid of the Civil Power, 1923, p. 3. 
8 Thomas Mockaitis, British Counter-Insurgency in the Post-Imperial Era, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1995, p. 2.  His other principles were civil-military co-operation and tactical flexibility. 
9 Thornton, “Historical Origins of the British Army’s Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist 
Techniques”. 
10 Duties in Aid of the Civil Power, 1923, p. 7. 
11 Counter Insurgency Operations, p. B-3-14. 
12 Srinath Raghaven, “Protecting the Raj: The Army in India and Internal Security, c. 1919-39”, Small 
Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 16, No. 3, December 2005, p. 257. 
13 Ibid, p. 258. 
14 National Archive, CAB/24/105, Indian Disturbances. Conclusions of the Indian Disorders Committee, 
6 May 1920, p. 2. 
15 Hew Strachan, The Politics of the British Army, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 169. 
16 Thornton, “Historical Origins of the British Army’s Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist 
Techniques”, p. 43. 
17 Hew Strachan, (ed.), Big Wars and Small Wars: The British Army and the Lessons of War in the 20th 
Century, London:  Routledge, April 2006, p. 9. 
18 Caroline Elkins, “Royal Screwup”, The New Republic, 19 December 2005.  See also Caroline Elkins, 
“The Wrong Lesson,” The Atlantic Monthly, July/August 2005, pp. 34-36. 
19 Christopher A. Bayly and Timothy N. Harper, Forgotten wars: freedom and revolution in Southeast 
Asia, Harvard, CT:  Harvard University Press, 2007, pp. 449-450. 
20 Huw Bennett, “The Other Side of the COIN:  Minimum and Exemplary Force in British Army 
Counterinsurgency in Kenya”, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 18, No. 4, December 2007, pp. 638–
664. 
21 War Office Manual 1307, Notes on Imperial Policing, London:  HMSO, 1934. 
22 Gwynn, pp. 13-14. 
23 Ibid, p. 5.  Emphasis added. 
24 Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-insurgencies, p. 44. 
25 Notes on Imperial Policing, 1934, p. 5. 
26 Ibid, 1934, p. 5. 
27 Ibid, 1934, p. 7. 
28 War Office Code 8439, Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power, London:  The War 
Office, 1949, p. 4. 
29 Ibid, p. 5. 
30 Ibid, p. 6. 
31 Ibid, p. 7. 
32 Ibid, 1949, pp. 7-9. 
33 Ian F. W. Beckett, “Robert Thompson and the British Advisory Mission to South Vietnam, 1961-
1965”, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol.8, No.3, Winter 1997, p. 44. 
131 
 
                                                                                                                                                
34 ATOM, Chapter II.  See also Federation of Malaya, Report on the Emergency in Malaya from April, 
1950 to November, 1951 by Lt. Gen. Sir Harold Briggs, Kuala Lumpur:  Government Press, 1951; 
Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960, New York: Crane, Russak, 1975. 
35 Daniel Marston, “Lost and Found in the Jungle: The Indian Army and British Army Tactical Doctrines 
for Burma, 1943-45 and Malaya, 1948-1960,” in Strachan, Big Wars and Small Wars, p. 97 
36 Riley Sutherland, Army Operations in Malaya, 1947-1960, Santa Monica, CA:  RAND, Prepared for 
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs, September 1964, p. 27. 
37 See Raffi Gregorian, “‘Jungle Bashing’ in Malaya: Towards a formal Tactical Doctrine”, Small Wars 
and Insurgencies, Vol. 5, No. 3, Winter 1994, pp. 338-359. 
38 Sutherland, Army Operations in Malaya, p. 56. 
39 Gregorian, p. 346. 
40 Maj. Scott R. McMichael, A Historical Perspective on Light Infantry, Fort Leavenworth, KS:  U.S. 
Army Command Staff and General College, Combat Studies Research Paper No. 6. September 1987, p. 
97. 
41 Richard Stubbs, “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds:  The Evolution of British Strategy in 
Malaya 1948-1960”, in Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, (eds.), Counterinsurgency in Modern 
Warfare, Oxford:  Osprey Publishing, April 2008, p. 125. 
42 Report on the Emergency in Malaya, p. 3.  See also Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, p. 
234. 
43 Report on the Emergency in Malaya, p. 5. 
44 Ibid , p. 7. 
45 Marston, “Lost and Found in the Jungle”, p. 103. 
46 HQ Malaya Command, The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya, Malaya Federation:  
Kuala Lumpur, Federal Director of Emergency Operations, 1952, Third Edition, 1958, Foreword.   
47 Gregorian, p. 350. 
48 War Office Code 9455, Keeping the Peace (Duties in Support of the Civil Power), London:  The War 
Office, 10 April 1957, p. 2. 
49 Ibid, p. 2. 
50 Ibid, p. 3. 
51 Ibid, p. 38. 
52 Ibid, p. 38 
53 Ibid, p. 39 
54 Ibid, p. 30. 
55 Ibid.  Emphasis in original. 
56 Ibid, p. 31. 
57 Ibid, p. 54. 
58 Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, pp. 111-114. 
59 ATOM, p. 7. 
60 Callwell, Small Wars, pp. 131-4. 
61 Keeping the Peace, 1957, p. 54. 
62 Ibid, p. 55. 
63 Ibid, p. 50. 
64 Ibid, p. 52. 
132 
 
                                                                                                                                                
65 Kitson, Practical Aspects of Counter Insurgency, p. 14. 
66 Ibid.  
67 War Office Code 9800, Keeping the Peace (Duties in Support of the Civil Power), Part 1-Doctrine, and 
War Office Code 9801, Keeping the Peace (Duties in Support of the Civil Power), Part 2-Tactics and 
Training.  London:  The War Office, 1963. 
68 Ibid, Part 1, p. viii. 
69 Ibid, Part 1, p. 27. 
70 Ibid, Part 1, p. 31. Original paragraph numbering. 
71 Ibid, Part 1, p. 66. Original paragraph numbering. 
72 Counter Insurgency Operations, 1995, p. B-3-2. 
73 Army Code No 70516, Land Operations Volume III, Counter-Revolutionary Operations - Part 1-
General Principles, Part 2-Internal Security, and Part 3-Counter Insurgency, London:  by Command of the 
Defence Council, 1969. 
74 “If we watch a torrent bearing down on each successive bank or earthen dam in its path, we see that it 
first beats against the obstacle, feeling and testing it at all points.  Eventually it finds a small crack at 
some point. Through this crack pour the first driblets of water and rush straight on.  The pent-up water ... 
pours straight through the breach [and] expands to widen once more the onrush of the torrent. Thus as the 
water pours through in ever-increasing volume the onrush of the torrent swells to its original proportions, 
leaving in turn each crumbling obstacle behind it.”  Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, The ‘Man-in-the-Dark’ 
Theory of Infantry Tactics and the ‘Expanding Torrent’ System of Attack, Presented on Wednesday, 
November 3rd, 1920, published in The RUSI Journal, February, 1921, p. 13. 
75 Counter-Revolutionary Operations, 1969, Part 1, p. 1. 
76 Keeping the Peace, 1963, Part 1, p. 2. 
77 Ibid, Part 1, p. 4. 
78 Ibid, Part 1, p. 17. 
79 Ibid, Part 1, p. 3.  Emphasis added. 
80 Ibid, Part 3, pp. 2-3.  Emphasis added. 
81 Ibid, Part 1, p. 41. 
82 Ibid, Part 1, p. 41. 
83 Ibid, Part 1, p. 41. 
84 Ibid, Part 1, p. 41. 
85 Ibid, Part 1, p. 41. 
86 Ibid, Part 1, p. 42. 
87 Ibid , Part 1, p. 41.  Emphasis added. 
88 Ibid, Part 1, p. 44. 
89 Ibid, Part 1, p. 87. 
90 Ibid, Part 1, p. 87. 
91 Richard Stubbs, Hearts and minds in guerrilla warfare: the Malayan emergency, 1948-1960, Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 1989, p. 2. 
92 Counter-Revolutionary Operations, 1969, Part 3, p. 4. 
93 See Stephen Biddle, “Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon”, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006, p. 3. 
94 Counter-Revolutionary Operations, 1969, Part 1, p. 13. 
95 Strachan, Big Wars, Small Wars, p. 10. 
133 
 
                                                                                                                                                
96 Counter-Revolutionary Operations, 1969, Part 2, p. 73. 
97 Ibid, p. 103. 
98 Ibid, p. 103. 
99 Beckett, “Robert Thompson and the British Advisory Mission to South Vietnam, 1961-1965”, p. 43. 
100 Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, p. 10. 
101 Ibid, p. 50. 
102 Ibid, p. 52. 
103 Bulloch, “The Development of Doctrine for Counter Insurgency – The British Experience”, p. 23. 
104 Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, p. 10. 
105 He acknowledged that his suggestion of the clear political aim – “to establish and maintain a free, 
independent and united country which is politically and economically stable and viable” – might be too 
broad.  Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, p. 51. 
106 Counter-Revolutionary Operations, 1969, p. 41. 
107 Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, p. 53. 
108 Ibid, p. 53 
109 Ibid, p. 83. 
110 Ibid, p. 89. 
111 Keeping the Peace, 1957, pp. 54-55. 
112 Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, pp. 111-112. 
113 Ibid, Preface. 
114 Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies, p. 225. 
115 Counter Insurgency Operations, 1995, p. iii. 
116 Lt. Col. Frank Kitson, quoted in Stephen T. Hosmer and Sibylle O. Crane, Counterinsurgency:  A 
Symposium, April 16-20, 1962, Santa Monica, CA:  RAND, 2006, p. 136. 
117 Kitson, in Hosmer and Crane, p. 127. 
118 Ibid. 
119 See Kitson, Gangs and Countergangs.  See also Lawrence E. Cline, Pseudo operations and 
counterinsurgency: Lessons from other countries, Carlisle Barracks, PA:  Strategic Studies Institute, 
2005.  Cline raises the risks of clandestine operations acting too much like guerrillas and acting outside 
the law, particularly with regard to human rights. 
120 Supplement to The London Gazette, 23 May 1958, p. 3238. 
121 Hosmer, p. 123. 
122 Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, p. 2. 
123 Ibid, p. 78. 
124 Ibid , pp. 189-191. 
125 Julian Paget, Last Post:  Aden 1964-67, London: Faber & Faber, 1969, p. 150. 
126 Brig. R. C. P. Jeffries, “Operations in Aden – Some Infantry Lessons”, The Infantryman, No. 84, 
November 1968, p. 19. 
127 Kitson, Bunch of Five, pp. 290-1. 
128 Lt. Gen. Sir Frank Kitson, Operational Aspects of Counter Insurgency, Kermit Roosevelt Lecture 
delivered May 1981, Upavon:  Tactical Doctrine Retrieval Cell:  Annex B to DCinC 8109 dated 11 Jun 
81, p. 5. 
134 
 
                                                                                                                                                
129 The term propaganda, which today has unpalatable associations with state control, is no longer used 
but the requirement to inform key audiences quickly, accurately and effectively does.   
130 Kitson, Bunch of Five, pp.284-289. 
131 Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, p. 165. 
132 Kitson, Bunch of Five, p. 301. 
133 Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, p. 166. 
134 Ibid, p. 167. 
135 Ibid, p. 167. 
136 Minutes of a Study Period held by Lt. Gen. Sir Ian Freeland, KCB, DSO, GOC Northern Ireland, 5 
Dec 69, Upavon:  TDRC, 00456, p. 33. 
137 Ibid, p. 2. 
138 Grant and Bulloch, interviews. 
139 Kiszely, interview. 
140 Lt. Gen. Sir John Kiszely, “Learning About Counterinsurgency”, The RUSI Journal, December 2006, 
p. 18. 
141 Rod Thornton, “Getting it Wrong: The Crucial Mistakes Made in the Early Months of the British 
Army’s Deployment to Northern Ireland - August 1969 to March 1972”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 
Vol. 31, No. 1, February 2007, pp. 73-107. 
142 Operation Banner, p. 2-15. 
143 Kiszely, interview. 
144 Bulloch, interview, Enford, 2009. 
145 Operation Banner, p. 4-12. 
146 BMD, 1996, p. 2-5. 
147 Richard Iron, “Britain’s Longest War”, in Marston and Malkasian, p. 276, Note 3. 
148 Counter Insurgency Operations, p. B-2-1. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Mockaitis, The Iraq War, p. 11 
151 At that time all Northern Ireland training was co-ordinated by a retired officer working in HQ UKLF 
in Wilton. 
152 Col. Bryan Watters, interview with author, Warminster, 30 January 2009.  Watters served in 
Headquarters Northern Ireland as SO2 Pre-Operational Tour Training between December 1988 and 
January 1990 and wrote the first operational standing operating procedures for Northern Ireland. 
153 Ibid. 
154 The staff divisions of the time covered responsibilities as follows:  G1 Personnel and Administration, 
G2 Intelligence, G3 Operations and Training, G4 Logistics and G5 Civil-Military Relations and Public 
Information.   
155 Watters, interview. 
156 Grant, interview.  Operation Banner, p. 4-7. 
157 Operation Banner, p. 4-4. 
158 Ibid, p. 8-3. 
159 Irwin’s lectures to HCSC on operational art and campaign planning were subsequently published.  See 
A. S. H. Irwin, The Levels of War, Operational Art and Campaign Planning, The Occasional, Number 
14, Camberley:  Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1993. 
135 
 
                                                                                                                                                
160 Irwin, interview. 
161 Idem. 
162 Lt. Gen. Sir Alistair Irwin, The Campaign in Northern Ireland: The Challenges of Command, paper 
presented to the Oxford Leverhulme Changing Character of War Programme, All Souls College, Oxford, 
1 November 2006. 
163 Ibid.  The significance of this change in the philosophy of command was confirmed by Gen. Sir Roger 
Wheeler, who was GOC Northern Ireland in 1995.  Interview with author, Warminster, 29 June 2009. 
164 Counter Insurgency Operations, 1995, pp. B-2-10-11. 
136 
 
 5 British Operations in Iraq 2003‐2009 
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the course of British operations in Southern Iraq 
so that the validity of counterinsurgency doctrine can be determined. It has to be made 
clear from the outset that Iraq poses a difficult theory/practice divide:  the level of 
understanding and application of warfighting doctrine seen during the invasion was not 
mirrored in subsequent post-conflict operations.  In this sense, the chapter judges a 
much less clearly defined application of a coherent doctrine than might be generally 
expected.  For the sake of clarity, a chronological approach will be followed.  The 
overview of the campaign the chapter provides will highlight how the dynamic strategic 
and security situation influenced the British approach. 
Each TELIC deployment provided a divisional headquarters which formed 
Headquarters Multinational Division (South East) (HQ MND(SE)) and a manoeuvre 
brigade.  The sequence became desynchronized as the campaign progressed.  For 
TELICs 3-5 and 8, the divisional headquarters were ad hoc.  Unusually for an enduring 
campaign of this sort, each deployment brought with it a new interpretation of the 
threat, the military problem faced and the response required.  One senior officer 
remarked in 2007, “HQ MND(SE) is pretty well bedded-in by now but, each time a new 
commander comes in, it has to change direction.”1  Past campaigns had been 
characterized almost from the start, and each characterization has experienced little 
reinterpretation.  In Malaya the campaign was countering Communist Terrorism, Kenya 
was countering a tribal rebellion, and Northern Ireland was MACP.  The same was not 
true with Operation TELIC.  The reasons for this are complex and relate to command 
and control arrangements between the home base and the theatre of operations, and – 
perhaps surprisingly given the emphasis the Army placed on it – mission command.  
These will be examined in the thematic analysis in Chapter 6 which will use the 
principles of British counterinsurgency and the doctrinal approach which were 
identified and examined in Chapter 3.  
The issue of characterization is important, particularly if Clausewitz’s dictum is 
accepted that,  
The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman 
and commander have to make is to establish … the kind of war on which they 
are embarking, neither mistaking it, nor trying to turn it into, something that is 
alien to its nature.  This is the first of all strategic questions and the most 
comprehensive.2
Whether the British operation in Iraq was viewed as nation-building, stability operations 
or counterinsurgency, the fact remains that almost from the start, and to the end of 
British operations, clearly identifiable organizations emerged which posed a threat and 
which fell clearly into the category of insurgency.  These were minority groups “within 
a state ... intent on forcing political change by means of a mixture of subversion, 
propaganda and military pressure aiming to persuade or intimidate the broad mass of 
people to accept such a change.”3  Of course, this definition is drawn from that first 
coined in Counter-Revolutionary Operations (1969), which focussed on a form of 
guerrilla warfare intent on overthrowing a government.4  While it assumed a single 
insurgency, this was not the case in Iraq.  In the absence of an Iraqi government capable 
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 of implementing a national development and security plan, and with limited security 
forces to contain and control the security situation, by 2005 a number of powerful 
insurgent groups had emerged.  Each had its own objectives, but not all were intent on 
overthrowing the nascent GOI, indeed some were linked directly with Iraqi ministries or 
with provincial councils.  Whether insurgents fought from within the GOI or against it 
and against the Coalition forces, they all sought first and foremost to secure and 
maintain their position, the power they held, and their influence.  These were entirely 
predictable Iraqi responses to changing political conditions.  As Charles Tripp suggests, 
the history of Iraq, 
is in part a history of the strategies of cooperation, subversion and resistance 
adapted by various Iraqis trying to come to terms with the force the state 
represented.  It has also been a history of the ways the state transformed those 
who tried to use it.5
By introducing violence into the political arena, the presence of insurgent groups 
defined the character of the problem British forces faced.  The “Peacekeeping Trinity, 
[of] consent coupled with the linked principle of impartiality and limits on the use of 
force,”6 may have been relevant the early months of the British presence in Iraq, but the 
threat posed by insurgents, and the actions required to deal with it ultimately required 
classic counterinsurgency more than a revisionist view of peace support which was 
based on the peculiarities of the Balkans model. 
As the campaign unfolded, at some point all the insurgent groups took up arms against 
the Coalition presence, for the most part with ever-increasing levels of violence and 
sophistication.  The turning point in the campaign came with the bombing of al-Askari 
Mosque in Samarra on 22 February 2006 by AQI, after which insurgents turned on rival 
religious and ethnic sects within the Iraqi population.  The result was a bloody civil war 
and the level of violence increased dramatically.  Sectarian intimidation and killings 
spiralled out of control and the worsening situation took the U.S.-led strategy of 
transition (handing over to Iraqi control at the earliest opportunity and withdrawal; 
referred to as ‘standing down as they stand up’) to the point of defeat.  In December 
2006, realization that defeat loomed prompted a complete reversal of policy by 
President Bush.  In a matter of weeks, the U.S. approach flipped from transition to one 
of securing the Iraqi population in order to create the political space for the GOI to 
establish its political legitimacy and efficacy with the Iraqi people.  A further 30,000 
U.S. troops were sent to Iraq over the summer of 2007 and, under the leadership of 
Ambassador Ryan Crocker and Gen. David Petraeus, the implementation of a 
comprehensive, cross-government counterinsurgency campaign plan based on the U.S. 
military’s new counterinsurgency doctrine, combined with the effects of a widespread 
Sunni rejection of AQI and a surge of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), brought violence 
under control, and set the scene for first local and then national political progress.   
As Coalition military operations in Iraq developed from 2003, the view gradually 
changed within the Army of what the British force in Iraq was there to do.   Initially it 
was Nation-Building.  By January 2005 the Army’s official view, reflected in 
DGD&D’s analysis of Operation TELICs 2-5,7 was that it was conducting Stability 
Operations, seeking to “impose security and control over an area while employing 
military capabilities to restore services and support civilian agencies.”8  The authors of 
Stability Operations in Iraq could not ignore, however, insurgency as a growing 
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 problem, and in 2006, as U.S. policy and practice turned towards counterinsurgency, so 
too did the British view.  Maj. Gen., later Lt. Gen. John Cooper was the first GOC in 
Basrah to define the campaign as one of counterinsurgency.9  His successor, Maj. Gen. 
Richard Shirreff agreed, but by early 2007 the problem had been redefined more as 
criminality than insurgency.  Nevertheless, for the last two years of the campaign those 
taking part saw it as a counterinsurgency, even though it was missing the key 
ingredients of a co-ordinated political, military, economic and information campaign, 
and the efforts made to develop the Iraqi Army proved to be disappointing. 
5.1 Warfighting and Nation‐Building 
On Monday 11 May 2009 British forces conducted their final combat mission in 
southern Iraq, escorting the last convoy of 20 Armoured Brigade’s heavy military 
equipment in a move south from the Contingency Operating Base (COB) in Basrah, 
across the border into Kuwait.  It brought to an end the British part of a campaign which 
started on 20 March 2003, when the U.S.-led coalition launched its offensive from 
Kuwait to remove Saddam Hussein from power and to secure weapons of mass 
destruction.10  The campaign finished in 2009 in a manner which could not have been 
predicted even as late as March 2007, with British forces operating confidently 
alongside the Iraqi Army to secure the population, with local support, and the streets of 
a Basrah firmly under the control of the GOI.  This outcome was certainly very different 
from that which seemed likely by 2005.  Early Iraqi support for the Coalition presence 
evaporated once the political landscape solidified, and ethnic and sectarian groups 
resorted to violence to secure their survival and to advance their various interests.  As 
the campaign developed, British forces faced increasingly more violent opposition from 
Shi’a militants at the same time as expectations in Whitehall grew for a quick handover 
to ISF and a withdrawal from Iraq.  British force reductions were not matched by 
increasing ISF capacity and capability, and the spiralling violence and increasing militia 
control over the population in Southern Iraq eroded Iraqi support for the British 
presence.   
In March 2003, in a blitzkrieg advance up the Euphrates river valley, which embodied 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s vision of military transformation, Rapid 
Decisive Operations and ‘Shock and Awe’,11 U.S. ground forces quickly overwhelmed 
those elements of the Iraqi Army which stood and fought.  Those which did not, melted 
into the population to undertake initially sporadic but increasingly more violent guerrilla 
attacks on the occupying forces.  By 4 April, U.S. forces had seized the outskirts of 
Baghdad and the International Airport, and on 6 April British forces entered Basrah, 
their principal objective.  Within a week, the first UK-Iraqi joint police patrols took 
place in the city. 
This part of the operation was an impressive demonstration of U.S. military prowess, 
and the U.K. contribution was notable for how quickly it deployed to Kuwait and the 
way it carried out its task of securing Basrah.  The Secretary of State for Defence 
announced as late as 18 December 2002 that the UK would contribute a divisional-sized 
land force to any operation in Iraq.  Deployment of land forces was authorized on 20 
January 2003 and by the time British ground operations started on 20 March, some 
46,000 personnel from the three services and a huge range of equipment and materiel 
had been deployed to the theatre of operations.12  After securing the al-Faw peninsula, 
and Umm Qasr, Iraq’s only deep water port, 1 (UK) Division first isolated then took 
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 control of the city of Basrah through raids to eliminate enemy strong points and strong 
fighting patrols.  Organized resistance quickly collapsed, and although looting and 
rioting followed, “order was slowly imposed, with assistance from the majority of the 
population.”13
The decision for British forces to take responsibility for the Basrah sector in the south 
east emerged late in 2002 from planning at CENTCOM, where British officers had been 
embedded since 2002, and from discussions between the Pentagon and MoD.14  Maj. 
Gen., later Lt. Gen. Robin Brims,15 commanding 1 (UK) Division, used a textbook 
manoeuvrist approach to isolate Basrah.  From the start, he and his brigade commanders 
recognized that the active support of the Iraqi population would be crucial to the success 
of the post-war phase of operations.  They adopted an unconventional approach,16 first 
isolating Basrah, and did not enter the city until the regime in Baghdad collapsed.   
Brims’ aim was to “destroy the regime and drive a wedge between the regime and the 
ordinary people... these were people who wanted us to come in, they wanted to be freed 
but they could not do it themselves, they needed our support.”17
On 1 May, President Bush announced the end of major combat operations in Iraq, 
acknowledging that “We have difficult work to do in Iraq. We are bringing order to 
parts of that country that remain dangerous.”18  Post-conflict operations were planned to 
first stabilize, then develop a secure and stable country, and finally to complete the 
transition from coalition control to a peaceful, self-governing Iraq.  Pre-war 
assumptions about the state of Iraq’s civil administration and the efficacy of the Iraqi 
Police Service (IPS) were flawed,19 and early decisions by the Coalition Provincial 
Authority (CPA), in particular Paul Bremer’s decision on 23 May 200320 to disband the 
Iraqi Army, exacerbated security problems across the country.  The Coalition force, 
designed for and successful in the combat phase of the campaign, proved to be too small 
and incorrectly postured for the complex challenges of post-conflict stabilization.21  In 
the political and security vacuum of the weeks and months which followed the end of 
major combat operations, armed groups emerged to oppose the Coalition and to secure 
their own position and interests:  Former Regime Loyalists (FRLs), seeking to return the 
Sunni Ba’ath Party to power, and militant Shi’a groups, of which Moqtada al Sadr’s 
Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) and the Iranian-backed Badr Corps.  Within weeks Foreign 
Fighters (FF) started to move into Iraq to join al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and the largely 
Sunni FRLs. 
On 10 July 2003, 1 (UK) Division handed over to 3 (UK) Division in Basrah, with the 
latter forming the new HQ MND(SE).  As such it was part of the U.S.-led Coalition 
campaign which, from 15 June had been under the command of Lt. Gen. Ricardo 
Sanchez and U.S. Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7), based in Baghdad.  
MND(SE) had its own area of operation (AO) made up of al Basrah, Maysan, Dhi Qar  
and al Muthanna provinces.  Mission command had to be used extensively, supported 
by written directives, because many of the unit areas of operation were so large that 
there was no other way of running the operation.  Commanders had to use their 
initiative.  One commanding officer noted that, “I had such a large AO – the size of 
Northern Ireland – that I could not have controlled it directly even had I so wished.”22  
Another noted that,  
I was effectively the Military Governor and my focus thereafter was to try to 
shape the operation by dealing with the influential people in the local area, 
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 reforming local security organisations and institutions and using my forces to 
support my intent.  With a battle group of 1200 people and with a local 
population of 800,000 the only way I could operate was with the consent of the 
people.  You had to use an indirect approach and kinetic effects were not always 
the best or indeed only method. Unlike during warfighting operations, I knew 
that we had to achieve effect in a different way and there was a need to engage 
with the local people.23
MND(SE) worked alongside Coalition Provisional Authority (South) (CPA(S)) to 
deliver CJTF-7’s four lines of operation:  Security, Economy, Essential Services and 
Governance.  Andrew Garfield considers that the British commitment in these areas was 
limited, “necessitated as much by a lack of resources and waning public support for the 
war as ... by greater realism based on experience and a better military appreciation of 
challenge.”24    Herein lay a major problem:  CPA(S) did not have enough suitably 
qualified people, and HQ MND(SE) was drawn inexorably into all the major aspect of 
the campaign to make up for CPA(S)’s shortfalls.25  The absence of an effective civilian 
organisation and civilian leadership, expertise or financial assistance, forced additional 
responsibilities onto the shoulders of military officers who found themselves involved 
with projects and tasks that crossed all four lines of operation.  Colonels, for example, 
were put into the field as de facto provincial governors, units started projects to re-
establish local businesses, and the principal military engineer first created and then ran 
the Emergency Implementation Plan.   
Lt. Gen. Sir Graeme Lamb, then a major general and commanding MND(SE), recalls 
that “there was no one else in theatre but the military and so I worked on first principles.  
My priorities were to deliver operational success, allocated from within the resources I 
had been provided, disassemble the problem, reassemble the solution and crack on.”26  
Lamb identified two important aspects that should underpin the operation.  The first was 
“to give the Iraqi people a better life,” and the second was that to leave in a timely 
fashion.  In all matters, therefore, ‘adequate’ was good enough.27  Within a few days of 
arriving, FRLs had started to make their presence felt.  More disquietingly, early Iraqi 
expectations about what the British operation would do for them were still unfulfilled.  
Lt. Gen. Brims later recalls that a good deal of effort had been spent before the invasion 
in trying to convince the people of Basrah that the British operation was intended to free 
them from the Ba’athist regime, and therefore was not targeted at them.  The Iraqis were 
told that they would be helped if they co-operated with British forces.  In Brims’ view, 
Britain’s inability to deliver on promises made undermined the credibility of further 
British promises.28
5.2 The Honeymoon Ends 
20 Armoured Brigade replaced 19 Mechanized Brigade in November 2003, for TELIC 
3, and a composite staff replaced HQ 3 Div as HQ MND(SE).  The signing of UNSCR 
1511 in November, some fifteen days into the tour, authorized the transfer to an Iraqi 
Transitional National Assembly on 30 June 2004.  This significantly changed the 
emphasis for operations, providing a date on which effort could be focused, and a 
tantalizingly short planning horizon for the end of the campaign.  Over the autumn of 
2003 the threat from FRLs was largely contained, and this provided the opportunity to 
concentrate effort elsewhere.  20 Brigade’s mission was adapted to reflect the new 
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 emphasis, with it conducting security and stabilization operations to create the 
conditions for the transfer of civil authority and control to the Iraqis.29
Operations in Iraq during TELIC 3 proved to be varied and challenging.  The first two 
months of the campaign were dominated by counterterrorist operations against the FRLs 
and Foreign Fighters.  The middle two months concentrated on building capacity in the 
Iraqi Security Forces and wider Iraqi institutions in a period where consolidation was 
possible because of the success of what were termed Counter Terrorist operations.  The 
final two months were dominated by the rise in short term high intensity operations 
against the Shi’a militias.  Such rapid changes in role and focus demanded a great deal 
of flexibility from those involved, because tasks switched from supporting local 
political leaders, to working with the Customs Authorities, to training the police.  At the 
same time the security situation remained highly volatile, and the use of force was 
necessary, ranging from firing baton rounds to dealing with public disorder to full scale 
company-level combined arms operations to defeat an insurgent threat. 
HQ 20 Armoured brigade developed a plan using four lines of operation.  These were 
designed to defeat the threat from terrorism, build the capacity of Iraqi security 
institutions (also known as Security Sector Reform (SSR)), improve the security 
situation to a level the Iraqis could manage, and build a sustainable environment.  These 
tasks were underpinned by the enduring requirement to secure the consent, support and 
trust of the population.  The overall intention was to create competent Iraqi institutions, 
which in due course would be able to operate in support of a ‘tolerant and pluralist 
society.’30
Commanders recognized very early in the campaign that building the capacity of Iraqi 
security institutions through SSR would be the key part of the overall exit strategy.  
Although the longer term structure of Iraq’s security forces had yet to be determined, 
there was sufficient information to enable some safe working assumptions to be made.  
The principal assumption was that as the ISF stood up, so Coalition Forces could stand 
down.  No real consideration seems to have been made about what would happen if the 
ISF proved incapable of handling the security situation without multinational support. 
In the Basrah and Maysan provinces four principal organizations emerged:  the Iraqi 
Armed Forces (IAF); the Iraqi Police Service (IPS); Border Enforcement Forces 
(including customs, immigration, the Iraqi Riverine Police Service (IRPS) and border 
guards); and the Iraqi Civil Defence Corps (ICDC).  20 Brigade established three 
principles which were later to be incorporated into new tactical doctrine for SSR: 
The starting point was not to impose our own solution, but rather to examine 
what was there before, and if it was adequate and acceptable, build on it as 
appropriate.  It is pointless to put something in place that is culturally or 
economically unsustainable in the longer term. 
It was necessary to make the space for the Iraqis to take responsibility for 
themselves.  This meant taking risks, putting an Iraqi face up front wherever 
possible, and gradually allowing control to pass. 
We needed to encourage them to decentralize and share control – for this was 
probably the most effective means of persuading their institutions to be 
accountable to the population.31
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 The plan recognized that defeating the threat from terrorism was the main way to free 
up military support for the other lines of operation.  Using deterrence, disruption and 
demonstrations of capability, and by trying to be as unpredictable as possible – all 
proven techniques from Northern Ireland – British operations achieved enough freedom 
of action to allow other operations to continue.  Maj. Gen. Nick Carter, then the Brigade 
commander, recalls that the threat started to change:   
The FRL were always present and their presence manifested itself in roadside 
bombs.  My Chief of Staff ran operations against them in a classical Northern 
Ireland interpretation, using intelligence-led operations to target FRL.  The 
result was they were effectively suppressed and clever control measures, for 
example, of ingress into and egress out of Basrah, closed them down.32
It was during 20 Armoured Brigade’s tour that the insurgency really took hold, albeit 
that the first major attack, that of five vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices 
(VBIEDs) used to attack five separate police facilities in and around Basrah, was 
believed to be the work of AQI.  Carter suggests that previous experience and 
perceptions, rather than a genuine understanding of the character of the problem, served 
to limit not enable thinking about its true character and the general approach it would 
require: 
The trouble was that our approach had been muddled by experiences in Bosnia 
and Kosovo.  They shaped our understanding of what we thought was meant by 
Peace Enforcement.  The result was that we entered Iraq on reconstruction 
terms, with reconstruction and SSR in mind, and techniques and style more 
applicable to peacekeeping.  We therefore lurched into counter insurgency, 
having thought that the odd IED was nothing more than a blip in what was to be 
a longer term reconstruction campaign.33
An important development in the security situation occurred in late March 2004.  Since 
April 2003, Ahmid Hassim observes, the Shi’a were prepared to challenge the authority 
and legitimacy of the Coalition and the Sadrist movement, led by Moqtada al-Sadr, had 
been its most vociferous critics.34  The Sadrists had a political wing, the Office of the 
Martyr Sadr (OMS), and a militia (JAM).  First it declared Sadr City, the huge Shi’a 
slum in Baghdad, a no-go area for the Coalition, then it started to establish alternative 
councils across the south of the country, and at al-Rafi in Dhi Qar, Sadrists forced the 
district council to resign at gunpoint.35  On 28 March, U.S. forces closed down the 
OMS newspaper and arrested a senior Sadr aide.  Sadr’s response was to instigate an 
uprising across Southern Iraq, with violence breaking out in Kufa, Karbala, Najaf and 
al-Kut.36  The uprising had little effect when it broke in Basrah on 3 April 2004, where 
JAM was in a minority, its leadership fragmented, so the situation was quickly brought 
back under control by the Coalition.  Importantly, local leaders still held sway, and this 
was something Carter was able to exploit: 
We spent a great deal of time working up a local solution whilst combating 
disruptive armed action by the militia with force.  Remember that we were still 
in the early stages of the campaign and force protection was not a constraint, so 
we used local leaders to exert influence.  This was important and we had an 
effective dual track approach that was definitely British in character.37
The situation was not restored so easily in Maysan, 200 kilometres north of Basrah.  
With a population of over one million almost entirely poor, rural Shi’a, Maysan had a 
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 history of militancy, and it had long seen itself as what Michael Knights and Ed 
Williams describe as “an unruly bastion of local power brokers.”38  
Operations in Maysan were acknowledged by successive commanding officers to be an 
economy of force mission in order to allow the political and economic development of 
Basrah and the eventual UK withdrawal.39  This stretched battlegroups, whose 
commanding officers found themselves having to work with the CPA headquarters in 
dealing with provincial-level matters, and company commanders having to train the 
IPS, run civil-military co-operation tasks, and conduct security operations.  It left 
battlegroups with little immediate capacity to respond to sudden changes in the 
situation, and the by now institutionalized reluctance to recognize the problem for what 
it was, and the insistence on seeing the Iraqi problem in terms of Northern Ireland or the 
Balkans exacerbated the problem.  An outgoing Commanding Officer remarked that the 
replacement battlegroup kept saying, ‘It’s just like Kosovo.’   He was clear that it was 
not:  “You are misappreciating the situation if you try to import a model from 
somewhere else.  You have to take each situation as you find it and adjust your 
procedures and your mindset to make it work.”40  The author of Field Service 
Regulations in 1909 made the very same point:  the universality of principles required 
them to be adapted to circumstances, not necessarily the development of a wholly new 
approach. 
Carter summarizes the British approach over the first year in the south as one based on 
“the appropriate use of force, the desire to find political outcomes wherever possible, 
engagement with the population and local opinion formers, the desire to pull it all 
together holistically.”  These tenets were very much in keeping with the traditional 
British approach, reflected in doctrine since 1963.  Unfortunately, unlike Malaya or 
Northern Ireland, they were undermined, he concluded by a “complete incapacity to 
have or support non-kinetic effects [so-called ‘soft’ effects], and a complete failure to 
provide continuity.”41
5.3 Peace Support Operations and the Sadrist Uprising 
In April 2004, 1 Mechanized Brigade replaced 20 Armoured Brigade.  The summer 
period saw both the Transition of Authority to the Iraqi Interim Government, and two 
upsurges in violence, largely as result of American actions against AQI in Fallujah and 
JAM in Najaf.  In addition the nominally undeployable Land Warfare Centre 
Battlegroup, 1st Battalion The Black Watch (1 BW), deployed to Iraq in October as the 
Divisional Reserve and was subsequently sent north into the U.S. AO to support 
operations to clear Fallujah of AQI and Sunni insurgents.   
From May 2004, the JAM uprising in Maysan intensified.  Later, the Army would 
generally agree that during the summer in Iraq the 1st Battalion the Princess of Wales’ 
Royal Regiment (1 PWRR) Battlegroup, stationed in Maysan, faced the most constant 
period of combat of any British Army unit since the Korean War.  Richard Holmes 
records 1 PWRR’s hard fought experiences in Iraq in Dusty Warriors.42 1 Mechanised 
Brigade fired more small arms ammunition than 7 Armoured Brigade did during the 
invasion of Iraq, and more in six months than the British Army as a whole did in thirty 
years in Northern Ireland.  The 1 PWRR Battlegroup in Maysan Province was involved 
in over one hundred contacts (armed incidents) in one day alone, and close to nine 
hundred over the tour, including gun battles which lasted hours and over seven hundred 
mortar or rocket rounds fired at it.43   
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 The defence of CIMIC House by Y Company during August was most notable.  Attacks 
were “daily, intensive and unrelenting... The Company’s patrols were attacked 87 times 
between April and July... CIMIC House... received over 165 mortar rounds, either in the 
compound or within 300 metres, during 79 separate indirect attacks.”44  Another 
company in Basrah faced what was described subsequently as the most violent single 
contact of the period, with one soldier killed in action, the Company Commander and 
Company Sergeant Major being severely wounded and several others wounded.  In al 
Amarah, C Company took twenty-five per cent casualties in the first seventeen days of 
the tour and every single man who deployed with 1 PWRR was in some form of 
contact. 45
For most of 1 Mechanised Brigade’s tour, military operations focussed on SSR and this 
was the main effort throughout.  This was despite the Army having no formal doctrine 
or conducting any training for it.  Indeed, debates continued in the UK, in Whitehall 
among government departments, and within the Army, about what constituted SSR.  
Units were still required to conduct operations across all four lines of operation – 
security, governance, economy and essential services – as part of the overall brigade 
plan.  Tasks included the re-supply of vulnerable outstations and operations to re-
establish freedom of movement and the rule of law.  The range of activities required 
soldiers to conduct traditional security operations as well as acting as diplomats, local 
administration advisors, infrastructure consultants and economic development advisors, 
all through an interpreter.  The intensity of violence met in some engagements, and 
which followed deliberately planned actions was more characteristic of warfighting than 
the generally low tempo, low intensity character of operations in Northern Ireland or the 
Balkans.  Nevertheless, the need to maintain and build the consent of the local 
population remained a central underpinning theme, as it had been throughout the 
campaign.46   
Despite the intensity of much of the fighting, and in contrast with Carter’s considered 
post-tour view that the campaign had already become one of counterinsurgency, the 
general view was that operations “were fundamentally Peace Support in nature. 
Superimposed on this was a counter insurgency campaign, which ran throughout the 
tour, conducted for the most part with the co-operation of ISF.”47  This point made by 1 
Mechanized Brigade at the end of its tour goes some way to reinforce that made by 
Carter that the Balkans experience had pre-conditioned attitudes which then did not 
match the circumstances individuals found in Iraq.  Counterinsurgency, in the context 
that 1 Mechanized Brigade used the term, was the direct action taken against insurgents; 
disruption, deterrence and dislocation.  It was not the broad-based, cross-government 
response British counterinsurgency doctrine explained.  While there is nothing 
intrinsically wrong in what the following Commanding Officer says, the context in 
which his comments were set was one of insurgency and counterinsurgency.  What is 
missing is mention of the insurgent threat and the underlying political, economic and 
social problems that had spawned it:  
There is a difference in approach between warfighting and Peace Support 
Operations (PSO).  In warfighting... success is measured in the number of 
objectives seized and the number of enemy destroyed.  In PSO success is 
measured in the amount you have reduced your profile and the extent to which 
you have handed over your tasks to civilian agencies. In PSO you are intuitively 
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 seeking to use less force and seeking an alternative approach (other than kinetic) 
as the operation matures; this is in line with your exit strategy.48
5.4 Elections and SSR 
4 Armoured Brigade took over from 1 Mechanized Brigade on TELIC 5 in November 
2004.  It was a very different phase of the operation, with two distinct stages: the run up 
to and the staging of Iraqi legislative elections in January 2005, and the subsequent 
post-election period where SSR, which took second place to security during the election 
period, once again became the priority.  The level of violence against Coalition Forces 
was markedly less than experienced by the previous brigade:  
When my predecessor arrived, there had been a clash of strength, and de-
escalation was just not an option. His taking on the Muqtada al Sadr Militia 
created the operational pause I needed to begin to develop SSR.  The handover 
between us also served to provide an opportunity for the militia to change tack, 
without losing face.49  
This pause in insurgent activity, and the stringent approach to training taken by the 
Brigade Commander on safe driving and weapon handling, meant that 4 Brigade 
returned without suffering a single fatality during the tour.   
Despite SSR being the declared Main Effort, SSR training had still not been codified in 
doctrine so units resorted to first principles.  Building the IPS capability proved 
troublesome, with the lead having been given to the FCO.  Central direction for the 
training, equipping, organising and mentoring of the IPS was minimal and this raised 
questions about the appropriateness of the model for Iraqi governance and 
administration UK policy was pursuing:  
The way in which the FCO and the Civil Police were given the lead for Police 
Reform was nonsensical.  The Iraqi Police Service was not anything like a 
European Police Force; it was a Middle Eastern paramilitary organisation, 
unworried by political correctness and facing Middle Eastern problems in a 
harsh operational environment.  Our Police advisors, whose support in the UK 
has often been outsourced to contractors for some time, have no experience of 
building up something from scratch and running it themselves, across the 
spectrum of infrastructure, communications, equipment maintenance and 
personnel and career development.   Their relevant operational expertise is also 
questionable.50
Concerns also started to emerge about the state of intelligence training, organisation, 
targeting and equipment.  Targeting training still focussed on the business of dropping 
bombs, rather than arresting terrorists, and the absence of an intelligence database to 
optimise collation, along the lines developed over the years in Northern Ireland, was a 
concern.  There seemed to be little actionable intelligence available and much of what 
did arrive came from single sources, and therefore was often difficult to corroborate: 
Generally, I don’t think that we actually knew much about what was happening 
in Iraq, or indeed just outside the gate for that matter; from the day-to-day 
pattern of life, to the darker side of the insurgency.  We tended to be launched on 
single-source intelligence, which sometimes proved to be accurate, and 
sometimes not.51
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 It was not just in the area of intelligence that shortcomings in manning and selection 
became apparent.  The system of augmentation for HQ MND(SE), which it will be 
recalled was an ad hoc organization after HQ 3 (UK) Division left in November 2003, 
was seen by senior officers to be flawed, particularly for often very important staff 
appointments:  “We had no British staff-trained SO2s [majors] in the Headquarters 
when I arrived, and it was more like a Volkssturm Headquarters, manned by people with 
the weakest penalty statements.”52  This was in stark contrast to the U.S. which used 
fully formed and trained corps and divisional headquarters to provide HQ MNC-I and 
its subordinate divisional HQs, moved to twelve-month, later eighteen, tours in 2004, 
and ended mid-tour handovers for those in key appointments. 
Maj. Gen., later Lt. Gen. Jonathon Riley, retitled his appointment from GOC MND(SE) 
to the U.S. term of Commanding General so that it could be better understood by the 
American chain of command.  He also reorganised his command to interface better with 
the Iraqi civilian structures: 
We needed to align ourselves with the provincial level of government; that is 
where everything comes together; the governors, councils, security committees, 
IECI (Independent Electoral Committee for Iraq), police chiefs, Iraqi brigade 
commanders and the emergency services.  I aligned one of my manoeuvre 
formations to each province, and then resourced them proportionately.  There 
was no civilian equivalent of Divisional Headquarters, and that would mean that 
there were to be few decisions for me to take.53
He also created a Divisional Support Command to deal with the non-linear nature of the 
battlefield and to provide logistics units with the firepower and manoeuvre elements to 
conduct effective combined arms logistic operations.  Up to that point, logistics units 
had struggled because they did not have the training or weapons to carry out anything 
more than self-defence.  Riley’s Support Command organization allowed his logistics 
commander to provide complete sustainment across the division:  
There are really only two ways of addressing the want of self-defence training of 
CSS troops: one is to train them harder, the other is to mix them with combat 
troops.  We did the latter, by the creation of the Divisional Support Command, 
consisting of Combat, Combat Support and Combat Service Support troops, 
which provided a good model for the future; it is very efficient and empowering 
for a logistic lieutenant colonel or Brigade Commander to be given what is 
effectively an all-arms command.54
As a result of the financial rules imposed by Whitehall, relatively inexpensive yet 
important CIMIC tasks were not fully funded properly, a major drawback given the 
value placed on ‘buying consent’: 
I needed really big levers in the Reconstruction domain in order to buy the 
necessary influence to achieve SSR and attack the terrorists.  MND(SE) staff 
were sometimes slow to secure sufficient resources for me and were reluctant to 
cede control when they did; I was not authorised to spend more than $10,000, 
which doesn’t buy you lunch in Basra.  We have abrogated responsibility for 
Reconstruction to DfID, who are constitutionally really only interested in 
developmental projects, rather than in buying influence.55
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 The preparation and planning for the elections were initially carried out by the ISF, with 
Coalition support, which involved, and then handed over the process to the Iraqi civilian 
authorities.  The fact that the elections actually took place, and were successful, did not 
seem to surprise MND(SE).  The ISF performed well making the elections work, and 
ISF competence and enthusiasm surprised many commanders and mentors: 
We were guilty of underestimating what the Iraqis were capable of doing.  They 
made their plans, delivered the ballot papers, set up the polling booths, collected 
all of the papers in, counted them, in the dark (power failure) and ran the whole 
thing.  That was quite an eye-opener.56
It was during this stage in the campaign that MND(SE) developed the concept of 
Transition, to codify the transfer of security responsibility from the Coalition to the ISF.  
It was born out of Riley’s experience of SSR with the U.S. in Baghdad and Afghanistan.  
Until a formal plan was put together that explained how SSR and the withdrawal of 
forces were linked, he considered that the British approach was open to criticism and 
misinterpretation.  Commanders in Basrah had identified almost from the start of the 
campaign that SSR was the principal way to affect the withdrawal from Iraq and this 
meant building security sector capacity so that the Iraqis could provide their own 
security.  Riley asked MNC-I and PJHQ what was to happen after the elections and, 
crucially for the UK, how could PJHQ repudiate any accusations that the British force 
was one of occupation.  To assist them, he proposed the concept of Transition, one 
which mapped out the transfer of responsibility from the Coalition to the ISF, and 
managed the attendant risks.  These included what would happen if the ISF could not 
cope in the short term, how much Coalition support might be available, how long would 
it take the Coalition to respond?  Riley’s plan recognized the complexity of the 
problem: 
SSR leads to transition, it is not just train and equip, rather it is the creation of 
institutions that can train and equip their own people, administer and support 
them.  So there will be inevitable tensions as the emerging institutions battle to 
establish themselves and impose their authority and there are considerable but 
necessary risks to be taken to achieve a functioning, self-sustaining 
government.57
These tensions between an emerging ISF responding to increasing sovereign 
responsibilities and ambitions, and the Coalition were to continue to influence decisions 
in Basrah and Baghdad until the end of the campaign.  They proved inherently difficult 
to manage. 
5.5 Early U.S.‐UK Tensions 
In the wider context of the campaign, the relatively benign security state in the south 
allowed development and governance to advance at faster rates than elsewhere in Iraq.  
British officers working in Baghdad in 2004 and 2005 noted an increasing U.S. 
irritation that MND(SE) did not seem to fully appreciate the scale of the American 
commitment, and the scale of effort and intensity of operations being conducted in the 
centre, in the so-called Sunni Triangle and the north.  The biggest area of irritation came 
from an apparent British arrogance over the American approach to operations; the ‘we 
know better and we can do it better.’58  Some misunderstandings and tensions inevitably 
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 followed as attempts were made to highlight the strengths of the so-called British way 
to American allies.  Thomas Mockaitis notes that, 
American officers [were] barraged with ungenerous, over-simplified, and often 
glib comparisons between their supposedly ineffectual methods in Vietnam and 
the allegedly superior British approach employed in Malaya. Similar 
comparisons between the British army’s handling of Basra and the U.S. 
military’s alleged mishandling of the far more challenging Sunni triangle [made] 
American officers understandably resistant to what they [saw] as ‘more British 
tripe.’59
The issue came to a head in February 2006 when the U.S. Army’s Military Review 
published a paper by Brig. Nigel Aylwin-Foster in which he critically assessed U.S. 
military culture.60  The paper, written when Aylwin-Foster was at RCDS, was published 
at the direction of its editor to prompt internal discussion.  Some believe it was 
published on Gen. Casey’s direction.61  Aylwin-Foster, who had served on the 
headquarters staff in Baghdad, commented on the difficulties the U.S. Army appeared to 
experience in non-combat operations, such as counterinsurgency.  Its publication 
prompted an immediate outcry in the U.S. military.62  Ironically, the controversy over 
one view that the U.S. Army had failed to respond effectively to the challenges of Iraq 
captured prime news slots on the day that Gen. Petraeus co-chaired a workshop of 
human rights groups, government officials, representatives of international and non-
governmental organisations, anthropologists and military officers gathered to examine 
the U.S. Army’s thoroughly revised and overhauled counterinsurgency doctrine. 
In Iraq, misunderstandings and tensions extended to SSR and generated some friction.  
However this needed to be balanced against MND(SE)’s determination to advance SSR 
activity as the conditions allowed and its perception of U.S. priorities: “Looking up, our 
inability to convince Corps to allow us to continue to accelerate ahead of the rest of the 
country acted as a brake.  The American perspective was that they had first to resolve 
military problems like Fallujah, before progressing with SSR.”63  MND(SE)’s 
dissatisfaction with the amount it was receiving eventually became an issue within the 
MNSTC-I staff.  The then Lt. Gen. Petraeus, commanding MNSTC-I, ordered a 
comprehensive review be conducted by his staff of the police, army and Iraqi National 
Guard equipment and resource provision. The review concluded that MND(SE) had 
actually been given more – proportionally – than anywhere else.64  Similarly, and whilst 
the U.S. was grateful for the UK commitment during Operation BRACKEN outside 
Fallujah, there was some evidence of U.S. misunderstanding of the significance of the 
deployment of 1 BW up to the highest levels: 
In theatre, they [the U.S.] understood the challenges faced by the British 
Government to mount that operation but, in Washington, this was considered 
small beer; one battalion was insignificant to them.  The British expected the 
American Joint Chiefs to have been much more closely engaged on the issue, 
but it was only after the British media hype that surrounded the whole thing that 
Washington seemed to grasp its significance.65   
5.6 The Counter‐IED Campaign 
The Iraqi National Referendum took place on the 15 October 2005 and it passed off 
without incident.  A jointly run Iraqi-Coalition security operation was seen to be a 
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 success in all four provinces in MND(SE) despite having been hindered in Basrah 
during the planning phases by its Provincial Council’s policy of non co-operation and 
disengagement which started in mid-September.  On 19 September 2005 the IPS 
arrested two undercover SAS soldiers engaged in a surveillance operation and handed 
them over to a militia.  This prompted an intense search for the two men, high level 
negotiations between Coalition Forces and the Baswari governate, and a high tempo, 
forceful and ultimately successful operation to release them.  The final stage involved 
raiding the Jameat Police Station in Basrah, where the two had been held, using 
Challenger tanks and Warrior armoured fighting vehicles.   
For the British, the incident raised serious doubts over the integrity of the IPS and 
concerns about militia infiltration.  On the Iraqi side, the Basrah Provincial Governor 
broke off relations with MND(SE) and disengaged from any involvement with military 
commanders:  “Basra broke off relations with us and any effort we put into the IPS 
there was wasted; we just weren’t even getting through the door.”66  The Coalition 
response was to concentrate effort on the Transition plan, so MND(SE) increased its 
SSR effort in Al Muthana and Maysan provinces to get the ISF ready for Provincial 
Iraqi Control (PIC).    
TELIC 6 marked the insurgents’ introduction of increasingly technically advanced and 
lethal insurgent methods of attack, in particular IEDs.  In overall terms, the previous 
TELIC had been a relative stable period; nascent democratic institutions had taken the 
opportunity to establish themselves, the level of violence was viewed as broadly 
acceptable, and the militia appetite for continued violence appeared to have been dulled 
by the bitter, and for them costly engagements of summer 2004.  While there was clear 
evidence of a continuing JAM threat in Maysan, it gave no indications of a widespread 
return to violence.  Insurgents no longer appeared willing to engage Coalition Forces 
directly.  Sadly, although the number of attacks against British forces decreased during 
the tour, the number of fatalities rose.  This was due to the increasing sophistication of 
the insurgents and their use of technologically sophisticated IEDs.67   
The development of Explosively Formed Projectiles (EFPs) posed a serious threat and, 
for a period, they hindered the British forces’ ability to conduct SSR.  The balance 
between SSR, which was the Main Effort, and counterinsurgency had to be reviewed.  
The threat between September and November 2005 deteriorated so much in Basrah 
province that conducting SSR with Iraqi forces became unsustainable. Units had to be 
able to get out to train the ISF and this required greater general security and increased 
freedom of movement.  Significant effort was therefore focussed on neutralizing the 
threat so that SSR could be carried out effectively.  In the absence of an immediate 
technological answer, units fell back on old TTPs based on Northern Ireland:   
Initially, the IEDs being used were relatively low tech (although they still had 
the potential to kill).  As the technology developed and the threat significantly 
increased, we worked very hard to develop the [counter IED] plan and new 
TTPs to counter the threat, which was itself constantly developing.  You need to 
rely on long-accepted Counter Insurgency drills, which will offer the best 
protection until technological defences are developed.68    
In order to formally capture existing TTPs, Land Warfare Centre’s Mission Support 
Group, in conjunction with the Operational Training and Advisory Group (OPTAG; 
NITAT’s successor), produced the Stability Operations Handbook in December 2005.  
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 It updated all the TTPs published originally by Bulloch as the Tactical Handbook for 
Operations Other Than War,69 validated each TTP against best practice in MND(SE) 
and tested them in training at OPTAG.  Changes in tactics and Force Protection 
measures in turn affected how SSR could be conducted and this required considerable 
thought to be given to the balance to be struck between logistic output and force 
protection.  For a time this placed increasing demands on support helicopters in order to 
move troops around until new equipment could be fielded.70
A series of intelligence-led detention operations in September and October 2005 forced 
JAM onto the back foot.  The tempo of British operations and their successes had a 
debilitating effect on the insurgents. The intelligence which was available was, as 
always seemed to be the case, far from complete and luck often played its part in 
successful operations.71  However, to the insurgent this was an unnerving time and 
indications were that JAM did not believe it had the freedom to operate.  In the game of 
cat-and–mouse, the incomplete picture British forces had of the insurgency was more 
than compensated for by the insurgents’ belief that their freedom of action had been 
significantly constrained. 
The view from MND(SE) was that the situation in Southern Iraq remained in a state of 
flux:  the civil administration and people were enjoying freedoms and democracy but 
nothing was sufficiently well-developed or established to make any significant political 
progress.  Nevertheless, confidence within the IA continued to grow and with it a belief 
that they no longer relied on Coalition Forces.72  This left the British position in the 
balance, with consent, and its ability to achieve leverage gradually waning.73  While the 
ISF continued to make progress, notably the IA, they were not yet able to operate 
independently of Coalition Forces, even though they seemed to believe that they could.  
The principal issues were sectarianism and debilitating corruption among officials, a 
problem compounded by problems in gaining any real intelligence from the population.  
As a result, internal power struggles and malign criminal and political influences were 
largely hidden from Coalition sight.74
With the arrival in December 2005 of HQ 1 (UK) Division in MND(SE) at the start of 
TELIC 7, the emphasis on setting the conditions for transition to Iraqi control increased.  
It was in the first few months of 2006 that the term ‘Provincial Iraqi Control’ (PIC) 
emerged to better reflect what the Iraqis were achieving, not what Coalition Forces had 
done.75  At the campaign level, Transition and PIC were the Main Effort; these 
translated into SSR at the tactical level, and it was with SSR that British forces 
remained focussed in their efforts.  Politically, the delay in forming an Iraqi national 
government set the campaign back.  As one senior officer recalls:   
I arrived five days after the National Elections, and everyone hoped for a 
National Government to be formed quickly; this actually took five months, and 
we lost a lot of ground during that time; without the writ of central government 
there was a rise in the militias and infiltration by them of various parts of the 
Iraqi establishment, including the IPS.76   
In the interim, problems with the Basrah Provincial Council continued.   
Maj. Gen. John Cooper took steps to recast the campaign as one of counterinsurgency 
not peace support:  “I encouraged my subordinate commanders to think things through 
against the COIN principles, and so we always used them.”77  Cooper also noted the 
importance of a broad approach to counterinsurgency: 
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 We need to foster a wider approach to COIN.  If you consider [1 (UK) Division] 
on warfighting operations, it consists of Infantry, armour, guns, aviation, 
artillery, engineers and logistics.   Which is the most important element?  The 
answer is none of them.  It is the sum of the parts that is important; the synergy 
they create.  It is the same with COIN; everyone is part of it; it is the sum of 
military ops offensive and defensive, Iraqi leadership engagement and 
development, the training of the ISF in SSR, reconstruction ops and, just as with 
conventional operations, it is the synergy that comes from the sum of the all of 
the component parts that will make the difference.78
The synergy to which Cooper refers would not be achieved in the campaign as a whole 
until Ambassador Crocker and Gen. Petraeus produced their first Joint Campaign Plan 
in April 2007, and the surge of U.S. forces ordered by President Bush helped to take 
control of the security situation in Baghdad. 
Cooper’s analysis of the problem was accurate, and his call to use extant doctrine, in 
particular the principles, had much utility.  However, it raises the issue of the efficacy of 
counterinsurgency education.  Daniel Marston recalls that “men walked around with the 
principles and could list them, but they did not understand them.”79  This should not be 
surprising.  It was identified in Chapter 3 that counterinsurgency had not been taught 
fully since 1997.  Even junior officers who had served in Northern Ireland would only 
be familiar with one particular type of the problem.  To ameliorate the problem, British 
battlegroups went to the unusual step of organizing and running their own COIN 
seminars in Basrah over the summer of 2006.  Dan Marston was called out to Basrah to 
instruct units in counterinsurgency history and theory, using the counterinsurgency 
module he taught to captains at Sandhurst. 
5.7 Drawdown, Surge and Operation SINBAD 
Basrah Provincial Council’s disengagement with British forces stalled the momentum 
gained through earlier efforts.  When 20 Armoured Brigade arrived in April 2006, the 
situation was difficult, not just because of the deteriorating security situation.  Local 
government officials had started to show increasing independence, and less interest in 
working with the Coalition.  It was clear from intelligence reports that corruption was a 
widespread problem.80  Just as worrying, the Sunni minority had started to leave the 
South in response to a campaign of sectarian intimidation and murder, and the threat to 
Coalition Forces from an increasingly confident enemy was rising.81  Over the summer 
months, through careful work from military commanders and FCO officials, Basrah’s 
Provincial Council started to re-engage with MND(SE) and a workable command and 
control system was established through the creation of the Permanent Joint 
Coordination Centre (PJCC).   
Although HQ 1 (UK) Division had focussed on achieving PIC in the more stable and 
less populous provinces, it had not been possible to achieve it during its tenure in 
command.  Further progress was needed in security and governance and steady 
improvements during May, June and July through a 20 Brigade re-engagement and re-
intervention model enabled PIC to take place in Al Muthanna and Dhi Qar Provinces on 
13 July and 21 September 2006 respectively.  In Maysan, Camp Abu Naji, the main 
Battlegroup base in al Amarah, was handed back to the IA on 24 August 2006.  The 
camp was immediately looted by the local population and subsequent withdrawals from 
British-held bases were planned to avoid further ‘Abu Najis.’82  In overall terms, these 
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 developments allowed 20 Brigade’s effort to be refocused on to the border, where it 
deployed a light battlegroup into the desert to interdict weapons smuggling, and in 
Basrah, where the Armoured Infantry battalion, withdrawn from Maysan, would be later 
used alongside the only British battlegroup in the city in what became Operation 
SINBAD.83
HQ 3 (UK) Division took over from HQ 1 (UK) Division in July 2006.  In Baghdad, 
Operation TOGETHER FORWARD had been underway for just over a month.  At 
Prime Minister Maliki’s insistence, an Iraqi-led operation was planned and quickly put 
into action to try to re-establish security in Baghdad following the dramatic rise in 
sectarian violence across Iraq initiated by the bomb attack on the al-Askari Mosque in 
February.  Unfortunately, neither the ISF plan nor an additional 3,700 U.S. troops from 
Mosul could contain the violence, and sectarian killings continued to rise.  Nevertheless, 
the general mood in Baghdad was that something had to be done to get the security 
situation back under control.   
Against this backdrop, Maj. Gen. Richard Shirreff quickly re-assessed Basrah’s 
continuing state of insecurity and the impact it was having on progress towards PIC and 
development in general.  One problem he identified was that the campaign was still not 
being characterized correctly and this was a constraint on bringing the right resources to 
bear and on ensuring that efforts were properly prioritized and co-ordinated.  Cooper 
had been clear that Basrah was a counterinsurgency campaign and had used the 
principles from Counter Insurgency Operations in planning84 but this was still not the 
generally accepted view.  Shirreff noted, 
There continues to be a disturbing belief that we are carrying out some form of 
Peace Support Operation and that the remedies that applied to Bosnia, apply 
equally to Iraq.  This is not the case, and the way in which hard and soft effects 
are balanced in a theatre like Iraq needs to be vested in one person. In Iraq, there 
were several uncoordinated agencies involved in the process, including the FCO, 
DfID and the [Provincial Reconstruction Team];85 there was no supremo; and 
the consequent effect was dissipated.86
The security situation limited freedom of movement for both Coalition Forces and 
British officials and administrators with the result that no momentum could be 
generated on any of the four lines of operation:  “someone couldn’t go and repair the 
water system because he would get shot if he did.”87  The principal task was, therefore, 
to restore security and Shirreff assessed that this would require forces to be concentrated 
on Basrah, and for economic effort to be similarly concentrated so that consent could be 
bought in the short term.  The brigade commander noted the change of emphasis 
Shirreff brought: 
The end-state remained the same [PIC for Basrah], but in terms of sequencing, 
the approach changed. The first GOC had considered SSR to be the Main Effort, 
whereas the second changed that to Security.  This meant that MND(SE) 
initially concentrated on the northern three provinces to be delivered to Iraqi 
Control, leaving me to focus on Basra.  On changeover, the Divisional focus 
shifted to Basra, embarking on a huge Comprehensive Approach operation for 
Basra City, which involved $87 million of American money.88   
Shirreff realized that he needed more forces, in spite of the on-going troop withdrawals.  
He also required support of the OGDs, but they would not support the concept of 
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 buying in short-term economic effect because it was believed “it would foster a 
dependency culture...indeed they believed it to be counter-productive.”89  Any idea that 
the Comprehensive Approach was being followed was patently ill-founded, so Shirreff 
resolved to do it with whatever resources he could get.   
By now, PJHQ’s six-monthly force level review was underway and a steady drawdown 
of troops had started.  One view offered was that these “were mathematically rather than 
tactically-based.”90  MND(SE)’s intention was to put British operations onto a more 
offensive footing and to use co-ordinated inter-agency efforts to address the areas of 
governance, essential services and economy, as well as security.  The result was 
Operation SINBAD.  It had three objectives:   the re-establishment of security in Basrah 
by isolating the militants from the mainstream population, rooting out corrupt police, 
and offering assistance to the Baswaris through rebuilding and micro-economic 
regeneration.  Just as importantly in terms of relationships with the U.S. in Baghdad and 
Washington, it provided the opportunity to disprove some critics’ views that the British 
were not prepared to fight.91
The idea for Operation SINBAD came from a study of U.S. experiences in Mosul and 
Baghdad undertaken by Brig. James Everard and his brigade staff.  It looked at why 
U.S. progress had stalled in the north, and why seemingly impressive achievements had 
been reversed.  The study identified several contributory factors.  U.S. projects were 
overwhelmed by the scale of the problem; they attempted too much too quickly; they 
were unable to consolidate when successful; too many projects were underfunded; 
external co-ordination and internal synchronisation were poor; the wrong projects were 
targeted; and projects were poorly supported by Influence and Information 
Operations.92  As a result, 20 Brigade developed a model designed to avoid the pitfalls 
of the U.S. approach and so protect progress.  It involved carefully selecting target 
areas, empowering local government organizations where possible, enhancing the 
effectiveness of the IPS, and giving the IA a prominent role.93   
The plan started life as a much more kinetic operation than that which eventually took 
place.  Troops were to go into each police station and identify and then remove those 
policemen and officials implicated in corruption and militia activity but in practice, 
powerful intimidation by the Shi’a death squads prevented that from working.  MNC-I 
initially refused the first plan, so it was amended to satisfy what Shirreff termed “the 
militia-intimidated Iraqis,” while still achieving the results required.  It was repackaged 
as a reconstruction operation, enabled by Iraqi and Coalition Forces.  The first plan had 
not fully taken into account that the IPS was not a British-style constabulary, but a 
heavily armed paramilitary force which needed firm military control and strong 
leadership.  Shirreff’s original intent was to mount a mini surge, similar to that of 
Operation MOTORMAN in Northern Ireland between 31 July and 1 December 1972,94  
but the force levels did not permit that; so we had to bite off bits in chunks, by 
districts; going in by pulses; surging in troops with intelligence-led ‘seize’ 
operations, whilst simultaneously producing short-term projects (like repairing 
schools and clearing rubbish) and setting up medium and long term 
reconstruction projects as well. 
...When I briefed them on my plan for Op SINBAD, which needed a surge of 
troops to achieve, it did not go down well at all: there was a lot of push-back 
from the staff.  Even in August, when we moved out of Camp Abu Naji to free 
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 up troops for SINBAD, we still had to persuade people that what we were doing 
was right; and there were heated meetings about it.  That said, once eventually 
signed up to SINBAD, PJHQ did try to do whatever they could for us...such as 
getting Light Guns for the Counter Indirect Fire role.  Admittedly, in the short 
term, we were running against the grain of drawdown, but we were doing so for 
long-term benefits.95
Crucially, Operation SINBAD captured the Iraqi imagination:  it provided the means by 
which the Iraqis could demonstrate that they had the capacity to secure their own 
population and to improve conditions locally.  Prime Minister Maliki eventually agreed 
to the plan provided that military operations were divorced in both time and space from 
redevelopment efforts.96  Inevitably, the delay between the two undermined the original 
intention to tackle the death squads and militants directly.  Their continued presence 
was to create increasingly more complex political problems for the GOI until Prime 
Minister Maliki launched Operation Charge of The Knights in March 2008, and used 
the IA to confront the militias and to re-establish government control of Basrah. 
Iraqi and MNC-I views were folded into the concept.  In essence, a 48-hour security 
‘pulse’ would take control of an area and establish a secure environment, during which 
Coalition Forces were to deliver immediate impact improvements.  During a 28-day 
‘pause,’ a high level of IA military presence would then be maintained in the area, 
during which effort would be focussed on improving the IPS through the International 
Police Advisers’ Police Action Plan.97  Longer-term projects were to be delivered by 
Iraqi contractors, who would employ local people to lay electrical distribution cables, 
improve water pipelines, or repair roads.  At the end of the ‘pause,’ the IA would leave 
and the IPS would take over responsibility for the area.  As Thompson had emphasized 
in his tactical concept of Clear-Hold-Winning-Won, it would be essential to ensure that 
resources were lined up and ready to be used: 
The immediate soft effects such as clearing rubbish from the streets were done 
quickly, often without consultation, using Iraqi contractors.  We had Schools’ 
Packs ready with things like desks, chairs, blackboards and so on, which were 
delivered whilst Iraqi and British Army Engineers repaired the buildings.  The 
medium-term improvements used our (Coalition) money and, although they 
were often based on our ideas, these had been sold to and endorsed by the Iraqi-
led Provincial Reconstruction and Development Committees; this served to 
empower the Iraqi authorities.  You have to work through an empowered Iraqi 
structure and you have to remember that, at the top of everyone’s list of 
priorities was ‘Essential Services.’98
Operation SINBAD started on 27 September 2006.  An estimated 2,300 Iraqi army 
troops and 1,000 British soldiers took part in the operations with another 2,000 in 
reserve.  During its remaining time in Basrah, 20 Armoured Brigade launched fifty-six 
deliberate strike operations, made 139 arrests and detained seventy-five key militant 
JAM members.99  Strike operations proved to be vital in taking the fight to the enemy.  
Everard noted, 
Of 68 strike operations, only one hit the wrong house.  I was hugely impressed 
by the ability of a large, reinforced brigade HQ to co-ordinate a very complex 
operation where our traditional enablers were disabled by circumstance.  The 
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 difficulty in building the intelligence picture and then sharing it [because of 
national restrictions] is a case in point.100
In November 2006, 19 Light Brigade took over from 20 Armoured Brigade on what was 
now Op TELIC 9.  It fitted straight into Operation SINBAD, picking up the high tempo 
of the operation and arriving in time for the fifth ‘pulse.’   It completed a further thirteen 
pulses in Basrah city and four more outside it before the operation ended.  Such a high 
level of activity was reflected in the number of Significant Acts (defined by MNF-I as 
“all incidents reported to MNF-I through daily Significant Activity Reports. It includes 
known attacks on Coalition forces, Iraqi Security Forces, the civilian population, and 
infrastructure”101) that took place, being the highest since the invasion, with over 2100 
incidents recorded in the seven-month period.  19 Brigade conducted seven brigade-
level strike operations and over one hundred and twenty at battlegroup level.  All were 
focused on disrupting the militia to keep them on the back foot while the Iraqis moved 
towards PIC in Basrah.102  In keeping with Operation SINBAD, the pressure created by 
strike operations on JAM provided the opportunity for economic and political 
development to be started.  This, in turn, started to shape the public information 
campaign.  All this came at a cost, however:  twenty-seven were killed in action and 
over one hundred and fifty wounded. 
19 Brigade fought hard to maintain the momentum established by 20 Armoured 
Brigade, so that it could retain the initiative and stay on the front foot against a 
professional and well motivated enemy, determined to inflict casualties through indirect 
fire and IEDs:  “There was a conscious decision to strike early, disrupt the enemy, 
exploit any intelligence leads and create opportunities in order to ensure that the militia 
could not gain the upper hand.”103  Improvements in intelligence fusion and the 
additional ISR resources made available by MNC-I, allowed several very successful 
intelligence-led strike operations to be completed which seriously damaged militia 
leadership in Basrah.104
Shirreff’s conclusions about SINBAD are particularly relevant to the issue of 
counterinsurgency doctrine.  They resonate strongly with ideas which Kitson had 
highlighted from his experience in the very different environment of Kenya’s forests, 
and Thompson emphasized in his concept of Clear-Hold-Winning-Won, that security 
operations need a strong security force presence and this means numbers: 
We are not particularly good at making plans happen; to make plans happen you 
must first understand the problem. We didn’t know much about Basra but, 
through SINBAD and the recces and planning we conducted we began to 
understand more.  As we began to understand more, we began to understand the 
dynamics of the City itself, and then we began to be able to find solutions to its 
problems.  If you compare Basrah to Belfast (where we had things like religious 
maps and a thorough knowledge of relationships built up through framework 
operations), and compare that to Basrah (where we had very little indeed), you 
may remark that, whereas when I went out on my main recce I found a situation 
where we had only thirteen multiples [a half platoon] available for operating 
amongst the 1.5 million people in Basrah, there were actually 10,000 troops 
operating amongst the 300,000 population of Belfast.105
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 5.8 Transition and Repositioning  
HQ 3 (UK) Division left Iraq in January 2007.  It was replaced as HQ MND(SE) by a 
bespoke team, commanded by Maj. Gen. Jonathon Shaw.  Following on from Operation 
SINBAD, and to compliment what was now referred to generally as the Baghdad 
Security Plan, British operations continued to centre on developing ISF capability to 
conduct joint and centrally co-ordinated operations.  Efforts focussed principally on 
developing a ‘Ring of Steel’ around the city with fully manned vehicle check points 
(VCPs) and supporting patrols into neighbouring districts.  Operations were centrally 
co-ordinated at the PJCC and monitored by Coalition Forces, both at the PJCC and at 
jointly-run VCPs, and through mentoring visits from British forces to the Iraqi Army.  
Constant monitoring of security proved to be essential, with permanent VCPs in 
troublesome areas being a concern because of militia intimidation of the ISF.106
Transition remained the continuing overall theme, however Operation SINBAD’s 
emphasis on increasing ISF independence moved things in the right direction.  In 
overall terms, SINBAD had started to set the conditions for the handover of greater 
security responsibility to the ISF which would be necessary for the province to achieve 
PIC.  As part of the wider transition plan, over a six-week period in April 2007, British 
forces handed back their bases in the Old State Building and the Shat Al Arab Hotel in 
Basrah, the Shaiba Logistic Base at the old airfield south of Basrah – which remained 
the IA Divisional Training Centre (DTC) where British forces trained the IA – and at Al 
Faw.  There were no more ‘Abu Najis’ and Maysan Province was handed over to its 
governor on 18 April. 
19 Light Brigade handed to 1 Mechanized Brigade in April 2007.  The situation had 
changed greatly since 1 Brigade’s last tour of duty in the summer of 2004.  It deployed 
with five battlegroups, three of which were based in the COB at Basra Air Station:  one 
was in the Monitoring, Mentoring and Training role (M2T) training the IA, one was 
responsible for an area of operations south of Basrah, and the third was the Manoeuvre 
Battlegroup.  The two remaining battlegroups were initially deployed with one in 
Maysan and the other at Basrah Palace.  Over the summer which followed, the Maysan 
battlegroup withdrew back to the UK, and the Basrah Palace Battlegroup withdrew to 
the COB.  This operation is examined as a case study later in this chapter.  The reduced 
responsibility to hold ground was seen to be to the Brigade’s advantage.107  1 Brigade 
continued to seek to improve security by conducting strike operations against JAM 
leadership targets, and to transition to PIC by improving the Iraqi Army’s capabilities.  
The latter task was, as with previous brigades, the Main Effort, but it was somewhat 
overshadowed during 1 Brigade’s first three months in Basrah by the continuing high 
levels of violence, in particular IDF against the COB, and IED attacks against military 
operations in the city. 
As other brigades had found before, 1 Brigade’s tour proved to be one of two distinct 
phases.  The first was intense, violent, and focussed on maintaining security.  The 
second focussed on Transition and the period was much more benign.  The end state to 
which operations were focussed remained the handover of responsibility for the security 
of Basrah to the ISF, concomitant with British forces consolidating on the COB.  This 
was all part of Operation ZENITH, the name given to the British force reduction 
process in Iraq.  When the operation had been devised during 2006, it was very much in 
line with the overall concept of Transition for Coalition Forces.  V Corps, which was 
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 the MNC-I until December 2006, had written a concept of operations to draw down 
forces and to handover to the Iraqis in a process of accelerated Transition.  A senior 
staff officer in MND(SE) recalls that, 
By the time that we actually deployed, [the previous policy] had been stood on 
its head and the Americans had chosen ‘victory and the surge’ over immediate 
Transition.  Transition was therefore postponed, and that put our Operation 
ZENITH out of kilter with the Corps.  The UK and U.S. were on different 
political trajectories and electoral timelines.108
This divergence was further complicated when the British Government announced in 
February 2007 further troop reductions, from 7,100 to just over 5,000.  Prime Minister 
Blair explained, “We are able to announce this reduction in Force levels because of the 
growing capacity of the Iraqi security forces.”109  This decision was made just as 
interest in the U.S. focussed on President Bush’s decision to surge forces into Iraq, and 
Gen. Petraeus’ taking command in Baghdad.110   Officially the British interpretation of 
security in Basrah was accepted by MNF-I:  “We really see Basra as something that we 
want to do in the rest of the country. They’re a bit further ahead, obviously, in terms of 
security and in terms of violence than other parts of Iraq.”111  However, some 
commentators openly questioned the British view, the validity of the British approach to 
Basrah and the south, and to its understanding and interpretation of counterinsurgency:     
The British announcement of force cuts reflected a set of realities on the ground 
that had dominated south eastern Iraq for more than two years. South eastern 
Iraq had long been under the de facto control of SCIRI and Sadr factions. The 
British effectively lost any opportunity to shape a secular and nationalist Basra 
in the summer of 2003, and the US defeat of the Sadr militia in March and April 
2004 never extended to the southeast and Basra area. 
The British won some tactical clashes in Maysan and Basra in May-November 
2004, but Operation TELIC’s tactical victories over the Sadrists did not stop 
Islamists from taking steadily more local political power and controlling security 
at the neighborhood level when British troops were not present.112
These tensions would not be resolved for nearly another year and would require the 
direct intervention of Prime Minister Maliki to provide the catalyst for change.  
ZENITH was intended to set the conditions for PIC through the repositioning of British 
forces into operational overwatch which, in turn, would allow the further withdrawal of 
forces to the UK.113  There were, however, a number of conditions on which this 
depended.  They included the capability of the Iraqi Army to conduct effective 
independent operations, the credibility and capability of the IPS, the tactical and 
logistical challenge of getting British forces out of Basrah, and the even greater 
challenge of remaining in step with the overall U.S. campaign plan.  It is now clear that 
none of these conditions had been met. 
Whatever the view was in Basrah, PJHQ and Whitehall, it was the complete reverse of 
that held by U.S. commanders in Baghdad.  By April 2007, Gen. Petraeus and Lt. Gen. 
Ray Odierno, his corps commander at MNC-I, had started to implement an aggressive 
operation to secure the population in Baghdad.  U.S. forces were taking a very active 
role in supporting the ISF, living, working and fighting alongside them in Baghdad.  
The differences between Baghdad and Basrah were now evident, not just in the 
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 Surge/Transition dichotomy, but in the approach to supporting the ISF.  The Americans 
embedded nearly a dozen officers and NCOs into each IA battalion in what they called a 
Military Transition Team, or a MiTT.  MiTTs provided training, mentoring and direct 
support in terms of communications, intelligence and fire support to their respective 
battalions.  Importantly, they helped with the planning of an operation, and they fought 
alongside their Iraqi counterparts when the plan was put into action.  The British 
approach was to provide M2T teams at brigade level and the fifteen-man MiTT with 
10th IA Division, commanded by a British colonel.  Unlike the Americans, British 
teams did not go out on operations with the IA.  One officer noted that, 
Whenever the Americans visited us, they always looked uncomfortable with 
what we were doing.  They genuinely believed that we were under-powering our 
operation... To the Americans, our fifteen man team in the Divisional 
Headquarters meant that we were merely involved, not committed like them.114
Against this backdrop, in February 2007, 10 Division was ordered to send two 
battalions to Baghdad to take part in the Baghdad Security Plan.  MNDS(E) focussed 
efforts on preparing the two battalions, inspecting their weapons, training, and logistics.  
Significantly, and unnoticed by PJHQ, two British four-man teams were embedded 
alongside eleven-man American MiTTs to go to fight in Baghdad.  A senior British 
officer noted that the “deployment worked a treat.  It was a very British affair; ad hoc 
and completed by worthy volunteers.  The validation from our point of view was that 
they performed at least as well as any of the other Iraqi battalions during that 
deployment.”115  Given this outcome, if SSR was so important, the question has to be 
asked why did MND(SE) not embed MiTTs throughout 10 Division? 
Nevertheless, the situation in MND(SE) was that it was “under remit from PJHQ to 
continue with ZENITH regardless:  in order to support the increasing deployment to 
Afghanistan, we had to continue to drawdown force levels in Iraq.” 116  As a result, 
This inevitably caused problems of perception, management and to an extent 
trust between the Corps and ourselves.  We had in fact already had our surge; 
during Op SINBAD, and there was no appetite for further investment of 
resources.  Moreover, the UK view was that transition was the right thing to do 
to progress the campaign...  Despite [this], we were not acting in isolation; we 
very deliberately staffed the plan through Corps HQ and would not have 
achieved Op ZENITH without Corps buy-in in the first place, and they 
supported us throughout: it was a Corps-owned and Corps-resourced plan.117   
This insight is important.  The U.S. leadership in Baghdad appeared to accept the view 
put forward by MND(SE), and it supported the British approach.  The underpinning 
logic was that the British presence had lost legitimacy with Baswaris, and that it was the 
principal reason for violence: if the British left Basrah, the reason for the attacks, which 
so disrupted life in the city, would be removed.  Basrah’s security created a politically 
painful and potentially costly dilemma:  if Basrah was not secure, PIC could not be 
justified, but if PIC did not take place, London’s endstate could not be met.  If British 
forces remained, casualties would continue, but British forces could not start to leave 
until Basrah was secure.  The difficulty was that 10 IA Division was not in a position to 
secure it: 
Our challenge was to get 10 Division operating against the militia on the streets 
of Basra because, in the South, it was the militia who presented the greatest 
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 threat to the Coalition.  10 Division recruited almost exclusively from the 
MND(SE) area and there was therefore a reluctance by them to take on people 
who were essentially their own.118
5.9 Case Study 1:  Summer 2007, 4 RIFLES and Basrah Palace 
One of the many fraught problems of summer 2007 was how to withdraw British forces 
from Basrah Palace, the last British base in the city, and hand it over to the Iraqi army.  
This step was important in the plan to transition security responsibility to the Iraqis, but 
was at odds with the plan being implemented in Baghdad.  Since February 2007, U.S. 
forces had being moving out of their big Forward Operating Bases and setting up small 
Joint Security Stations and Combat Outposts in all of Baghdad’s neighbourhoods.  
Together with the ISF, they were putting MNC-I’s tactics of Clear-Control-Retain into 
action.  This concept was a development of Clear-Hold-Build, laid out in the U.S. Army 
counterinsurgency doctrine of December 2006, and very similar to Thompson’s Clear-
Hold-Winning-Won.  While U.S. and Iraqi forces were fighting to regain control of 
Baghdad, the British plan was to withdraw back on to the COB.  Lt. Col. Patrick 
Sanders, commanding the 4 RIFLES Battlegroup in Basrah Palace noted the strategic 
dissonance: 
the Americans had taken the bold, and we now know far-sighted and successful 
decision to surge.  We found ourselves out of step in Iraq, disengaging and 
drawing down in Iraq at precisely at the point the U.S. was reinforcing.119
By June 2007, Basrah Palace was the most attacked base in Iraq, taking 1750 rounds of 
IDF between June and August.  In the city, Sanders notes that Baswaris were “fearful of 
increasing Iranian influence, frustrated with the lack of British progress and venality, 
but above all they were neutral.”120  If British doctrine had been followed, Baswari 
neutrality should have been exploited to further separate the insurgents from their 
support and to set them up for political and military neutralization.  Instead and 
inevitably given the paucity of British forces, limited intelligence on the situation in 
Basrah, and the overall policy of Transition, the brigade plan had to focus on separating 
the majority of JAM from the so-called Special Groups, which were trained and 
equipped by Iranian Special Forces, and to weaken if not remove Iranian influence in 
Basrah.  JAM leadership at all levels had already been weakened by strike operations 
undertaken by previous brigades but this had not reduced levels of violence, in fact they 
increased.  The role of British forces in Basrah was to provide a credible threat to JAM 
and to demonstrate resolve.  The rationale behind the British approach was to convince 
mainstream JAM leadership to co-operate, and not to oppose British military operations 
in the city.  This would then allow operations to be focussed on the purely nationalist, 
Iranian-backed Special Groups who it appeared had little local support.   
In the months leading up to the withdrawal from the Palace, the Rifles showed the 
importance of learning and adapting.  IEDs and snipers posed the principal threats.  The 
Rifles encountered 150 IEDs, eighty-five functioning against them, mostly EFPs, which 
were technically advanced and not made locally.  They realized that IEDs were best 
countered by operating during the day, but JAM responded with the use of snipers.  The 
Rifles then recognized that snipers posed the most threat dangerous so they switched to 
working during the hours of darkness to counter the sniper threat and they adapted their 
counter-IED tactics accordingly for night operations. 
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 The operation which defined the Rifles’ tour was the handover of Basrah Palace and 
their move to the COB.  Sanders notes that “for the purposes of ‘strategic messaging’ 
this was described as ‘repositioning’; for the military for whom withdrawal is a 
perfectly acceptable term, the operation was a relief in place followed by a withdrawal 
in contact.”121  The essential requirement was to ensure that the operation was 
conducted on British terms:  
In reality, we ended up having to fight the most demanding and intensive part of 
the campaign:  a ‘Withdrawal in Contact.’ We were under resourced for the 
campaign we had to fight, and we had to produce massive kinetic surge with 
diminishing troop numbers.  In order to set the conditions for PIC in Basra, we 
had to take on the JAM so that we could be seen to be moving out of Basra on 
our terms, not theirs.  It was the classic strike that made the Break Clean 
possible. It was a high risk operation and we were left in no doubt that British 
military prestige was at stake – we could not afford an Info Ops ‘defeat.’122
Sanders therefore had to plan for a withdrawal in contact and before that had to set the 
conditions for the operation to succeed by “mounting a series of raids [the purpose of 
which ADP Operations defined as “to destroy or capture a vital enemy asset. Its wider 
purpose is to disrupt the enemy.”123] into JAM strongholds along our likely withdrawal 
routes to erode JAM’s capability and to seize the initiative.”124  The move to raiding 
reflected the constraints imposed by the highly canalized urban environment and the 
lack of numbers.  Sanders’ view of the impact this had on his ability to conduct 
operations is important: 
Doctrinally, we recognized we were engaged in a counterinsurgency, in COIN 
the focus is on securing the population, not on defeating the enemy.  This 
requires sufficient boots on the ground, Coalition and local forces as they 
became available, and the lesson of Operation Motorman and the U.S. Surge is 
clear:  surges work.  But in 2007 and 2008 we lacked sufficient forces in Basrah 
to secure the population.  This forces us to adopt a raiding approach to 
counterinsurgency and the trouble with it is it can reinforce the perception of 
Coalition Forces as aggressors, and it can cause us to conflate tactical success – 
the number of JAM detainees – with actual measures of strategic success such as 
the rejection of militia violence and the acceptance of the legitimacy of the Iraqi 
Government by the population.125
The operation was successful.  The withdrawal, completed on 3 September, was orderly 
and without incident, and the Iraqi Palace protection force has remained in possession 
ever since.  This was not how the British media or U.S. commanders and senior staff in 
Baghdad saw Sanders’ carefully planned and skilfully executed withdrawal.  “The 
British have basically been defeated in the south,” was one U.S. view, which 
highlighted the dysfunctional nature of Iraqi politics and concerns about “a) the lawless 
situation in Basra and b) the political and military impact of the British pullback.”126   
5.10 Provincial Iraqi Control in Basrah and Operation Charge of 
The Knights 
Throughout 2007, IDF attacks on the COB increased.  MND(SE) took measures to 
reduce the effect of sporadic, random attacks, and employed vigorous countermeasures 
to disrupt and interdict militia rocket teams.  In August 2007, 1 (UK) Division took over 
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 MND(SE).  Very soon afterwards, the opportunity arose for what became referred to as 
an ‘accommodation’ between British forces and the militia in Basrah.127  In return for 
keeping out of Basrah, JAM stopped its attacks on the COB.  A senior officer concluded 
as the operation in Basrah transitioned from one of Security Assistance to one of 
Military Assistance,  
We enabled a situation where the Iraqi Security Forces became responsible for 
security operations in Basra, and where we could now step back and concentrate 
on M2T.  It was in many ways the perfect tour for us; with intensive military 
operations at the beginning, thereby setting the preconditions to allow the 
Political and Economic Lines to develop.128
The ‘accommodation’ brought an end to attacks on the COB but the price was 
MND(SE) lost its by now limited control of Basrah and ceded control of the city to 
JAM.  As Richard Iron notes,  
[the] accommodation with militias permitted de facto militia control of various 
areas of the City in exchange for a no violence agreement. It was a pragmatic 
response to the situation on the ground: the ISF was initially weak and JAM was 
numerically strong, well supported and equipped from Iran, and could count on 
popular support in its urban heartlands. The reality of the accommodation, 
though, was that the Government of Iraq could not impose its law across Basra. 
Instead, the militias imposed their law – however unattractive their law was to 
us, such as rapes and murders of women inappropriately dressed.129  
Over the following months, first 1 Mechanized Brigade, then, in December, 4 Brigade, 
its successor, concentrated on training the Iraqi Army with the overall intention of 
achieving PIC in Basrah as conditions allowed.  The British view now characterized 
security in Basrah as ‘Palermo rather than Beirut,’130 criminality rather than insurgency, 
“large scale gangsterism rather than all out war.”131  This differed considerably from the 
views held in Baghdad and in Washington DC that Iraq required a classic 
counterinsurgency campaign, and that the population had first to be secured to allow the 
political progress necessary to improve the overall situation.  MND(SE) and U.S. 
commanders and analysts differed in how they understood the complex diplomatic, 
political and security environment.  Irrespective of interpretation, the situation in Basrah 
was widely reported: 
Commanders claim that security has improved enough in Basra for Iraqi forces 
to take charge. Attacks against British forces have declined, but that is largely 
because of a shortage of targets after British troops withdrew from the city 
centre to the airport in September. A six-month ceasefire declared by Muqtada 
al-Sadr, the powerful radical cleric, has helped to reduce violence.  
For Iraqis, though, Basra remains a violent place, with scores of people killed 
every month. Major-General Jalil Khalaf, the police chief, complained of being 
left in a sea of troubles. Rival Shi’a militias with murky links to Iran compete 
violently for control and terrorise the population—particularly women deemed 
immodest, barbers and those selling alcohol.132   
On 16 December 2007, in a ceremony held at Basrah airport, Basrah PIC was 
completed.  In line with all previous decisions concerning PIC, the transfer followed a 
rigorous assessment by the GOI and MNF-I to demonstrate that conditions were right 
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 and that the ISF were ready to take the lead.  The ceremony formalized the reality of the 
situation in Basrah since the ‘accommodation’ was reached in early September:  the ISF 
were now responsible for security in the city, and British operations outside the COB 
were restricted as much by Iraqi sovereign responsibilities as policy from Whitehall.  In 
a statement made during the PIC ceremony, Maj. Gen. Graham Binns, GOC MND(SE), 
said: 
The Iraqi Authorities have shown they can maintain stability in their own right 
and that is why it is now time to hand over control. We will continue to offer 
support, training and mentoring to the Iraqi Security Forces, as we support the 
Government in their efforts on economic regeneration and reconstruction.133
Military operations for the now much-reduced British force – the brigade only had two 
battlegroups – continued to focus on training the IA.  Despite PIC in Basrah, between 
December 2007 and March 2008 IDF attacks on the COB increased steadily, often 
being fired from areas that British forces could no longer operate in because of the 
‘accommodation’ or into which they could not conduct counter-battery fires.134  IDF 
was a symptom of wider instability within Basrah and one which increasingly troubled 
Iraqi leaders.  While the instability was characterized in some British circles as criminal 
activity, Col. Richard Iron, mentor to Gen. Mohan, commanding Iraqi forces in Basrah, 
is clear it was JAM “imposing its own form of discipline, and reinforcing its position 
and authority on a weakened population.”135
Gen. Mohan recognized that the complex security threats which JAM posed, needed 
what he described as a counterinsurgency operation to take control of the situation 
“from militias who do not accept the political path.”136  Guided and advised by Iron, 
Gen. Mohan developed a plan to build an effective counter-insurgent security 
infrastructure in Basrah made up of strong points, rooftop observation posts, and 
physical border security measures.  Once this framework was in place, he believed that 
the ISF would be able to take control the city and to “demonstrate absolute military 
superiority relative to the militias.”137  Gen. Mohan listed the prerequisites for success 
in the operation: 
• Basrah City’s security infrastructure completed:  PVCPs to control all routes 
into the city; and company strong points constructed in difficult areas of the city. 
• All brigades of 14 Division mobilised, trained and equipped to win an urban 
battle against a heavily armed adversary. 
• The movement of people and munitions from Iran, both across the border and 
from Maysan, interdicted. 
• Moderate JAM are at worst neutral in the fight; preferably they support ISF and 
provide intelligence about radical elements. 
• The vast majority of the population of Basrah supports the ISF. 
• The Iraqi Police Service is largely free from malign militia influence.138 
Gen. Mohan and Iron went to Baghdad to brief the Basrah plan to Gen. Petraeus and 
Prime Minister Maliki and to secure the extra resources it needed: forces, money, and 
equipment.  The intention was to build the security framework in April and May, and to 
re-equip and then train 14 (IA) Division concurrently for urban operations.  The next 
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 stage would start in early June when Prime Minister Maliki was to announce a weapons 
amnesty, after which a major disarmament programme would be run for all the militias 
in Basrah.  When the disarmament programme ended, ISF would then initiate strike and 
search operations against known militia arms caches.139
On Friday 21 March, Mohan briefed the plan to Gen. Petraeus and Dr. Mowaffak al-
Rubaie, the National Security Advisor.  During the early negotiations, senior Coalition 
officers made it clear that they did not want to open a second front in the South and that 
they would rather use forces, which were then dealing with AQI in the north, as they 
became available.  Many U.S. commanders understood the fight against AQI and were 
uneasy with the prospect of Shi’a extremism, and still more the risk to campaign 
progress that a major operation in the south might pose.  On Saturday 22 March, 
Petraeus briefed the plan to Prime Minister Maliki, at the end of which he told Gen. 
Petraeus of his immediate intention to take on criminals and gangs in an Iraqi-led 
operation.  Gen. Petraeus tried to persuade the Prime Minister to wait until the major 
Coalition operation against the last remnants of AQI around Mosul had been completed, 
after which Coalition resources could be focussed on Basrah and JAM.140
Maliki would not be persuaded. The next day, he ordered two additional Iraqi battalions 
to move down to Basrah, Maliki flew to the city and personally took command of 
preparations.  Operation Charge of the Knights started on 24 March; routes into the city 
were closed and a curfew imposed.  On 25 March, the clearance operation commenced.  
The sixteen IA battalions involved moved into the outskirts of Basrah but they soon met 
with fierce JAM opposition from well-defended positions in the militia-controlled 
districts.  The initial assault faltered and played directly into JAM’s propaganda that the 
Badr Brigades [a reference to sectarianism within the IA] and the ‘traitor’ Maliki had 
come to murder Baswaris in their homes and that only JAM could protect them.141
The Iraqi operation was not well-planned or well-coordinated and met with little initial 
success.  Nevertheless, it was, as President Bush declared, a “defining moment in the 
history of a free Iraq.”142  The original plan to take control of Basrah depended on the 
border being secured, the city sealed off, and known JAM strongholds isolated before 
the suburbs were cleared systematically using the Clear-Hold-Build method.  None of 
this had been achieved when the operation started and open flanks gave JAM much 
more room to manoeuvre than should have been the case.  Iron commented that “the 
Basrah Security Plan was at least a plan, whereas Charge of the Knights was not much 
more than a statement of intent: ‘remove criminals, liberate Basrah and shoot anyone 
armed.’”143  
Very quickly after the operation started, Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, commanding MNC-I, 
flew down to Basrah to assess the situation.  He called forward his Tactical Operations 
Centre commanded by his Deputy Commanding General (DCG), Maj. Gen. George 
Flynn USMC, to work alongside Mohan at the Basrah Operations Centre.  Austin also 
co-located Rear Admiral Winters with the Prime Minister, and the Minister of the 
Defence, in Basrah Palace.  The Coalition intent was “this must not fail.”144  Flynn 
explained to MND(SE) that, 
the Corps TOC had been deployed to ensure operational overwatch was properly 
conducted and did not fail again.  Furthermore, he considered it had not worked 
because we did not have the necessary Situational Awareness to prevent a crisis 
from occurring, and that that was what operational overwatch was all about.145
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 The conclusion is stark:  British operations in Basrah had not kept abreast of the 
situation and British forces were not in a position to manage the risks attendant with 
being in overwatch.  The first few days of Operation Charge of the Knights exposed 
MND(SE)’s poor situational awareness and its lack of resources with which it could 
take the fight to the extremists.  The Iraqis and Americans started to doubt British 
commitment and ability.  One senior officer considers it tarnished the British 
reputation.146  Some calls for fire proved to be beyond UK Rules of Engagement, and 
this produced further accusations that British forces were not supporting Iraqi forces in 
the fight for Basrah.  MNC-I very quickly filled capability gaps by re-allocating air, 
aviation and UAVs to Basrah, and they provided the means to locate, identify and 
engage militia teams.  U.S. MiTTs also arrived to accompany IA and National Police 
units in action.   
The difference between the British and U.S. approach to MiTT-ing has already been 
highlighted.  MNC-I responded very quickly to the Iraqi Army’s needs, providing 
Special Operations Forces (SOF), and MiTTs from 82nd Airborne Division and the 
USMC in Multinational Force-West in less than twelve hours.  They were soon in 
action in Basrah with their new Iraqi counterparts, bringing in close air support and 
artillery fires, providing intelligence and command and control, and bolstering and 
encouraging where needed.  By contrast, it took 48-hours for authority to be received 
from Whitehall for British forces to move back into Basrah, re-organized from M2T to 
MiTTs, along U.S. lines.  One account refers to a “political mandate... being sought 
through PJHQ and Whitehall for British units to re-enter [Basrah] for the first time since 
September 2007.”147   
For the record, it should be noted that some discussion of what MiTT-ing would entail 
took place in early March, as plans for the original Basrah Security Plan took shape.  At 
Iron’s instigation, Daniel Marston, then an instructor at the U.S. COIN CFE at Taji, 
provided battlegroups in MND(SE) with advice on MiTT-ing based on his experience 
with U.S. forces elsewhere in Iraq.148  This was put into practice on 28 March, when the 
1 SCOTS Battlegroup “re-aligned its effort from [Mentoring, Monitoring and Training] 
to direct MiTT support to those elements of 14 (IA) Division still in contact in Basra.”  
The approach adopted was based on “the sound model developed by US MiTTs in 
Baghdad.”149  Each MiTT was based on an infantry platoon and included additional 
snipers, anti-tank weapons, and a fire controller.  The MiTT mission was threefold:  to 
thoroughly and quickly embed with the Iraqi Army, to establish what was going on in 
the city, and to provide as much mentoring assistance, intelligence and fire support as 
possible.  British officers very quickly established strong working relations with their 
Iraqi counterparts, providing advice, guidance and support: 
This had to be done with an enormous level of sensitivity and care not to 
patronize...  For example, a distraction cordon and search operation during 
[Charge of the Knights 3] within the al Jazarer district, utilising a ‘swarming 
effect’ from all directions, was subtly changed to a controlled linear advance 
with sensibly placed cut-offs... without the loss of any credibility.150
Between 21 March and 1 April, the ISF’s operation prompted a considerable backlash 
from JAM in Basrah.  In Baghdad, it launched on average twenty rocket attacks per day 
on the International Zone from its sanctuary in Sadr City, although the U.S and Iraqi 
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 response accounted for an estimated nine-hundred militiamen in the operations to clear 
the JAM stronghold by the end of May.   
Bolstered by Coalition Force support, Mohan launched a counterattack into Basrah on 2 
April.  Maliki urged Gen. Mohan to launch an all-out assault into the Hiyyaniyah 
district but Iron dissuaded him and, instead, focussed Mohan’s attention on securing 
access routes into the city and dealing with each pocket of resistance in a carefully co-
ordinated way.  Each successful engagement added to Iraqi confidence, both among 
Baswaris and ISF.  Civil action programmes followed up immediately behind combat 
operations, clearing rubbish from the streets and opening up market areas.  By the time 
a major operation started to clear the Hiyyaniyah, Baswaris pointed out weapons caches, 
IED locations, and the hard-line insurgents.  The operation marked the turning point in 
Basrah.  For the first time almost since the invasion, Iraqi forces conducted successful 
operations among their people, with the consent of their people, and with British forces 
in support.  After the operation, commanders concluded that local support was the key 
contributory factor to the low level of violence encountered.   
On 3 April, Maliki ordered a ceasefire to allow negotiations with JAM to take place.  
This was very much against Coalition advice because the counterattack had been very 
successful, and MNF-I commanders believed that a ceasefire would give JAM time to 
reorganize.151  From 16 April, slow, deliberate clearance operations continued as the 
ISF worked through Basrah, district by district.  The operation continued for several 
weeks, in particular the programmes to clear rubbish from the streets and to repair 
Basrah’s damaged civil infrastructure.  The important aspect of the operation, as Iron 
and Mohan identified from the start, was that it was led by the GOI and carried out by 
the ISF.  Iraqis, supported by the Coalition, had secured their own people and the 
immediate political future. 
By mid-April, JAM in Basrah was defeated; its leadership had slipped away and left 
what Iron describes as the ‘corporals’ to fight on.  Maliki’s gamble paid off:  his forces 
re-established the Iraqi rule of law in Basrah, the operation broke JAM’s power, and, 
crucially, both Maliki and the Iraqi Army had grown in confidence and standing.  
British forces, once committed to the operation gained greatly from their involvement.  
Iron, who had been in Basrah from autumn 2007, and witnessed declining British 
influence following PIC, concluded, “the British in Basrah were incredibly popular, 
appreciated for what they were now doing, and they had gained consent.”152
British forces in Basrah remained embedded with the IA until the end of Operation 
TELIC, and their position with the Iraqi Army was greatly enhanced as a result.  The 
overall outcome of both Operation Charge of the Knights and TELIC was not one that 
could have been predicted by extrapolating the downward trend of British troop levels 
in Basrah and the upward trend in violence in southern Iraq.  Ironically, Maliki’s ill-
prepared and strategically risky operation to take control of Basrah created the 
conditions where British forces could once again play a positive role in securing the 
Iraqi population.  As one commanding officer noted, “The success of Op Charge of the 
Knights changed Basra beyond all recognition, with the city moving from a non-
permissive environment to a broadly permissive one in the space of two months.”153  
The tactical successes gained by the MiTTs were as notable as those gained by the SAS 
and loan service officers working with the firqat and the Sultan’s Armed Forces during 
the war in Dhofar in the 1970s.154  The question of defining campaign success, 
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 discussed in Counter Insurgency Operations, evident in Kenya, Malaya, Borneo, and 
Northern Ireland, and acclaimed in the Oman, was unclear in Iraq, and the validity of 
the doctrine which was available to support Operation TELIC has to be ascertained. 
5.11 Conclusions 
Military operations started in Iraq in March 2003 with no clear vision of how the 
campaign would unfold.  That the Iraqi regime would collapse under U.S. military 
pressure was hardly in doubt, nor was the ability of the Coalition to overwhelm the Iraqi 
armed forces.  The immediate post-conflict period proved much more uncertain and it 
was in the weeks and months that followed the collapse of Saddam’s regime that the 
military and political costs of the invasion started to add up.  Neither the U.S. nor the 
much smaller British contingent were strong enough militarily or configured politically, 
militarily or organizationally for post-conflict nation-building.  As luck would have it, 
for there is no evidence that any pre-invasion planning accurately predicted how the 
post-war security situation would unfold, the British were given responsibility for the 
four pre-dominantly Shi’a provinces of southern Iraq.  The British were spared the 
vicious backlash that American forces faced almost immediately in Baghdad and in the 
Sunni province of al Anbar.  Instead British forces found a generally compliant Shi’a 
population, glad to be free from the Ba’athist regime, and quick to secure power and the 
resources that came with it.  Herein lay the root cause of the problem:  Iraqi politics are 
a struggle for power and resources.  Those with them will fight to retain them from 
those without.  The inter-factional struggles started to grow as, and until Iraqis re-
established a new political hierarchy, both formal and, in keeping with Arab tradition, 
informal. 
The early months in Basrah proved to be chaotic but, apart from FRL terrorist attacks, 
the threat to political development and what would become attendant threats to security 
were less clear.  Charles Tripp is pointed in his criticism of this early period: 
The British had only a weak grasp of the personal histories, relationships, 
rivalries and status differences behind provincial networks.  This was knowledge 
that came gradually, and by that stage people had already inserted themselves 
into positions of influence in local government.  They used these posts to build 
up local fiefdoms, pursue feuds with rivals and initiate complex relationships 
with the emerging parties and leaders in Basra and Baghdad.  In short, a 
distinctly Iraqi politics was developing which escaped the supervision, let alone 
control, of the allied forces in occupation of the country.155   
Bryan Watters suggests after working with ISF in MNSTC-I in 2005 that early Iraqi 
compliance or, at worst, ambivalence, can be accounted for by Iraqi uncertainty about 
who would prevail in the political process.  Once Shi’a domination had been secured, 
albeit fragmented by internal division which was then to factionalize the GOI and its 
ministries, the factions had no need of Coalition support.  Coalition forces became an 
obstacle to cementing further power and therefore became a justifiable target.156  
Coalition forces thus became the problem not the solution, as GOCs in MND(SE) 
increasingly characterized the situation in Basrah in 2007 and early 2008. 
Almost from the point that President Bush declared ‘Mission accomplished,’ pressure 
from London was placed on British forces in Iraq to scale down operations.  This 
pressure continued throughout the campaign.  For a long time the underpinning logic 
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 held up:  the south was different from the rest of Iraq; it was stable, progressive and it 
was spared the sectarian tensions and ultimately the violence of Baghdad and the central 
provinces.  On this basis, force reductions could be justified and were, after all entirely 
in line with the U.S. policy of transition and withdrawal.  The decisive point for all 
campaigns, both insurgent and counterinsurgent, came not with any political 
developments or military milestones but with the carefully calculated attack by AQI on 
the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra on 22 February 2006.  The civil war which erupted 
changed the demographics of Baghdad, mixed areas became Shi’a or Sunni depending 
on the militia powerbase, and the levels of violence that followed proved that the U.S., 
its coalition partners, nor the still developing ISF were strong enough to contain the 
sectarian violence.  Worse still, it showed that the GOI was incapable of acting 
effectively and that some of its ministers and its ministries were complicit in the 
bloodshed.  
Attacks by Shi’a militia on British forces increased during 2006 yet, despite this, force 
reductions continued in line with the policy of transition.  In a minor reversal of policy, 
British forces resorted to classic counterinsurgency tactics of combined military, 
political and economic development activity in a sustained effort to demonstrate resolve 
and the capability of the ISF.  Operation SINBAD, which had demonstrated British 
resolve to its U.S. ally and had captured the imagination in Whitehall,157 stopped in 
early 2007, when the effort switched from countering the insurgent threat posed by 
JAM to dealing with the criminality associated with JAM.  The U.S. campaign had not 
only changed direction from withdrawal to a troop surge, but it changed its approach 
from SSR and transition to population security and an updated version of the same 
classic counterinsurgency theory reflected in Operation SINBAD.   
What conclusions can be drawn from this examination of the British campaign?  First, 
change was one of the few constants throughout.  Each TELIC deployment was and can 
be characterized in a different way.  Successive commanders developed a different 
theme or approach.  In the early tours, this was as much driven by British commanders 
and their interpretation as it was by either Iraqi political or insurgent pressure.  Towards 
the end of the campaign, although the U.S. adopted a classical counterinsurgency 
approach, the British interpretation that the problem in Basrah was more criminal than 
insurgent, and its policy of continued transition, put it at odds with the now dominant 
and successful U.S. strategy of securing the population.  Second, SSR and developing 
the ISF were identified from the start as the way to bring the military campaign to a 
close.  The ISF had to be able to provide security for its population and once it could, 
British forces could leave.  The logic is sound and in keeping with both past practice 
and doctrine.  The difficulty was that the approach was not consistent, successive 
battlegroups were put off by militia infiltration of the IA and its inconsistent 
performance on operations.  Yet when British training teams had to take firm control of 
the battalions they were training, and when they embedded teams for high intensity 
counterinsurgency operations in Baghdad, the IA responded, as they were to respond 
again and decisively in March 2008 during Operation Charge of the Knights.  Third, the 
process of continual force level reductions and transition ran counter to classic 
counterinsurgency theory:  British forces were unable to secure the population, and, 
once the IED threat manifested itself so violently, they were unable to operate among 
the population with the level of confidence they intuitively knew was required from 
their general experience of Northern Ireland.  Fourth, with reduced interaction with the 
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 population, intelligence sources were increasingly limited and specific.  Operations 
became similarly focussed and for all the right reasons – reducing collateral damage, 
avoiding where possible from alienating the population – but they were unable to 
provide a sustained effect on the population.   
While strike operations reduced JAM’s capability, it did not neutralize it, nor did it help 
separate JAM from its support.  Again, reduced force levels and limited ISF capability 
prevented military operations from achieving anything more than what Gen. Wall 
describes as ‘tactical acupuncture.’158  All this was far removed from the doctrine 
published in July 2001 and, from December 2006, the U.S. Army’s doctrine and the 
tactics it put into practice in Baghdad and later across Iraq.  The questions to be 
examined in Chapter 6 is, in the light of the Army’s experience in Basrah, is its doctrine 
still valid, or were circumstances so different that it was simply not applicable to post-
conflict Iraq?  
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 6 British Counterinsurgency Doctrine:  
Practice against Theory 
 
The previous chapter examined the course of the British military campaign in Iraq.  It 
identified that many participants viewed and characterized the campaign differently.  
This affected the way the campaign developed.  Chapter 5 showed that the process of 
British force reductions continued, despite increasing levels of violence in Basrah, 
which the ISF were unable to contain, despite British efforts to train and develop them.  
It highlighted differences between the U.S. and the British approaches.  At first, the 
U.S. military struggled to adjust to the broader challenge of counterinsurgency, 
believing that, for the first year or so clinical counter terrorism would solve the rising 
problem of insurgency.  By contrast, conditions at first in the south allowed British 
operations to make relatively quick, but, as things transpired, somewhat short-lived 
progress.  The gradual consolidation of political power at provincial and national level 
was coincident with increasingly violent insurgencies in many parts of Iraq against 
which, until the U.S. policy, approach and force levels were adjusted in January 2007, 
the Coalition policy of transition and withdrawal proved hopelessly ineffective. 
British forces started Operation TELIC organized, trained and equipped for warfighting.  
They quickly and instinctively transitioned to what was first seen as peace support 
operations, validating the premise on which the Army had been built since the mid-
1990s; “Forces trained for high intensity combat can adapt to peace support 
operations.”1  Although the characterization of the British campaign changed, the 
majority of the soldiers faced an insurgent threat, and they had to learn and adapt to it in 
the most challenging of circumstances of unfamiliar language and culture, diminishing 
intelligence as the campaign unfolded, and with no formal education in 
counterinsurgency.  Regardless of how it was characterized, the problem required 
classic counterinsurgency methods to establish security:  building the host nation’s 
security forces to the point when they could maintain effective local security; 
neutralizing the insurgent through intelligence-led precision-strike operations; 
supporting and sustaining local political initiatives and development projects.  There 
were, inevitably, some differences between the campaign in Iraq and previous 
campaigns.  Some might have been anticipated, others would be harder to predict.  In 
overall terms, however, as one senior officer noted, 
The term counterinsurgency is applicable [in Iraq] but in a context unlike any 
previous campaign.  There was no civil-military structure, no political process, 
and no institutions that worked.  The reality was that we were building capacity 
to deal with the insurgency at the same time as we were running a 
counterinsurgency campaign.2
With this in mind and after taking a broad view of British operations in Iraq, the aim of 
this chapter is to examine the validity of Counter Insurgency Doctrine, the six 
principles of British counterinsurgency and the Ink Spot method, which were identified 
and examined in Chapter 3, and evaluated in Chapter 4 against the broad development 
of British counterinsurgency theory.  Its primary sources are the interviews conducted 
by the author to support the thesis.  Those interviewed included brigade and divisional 
commanders, senior staff officers in British and Coalition headquarters, and those 
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 involved with the development of doctrine in general and policy for Iraq in particular.  
The author’s interviews inform much of the analysis in this chapter and they are 
supported by observations drawn from the body of official Post-Operational Reports 
and Interviews and media reports.  The interviews sought to examine how practitioners, 
planners, staff officers and commanders characterized the British approach to 
counterinsurgency, to examine whether they viewed the British doctrinal approach as 
still valid, to identify the extent to which and reasons why the Iraq campaign differed 
from doctrine, and to re-examine the impact of education in establishing an 
understanding of the principles and basic approach.   
6.1 The First of all Strategic Questions:  Peace Support or 
Counterinsurgency? 
Since the campaign started in Iraq, interest in counterinsurgency doctrine has almost 
inevitably increased.  It certainly captured media interest in the U.S. and for the first 
time, the U.S. Army’s doctrine, FM 3-24, was published by the University of Chicago 
Press both in response to interest and to widen its accessibility.3  Despite the general 
interest in counterinsurgency which followed the invasion of Iraq, somewhat 
surprisingly, very few post-operational interviews make any reference to doctrine.  
While all of those interviewed mention training for and the tactics used in Iraq, the vast 
majority did not make the link between best practices and the development or validation 
of doctrine, or to more general professional education and training.  There are several 
possible explanations for what is a surprising omission.   
First, those interviewed may not have known what the doctrine contained.  Everard 
identifies the practical problem faced at unit level.  It highlights the problem of 
accessibility, identified in Chapter 2 as a criterion of effective doctrine: 
The volume of concepts and doctrine we have to read is staggering and the 
volume problem is exacerbated by technology which allows us to burn CDs and 
hang enormous amounts of work on websites, often with little guidance or 
direction on what is important, what is essential or what, quite frankly, can wait 
to be overtaken by the next turn of the wheel. The rate at which doctrine is being 
produced brings with it the real risk of it not being understood.4
Everard’s view reflects the problem faced at unit level.  ACSC graduates had at least 
been given an introduction to counterinsurgency, although, as Chapter 3 identified, 
there was a marked drop in the depth to which counterinsurgency was studied between 
1997 and 2007.  Captains also were taught the theory and the history of the British 
counterinsurgency when they attended the short residential course at the Royal Military 
Academy Sandhurst as part of their promotion studies.  A second possible explanation 
is that those familiar with the doctrine may have considered that it contained nothing 
contentious and that it was broadly relevant and useful.  A third option is that the 
differing ways the early deployments to Iraq were characterized meant that many failed 
to consider that counterinsurgency was necessary or relevant.  This point was raised in 
Chapter 5, where, in the view of some commanders, the terms peace support and 
counterinsurgency appeared to be mutually exclusive, while for others they were 
synonymous.  Those who reached for peace support doctrine would not have necessarily 
reached for counterinsurgency doctrine as well.  Maj. Gen. Nick Carter considered that 
experience of peace support operations in the Balkans confused thinking about what 
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 sort of problem Iraq posed.  His point captures the essence of the problem and it ties in 
to Kitson’s view that a specific response is needed for each insurgency.  In Carter’s 
view the result was “We therefore lurched into counter insurgency, having thought that 
the odd IED was nothing more than a blip in what was to be a longer term 
reconstruction campaign.”5  The interesting point to note is that Carter was referring to 
2004, when the general view was that Operation TELIC was a peace support operation. 
Lt. Gen. Sir Graeme Lamb goes further, identifying the risk which emerges when 
people seek to characterize a complex problem without properly understanding what the 
problem is, and then force their interpretation to fit what would be an inevitably simple 
doctrinal model: 
There always has been a danger of chasing labels and we try to think of things in 
nice neat terms.  The reality is that what we face in Iraq is multidimensional and 
it cannot be simplified; it does not fit easily into anything we have already 
described.  The search for a neat and tidy solution by those who don’t really 
understand the problem, even at the most basic level, will get us into a 
dangerous situation through lazy thinking and lazy talking about what the 
campaign is and what we need to do about it.6
Lamb’s observation is closely related to a general point Iron makes about doctrine and 
experience.  Iron suggests that commanders make decisions based on what they 
recognize.  What they then recognize is, in turn, based on their experience and 
understanding: 
From the miasma of information available, staff officers manipulate information 
until it fits a pattern that the commander can identify.  Commanders then drag a 
solution that fits from their filing cabinet full of potential solutions.  The only 
way to build up the filing cabinet, other than through operational experience, is 
through reading and study.7
It was only really from 2006 that the idea that Iraq was a counterinsurgency campaign 
started to be accepted within MND(SE).  This was largely as the result of the efforts of 
Maj. Gens. Cooper and Shirreff, despite the fact that the approach in MND(SE) was to 
transition security sector responsibility to the ISF with concomitant UK force 
reductions.  During 2006, as the intensity of operations increased, the general view 
changed to one that accepted counterinsurgency was a more appropriate response to 
conditions in Iraq than peace support.  It was clear, after all, that there was no peace to 
support.  The realization that insurgency was the principal security challenge in Iraq 
coincided with a greater general awareness of counterinsurgency doctrine prompted in 
the British Army by the publication of Stability Operations in Iraq, which commented 
on British doctrine, and the publicity surrounding Gen. Petraeus’ project to develop 
U.S. doctrine.  Although both heightened interest in counterinsurgency, neither brought 
about a change in policy or increased resources. 
The MNF-I policy of Transition, developed by Gen. Casey, did acknowledge initially 
that Iraq required a counterinsurgency campaign in the generally accepted, fully co-
ordinated classical method.  However, by summer 2006, for those involved in 
operations in MND(SE), Daniel Marston observed that all the British battlegroups 
deployed recognized that that was what it was; “All battalions knew they were fighting 
an insurgency.”8  He noted that junior commanders generally understood the basic 
requirements of counterinsurgency.  Marston also noted, and took part in considerable 
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 discussion between commanding officers and company commanders about how the 
general approach might be adjusted to better reflect the basic tenets of 
counterinsurgency doctrine which they understood.  Measures they discussed included 
embedding company training teams with the IA, running operations to interdict 
smuggling of arms and ammunition from Iran, and developing and focussing the 
Army’s lessons learned process.  Of particular note, given that these discussions pre-
dated the Petraeus-led revival of population-centric counterinsurgency, Marston 
observed a general desire to re-establish company bases in Basrah to take control of the 
city and to “get out amongst the people, because the Iraqi people want to talk.”  It was 
also clear to those involved at battalion and company level that there were not enough 
troops to carry out this task.9
In a follow-up visit between February and March 2007, Marston drew the same 
conclusion:   the new battlegroups understood counterinsurgency but, due to force 
levels, they were limited in the extent to which security could be established.  
Nevertheless, battlegroups were working with tribal leaders, and were training the IA 
and in two cases were embedded with Iraqi battalions and in action with them in 
Baghdad.10  As he found in his previous visit, he noted a general view that the soldiers 
saw the need for and wanted to be in forward bases among the population than on the 
COB.  The need for strike operations was understood, but their detrimental effect could 
not be ameliorated because there was no British presence on the ground to reassure the 
population and to deter and neutralize the insurgents.11   
6.2 Characterizing the British Approach and the Campaign in 
Iraq 
Sir Alistair Irwin remarked that arguments over definitions are often more semantic and 
academic than practical.12   The characterization of the campaign is not a prosaic 
academic discussion point.  As Clausewitz makes clear in the ‘first of all strategic 
questions’ – that of establishing what type of war it is – characterizing the campaign 
correctly has significant implications for the strategy a nation adopts and the way it 
plans and co-ordinates its efforts.  There are implications for doctrine when it is linked 
by strategy, which links ends, ways and means, to policy.  While this creates the 
potential risk of doctrine changing with every change of government, doctrine should 
provide the framework of common understanding against which discussion of policy 
and strategy can take place.  In this sense, doctrine is not just what is taught, it has much 
wider applicability.  Language therefore is important.  Carter explained that, 
If it is not precise, there is a risk that political direction can get in a muddle.  
Talk of Peace Enforcement, with the word Peace included, can allow the wrong 
conclusions to be drawn.  Therefore we have to use terms that capture the 
entirety of what is involved.  We have to be careful how the campaign is 
described.  Characteristics and the implications of terms such as enduring and 
intensity need to be made clear because they have implications for the extent to 
which the Comprehensive Approach can be implemented.  These in turn have 
implications for what [the country] can sustain, and the resilience of our plans.  
What we do, what we describe, affect the outcomes for Defence.  In these terms, 
underpinning language is critical.13
Mockaitis concluded that adaptability is a central characteristic of the British approach 
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 to counterinsurgency.  Lt. Gen. Riley concurs; “The British model is very adaptable.”  
However, he stresses that “it is important to note that whilst there are lots of crossovers 
between Belfast and Basra, they were not the same.”14  As U.S. industrialist Mary 
Parker Follett asserted, “the law is in the circumstances.”15  The commanding officer in 
Maysan in 2004 was well aware that this was the case, and several commanders and 
principal staff officers interviewed expressed their concern over those who were too 
ready with a solution from Northern Ireland or the Balkans without, as Imperial 
Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power (1949) emphasized, a proper knowledge 
of the background to the unrest or having identified the dissident elements. 
Gen. Wall characterizes the British approach in terms of pragmatism: striking the right 
balance between short term actions and developing longer term legitimacy, recognizing 
the full implications and requirement for consent (what he describes as the modern 
‘Hearts and Minds’), being quick to understand the complexity and its nuances which 
was “due in part to our Northern Ireland experience, partly it is genetic, part of it is our 
military culture, and partly it is our doctrine.”16  Pragmatism, Wall argues, can be seen 
in the Army’s recognition that insurgency is not a military phenomenon for which there 
is only a military solution, while military force is a hedge against instability and 
discontent, where military force is used to contain the opposition’s military impact, 
political primacy and effective indigenous political machinery are the crucial elements 
of success; “The early days in Iraq were the exact opposite.”17  Wall also highlights the 
Army’s recognition that reconciliation and accommodation are an important step in 
achieving a political solution to insurgency; the agility demonstrated in developing 
TTPs and new equipment; and in its recognition of what he describes as the 
‘Boomerang Effect’ – where short term tactical success may be gained but at the cost of 
radicalising opponents; “We certainly fell foul of it in Northern Ireland and now in the 
Long War [against terrorism].”18  
Lt. Gen. Sir John Kiszely suggests that the British have followed two approaches:  
‘hearts and minds’ and the punitive.  “Totalitarian regimes can apply the latter.  We 
used it in the past.  Our approach is now firmly rooted in the ‘hearts and minds,’ mainly 
because our experience is from the softer end of COIN.”19  Experience is undoubtedly 
important in shaping both the development of doctrine and its practical application.  
Certainly the received view is that in the early years in Basrah, the Army’s recent 
operational experience gave it an advantage, as Maj. Gen., now Lt. Gen. Bill Rollo 
notes,  
The net effect of [the Balkans] was that we were very comfortable with the idea 
of arriving at a place, dividing it up by population centres, distributing ourselves, 
establishing framework operations and making things work.  It all fitted very 
comfortably with our understanding of Mission Command and drew on all our 
Northern Ireland experience.20   
The authors of Stability Operations in Iraq concurred, concluding that experience from 
Northern Ireland and the Balkans helped the Army to make a positive start in Iraq,  
The approach to people, the ability of commanders to think on their feet, to brief 
the media, to draw on proven tactics, techniques and procedures, and specialist 
skills and equipment, all proved invaluable.21
While it is possible to characterize the British approach, the issue of whether the actions 
and efforts in Iraq amounted to a ‘campaign,’ – what doctrine defines as “a set of 
179 
 
 military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a 
given time and geographical area”22 – in the early years is more contentious.  Riley is 
clear:  “Using the term ‘campaign’ implies that there was a plan which there never was.  
The result has been that we have stumbled from stage to stage, distracted as we have 
gone on by problems of the moment.”23  This places practice in direct conflict with 
doctrine, which describes six principles “arranged into a logical sequence which 
provides a government with a general pattern on which to base and review its COIN 
strategy,”24 and which adapted general campaign planning methodology for 
counterinsurgency.  Practise did not follow doctrine. 
At the campaign level in Iraq, the coalition did not have a plan until April 2004 when 
MNF-I formed in Baghdad under Gen. George Casey.  Kiszely notes that “that lack of 
planning [until MNF-I formed] had a detrimental impact of the security environment on 
political development.”25  Casey’s campaign plan was written by a British colonel, 
Andrew Sharpe, brought out to Baghdad specifically to write it by Lt. Gen. John 
McColl, Casey’s first British deputy.  While a plan was eventually developed by MNF-
I, in national terms, a difficulty emerged over how the UK handled the campaign in the 
south.  The complexity of Coalition operations was one factor; but so was the problem 
of variable progress across the country.  Early achievements in the south were not 
matched elsewhere, due largely to the ferocity of the Sunni insurgency around Baghdad, 
the unsuitability of the U.S. approach to deal with it, and Iraq’s initial political 
vacuum.26
6.3 Principles 
After confronting an insurgency for six years in Iraq, and given the significance of 
principles in doctrine and operational planning, the question has to be asked, ‘Are the 
principles of counterinsurgency still valid?’  By 2006, when work in the U.S. was 
underway to update counterinsurgency doctrine and the U.S Army was seeking advice 
from its British counterparts, Lt. Gen. Lamb, then responsible for the Army’s tactical 
doctrine and combined arms training, could find no evidence that the British principles 
had failed.  Indeed, he noted an emerging view in the U.S. which considered that, in the 
light of U.S. experience in Iraq, British principles still held true.  By 2007, Lamb’s view 
was that “the COIN principles are fine but we don’t find them applied in Iraq.”27  
Everard was equally clear:  “The COIN principles are still valid and they are very good 
but they have been difficult to apply in Iraq.”28  Riley took a similar stand: “The 
principles are good.  Nothing has changed that invalidates them or that requires us to 
change.  The issue is that we have singularly failed to live up to them, in particular 
political aim, coordinated government machinery and separating the insurgent from his 
support.”29  Maj. Gen. Gerry Berragan, then Deputy CG MNC-I, also considered that 
the principles remained valid.  His concern was that he was not sure that they could be 
applied: 
Inter-agency activity [referring to the U.S. term for cross-government co-
operation] does not work effectively for us.  The difficulty is that we do not have 
someone in charge.  Petraeus and Crocker share responsibilities because a 
supremo is a rare beast.  This means that there will always be a tension between 
the military and the politicians reporting on separate channels.30
Gen. Wall also believed that the principles were valid, although he thought “It is quite 
difficult to apply some of these principles when you are the occupying power and we 
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 completely disregarded them in the post-war stage in Iraq.”31  However, in his view, the 
issue of informing the target audiences at home and in the theatre of operation, as 
Counter Insurgency Operations identified, required a great deal more attention: 
We are fighting a battle at the strategic and operational level where the old style 
framework operations, developing information from patrolling and making 
contact with the population, now takes place on the internet.  Our strategic 
communications has to take account of narratives and they need to be 
emphasised.32
Another GOC in Basrah concluded that, 
We were doing COIN with a difference; we used a B1 Bomber to effect a break-
clean in Basra, and were firing artillery into built up areas, which is not normal 
in COIN.  You need to adapt COIN doctrine to the parameters of violence that 
exist within the operation and within the society that exists.  The almost 
universal Iraqi reaction to our strike operations was, ‘excellent; do more of 
those.’  These are not the lessons we learned from Northern Ireland.  However, 
if the doctrine is right, (and I think it is) then it can be adapted to the operation, 
and it is the drills employed on the ground that are different.33
The conclusions recorded here were made by commanders and principal staff officers 
who had served in Iraq, in Basrah and in Baghdad, and their combined experience 
covered the entire campaign.  It is important to note that they, and all those other 
officers interviewed expressed strong support for British principles laid out in Counter 
Insurgency Operations, and for their rationale.   
Holden Reid suggests that doctrine should be developed through “debate and the 
exchange of ideas in the calm of peace.”34  By 2006, the Army was embroiled in Iraq, it 
faced an increasingly violent insurgency while at the same time having to implement 
force level reductions, and it was increasing its efforts in Afghanistan.  The opportunity 
for calm, considered doctrine development had long since passed.  As writers at 
DGD&D prepared ADP Land Operations during 2005, and they reconsidered the range 
of military operations in the context of the invasion of Iraq, Maj. Gen. Lamont Kirkland 
– the last DLW before DGD&D became part of the Defence Concepts and Development 
Centre in April 2006 – took the opportunity to re-examine counterinsurgency doctrine 
and its principles.  His conclusion is important because it was based on a wide range of 
views, not just personal experience from an operational tour at a specific time and place: 
Our operational experience suggested that the Army’s COIN doctrine was fit for 
purpose.  Although it is important to remain very critical, and we need to watch 
for circumstances where our doctrine does not fit, there was no evidence that 
either the COIN doctrine had failed or that the situation had changed enough to 
warrant its revision.35
Kirkland’s view was reflected on 16 June 2006 when, after over three years of British 
military operations in Iraq, the newly formed Army Doctrine and Concepts Committee, 
the successor to ADC, agreed that the principles for counterinsurgency were indeed still 
valid.36
6.3.1 Political Primacy and Political Aim 
Doctrine has long asserted that political will is essential for effective counterinsurgency 
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 and it underpins the principle of Political Primacy and Political Aim which states that 
the overall plan of campaign should be the responsibility of government.  British 
doctrine has been clear since 1963 that there is no such thing as a purely military 
solution to insurgency, a point which Kitson reinforced in Bunch of Five, and in 
doctrine publications since: successful counterinsurgency requires political, military and 
economic measures to be brought to bear to re-establish good governance.  As Riley 
made clear,  
It has to be clear that military activity is a sub-set of the overall campaign.  
Military force should not be applied if it is going to make a bad situation worse.  
Intelligence, coordinating with the civil authorities, civil affairs, and the use of 
minimum necessary force are the proven, enduring themes of how we approach 
counterinsurgency, but they have to be applied correctly and in the right context.  
Apply them incorrectly, get the balance wrong and they will not make things 
better.37
Counter Insurgency Operations assumed that there would be a functioning government 
in the country of operation.  In the case of Iraq, its government and the administration 
collapsed after the Coalition invaded, and it took a great deal of effort to re-establish a 
nascent but far from effective form of governance.  In Iraq, the issue quickly became 
which government and whose aim?  In the absence of a functioning Iraqi government, 
until 2005, when the first Iraqi government was elected, the U.S.-led coalition was the 
de facto governing authority.  From 2004, when MNF-I was formed, the U.S. policy of 
Transition defined the campaign, even though Iraqi, U.S. and Coalition interests and 
objectives were not clearly defined.  In this situation, Rollo observed that, “all this 
added up to making the application of our doctrinal principles very difficult because we 
were attempting to support something [the Iraqi administration] which was 
dysfunctional and, at times, malevolent.”38   
Lamb suggested that “We should have been more realistic, and recognised from the start 
that Iraqi leadership would take time to adjust to their new responsibilities and that they 
would need mentoring.”39  He also considered that the principle of political primacy and 
a clear political aim remains valid, but, in the context of ‘whose primacy, whose aim?’ 
he identifies the critical problem was the Coalition put the Iraqi political structure in 
place, “but then we walked away.”40  Capacity building, he argued, 
is not just ‘telling’ and it is more than just ‘showing.’  It is being there every step 
of the way.  We should have been more realistic and recognised from the start 
that Iraqi leadership would take time to adjust to their new responsibilities and 
that they would need mentoring.  There are some realities that we do not seem to 
have done anything about.  The FCO, after all, will have a relationship with Iraq 
long after we have gone so it would have been in our interests to have invested 
in this in a really meaningful way.  Instead, we have been tied into short term 
political horizons.  This challenges the very concept of the Comprehensive 
Approach:  we cannot do everything ourselves, and what we have to do, has to 
be done on more realistic timelines.41
As Lamb recognized in 2007, the pressure to handover to the ISF and to leave did not 
take sufficient account of the time it would take for the Iraqis to adjust to their new form 
of government, and for factions and parties to find a political equilibrium.  
Counterinsurgency operations take time, and this is made clear in Counter Insurgency 
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 Operations.  What could not have been anticipated when it was written – and it would 
be unreasonable to think that it could since there was no experience to suggest it was an 
option – was the parlous state that Iraq would be in politically, and the intensity of the 
sectarian and inter-factional violence which stemmed from political uncertainty and 
instability.  It was only when Ambassador Crocker and Gen. Petraeus revised the 
campaign plan in April 2007 and they started to address Iraq’s political and 
governmental problems by addressing the resulting security situation, were time and the 
need for effective governance properly dealt with in planning and approach. 
6.3.2 Co‐ordinated Government Action 
Counter Insurgency Operations presents a logical but somewhat simple doctrinal model 
for co-ordinated government action.  It assumes that the host nation, however hard 
pressed by the insurgency, would have the vestiges of a functioning government for 
which British military operations could act in support.  The doctrine strongly supports 
the appointment of a Director of Operations, along the lines of Briggs and Templer in 
Malaya.  Counter Insurgency Operations did not take any account of the broad aspects 
of multi-nationality, such as national caveats on what contingents could and could not 
do, the role of national command and control arrangements in shaping the British 
approach, and the division of responsibility, and inevitable differences of opinion 
between government departments and among the Coalition partners. 
Multi-nationality affected the British operation in a number of ways.  First, MND(SE), 
although based around a core of British officers, was, as its name suggests, multi-
national.  The mix of staff officers added their own national approach and while, as 
Riley notes, familiarity with NATO procedures helped, there was an almost inevitable 
friction created by an ad hoc organization which had not trained together and which was 
operating in a U.S.-led, U.S.-dominated coalition.  Very early in the campaign, a senior 
officer observed, 
It came as no surprise to most that Multi-nationality degraded the performance 
of headquarters (by about a third).   It was also suggested that as we were likely 
to be the nation of choice to lead multinational headquarters within a US-led 
coalition force in the future we should take it more seriously and formalise our 
doctrine and procedures.42
This comment might not have been necessary had British doctrine already formalized 
multi-national operations more comprehensively, and account been taken in training 
headquarters and staff officers for operations in Iraq.   
Second, British commanders were acutely aware that being able to get the most out of 
all the sub-ordinate national contingents required a clear understanding of what 
freedoms and constraints each contingent faced, and to make arrangements, however 
complicated, for them to work.  Riley’s directive to his sub-ordinates makes this clear: 
You must read this in conjunction with the orders you have been given by your 
national contingent commander or your government. Nothing that I say is meant 
to run contrary to those instructions and I have been careful to match my 
instructions to you with those orders. It is one of my tasks to see that there is no 
conflict between those national orders, and instructions issued to you by me, or 
to the division by our higher headquarters in theatre, Multinational Corps Iraq.43
Third, the campaign highlighted the problems a British force faced as part of a U.S. 
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 operation, in particular, its roles and responsibilities as a junior partner in a U.S.-led 
operation.  There were a number of recurring issues which, far from being resolved as 
the campaign developed, were exacerbated as national strategies bifurcated in January 
2007 with the start of the Surge.  While MNF-I was generous in U.S. money and 
capabilities it made available to MND(SE), from ISR systems to the $87 million made 
available for Operation SINBAD,44 its generosity did not extend to British 
interpretations of the situation once the Surge had been announced.  On the one hand 
the view was expressed that “we have not been able to handle the campaign in the south 
in a national, UK way, because of the complexity of Coalition operations.”45  On the 
other, at the operational level, the U.S. was forced to concentrate on the Sunni-Shi’a 
civil war so that it could secure Baghdad.  The UK’s focus was less clearly defined.  
Differences between the two positions were manifest in vitriolic public criticisms which 
highlighted the difficulties in interpretation and intent between British and U.S. 
positions: 
A senior US officer familiar with Gen Petraeus’s thinking said: “The short 
version is that the Brits have lost Basra, if indeed they ever had it. Britain is in a 
difficult spot because of the lack of political support at home, but for a long time 
- more than a year - they have not been engaged in Basra and have tried to avoid 
casualties. 
They did not have enough troops there even before they started cutting back. 
The situation is beyond their control. 
Quite frankly what they’re doing right now is not any value-added. They’re just 
sitting there. They’re not involved. The situation there gets worse by the day. 
Americans are disappointed because, in their minds, this thing is still winnable. 
They don’t intend to cut and run.”46
Within UK national structures, the doctrinal model called for “a coordinated national 
plan [to]... cover the entire national, economic, administrative, operational and 
intelligence fields.”47  Many of those interviewed believed that no such British plan 
existed, and Kitson’s call for national efforts to be co-ordinated through one individual 
who could represent it on the host country’s supreme council to help formulate overall 
policy was not addressed fully at any point in the campaign.48  At the tactical level, this 
created inevitable tensions between military and non-military activities: 
We felt the lack of a holistic approach across the four lines of operation 
[Security, Governance, Communications and the Economy]; the only coherent 
one seemed to be Security and this was used by the other agencies [FCO and 
DfID] in particular to beat us with, as their excuse for their not doing anything.  
One of my company commanders commented ‘Basra is a very lonely place for 
the military.’49
A senior staff officer recognized the strength of the Director of Operations model, and 
highlighted the practical shortcomings of not having either a plan or the means to co-
ordinate UK national initiatives and efforts within MND(SE) and as part of the 
Coalition: 
Were we to start with a clean piece of paper, then I think we would have come 
up with the decision that we needed to appoint some form of Pro-Consul; a 
general or an empowered civilian like Lord Ashdown, it matters not.   We 
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 should then have provided the necessary resources along each of the Lines of 
Operation; sufficient troops for the Security Line for example – compare our 
two battalions in a city of two million, compared to the fifteen battalions in a 
city like Belfast of 300,000 – money for the Economic Line – the only money 
we got was American and we needed big money; millions of pounds; a Marshall 
Plan big enough to restore Basrah – and we would have staffed Information 
Operations with young dynamic and imaginative Alistair Campbell-type people.  
But we didn’t.50
Of course, these were problems experienced at the tactical level by a British-led division 
operating within a U.S.-led corps.  One senior officer highlighted how the difficulties 
between PJHQ and MoD affected strategy and decision-making: 
The problem we have created is a national level disconnect between what we did 
in the bunker at PJHQ and policy makers in MoD.  The focus in MoD was far 
too short term, certainly during TELIC 1.  This might have been a transitory 
thing but it might have been a problem if the war had gone on much longer.  
With a short term view and no obvious thinking beyond the horizon and to 
Phase 4, this calls into question MoD’s role.  It has to be able to run things and 
think about the next stage but it cannot because it is pegged by the need to deal 
with the day-to-day issues that are as much political as they are military.  This is 
a lesson we need to learn and it means we should really examine the delivery of 
military-strategic command.51   
The conclusion is clear:  not only must the national effort be co-ordinated within the 
theatre of operation but it must be co-ordinated effectively at home.  PJHQ provided the 
principal gateway for information and decisions to and from Iraq but it did not have the 
means or the support from other government departments to provide the degree of co-
ordination necessary.  Lt. Gen. Rollo develops this in the context of in-theatre co-
ordinated government machinery, described by the MoD as the Comprehensive 
Approach:52
Today’s Comprehensive Approach is, in broad terms, correct in theory because 
it seeks to draw together all levers of national power to support political aims 
and objectives.  However, its application has been less successful in practice.  
Why?  Because there is no common mechanism across government to define 
what is required from across government to achieve success.  In Iraq, we found 
ourselves caught between two stools.  It was an issue of strategy and we faced 
two options:  do we support the main campaign and take our place in it 
accordingly, or do we take a chunk of the campaign and focus all our effort 
there.  In fact we found ourselves trying to do both.53  
Although the FCO and DfiD were present in the south, they were based in Basrah 
Palace.  However, HQ MND(SE) was based at Basrah air station, and as the IED threat 
increased, so did the difficulties of senior representatives meeting to plan and co-
ordinate: 
One of the basic principles of this sort of operation is to collocate the political 
and military effort, and ensure that they operate from the same plan.  We were 
separated from the Consul General and, although we tried as hard as we could to 
keep in touch and my POLAD (Policy Advisor) visited him regularly, the threat 
reduced movement between the two locations significantly.  Not being 
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 collocated was a considerable disadvantage.54
A senior officer concluded this “was a glaring weakness which broke the most 
fundamental of COIN principles... When the Brigade Headquarters had been moved out 
of Basra Palace we had broken that key principle, and that had been a mistake.”55  
Another identified that the absence of co-ordinated UK government machinery in the 
south allowed UK effort to be dissipated; “This would have been avoided if we had 
decided in the planning phase to make South East Iraq an exemplar and DfiD directed to 
take the lead.”56  Such an approach would, however, have been problematic since Iraq 
was organized on a provincial, not regional level so there was no natural regional 
interlocutor with whom a regional UK-led approach could have co-ordinated.  More 
importantly, as Rollo notes, there was “certainly no political desire, Iraqi, American or 
British, appetite to create any regional body.  The fear of a federated Iraq had to be 
ameliorated.”57   
Both doctrine’s view of co-ordinated government machinery, and the guidelines to 
shape the ally-host nation relationship are logical and sensible, but neither was applied 
in the early years of the campaign.  By the time Petraeus and Crocker unified U.S. 
efforts at the campaign level in 2007, Operation ZENITH was underway in the south 
and the pressure from London continued to be on scaling down the British presence and 
transitioning to Iraqi control.  As the authors of Stability Operations in Iraq concluded, 
The British doctrinal model (usually applied to counter insurgency) of a single 
authority e.g. a Director of Operations, co-ordinating political, economic, social, 
legal, security and cultural strands of a campaign is still valid but was not 
followed in the UK Area of Responsibility in Iraq. This created confusion...58
6.3.3 Intelligence and Information 
“Good intelligence,” Counter Insurgency Operations makes clear “is perhaps the 
greatest asset for a government combating an insurgency.  Without it the security forces 
work in the dark and random offensive operations on this basis produce nothing positive 
and much negative reaction amongst the population involved in the theatre from within 
the international forum as a whole.”59  The campaigns in Malaya, Kenya, and Northern 
Ireland saw a great deal of emphasis placed on building and sustaining effective 
intelligence operations.  In Northern Ireland, covert surveillance by undercover soldiers, 
agent handling, and technical intelligence operations became part of the campaign 
culture, and they developed a mystique and a mythology which carries on.60   
Without exception, all those interviewed noted the paucity of intelligence available and 
the surprisingly low level of cultural and situational understanding those involved had 
of the campaign and their area of operations.  The fundamentals identified in Imperial 
Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power (1949) were certainly not evident in Iraq:  
knowledge of the background to unrest, identifying the dissident elements, a sound 
intelligence system and good topographical knowledge.  None of those interviewed 
could explain why, certainly in the light of Northern Ireland, this was the case.  The 
effect that these shortcomings had was surprising: 
I have never been in a theatre where so little intelligence came off the ground.  
There are a number of reasons for this, ranging from language to culture, as well 
as the Iraqi habit of keeping all information to themselves.  It meant that we had 
to rely on higher-level intelligence to conduct operations, which was mostly 
186 
 
 responsive and often single-source.  However, if there isn’t much coming up, 
then there needs to be a change to the rules concerning what can be shovelled 
down.  Much was too classified for that.61
The similarity between the situation in Iraq and that during the final year of the 
withdrawal from Aden has already been made.  The implications of little or poor 
intelligence were significant, as Riley notes: 
Information requests generated by the Commander, collection plan, and the 
organisation of assets, and via a targeting board, lead ultimately to actions. It can 
and does produce actionable intelligence at the right levels...  This has real 
importance, because in an environment where consent has to be built and 
maintained, operations have to be correctly and carefully targeted.62  
While efforts were made to fuse intelligence and to improve coverage, actionable 
intelligence was often limited to that produced by very specific, often limited 
capabilities.  As Rollo observes, “It was therefore hard to take the war to the opposition 
without turning the support of the population away.”63
6.3.4 Separate the Insurgent from his Support 
In Counter Insurgency Operations, the principle of ‘Separate the Insurgent from his 
Support’ seeks to deny him information, logistics, recruits, safe bases and popular 
support.  It suggests that this can be achieved through physical separation and by 
developing government control from a firm base through a series of expanding secured 
areas.  It also makes clear that a co-ordinated effort to win the psychological campaign 
for hearts and minds is necessary, linked “to the need for the government side to retain 
legitimacy.”64  Much of this requires a clear understanding of the operational 
environment, the intelligence picture, and the cultural background.  Everard’s concern 
about failures to address these areas effectively enough is one highlighted by a number 
of interviewees: 
Human terrain is something we seemed to understand so much better in 
Northern Ireland and the Balkans where we had a sound understanding of the 
importance of the breakdown of religious groups, demographics and ethnicity.  
In Iraq, we simply don’t get it.  Iranian influence, money, finance, rumour, will:  
they are all covered by the local media and they all play to the Arab psyche 
which is so different to ours.  Where people believe the first thing they are told, 
it makes it difficult for our slower approach to counter propaganda.65
To Everard, the area still to be addressed was how to separate the insurgents from their 
support, “because the population changes its mind so quickly.”  Basic human interest is, 
he suggests, an important and difficult dynamic which affects both the intelligence 
picture and Information Operations: 
We have to focus on what people think and then get on the front foot with a 
product.  This is a simple enough ideal but our response is woeful.  Master 
themes, central control, ministerial clearance all miss the point and put us behind 
the enemy before we even start.  The focus for our information campaign has to 
be built on the here and now and authority has to be delegated to conduct 
counter command activity.66   
Lamb is clear that an understanding of cultural differences is not just important, but it 
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 potentially changes the approach to be adopted: 
If we have to cross a cultural divide, we are not dealing with hearts and minds; it 
is a question of tolerance.  The old model of an enduring relationship between us 
and the host nation not only does not work, it does not exist.  This means that we 
need a whole range of measures to cross the divide that inevitably exists.  Each 
measure depends on the specific circumstances, political, military and 
economic.67
The message put out by information operations is crucial to separating the insurgent 
psychologically from his support.  However, in the case of the militias, support was 
strong.  They were seen as their community’s protectors, more so than the ISF, and for 
the Shi’a, JAM was the last line of defence against Sunni death squads and AQI.  The 
continued presence of militias directly challenged Iraqi and Coalition authority as 
nascent Iraqi governmental institutions developed.  They undermined the GOI’s 
attempts to establish its own legitimacy and authority over the Iraqi population by 
fostering violent sectarianism even within government ministries, until Prime Minister 
Maliki eventually challenged JAM in March 2008.  Kiszely notes that, 
Denying that it was an insurgency was a great mistake as was not taking on the 
militias until it was too late.  Ironically, there was an appointment in the new 
Iraqi government to counter militias but it did nothing.  With hindsight, we 
should have been more hard-line with the Shi’a extremists early on as we might 
have been more successful in separating the insurgent from the population.68  
Lamb agreed that something had to be done about militias; “Their authority has to be 
challenged, but we do have to realize that the population has some confidence in terms 
of what they are there for.”69  As Knights and Williams, among others have highlighted, 
JAM provided security in those areas under its control, and rudimentary education, 
healthcare, and what it considered to be governance.  Militias sustained a great deal of 
support from their own community, albeit that, as eventually became clear, this was due 
to intimidation and duress.70   
Here was the crux of the problem the Coalition faced.  JAM provided security and 
services for its community, yet its existence was a grave cause of insecurity and unrest.  
JAM had to be confronted and neutralized while at the same time good governance and 
security had to be extended to JAM areas.  This inevitably led to direct confrontation 
with the GOI and the Coalition, and there was a concern that dealing with JAM in 2007 
threatened opening the civil war further, as Lamb highlighted when the civil war was at 
its height: 
If we were to [neutralize] them or detain them, when the next VBIED goes off in 
Sadr City, we will be the enemy because we will have removed the militias who 
had protected their people up to the point we intervened.  The key thing is to 
turn this on its head and to accept what they can do for security.  This, however, 
has to be part of the wider plan for Iraq, and some form of guarantee is needed 
from the militias, such as a tribal blood oath.71
Lamb refers to the process of reconciliation, with which he was personally involved, in 
particular with the Sunni tribes.  Much depended, therefore, on building and 
maintaining public confidence.  As Carter notes, “the geographic scale of the area and 
our force ratios made things difficult.  If, at the beginning, the force had been built to a 
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 coherent plan and had been resourced accordingly, then we might have got away with it.  
But there was no plan, it was not resourced and the result was a sub-optimal solution.”72  
Initially, British forces were not large enough to establish control of their area of 
responsibility, nor were the ISF strong enough or large enough to fill the gap between 
the Coalition effort and that which the political and security situation required.  Military 
operations might have been effective in neutralizing a target or disrupting an insurgent 
group’s activities, but such an approach did not add up on its own to campaign progress.  
Rollo recognized the strength of the view made clear in Counter Insurgency Operations 
that “there is no such thing as a purely military solution because insurgency is not 
primarily a military activity”: 
The prime way to drain the swamp, to pick up on Thompson’s approach, is the 
economy.  The political process had produced elections [and a government].  
The outcome might not have been a democracy, but as a process it worked.  The 
security line by comparison had not worked:  we wanted to follow the principle 
of minimum force but low force levels made that difficult.  But if you keep 
people on side because life is getting better, security problems reduce.  
However, overemphasise the military line of operation and increase the pressure 
on the population and the likelihood is that violence itself will increase as more 
people get drawn in. 
One proven way of improving the security balance was to develop the host nation’s 
security forces.  Commanders identified the importance of SSR very early in the 
campaign and successive brigades saw it as their main effort.  The result of their efforts 
was surprisingly disappointing.  One senior staff officer observed “I don’t think that we 
remained true to our traditions.  We have a fine history of raising, training and 
developing indigenous forces by embedding personnel into their organisations, yet we 
did not do this in Iraq; that in itself was a huge mistake.”73  Although battlegroups were 
assigned to training the ISF,74 until Operation Charge of the Knights, only the two IA 
battalions from 10 (IA) Division, sent to Baghdad in 2007, had British training teams 
embedded with them.  This proved very successful and once again proved the value of 
embedded MiTTs.  Despite this success, the approach of embedding training teams was 
not extended further with the IA until Operation Charge of the Knights.  A senior 
officer summarized the problem and the solution: 
We have had over two hundred years of imperial history, and we have never 
before trained indigenous troops without embedding training or command 
teams.  I feel that we have failed the Iraqi Army by distancing ourselves from 
them and, by stepping back, we have allowed them to become weak, corrupt and 
undermined.  When the Battalion mutinied in August, [100 members of a 
battalion in the 4th Brigade, 10th Iraqi Army Division, who were serving in the 
southern Maysan province, refused to deploy to Baghdad ] I sent a Military 
Training Team to them to try to sort them out.  This was shortly after Camp Abu 
Naji had been sacked, and my concern was that the Iraqi Army there would 
become unstitched.  As always, the British Infantry soldier saved the day, and 
transformed that Battalion almost overnight.  All [the IA] needed was leadership 
and command and, following a ten-day cadre in Shaiba, they were really quite 
competent.  This is important; the Iraqi Army must be capable (and be seen to be 
capable) of confronting JAM.  They can only achieve that by having sizeable 
embedded training teams who are prepared to go out on operations with them.75
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 6.3.5 Neutralize the Insurgent 
Counter Insurgency Operations explains that the insurgent, once isolated from support, 
should be neutralized physically through arrests or through strike operations to kill, 
capture, demoralize and deter insurgents, and psychologically through information and 
counter-propaganda and attempts to promote desertions.  The aim, it explains, is to 
“defeat the insurgent on his ground using enough but no more force than is absolutely 
necessary.”76  Wall identified the explicit link between this principle and that of 
separating the insurgent from his support “by building indigenous capacity which goes 
towards reinforcing legitimacy and establishing primacy.”77   
During 2007, attempts to promote desertions, as suggested in Counter Insurgency 
Operations, moved on from encouraging individuals to change side, as had been the 
case in Malaya and, most notably, in the Oman where former enemy fighters were 
formed as the Firqat.  By the summer, a number of Sunni tribes, which had been 
fighting alongside AQI to attack the Coalition, had been brought into the political 
process through engagement and reconciliation by senior Coalition officers.  Generally 
referred to as the ‘Sunni Awakening,’ this process dramatically reduced the number of 
attacks on Coalition forces, particularly in Anbar province and the ‘Sunni Triangle’, and 
the former Sunni insurgents turned on AQI.78  Lamb explained the value of the 
engagement process: 
Engagement does not necessarily produce coherent political solutions but it does 
keep the dialogue open between factions, it allows differences to be discussed 
and resolved without recourse to violence and it allows us to disseminate factual 
information to allay, dispel or counter other messages circulating at the time.  
Language is important and in engagement the key distinction is between the 
reconcilable and the irreconcilable; the outlawed.  Somewhere you have to draw 
the line between the legitimate and the outlawed, taking direct action against the 
outlawed.  This clearly identifies the threat:  outlaw equals threat.  When we talk 
about reconcilables, we are talking about those who can be reconciled to the 
future of Iraq, be that political, economic, security or ideology.  All this is part 
of the normal political process, although in Iraq, it is possible to alienate one 
section without realising it.   
This policy was not followed in MND(SE), although engagement through an 
intermediary with JAM’s leadership in Basrah resulted in the so-called 
‘accommodation’ in September 2007.  However, rather than it bringing the Shi’a militia 
under the aegis of the ISF and Coalition security framework, the ‘accommodation’ left 
JAM free to maintain control of its own area, maintain its popular support and protect 
its political and economic ambitions.   
Although strike operations continued at an increasing rate until the ‘accommodation’ 
effectively removed both the British presence in Basrah and the freedom to conduct 
them, neutralizing the insurgent in the sense developed in doctrine was simply not 
possible because of limited force levels.  As Everard noted, “Basra is the same size as 
Birmingham and yet I only had two battlegroups at best.”79  Basrah’s population is over 
one million in size.  The generally agreed ratio of security force levels needed to 
maintain effective security, where civil and civic life can continue normally, is 1:50.80  
The best force ratio Everard could provide was 1:700, or fourteen times smaller than the 
generally agreed optimal.  This meant that the inevitably limited British presence in the 
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 city found it was almost impossible to neutralize the insurgent either physically or 
psychologically.  The very sophisticated strike operations which they undertook 
disrupted JAM leadership in particular, but not in a way that seriously challenged JAM 
as a military organization.  This would need numbers, as Thompson had explained in 
Countering Communist Insurgency, and Operation Charge of the Knights demonstrated. 
6.3.6 Long‐Term Post Insurgency Planning 
Pimlott and Bulloch developed the principle of long-term post-insurgency planning to 
highlight the importance of accounting for, and making clear the host government’s 
intention to improve the economic and social life of its population.  The announcement 
of such government initiatives, Counter Insurgency Operations makes clear, can play a 
key role in winning the hearts and minds of the local population during a campaign and 
this principle “probably holds the key to the effective application of the other five.”81  
The approach adopted in Iraq, first through the CPA, then through the Iraqi Interim 
Government, and finally the Government of Iraq, created a number of political 
discontinuities that British doctrine had not anticipated.  Uncertainty and an unclear 
future compounded the structural difficulties the Iraqis and their Coalition partners 
faced.  Crocker and Petraeus identified the GOI’s institutional fragility and made it the 
central theme of their Joint Campaign Plan.  This at least provided the planning 
structure by which longer-term objectives could be discussed, developed and 
communicated to the Iraqi population.   
Counter Insurgency Operations was written on the assumption that it would be the host 
government, not its coalition partners, which needed to make clear its longer term 
intentions.82  From the start of the campaign, there was uncertainty about the approach 
the British intended to adopt in the south:  whether to develop MND(SE) as a British 
exemplar, or to integrate the region into the overall Coalition effort.  From the views of 
those interviewed, neither approach took primacy.  On the one hand the FCO set up the 
Southern Iraq Steering Group, co-chaired by the Consul General and GOC MND(SE), 
and which “focused assets and money, [encouraged] coherence among regional players 
and targeted application of donor resources.”83  On the other, British forces used U.S. 
money to support civil projects and made much use of U.S. capabilities, in particular 
intelligence systems and aviation.  All this might have been resolved if the co-ordinated 
government machinery had been put in place to run the British contribution in harness 
with the wider Coalition campaign plan and not, as has been identified, in a way that 
appeared to be at odds with the overall campaign. 
Doctrine offers no real guidance on how planners and strategists might better reconcile 
the potentially conflicting priorities of individual contributing nations and the coalition 
as a whole.  Kitson’s prescient suggestions that “the various contingents [in a coalition] 
must have a common understanding of the problem,”84 that aid should be co-ordinated 
through one representative at the highest level, and that there needed to be full co-
operation between the host country and the ally to ensure the full integration of the full 
range of civil and military efforts, had they been reflected in doctrine, might have better 
served national and Iraqi interests.  
6.4 Continuity 
In previous campaigns the use of standing formation headquarters and residential tours 
of duty for battalions provided continuity in command, the approach adopted, 
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 intelligence and situational awareness.  In Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus and Northern Ireland, 
formation commanders and their staffs served for two years, giving them the time to 
establish not just an understanding of the situation and campaign trends, but to develop 
their relationships with civil servants, policemen and the other government departments 
involved.  Brigade commanders in Northern Ireland, for example, got to know the 
overall situation and could set events in each battalion’s area in the broader context of 
the brigade and theatre.  As Kiszely notes, “a resident headquarters was able to exercise 
considerable influence and control over commanders and units coming in on 6-month 
tours.”85  In Iraq, British headquarters changed over every six months.  Continuity was 
not a factor. 
In Northern Ireland continuity was further improved at battalion level, by the 
introduction of Continuity NCOs (CONCOs) who worked in company and battalion 
intelligence cells to provide the background information and context which is almost 
impossible to pick up during pre-deployment training.  They completed longer tours of 
duty than the battalions so that they could build up expert local knowledge, and they 
changed over once the new battalion was settled in.  Both the mindset and the approach 
this instilled guarded against any idea that the campaign could be won in the space of a 
single tour of duty.  The situation in Iraq was somewhat different: 
I was astonished that, having been there for four years, we had such little 
understanding of the region...  I found battalions arrived in Basra as though they 
were the first ones to be there.  There was little intelligence, and absolutely no 
depth; we started anew each time.  There was little continuity and no corporate 
knowledge, and the good times appeared not to have been used to gain a decent 
understanding of the society or, if they had, it had been lost.  Memories were 
individual not corporate.86
Counter Insurgency Doctrine provides clear guidance about continuity: 
Insurgent commanders and their staffs usually remain in the same posts and in 
the same areas for considerable periods to build up a wealth of background 
knowledge. Even though the police provide long term continuity within the 
security forces the Army should aim for as much stability as possible, especially 
in important posts, as is consistent with career planning and the length of tours 
in operational theatres.87
... Units should be kept in the same area of responsibility (AOR) for as long as 
possible. This ensures that they become familiar with the local inhabitants, the 
other security forces, such as the police, and the terrain and infrastructure. They 
are better able to get the measure of their opponents and they acquire the ability 
to develop information into intelligence. In short, they get a feel for what is 
normal as a background against which to observe the abnormal.88
However, despite this generally well-understood need for continuity, the lessons of 
Northern Ireland were not applied in Iraq.  Even as late as 2007, the lack of continuity 
was still an issue.  No overall solution had been developed, beyond adhering to the 
Army’s policy of a six-month deployment for brigades and their sub-ordinate units.  
Rollo identified three reasons why continuity had to be achieved: 
First, counterinsurgency campaigns are complicated.  They are very specific and 
we have to spend time in theatre to gain the level of situational awareness 
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 needed to make sensible decisions.  Secondly, countering insurgency is about 
people and building human relationships, so if the rate of roulement [replacing 
one unit with another] is too high, particularly amongst our commanders, we 
limit the overall effectiveness we can achieve.  Third, the environment is harsh 
and there is a limit to what soldiers can be expected to sustain.  Force generation 
issues limit how short tours can be and for an army like ours, with hard-wired 
brigades, the headquarters should change with their brigade units.  Given our 
scale of effort, it would have been difficult to do otherwise.  But a static, 
resident headquarters with the time to build up relationships, with good 
situational awareness and corporate memory has a very clear role in enduring 
operations.89
Rollo raises a valid point about the wear and tear on battlegroups in Iraq, where the 
environment, the tempo of operations and the increasing intensity placed demands on 
soldiers for which it was hard to fully prepare, and from which it took time to 
recuperate.  “However complex we make training,” Gen. Lamb noted, “it is simple 
compared to reality.”90  Since the Army’s approach in Iraq was to prepare, train, deploy 
and fight brigades as brigades, the issue of continuity at brigade level appeared to be 
insurmountable if tours of duty were not to be extended, as the U.S. forces did by 
introducing twelve- to eighteen-month tours, or if a residential brigade or formation 
headquarters was not to be created into which battlegroups would deploy.   
In 2007, operational tours for divisional commanders and key staff appointments for 
colonels and above were extended to nine months.  While this improved matters within 
U.S. headquarters, it did not fully address the issue of maintaining situational awareness 
and continuity of relationships between brigade and battlegroup commanders and their 
Iraqi, and in some cases U.S. counterparts.  Kiszely is clear that “relationships are 
essential,” but in 2005, the brigade commanders changed five times in MND(SE).  In 
Kiszely’s view, “We got the balance wrong in the key appointments and we did not 
apply the lessons of Northern Ireland.”91  A senior commander explained what the 
impact was on the ground: “This is not sensible; the Arabs will ignore you if they don’t 
like you, because they know you will be gone soon.”92  A brigade commander was 
more explicit, highlighting the problem that the six-month tour created for continuity 
and approach:   
The campaign is disjointed and blighted by the 6-month horizon.  We got it 
wrong right from the start and the conditions we expected did not materialise...  
short-termism has complicated things.  Where is the campaign plan?  It changes 
every time a commander changes and personality is now a dynamic that affects 
us.93
6.5 Command and Control of the Campaign 
The issue of continuity is linked very closely to the issue of campaign management and 
command and control arrangements.  One senior commander believed that “the 
deployed commander is given too much latitude and PJHQ does not do for incoming 
troops into theatre what HQNI did for Northern Ireland.  The discontinuity between 
successive MND(SE)s was significant, and it is not the way to conduct an enduring 
campaign.  There needs to be a stronger controlling campaign ownership.”94  This 
discontinuity manifested itself in a number of ways; while there is no sense that 
commanders felt they were engaged in the wrong activity or for the wrong reasons, an 
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 occasional sense of isolation appears: 
Being in Iraq is like being in a darkened corridor, and if you wait for someone to 
turn on the light for you at the end of the corridor, you will stay uncomfortably 
lost.  The theatre was just too dynamic for that to happen and so I took my 
commander’s (very clear) statements of intent and got on with it.  I got the 
impression that everyone who had been there before me had done the same 
thing.95
Lamb suggested that one reason for the discontinuity in approach was a failure by those 
in the UK to correctly identify one point of command in Iraq and concentrate its 
attention on it: 
Strategic architecture needed to leverage the strategic points of contact:  Chief of 
Defence Staff’s LO [liaison officer, a brigadier] in Washington DC, [Senior 
British Military Advisor] in CENTCOM and the SMBR-I [Senior British 
Military Representative-Iraq].  Instead we focussed on MND(SE), forgetting that 
it is in reality a division within a corps, within a force, within a very large 
theatre of operations.  In my view, we should have had PJHQ headquarters 
deployed forward as part of the Corps headquarters, because that is the focus of 
all tactical activity going on in Iraq, and MND(SE) is a tactical HQ.  The breaks 
between the tactical, operational and strategic levels have meant that political 
decisions being taken in London are readjusting the mission to suit political not 
the strategic, operational or military imperatives [in Iraq].96
Carter agrees suggesting that even when PJHQ was being designed in the 1990s there 
was a concern about its ability to run simultaneous operations, to cope with the demands 
of enduring campaigns and its ability to provide the necessary level of continuity.  
While there was logic to PJHQ owning the UK campaign plan, Carter observed, 
...geography is everything and there is a great deal to be said of owning the 
campaign in theatre.  This leads back to the role of the divisional headquarters.  
It has the capacity to plan the campaign and run it, to provide the continuity.  
We know the model works because that was the essence of what HQNI did.97
A senior staff officer developed this concern in relation to the difference between the 
U.S. and UK strategic approaches from January 2007, once the Surge had been 
announced: 
The British position meant that, as the Tactical-level command, we still had to 
sell UK policy to our Corps Commander.  This, I suspect, made us 
uncomfortable subordinates to have under command at times.  The solution to 
this dilemma should have included either some form of PJHQ Forward based in 
Baghdad, or an empowered SBMR-I who was not double-hatted inside the 
American Chain of Command.  Such a solution would not only have given us 
top cover in theatre and enabled the GOC to concentrate instead on the tactical 
tasks he had, but would also have achieved a degree of continuity in theatre that 
had previously been lacking.98
Again, the idea of a focal theatre headquarters is not new, and Counter Insurgency 
Operations makes reference to a Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) but in the context of 
a British-led campaign.   While the campaign in Iraq was U.S.-led and dominated, the 
disaggregation of British interests between MND(SE), where the bulk of British forces 
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 were based, and MNF-I and MNC-I, where a number of officers were embedded in key, 
influential staff appointments, would have benefitted, as Lamb highlights, from a 
central in-theatre British HQ where national concerns and requirements could have been 
integrated into the overall campaign effort.  The Army’s own view was that this resulted 
in,  
an absence of local (UK) political direction for what, overall, the UK wished to 
achieve in its Provinces. There was no firm political view as to how political 
factions and their militias, or political affiliations among newly appointed Iraqi 
officials, and by extension economic development and reconstruction, should be 
handled.99
At the tactical level, the Army’s hierarchy of doctrine considered Theatre or Operation 
Instructions to be a vital supplement to doctrine, because they adapted general practice 
to the specific demands of the operational theatre.  ATOM and NISOPs demonstrated 
the valuable role played by doctrine owned by the theatre commander, developed by the 
theatre headquarters in response to tactical changes, validated by it, and introduced 
quickly into pre-deployment training.  No such theatre doctrine was produced, although 
classified SOPs were produced by MND(SE) for specialist capabilities, and to counter 
specific threats.  The Land Warfare Centre produced a halfway house in the form of the 
Op TELIC Aide Memoire,100 to bridge the gap between standard tactics and those in use 
in MND(SE) which acknowledged the inevitable lag between a change in practice and 
revised theory being published: 
Application Through Leadership 
Although doctrine and Tactics, Techniques & Procedures (TTPs) provide 
practical guidance on the conduct of operations, their publication alone will not 
sufficiently add to operational success. Unless soldiers understand doctrine, are 
well trained in TTPs and are sufficiently motivated to carry out their tasks to the 
best of their ability their effectiveness on the battlefield, as individuals or as part 
of a team, will be limited. It is leadership which ensures that training is effective 
and that drills are learned and followed correctly. It is leadership which drives 
effective action and motivates soldiers to give their utmost to achieve the 
common purpose. It is leadership which turns the bald statements of fact in this 
publication into life saving or battle winning action. And moreover, it is strong 
leaders who recognise that doctrine writers do not have a monopoly on wisdom 
and adapt and develop this guidance to win in the Contemporary Operating 
Environment.101
Although Counter Insurgency Operations’ attention to the practical problems of multi-
national operations was thin, it did, however identify the need to establish a common 
doctrine for the operation.  NATO’s doctrine and procedures were well known, well 
understood and were used extensively in the Balkans.  Coalition operations were a 
different issue and the doctrine is explicit:  “in the case of a coalition operation, the lack 
of a common doctrine will need immediate attention.”102   
The U.S. struggle to come to terms with the unconventionality of counterinsurgency 
operations is well known and examined in Chapter 7.  Mention has been made of the 
efforts made by the UK between 2004 and late 2006 when Petraeus published FM 3-24, 
to shape the U.S. approach, what Mockaitis described “ungenerous, over-simplified, and 
often glib comparisons between ... Vietnam and ... Malaya,” and American officers 
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 becoming “ understandably resistant to what they see as ‘more British tripe.’”103  In 
order to establish a common start point for tactical best practice and the development of 
theatre-specific TTPs, on 26 November 2005, Gen. Casey, established the COIN CFE at 
Taji.  Its purpose was to collate and provide information on the latest enemy TTPs and 
how to counter them, and the latest ‘best friendly practices’ for all incoming battalion 
commanders, Iraqi army battalion commanders, company commanders, intelligence 
officers and information officers in an attempt to “level the playing field for COIN 
operations.”104  It taught doctrine for Iraq based on an interim U.S. Army field manual, 
and once FM 3-24 was published, it taught that. 
The COIN CFE was based on the Malayan JWS model and it was successful for five 
reasons.  First, it was command-directed receiving first Gen. Casey’s then Gen. 
Petraeus’ personal involvement.  It was supported directly by the chain of command, 
with each U.S. divisional commander presenting his concept of operations and scheme 
of manoeuvre to each new brigade in his division.  It was authoritative, operating under 
CG MNF-I’s authority to examine every aspect of the campaign and visit every part of 
the theatre to find out what was going on, and what else needed to be done to improve 
education, training and understanding across the force.  It was the dynamic focus for 
change, being the theatre authority for all doctrinal and procedural changes, and being 
responsible for setting the standards for all U.S. pre-deployment training.   Finally, it 
provided continuity, maintaining situational awareness and spreading best practice 
among U.S. forces.105   
Somewhat surprisingly given the CFE’s position with the U.S. chain of command and 
the breadth of understanding it gained of the campaign as a whole, British engagement 
with it was limited.  A handful of the senior officers serving in Baghdad visited in 2007 
and 2008 and occasionally presented to U.S. brigade combat teams to explain 
operations in MND(SE), and a small group of British officers attended a course in early 
2008.  The absence of any meaningful presence at Taji allowed myths and uncertainties 
to perpetuate at brigade level and below in the U.S. forces about the British approach in 
the south, supported by such unchallenged views expressed in 2007 as “the British are 
moon-walking out of the country.”106
6.6 The Ink Spot Method 
Since 1949, British counterinsurgency doctrine has laid out the Ink Spot method as 
being the most effective concept by which governmental control could be re-established 
over an insurgent controlled area.  Its stages of establishing a secure base area, clearing, 
securing and pacifying selected areas, consolidating government control and finally 
extending government influence to neighbouring areas were taught at the Staff College.  
They have been a feature of doctrine and they were used in Malaya and the Oman.  The 
assumptions which underpin the successful application of the model are that intelligence 
would be needed to focus security force operations to secure a controlled area; the 
forces and resources would be at hand with which to establish control quickly and re-
introduce good governance effectively; and there would be a transition plan to return 
each area to the full control of the civil administration as conditions allowed.   
As such, the method adopted for Operation SINBAD in 2006 is broadly in line with the 
doctrinal model laid out in Counter insurgency Operations.  Intelligence-led strike 
operations started a ‘pulse’ of activity to take control of a target area, after which 
carefully targeted civil development projects were undertaken to improve general 
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 conditions in the target area.  Thompson’s approach was, however, designed to wrest 
control permanently from the insurgents.  SINBAD’s pulses could only achieve a 
temporary effect because of the limited British forces available, and the ISF were not 
capable at that point in the campaign of either taking control of an area or resisting 
militia intimidation.  The theory and thinking behind SINBAD were sound; the problem 
was its effects could not be sustained. 
The first stage of the ‘Concept of Military Operations’ in Counter Insurgency 
Operations was to secure a base area, from which to mount the operation and within 
which ‘the government could demonstrate its ability to govern effectively.’  Herein lay 
the first problem:  the stage assumed that the host government had some control, yet 
Iraq did not have anything approaching an effective government until 2008, and even 
then the Coalition had major concerns about malign sectarian influence among GOI 
ministries.  At the provincial level, as British commanders found repeatedly, 
effectiveness and engagement with the Coalition were patchy and certainly could not be 
assumed.  The Ink Spot’s second stage was to establish a firm forward operational base, 
‘typically in an area where government control could be re-established quickly.’  The 
important task was to secure the population “from an insurgent offensive and serious 
terrorist attack.”107  This assumed a strong security force presence and having the non-
military resources lined up to help consolidate the area promptly.   
In practice, the sustained security presence envisaged in the doctrine simply could not 
be met with only a brigade routinely available, which, in the last two years at least, 
amounted to two battlegroups which could be used for security operations.  Operation 
SINBAD was in keeping with doctrine’s third stage of securing a controlled area, in 
which military operations would concentrate on “just one or a selected few areas in 
turn,”108 to “seize the initiative ... by separating the insurgent from his support and then 
neutralizing him and his cause.”109  Interestingly, the doctrine correctly anticipated the 
response that securing an area would prompt, anticipating that insurgents would react 
and fight back.  This is exactly what first 20 then 19 Brigade experienced as the tempo 
of their operations in 2006 provoked violent counteractions from JAM, and, on a larger 
scale, what U.S. and Iraqi forces encountered when they took control of Baghdad in 
summer 2007.   
Separating insurgents from their support and neutralizing them proved impossible to 
achieve until Operation Charge of the Knights took place, and the GOI’s ISF-led, 
Coalition-backed political, military and development actions re-gained control of 
Basrah from the militia.  Only then could the fourth stage of consolidating controlled 
areas start, re-establishing civil administration, and starting the process of transition 
from military- to police-led operations.  Up to March 2008, British force levels, and 
limited ISF capacity to secure and hold an area, and to withstand militia pressure, were 
not enough to achieve the core tasks of separating and neutralizing the insurgent.  
Instead, British operations were limited to strike operations against selected targets and 
short ‘pulses’ of development aid.  Although this fits into the pattern of re-establishing 
control laid out in doctrine, the underpinning assumption necessary for its successful 
completion, that of providing the forces and resources necessary to secure an area, was 
not met.  
Operation ZENITH may have been entirely in line with Gen. Casey’s strategy of 
transition, and it may have made sense in terms of the early progress made in 
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 MND(SE), but the logic of continuing with force reductions despite the ISF’s inability 
to deal with JAM made no sense doctrinally or in terms of Washington’s revised 
strategy.  The last three years of the campaign in Basrah have been interpreted by some 
as early as 2007 as a defeat.110  It would be tempting, therefore, to challenge the validity 
of the Ink Spot concept on the evidence of the failure of British operations to counter 
JAM.  To do so would be to ignore the British failure to meet the requirements laid out 
in its own doctrine, and to ignore that the Ink Spot was the very concept which Gen. 
Petraeus was to use first in Baghdad, and then further afield in Iraq, and Gen. Mohan 
and Prime Minister Maliki adopted in Operation Charge of the Knights.  From Briggs 
and Templer in Malaya, to Maliki and Petraeus, the Ink Spot concept works when 
enough forces are made available to establish and maintain security, development 
resources are on hand to improve conditions quickly in the target area, and there is the 
political will to complete the task.   
6.7 Education and Training:  Learning and Adapting 
Counter Insurgency Operations emphasized the importance of education and training 
for counterinsurgency, explaining that “One of the keys to mission command working 
in COIN lies in the selection and education of commanders and preparing troops prior 
to and throughout operations.”111  Chapter 3 showed how, as a subject at the Staff 
College, counterinsurgency was almost completely marginalized between 1997 and 
2007, when somewhat belatedly some remedial action was taken to redress the balance 
to take account of the pressures of current operations.  Riley recognized the problems 
inherent in balancing the theoretical with the practical, a difficulty to which Kitson also 
drew attention.  While Riley does not discount the need to develop an understanding of 
a general warfighting capability, “because it has a profound influence on the way the 
Army is structured, manned, trained and equipped and we need to be able to get 
warfighting right,” his comments  on counterinsurgency are important: 
The top end of COIN is every bit as demanding and has so much in common 
with warfighting.  There are ways in which COIN is more demanding, namely 
the generation of intelligence from such a wide range of sources and in ways that 
go so much further than identifying platforms or units and formations, the 
coordination of activities that go beyond purely military tasks and the reality that 
the legal and media factors are so much stronger.  Faced with this, there is a very 
strong case to prepare the man for the most dangerous and complex task he is 
going to face.112
A firm base of doctrinal understanding is implicit in what Riley advocates, yet that was 
exactly what was not provided in staff training or general professional education.  
Professional education in doctrine is not an indulgence; it is an essential step to 
establish what Everard describes as “the language of operations.”113  Kirkland explains 
the value of doctrine in this context very clearly: 
I first learnt the COIN principles in PQS2 [promotion qualifying for promotion 
to major and the staff college exam], and since then they have provided me with 
a frame of reference.  When I was a student at Camberley, I remember that we 
spent a lot of time learning about COIN.  The answers were in the doctrine so 
we had to read it, and to read the key texts – Thompson and Kitson – if we were 
to understand the subject and make progress on the course.  ACSC was a 
wonderful opportunity to get under the skin of the subject.  This is why doctrine 
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 is so important.  It is not just having the opportunity to study but having the right 
material – the right doctrine – from which to work.114
However, education is now a much more complicated issue than simply teaching 
soldiers counterinsurgency doctrine.  Operation TELIC was run by PJHQ at Northwood, 
and its staff officers were drawn from the three services.  For those Army ACSC and 
HCSC graduates in key appointments, their counterinsurgency education and training 
was scant.  Those from the Royal Navy and the RAF received no education at all in 
counterinsurgency.  Gen. Wall highlights the problem that having ill-prepared 
commanders and staff presents:   
The modern era demands we prepare for the type of campaigns we face.  If 
COIN is not covered, we are not preparing ourselves properly, particularly if we 
accept our own premise that insurgency takes time to fix and we face up to the 
fact that we are in an enduring operation.  Now that ACSC does not do 
component [single service] education, COIN needs to be taught as a joint 
subject.  Whilst it is undeniably a land-centric operation, the other services need 
to really understand it.115
At the tactical level, despite the intensive, theatre-focussed pre-deployment training for 
Iraq, doctrine was not taught per se.  OPTAG, NITAT’s successor, taught company-
level TTPs, not the principles or the theory laid out in doctrine.  There is ample 
evidence that British TTPs changed as the threat changed, particularly once insurgents 
resorted to evermore technically advanced IEDs, and the EFP emerged as their favoured 
weapon.  Those TTPs which troops in MND(SE) developed remain classified to protect 
capabilities and tactics, but post-operational reports reflect the considerable tactical and 
technical effort expended in keeping up with a highly adaptive insurgent.  The 
following report is typical: 
We introduced the Threat Forum, which brought together all of those staff 
branches and national agencies who had a stake in the C-IED (Counter-IED) 
battle, in order to ensure that stovepipes were broken down, information was 
shared, and that sensible risk assessment could be made by the commanders on 
the ground, rather than being dictated by the staff branches in the headquarters.  
It gave them the very latest technical and intelligence information we had, so 
that they could make decisions... and the SO2 [responsible] would update 
ongoing C-IED TTPs.116
The insurgent reaction should also be noted:  “whenever we changed our tactics, the 
enemy changed theirs.  After a couple of weeks of our successes, in [neutralizing IEDs] 
and capturing equipment, they wised up; they became pretty savvy quickly.”117  Everard 
recalls that, 
On average, it took between 26 and 47 minutes for [the insurgents] to launch an 
attack on our cordon.  The old Northern Ireland patrol rule was different routes 
out and back.  In Basra, we picketed the route with [Challenger Main Battle 
Tanks] in order to meet the threat, so we went out and back on the same route.118
The insurgent was not just agile, he was responsive.  As a commanding officer 
considered, 
We were in a constant cycle of change with the enemy.  We would produce a 
Countermeasure for every measure the enemy took and, when we did, he would 
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 change again. I spent a lot of my time with my Command Group trying to think 
about what the enemy would do in response to our actions, what his tactics were, 
how he would use the ground and what was the most dangerous threat we faced.  
The balance of these factors changed regularly and we had to adjust our tactics 
accordingly.  That smart-thinking enemy is not one that appears on our training 
exercises, and we do not learn to read the battle properly as a result.119
Riley noted that TTPs were adapted to meet changing circumstances but he also noted 
that “insurgents have adapted in a similar way to Northern Ireland.  All have tried to 
find our weaknesses.  We have had to relearn a great deal from what we did in Northern 
Ireland.”120  Riley linked this point to the role of the Scientific Advisor (SCIAD), a post 
established in Northern Ireland in 1969 to provide operational analysis and technical 
support in the design of technical measures and countermeasures.  By the end of the 
operation “SCIAD had evolved a broad-based scientific and analytic capability. It is 
highly significant that SCIAD worked in HQ Northern Ireland and reported directly to 
the GOC,”121 who owned his own budget and could commission directly the equipment 
needed to fight the campaign.  It took several years for the SCIAD post to be fully 
established in MND(SE). 
It is evident that staff training and education did not place enough emphasis on 
counterinsurgency to provide officers with the necessary knowledge of the doctrine and 
with understanding necessary to deal with the complexity of the insurgency problem.  
Riley notes the “similarities between Baghdad and Basra and Belfast in the 1970s:  
ethnic tensions, underinvestment, minority groups, corrupt police, military force 
imposed from outside with low levels of consent.”122  While this was true, Everard was 
concerned that Iraq was much more complex than anything the Army had confronted in 
the previous twenty years: “The level of violence, the social dynamics, the expectations 
of the people and their tolerance levels are new.  It is Krulak’s 3 Block War123 plus in 
both time and space.”  He was also concerned about the Army’s intellectual preparation: 
Even the briefest study shows that Iraqi society is inherently complex and 
historically dysfunctional. It also shows that Iraqis have consistently failed to 
fuse sectarian groups into a single identity. We understood all this, yet were still 
surprised by the need to change the way we thought. Western logic and western 
rules of rational behaviour do not apply in Iraq.  This is an area worthy of further 
pre-deployment study.124   
Riley agreed.  He identified language training as an important enabler, and criticised the 
poor level of language skill British forces accepted: 
Language training, a key factor in intelligence gathering as in SSR, is likewise 
inadequate. Not nearly enough officers and NCOs are being afforded language 
training. During the Cold War, officers were given the opportunity to learn 
German instead of doing Division III [of the ACSC] at Shrivenham. This was 
abandoned in favour of over-training everyone on technological matters, which 
most students never used. We are now far more expeditionary, with a greater 
requirement for linguistic skills, and yet we offer fewer opportunities than we 
did 20 years ago. This is not right and it needs to be addressed.125
6.8 Revising Counterinsurgency Doctrine 
It would be wrong to assume that in the six years that British forces were in Iraq, no 
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 attempt was made to update counterinsurgency doctrine.  As early as May 2005, writers 
at DGD&D, working on ADP Land Operations, were aware that operations in Iraq 
should prompt a review of Counter Insurgency Doctrine.  Maj. Gen. Kirkland took 
special care over the short counterinsurgency section it contained, redrafting some of 
the principles [Ensure political primacy and political aim; Build coordinated 
government machinery; Develop intelligence and information; Separate the insurgent 
from his support; Neutralize the insurgent; Plan for the long term].126  He went back 
over Gavin Bulloch’s work, and polished up some of the main ideas:   
This was because I had recognized that any update of our COIN doctrine should 
properly stem from the brief synopsis of recent experience and revised thinking 
that ADP Land Operations represented.  We were, after all, 18 months into our 
campaign in Iraq.127
He noted that the doctrine published in July 2001 was built on the presumption that 
there was one sole power in charge.  It offered no detailed guidance on coalition 
operations, or any inference that the indigenous government might be ceded powers as 
the campaign progressed, sometimes more rapidly than the systematic military mind 
might feel possible.  Kirkland raised the same criticism of Counter Insurgency 
Operations that Bulloch had of Counter-Revolutionary Operations in the mid-1990s, 
observing that, 
the old doctrine still had the whiff of empire about it, where the intervening 
power held all the cards, and it dictated how power would be handed back.  The 
reality now is, of course, very different, and transition of authority on a gradual, 
[incremental] basis is now a key part of contemporary campaigns and one of the 
biggest challenges.128
Kirkland, like those practitioners who had struggled in Iraq without SSR doctrine, and 
those like Riley who had been forced to develop doctrine for transition while embroiled 
in operations, identified an area where the intention – to build up the host nation’s 
security forces and handover responsibility to them on a gradual basis as conditions 
allowed – was implicit rather than explicit.  Of course there was little recent operational 
experience to shape thinking at DGD&D but, like the failure to develop areas 
concerning multi-nationality, the requirement for SSR, transition and multi-nationality, 
with hindsight, should not have been avoided.  
The issue of judging when doctrine is no longer fit for purpose is crucial to address and 
potentially difficult.  Doctrine writers have to remain very critical of their work and to 
watch for the circumstances where the doctrine no longer fits.  For Counter Insurgency 
Operations, the changes that started to challenge its validity were gradual.  During 2005 
and 2006, the Army held the view that there was no evidence counterinsurgency 
doctrine had failed.  Lamb, for example, argued this point forcefully at ADC throughout 
2006.  Kirkland considers that “this may have had something to do with Northern 
Ireland where the key tenets of COIN were so familiar to us, and where we had been 
applying them for many years, and where there was nothing new about General Smith’s 
‘War among the People.’”129   
Lamb, however, judged the doctrine against his experience in Iraq and concluded that 
there was no evidence from British operations that it needed wholesale change.  Just as 
important was the U.S. dimension which Lamb introduced into the debate, because 
since October 2005, a small group of British officers had been working with their U.S. 
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 Army counterparts at the Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, who had started to 
develop what would eventually become the U.S. Army’s FM 3-24:   
Whilst we should do everything possible to develop our doctrine, [his] feeling is 
that we should exercise caution, particularly in following too closely US Army 
and USMC changes.  They, after all, are trying to close the gap with us by 
incorporating our approach to COIN into their doctrine.  We can do a lot of 
work collaboratively with our US counterparts but it seems counterproductive at 
this point to change the essence of the very thing they want to capture.130     
Kirkland’s observations on context are, however, important and he believed that the 
strategic context in which counterinsurgency doctrine was applied had changed.  He 
identified that the emphasis of contemporary operations was now firmly on multi-
nationality, sovereignty and building legitimacy; “the trouble is that unless doctrine 
reflects these changes in context, it will feel wrong to the reader, he will be put off and 
quickly lose confidence in what it says, even though there may be nothing wrong with 
the doctrine per se.”131  Stability Operations in Iraq identified some of the contextual 
changes which had taken place and suggested areas for revision.132  These are listed in 
Table 5 below along with, where relevant, the associated principle from Counter 
Insurgency Operations.   
  Revision Identified Associated Principle 
The obligations of an Occupying Power in the 
21st Century 
Political primacy and political aim 
The legal aspects of military action in the major 
combat and post-combat operations phases 
Political primacy and political aim 
Co-ordination of ‘Comprehensive Approach’ 
campaign planning and concurrent operations 
with OGD, and external agencies, including the 
UN, OSCE and NGOs 
Coordinated government machinery 
The use of a range of ‘soft’ and ‘hard power’ or 
‘kinetic’ approaches in varying circumstances 
Separating the insurgent from his support 
Neutralising the insurgent 
Peace enforcement operations in large urban 
areas e.g. of the size of Fallujah 
Separating the insurgent from his support 
Neutralising the insurgent 
Contending with an ‘extra-state’ terrorist 
influence e.g. of the Al Qa’ida type 
Separating the insurgent from his support 
Neutralising the insurgent 
Information Operations, both offensive and 
defensive 
Separating the insurgent from his support 
Neutralising the insurgent 
Occupation, transition and nation-building 
activities 
Separating the insurgent from his support 
Neutralising the insurgent 
Network Enabled Capability: its strengths and 
limitations in counter insurgency 
 
Force protection, in its widest sense, and the use 
of armoured vehicles in counter insurgency; 
suicide bomb threats significantly affect tactical 
decision making. 
Neutralising the insurgent 
The use of novel weapons and equipment 
systems, including ISTAR developments 
Neutralising the insurgent 
Coalition counter insurgency ideas and 
differences in approach, including legal 
viewpoints 
 
Table 5 - Changes to Counterinsurgency Doctrine 
Source:  Stability Operations in Iraq (Op TELIC 2-5), July 2006, p. 13. 
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 It is interesting to note that the amendments suggested in Stability Operations in Iraq 
reflect the changing operational environment and do not, in themselves, challenge or 
invalidate the existing principles or the Ink Spot approach.  Instead they indicate how 
the British approach might have to adapt to circumstances. 
Kirkland makes the link between doctrine being set in the right context and the 
experience of the reader.  If the reader is experienced, he suggests, to some extent the 
issue of outdated context can be overcome:  the senior officer should be able to identify 
anachronisms, make an allowance for them and use what is left which is still valid.  
This judgement is harder to make for the perhaps less experienced younger officer 
where professional education may not yet be complete.  Once again, this is where 
doctrine and education are so closely linked.  On the one hand, high educational 
standards demand up-to-date, valid doctrine on which courses can be designed.  On the 
other, however complete and up-to-date the doctrine is, to be effective it must be taught 
and assimilated.  Counter Insurgency Operations may have had overtones of the past, 
just like all its recent predecessors, but commanders and staff officers who fought the 
campaign in Iraq concluded that its principles and its approach were valid.  The problem 
was that nowhere was it taught.  
6.9 Conclusions 
Iraq posed a number of unique challenges to the Coalition forces which had to accept 
responsibility for running the country in the period after the collapse of the Saddam 
regime and the installation of the Transitional Iraqi Authority in 2005.  It would be 
reasonable to suppose that, absent of an effective Iraqi political system and in the face 
of increasingly violent and capable insurgencies, British doctrine, which could be traced 
back one hundred years and was rooted in post-colonial campaigns, would be no longer 
relevant.  Yet, despite the complicated Iraqi situation – political, security, diplomatic 
and economic – and despite initial confusion over the character of the campaign, 
practitioners found by hard fought experience, rather than education, that British 
doctrine was both relevant and applicable.  The problem was that it was not followed. 
This can be attributed to three principal factors.   
First, there was confusion over what sort of campaign it was.  In the very early stages of 
the campaign, once major combat operations were concluded, there was a short period 
when the theme was nation-building; the operation was one of peace support operations.  
That was a short period, a matter of months, and soon clear signs of a more deep-rooted 
political problem were evident as factions and parties competed for power or to protect 
their interests.  It was from this political struggle that Iraqi insurgent groups emerged, 
some supported by AQI, to challenge the nascent GOI and the Coalition presence.  
British doctrine recognized that this period of transition, when insurgents resort to the 
use of force in pursuit of their objectives, is difficult to identify.  In Iraq’s case, it was 
all the more difficult since its government ministries were not fully functioning and in 
some cases were under the control of the militias causing the instability.  It was at that 
point, in mid-2004 when the Sadr uprising was brought under control, that the reality of 
the campaign switched from peace support to counterinsurgency.  That it did not as a 
matter of policy, is the second factor. 
The UK was given responsibility for Basrah and the four southern provinces at the last 
minute, after Turkey denied the Coalition a northern option into Iraq.  Fortuitously, the 
largely Shi’a population received the British presence well and, unlike the Sunni areas 
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 of Iraq, where the Americans faced a bitter and violent backlash from insurgents, 
political and economic progress was possible.  The Coalition policy of transition and 
withdrawal initially made sense in UK terms given the ease with which the campaign in 
the south made progress.  Despite the promising start, clear indicators emerged of 
underlying tensions.  The first was the Sadr uprising in 2004 which, although stamped 
out by the U.S. in Najaf and around Baghdad, was never fully brought under control 
across the south.  The second was the increase in violence against Coalition forces in 
the aftermath of the 2005 elections, which clarified the new political order and removed 
any remaining requirement for the parties in Basrah in particular to co-operate with the 
British presence.   
The British policy of transition and withdrawal was at odds with the increasingly 
aggressive insurgency fought by JAM to establish control over Basrah and the south.  
The British military presence was not strong enough and the ISF were not capable 
enough to contain the situation.  British doctrine is clear that security requires force 
levels which can if necessary ‘pacify’ an area.  British policy followed an exact reversal 
of the Ink Spot; rather than expanding its area of influence to re-establish government 
control, it withdrew its forces against conditions determined in Whitehall rather than 
conditions in the south.  By 2006, when successive GOCs followed a more discernable 
counterinsurgency approach, the best that they could achieve was to carry out temporary 
security and development surges into carefully targeted areas of Basrah.  The method 
they followed had echoes of the Ink Spot and Thompson’s tactical method of Clear-
Hold-Winning-Won but only in the logic which combined security operations and 
economic development, not in the scale of the operation that was conducted.  The 
validity of planning, resourcing and sustaining the Ink Spot method was demonstrated 
in the south in March 2008 with Operation Charge of the Knights.  Although it got off 
to a bad start, once it was supported by Coalition forces, the methodical clearance 
operation wrested control of Basrah from the militia and established GOI control of the 
city. 
The third factor was that doctrine did not provide the baseline of common 
understanding which its author always intended and assumed that it should.  Its 
principles and method, generally agreed by those who took part to be still valid, were 
not applied.  By comparison, the invasion of Iraq was conducted exactly as warfighting 
doctrine described and in which the Army had been educated and trained. The failure to 
apply counterinsurgency doctrine may be due in part to the mischaracterization of the 
campaign, and the failure to adjust the approach as the insurgency intensified.  
However, it is much more to do with the failure to teach doctrine effectively to staff 
officers and commanders, as evidenced by the need to run remedial education packages 
in Iraq, in the middle of the operation, from 2006.   
Doctrine is what is taught, yet since 1997 counterinsurgency doctrine simply was not 
taught at JSCSC, in a way which would instil even a basic understanding to soldiers, 
and not at all to the other two services.  Tactics may have been amended as the 
campaign progressed and very sophisticated tactics developed, for example those for 
strike operations which were more closely related to Special Forces’ tactics than 
generally associated with the Field Army.  They were not, however, underpinned by 
doctrine and they introduced a new, informal lexicon of terms, many of which existed 
only for the length of the particular TELIC in which they were coined.  It was left to 
senior commanders to inculcate the British doctrinal approach to counterinsurgency, 
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 although, as this chapter has established, this was very much dependent on individual 
interpretation.  
This chapter set out to examine the validity of Counter Insurgency Operations’ central 
themes against practices adopted in Operation TELIC.  It did so by looking at the 
general approach, the principles and the Ink Spot.  The general approach was shown to 
be valid, the principles still applicable and the Ink Spot an effective method when 
followed.  These are not conclusions which might have been predicted given the 
criticisms from predominantly U.S. commentators of the British approach in MND(SE) 
and their conclusions that the British were defeated in Basrah.  The issue, as Gen. Lamb 
identified, was that “we don’t find them applied in Iraq.”133  He was referring to the 
British campaign in the south.  Where they were applied, the outcome was very 
different, and Operation SINBAD gave a brief glimpse of what was possible.  The U.S. 
‘Surge’ and the Baghdad Security Plan were not only based on doctrine which had been 
strongly influenced by the British approach, but they put it into practice and tested it 
against unprecedented levels of civil violence, and against multiple insurgencies, not 
just one which doctrine envisaged. 
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 7 The U.S. Army in Iraq:  Theory and Practice 
 
The U.S. Army is a doctrine-based army.1  As John Nagl observes, it is “enormously 
important to the United States Army.  Doctrine codifies both how the institution thinks 
about its role in the world and how it accomplishes that role on the battlefield.”2  
Doctrine underpins how the U.S. Army should be organized, what missions it should 
train to accomplish, how it should accomplish those missions, and what equipment it 
needs.  Its significance is formally reflected in the U.S. Army’s policy statements, 
warranting an annex, for example, in its annual Modernization Plan:   
Doctrine touches all aspects of the Army and … embodies fundamental 
principles by which military forces or elements guide their actions in support of 
national objectives… Army operations are based on doctrine and training 
standards.  Doctrine forms the basis for training.  Together, doctrine and training 
are key aspects of readiness.  Doctrine facilitates communication among 
Soldiers – no matter where they serve – and contributes to a shared professional 
culture that serves as a baseline.3  
Given its institutional importance, the issue this raises is straightforward:  if doctrine is 
the foundation on which the U.S. Army is designed, equipped, trained and acts, what 
happens when its doctrine is considered to be out of date and irrelevant, or when it is 
not well understood or, worse, when there is a ‘doctrinal gap’ between institutional 
understanding and the demands of the operation in which armed forces are engaged?  
These were problems which the U.S. Army faced in Iraq and for which, certainly until 
late 2006, no institutional response seemed relevant or likely to succeed.  For an 
organisation built on doctrine, the implications of such problems are potentially 
calamitous.  In the light of what Gen. Petraeus achieved in Iraq in 2007 and 2008, it is 
directly relevant to a study of British counterinsurgency to examine how the U.S. Army 
responded to the challenges it faced in Iraq and in Washington and to identify the 
lessons. 
Considerable criticism has been published concerning the paucity of U.S. post-conflict 
planning following its invasion of Iraq in 2003.  Just as much debate focuses on the 
unsuitability or not of U.S. forces for counterinsurgency operations, as Gray, Aylwin-
Foster, and Record, among others, highlight.4  That criticism was not confined to the 
political and academic groups in the United States.  The argument about whether 
military planning took enough account of the potential for politically motivated armed 
opposition has some relevance for this analysis.  However, the more important issue for 
this thesis is that, almost irrespective of how well developed or not the post-conflict 
plan was, the U.S. military found it very difficult to bring stability to Iraq as quickly as 
the Iraqi people expected.  Furthermore, since counterinsurgency was not part of the 
mainstream military discussion, the U.S. Army found it difficult to determine a coherent 
approach it could apply effectively.   It lacked a well-understood and institutionally 
accepted approach to such problems, and without a generally acknowledged doctrine for 
what developed into counterinsurgency, this constrained what could be achieved.  
Doctrine and strategy are not synonymous, although the absence of the former and 
confusion over the latter undoubtedly complicated the U.S. campaign in Iraq and the 
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 policy of Transition – standing down as the Iraqis stood up – took it to the point of 
defeat.  John Nagl notes that in Iraq, 
Many early ad hoc approaches to counterinsurgency failed to protect the 
population from insurgent attacks and alienated the people through the excessive 
use of force...  It was not until 2007 that the Army finally adopted a unified 
approach that effectively secured the population and coopted reconcilable 
insurgent fighters in Iraq.5   
A state of denial existed in the two years or so after the invasion of Iraq, when the 
conflict was seen as anything but an insurgency.  In 2004 Gen. John Abizaid, the new 
commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), concluded that the United States 
was facing “a classical guerrilla type campaign...  It’s low intensity conflict in our 
doctrinal terms,” he said, “but it’s war, however you describe it.”6  Under the heading 
Denial as a Method of Counter-Insurgency Warfare, Anthony Cordesman makes the 
point in his exhaustive analysis of the insurgency in Iraq that, 
US policymakers and many in the US military initially lived in a state of near-
denial about the rise of terrorism and insurgency. The US assumed for much of 
the first year after the fall of Saddam Hussein that it was dealing with a limited 
number of insurgents that Coalition forces would defeat well before the election. 
It did not see the threat level that would emerge if it did not provide jobs or 
pensions for Iraqi career officers, or co-opt them into the nation building effort.7
The heart of the problem was, as Bruce Hoffman observes, “the failure to detect early 
on the signs of incipient insurgency, combined with initially hesitant and uncoordinated 
responses in terms of meshing political as well as military approaches.”8  This, 
Hoffman notes, gave the insurgents “time to entrench themselves in the civilian 
population and solidify their efforts” while the security forces groped and stumbled 
about.  By the time the authorities realized the seriousness of the emergent situation, it 
was already too late. 
Yet despite this, by mid-2006 the U.S. Army had started to find a way out of what was 
seen by many as an intractable problem.  Stephen Biddle observes that in 2006, “Iraq 
was the single most controversial subject in the U.S.  The view was that the war was 
hopelessly lost, and that U.S. forces simply had to pull out.”9  A crucial component in 
changing this hopeless position proved to be doctrine.  In December 2006, the U.S. 
Army published Field Manual 3-24 - Counterinsurgency.10  It proved to be a crucial 
point in the U.S. campaign and important in the overall development of 
counterinsurgency doctrine.  After three years in Iraq the U.S. Army at last had an 
authoritative, relevant counterinsurgency doctrine against which it could develop its 
thinking, planning and the conduct of counterinsurgency operations.  FM 3-24 started to 
close an institutional gap in understanding evident since the invasion of Iraq and which 
could be traced back to the end of the Vietnam War.11  The first paragraph of FM 3-24’s 
foreword acknowledged the difficulties created by the absence of an appropriate 
doctrine: 
This manual is designed to fill a doctrinal gap.  It has been 20 years since the 
Army published a field manual devoted exclusively to counterinsurgency 
operations.  For the Marine Corps it has been 25 years.  With our Soldiers and 
Marines fighting insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is essential that we give 
them a manual that provides principles and guidance for counterinsurgency 
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 operations.12
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine, 
its development in the light of experience in Iraq, and the way in which the U.S. Army 
then applied its doctrine in Iraq.  It provides the comparator against which the British 
Army’s doctrinal approach to counterinsurgency and its application in Iraq can be 
judged.  The subject will be examined in four sections.  Section I examines the role of 
doctrine and importance in the U.S Army, the general effect of the Vietnam War on the 
U.S. Army as an organization and on its consideration of counterinsurgency, the impact 
of operations in El Salvador on the development of doctrine, and the development of 
counterinsurgency doctrine before the invasion of Iraq.  The underlying question to be 
addressed is the extent to which the U.S. Army was institutionally attuned to 
counterinsurgency.  Section II focuses on FM 3-24 in response to Iraq, the manual’s 
doctrinal origins, and way it was developed.  It provides a textual and thematic analysis, 
examines the concept of Clear-Hold-Build and the imperative of Learning and 
Adapting.  Section III examines the application of FM 3-24 in Iraq.  Against the 
backdrop of a brief analysis of the campaign as a whole, the section analyzes the 
detailed application of classical counterinsurgency theory.  The final section provides a 
critical analysis of FM 3-24 against the criteria for effective doctrine established in 
Chapter 2.  The Chapter draws on interviews conducted in Iraq and the U.S. with those 
at the heart of the counterinsurgency doctrine review, and with those who put it into 
practice in Iraq.  Account has also been taken of opinion and editorials published in the 
American media, whose principal defence correspondents are kept well-informed by the 
Department of Defense and senior officers.  
7.1 Section I – The Role of Doctrine in the U.S Army 
7.1.1 The Reaction to Vietnam and Its Effect on Doctrine 
The emphasis the U.S. Army places on doctrine stems directly from the reforms which 
followed the Vietnam War.  Even before the general U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam had 
started in the early 1970s, the U.S. Army’s Chief of Staff, Gen. Creighton Abrams, 
instigated a process of wholesale reorganisation to deal with “serious problems of 
manpower, morale, strategy and leadership”13 exacerbated, if not created by the war. 
Part of the response was to move to a smaller, professional, all-volunteer army.  
Another was to shift the American strategic focus from guerrilla warfare in South East 
Asia to deal with the threat posed by the Warsaw Pact on NATO’s Central Front in 
Europe.  While American attention was focussed on Vietnam, the Warsaw Pact had 
modernised its forces and was now numerically stronger.14  Analysis of the 1973 
Middle East war showed the areas where the U.S. Army had to address in its doctrine 
and tactics.  The doctrine which followed provided the unifying concept during the 
process of change.15
Given doctrine’s institutional importance, the issue is simple:  if doctrine is the 
foundation on which the U.S. Army is designed, equipped, trained and acts, what 
happens when doctrine is believed to be irrelevant, or is not well understood or, worse, 
when there is a ‘doctrinal gap’ between what is required of an organization and the 
responses it can make?  For an organisation built on doctrine, the implications are 
potentially serious, and it is relevant, therefore, to examine how the U.S. Army 
responded to the clear gap which appeared following the invasion of Iraq.   
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 7.1.2 Training and Doctrine Command 
On 1 July 1973, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) was created as part of the 
major post-Vietnam reforms, under the direction of Gen. William E. Depuy.   
TRADOC’s prime responsibility was, and still is, to develop and promulgate tactical 
doctrine, and to teach the U.S. Army how to fight using that doctrine.16  Its mission has 
not changed:  it “recruits, trains and educates the Army’s Soldiers; develops leaders; 
supports training in units; develops doctrine; establishes standards; and builds the future 
Army.”17  The resources allocated to it for developing and maintaining the link between 
tactics, weapons, equipment and organizations reflects the importance the U.S. Army 
places in TRADOC.  Its strength is about one third that of the British Army, with over 
30,000 military and 15,000 civilian staff.  Despite TRADOC’s size, the U.S. General 
Accountability Office (the National Auditing Office’s equivalent) investigated to see if 
it was sufficiently resourced to meet its wide range of responsibilities.18  The GAO’s 
concern was how TRADOC would prioritize its work if its resources were limited.  It 
concluded that TRADOC had concentrated on the most dangerous form of conflict, 
namely major combat operations conducted in an interventionist setting against a near-
peer opponent.  The most likely – operations short of war against an asymmetric or 
insurgent opponent – was not considered.  This mirrored the approach taken by 
DGD&D. 
The U.S. Army’s doctrine is developed, written and published by the Combined Arms 
Centre (CAC), commanded by a Lieutenant General, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.  
CAC provides 
leadership and supervision for leader development and professional military and 
civilian education; institutional and collective training; functional training; 
training support; battle command; doctrine; lessons learned and specified areas 
the Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 
designates in order to serve as a catalyst for change and to support developing 
relevant and ready expeditionary land formations with campaign qualities in 
support of the joint force commander.19
Within the CAC, its Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD) develops, writes, 
and updates Army doctrine at the corps and division level.  CADD also provides 
doctrine experts for the Combat Training Centers, the Battle Command Training 
Programme, and the Command and General Staff College (CGSC).  It produces field 
manuals that cover operations, command and control and tactics.  Its doctrine is 
developed in the joint and multinational contexts to ensure consistency throughout the 
Army and with joint and multinational forces.  
TRADOC was “born of frustration with the service’s response to war in Southeast 
Asia.”20  The lessons from Vietnam were not to be forgotten and TRADOC was the 
means by which focus and expertise were to be maintained.  The principal lesson the 
U.S. Army drew was that Vietnam was a strategic mistake which the U.S. Army should 
not repeat.  As James Corum notes, it was “adamant that there should be no more 
Vietnams.  This translated into the concept, ‘no more insurgencies.’”21  To meet the 
threat posed by the Soviet Bloc, the U.S. Army needed to revise its outdated warfighting 
doctrine and it had to do so quickly.22  Between 1974 and 1976 TRADOC reformulated 
doctrine for winning the land battle by better using the weapons it had, and by building 
an army designed to “win the first battle of the next war.”23  The U.S. Army achieved 
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 that when it won the Battle of Baghdad in April 2003; its problem was it did not know 
what to do next. 
7.1.3 The Rise to Dominance of FM 100‐5 Operations and AirLand 
Battle 
FM 100-5 Operations, published in 1976, was, as Richard Lock-Pullan notes, “the 
army’s first post-Vietnam War doctrine manual.”24  It became the central doctrine for 
operations and the conceptual catalyst by which the U.S. Army re-established its 
warfighting capability.  It provided the intellectual underpinning on which the U.S. 
Army designed, developed and ultimately perfected its approach to defeating the 
Warsaw Pact, using doctrine to argue for new equipment and weapons such as the M1 
Abrams tank, the M2/3 Bradley, the AH-64 Apache, the UH-60 Blackhawk, and the 
Patriot.25   
In 1977, Gen. Donn Starry took over from Depuy and under Starry’s direction FM 100-
5 was twice revised in 1982 and 1986.  James Stensvaag notes that Starry “brought with 
him to TRADOC the idea of an integrated and extended battlefield – the ‘central battle’ 
– to engage the enemy not only at the point of attack but also in depth.”26  Starry had 
been involved with the development of the 1976 ‘Active Defense’ version of FM 100-5 
before commanding V Corps in the Fulda Gap in Germany, at the heart of the NATO 
main defensive position.  There, Starry had seen the drawbacks of Active Defense’s 
tactics which placed too much emphasis on positional defence rather than gaining the 
initiative; it took away the traditional reserve; and it emphasized the forward placement 
of forces rather than the conventional approach using the depth of a defensive position 
to absorb the enemy’s advance.27   
Starry wanted a new doctrine which returned to historical principles and which “should 
educate Army officers in how to apply them.”28  He selected Lt. Col, later Brig. Gen., 
Wass de Czege to be the principal writer, supported by Lt. Col., later Lt. Gen., Don 
Holder.  They read into the problem in detail, studying U.S., German and Soviet 
doctrine, and military history.  Wass de Czege recalls that Holder “brought with him 
great practical experience under a respected coach, and a broad self-education in the 
literature of many of the outside ‘maneuverist’ reformers and had been quoting, e.g., B. 
H. Liddell Hart and J. F. C. Fuller.”29  The major development was to recognize that 
“winning successive line-of-sight engagements, as the 1976 doctrine emphasized, was a 
sure path to failure.”30  To overcome this, Wass de Czege and Holder developed an 
operational framework that fought a whole campaign not just an individual engagement.  
This would be achieved by fighting the close, rear and deep battles simultaneously.  The 
logic of Deep, Close and Rear organising framework proved central to the doctrine’s 
success and was later taken into British doctrine in ADP Operations by the then Col. 
Richard Dannatt. The concept of the deep battle brought in the Air Force to engage the 
Warsaw Pact’s second and third echelons in the enemy’s depth.  This meant that FM 
100-5 became the new doctrine for the joint operational level of command, and the 1982 
edition attended to and thus became the logic of joint operations.  In the absence of any 
joint doctrine for counterinsurgency, FM 3-24 assumed a similar role.31 
Starry read every chapter and every revision, an approach Petraeus would follow with 
FM 3-24.32  Starry’s doctrine was innovative because it required commanders to “look 
beyond the range of their weapons and picture the enemy in organizational wholes, within 
the context of higher commands and support, arrayed on the terrain and postured to perform 
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 missions.”33  Where Active Defense had been “attritionally-minded,” Lock-Pullan notes 
“AirLand Battle was a fundamental move away from attrition [and that] there was doctrinal 
innovation without a corresponding change in the strategic environment.”34  Wass de 
Czege considers that FM 100-5 provided, 
sound guidance and useful precepts for fighting a ‘counter-aggression’ campaign 
in response to the invasion of an ally.  It not only took into account a specific 
and very powerful enemy, but it also hypothesized that the host nation would 
tend to many very specific and very messy details that could be ignored by U.S. 
forces when the strategic aim is the restoration of territory.35
Wass de Czege’s last point is important, and the implication from it is clear:  soldiers 
are there to fight and win battles, not to worry about issues of civil administration, 
jurisdiction and development and aid work.  For an army inculcated in major combat 
operations, having to take responsibility for a whole range of non-warfighting tasks, for 
which it was not trained, in an alien, hostile environment, would be difficult. 
Interestingly, the pre-publication draft was made available to CGSC so that it could be used 
to “train intensively those officers destined for future assignments where they would be 
implementing AirLand Battle doctrine.”36  More generally, training was improved, refined 
and updated on the basis of FM 100-5 and the outcome was an army “transformed into a 
superb force for conventional warfare.”37  Education at CGSC played an important part in 
this transformation because, as Wass de Czege recalls, “it taught rigorous thinking about 
important conventional warfare issues that had been neglected during the Vietnam years.”38   
Significantly for this discussion of doctrine, FM 100-5 succeeded “in making the officer 
corps care about doctrine... and it led to a renaissance of professional discourse on how the 
Army should fight that has continued to the present.”39  The issue which would emerge and 
which caused such problems in Iraq was that the professional discourse the U.S. Army 
entered into as a result of FM 100-5 was concentrated almost exclusively on how to fight a 
major conventional campaign. 
7.1.4 Turning Away from Counterinsurgency and Ignoring Vietnam 
The U.S. Army’s focus on the central themes of FM 100-5 only served to divert its 
attention further and further away from counterinsurgency.  James Corum considers that 
the American officer corps made a conscious effort to forget Vietnam and made erasing 
the memory of Vietnam central to its transformation during the 1970s and 1980s.40  The 
Vietnam War thus became synonymous with counterinsurgency, despite the fact that the 
U.S. Army never really tried to fight a counterinsurgency war in Vietnam as many 
experts advised it to do at the time.  John Nagl and Andrew Krepinevich both consider 
that what Krepinevich describes as the Army Concept – “the Army’s perception of how 
wars ought to be waged and ... reflected in the way the Army organizes and trains its 
troops for battle”41 – prevented the U.S. Army from approaching counterinsurgency as 
effectively as it should.  In his biting criticism of U.S. military intransigence written in 
1970, Brian Jenkins concluded that “the Army’s doctrine, its tactics, its organization, its 
weapons – its entire repertoire of warfare was designed for conventional warfare in 
Europe.  In Vietnam, the Army simply performed its repertoire even though it was 
frequently irrelevant to the situation.”42   
The general characterization of the Vietnam War became that of a conventional Army 
trying to apply Jominian battlefield geometry to a large scale revolutionary war.  Yet 
despite such views, in the early years of the U.S. campaign, the key elements of 
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 effective counterinsurgency were put in place.  From 1950 until 1963, when President 
Johnson expanded the campaign into a conventional war, the U.S. Army used advisors 
in Vietnam to train and mentor the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) to fight the 
insurgency rather than any conventional North Vietnamese force.  It also attempted to 
apply the lessons from Malaya, inviting Thompson and a small British Advisory 
Mission (BRIAM) to Saigon.43  He, for example, proposed a plan that concentrated on 
providing political stability, securing the population, increasing the role of police, 
improving intelligence, and using the ARVN in clear-and-hold operations.44  
Unfortunately, as John Nagl notes, Thompson’s advice was largely ignored.45  The U.S. 
did, however, create an inter-departmental group to provide a co-ordinated mix of 
political, military and economic measures to address the root cause of the problem, and 
through President Johnson’s policy of pacification – “the specific strategy or program to 
bring security and political and economic stability to the countryside of Vietnam”46 – 
the Office of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development (CORDS), the State 
Department, the CIA, the US military mission in Vietnam and the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) were brought together.   
Of particular relevance to this thesis, a U.S. Army report into pacification in March 
1966 (Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of Vietnam, or 
PROVN) identified three criteria for the co-ordination of U.S. effort in Vietnam and to 
ensure a better cross-department interpretation of the situation.  Although, as Andrew 
Birtle points out, the PROVN report has been used by critics to attack Gen. 
Westmoreland, the U.S. commander-in-chief, and to inflate the position of Gen. 
Abrams, his successor,47 it provides a useful insight into the conclusions that were 
being drawn even at quite an early point in the Vietnam campaign.  There are strong 
similarities between what PROVN identified and the guidelines Kitson proposed for the 
effective integration of allied and host nation effort: 
(1) that a Washington executive agent coordinate Vietnam support activities in 
the United States; (2) that the US ambassador be the single manager in South 
Vietnam with two coequal deputies, one for US military forces and one for 
pacification; and (3) that below the deputies there be a single American 
representative or chief at each level in the field.48
After the war, the U.S. Army started to view Vietnam as the wrong war, fought at the 
wrong time, against the wrong enemy and by the wrong army.49   This idea was given 
much credence by Col. Harry Summers’ analysis in On Strategy:  A Critical Analysis of 
the Vietnam War.50  It was adopted by the U.S. Army War College and CGSC as the 
standard text and became, as Conrad Crane, Director of the U.S. Army Historical 
Branch, and the man eventually selected by Gen. Petraeus to lead the FM 3-24 writing 
team observes, “the prism through which the Army viewed Vietnam.”51  As the 
TRADOC-led reforms took hold, Corum concludes that in “the minds of the senior 
military leadership, the very term ‘counter-insurgency’ became associated with a failed 
strategy and doctrine.”52  As the U.S. Army focused on and became unquestionably 
proficient with AirLand Battle, the lessons from Vietnam were ignored, and it turned 
away from counterinsurgency.  Crane summarizes the effect of Vietnam on the 
institutional response to counterinsurgency: 
Army involvement in counterinsurgency was first seen as an aberration and then 
as a mistake to be avoided.  Instead of focusing on the proper synchronization of 
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 military and political tools with objectives necessary for success in low intensity 
unconventional conflicts, the Army continued to concentrate on mid to high 
intensity conventional wars.53
7.1.5 The Impact of the War in El Salvador 
Despite the U.S. Army’s rejection of Vietnam and the notion of counterinsurgency, 
President Reagan’s decision in 1981 to support the government of El Salvador against a 
major Marxist insurgency helped develop a new model for counterinsurgency.54  The 
United States provided aid, advisors, equipment and training but Congress, with 
Vietnam in mind, limited the number of U.S. military personnel in El Salvador to only 
fifty-five.  Originally, planners at U.S. Southern Command calculated that they would 
need 250 but they did not think that this figure would get support in Congress so they 
took a guess that fifty-five would be more acceptable.55   It was, and the arbitrary limit 
Congress placed on U.S. military operations El Salvador demanded a very different 
approach from that adopted in Vietnam.  With no possibility of U.S. forces being in a 
position to take the lead in tactical operations, the campaign concentrated on 
encouraging, pushing and supporting the Salvadorian government to instigate the wide 
political, economic and military reforms needed to defeat the insurgency.56  As such, 
there are strong similarities with the British experience in the Oman. 
The conditions and constraints imposed by Congress forced the U.S. military to develop 
a response closely akin to well-established principles of British and American 
counterinsurgency.  Through their careful application, the U.S. operation led and 
encouraged the Salvadorian government through a painful transformation to democracy 
and a viable political solution.  It was active economic, political and psychological 
efforts which were decisive not military action.57  Steven Metz identifies that the 
“absolute crux of U.S. counterinsurgency strategy, then, was finding ways to encourage 
or force an allied government and elite to do things they vehemently opposed.”58  
Echoing Kitson and Galula, Max Manwaring concludes in his analysis of El Salvador, 
that the “ultimate outcome of any effort to deal with a given conflict is not primarily 
determined by the skilful manipulation of violence in one of the many military/police 
battles that take place,” rather it is about social, political and economic reform.59
The impact of the El Salvadorian experience on doctrine is important.  The U.S. 
campaign provided a new, novel and ultimately successful counterinsurgency approach 
yet its impact on the U.S. Army was imperceptible.  With so few soldiers involved in 
the campaign, El Salvador could not possibly have the organizational or cultural impact 
on thinking and approach that Northern Ireland had on the British Army.60  At the 
strategic level, Corum identifies that it had no affect on improving inter-departmental 
coordination in the way that the theories of Thompson, Kitson and Galula recognised as 
essential.61   This lack of formal, legally binding co-ordination and policy still bedevils 
U.S. counterinsurgency efforts.  Yet, the doctrine that was written after the Salvadorian 
experience captured the essence of what had been learnt and is recognisable in today’s 
terms as best practice. 
7.1.6 FM 90‐8 Counterguerrilla Operations  
FM 90-8 Counterguerrilla Operations was published in August 1986.62  It made the 
distinction between counterinsurgency, which addressed the security and development 
requirements needed to alleviate the conditions which caused the insurgency, and 
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 counterguerrilla operations “geared to the active military element of the insurgent 
movement only... [which are to be] viewed as a supporting component of the 
counterinsurgency effort.”63  It laid out the requirements for U.S. forces to meet if their 
contribution was to support and not undermine, or be detrimental to the overall 
counterinsurgency campaign:   
(1)  Be appropriate – response is appropriate to the level of threat and 
activity.  
(2)  Be justifiable – actions taken are justifiable in the eyes of the host 
country’s population and the US public.  
(3)  Use minimum force – the goal is to restrict the use of force and the level 
of commitment to the minimum feasible to accomplish the mission. However, 
the principle of minimum necessary force does not always imply minimum 
necessary troops. A large number of men deployed at the right time may enable 
a commander to use less force than he might otherwise have done, or even to 
avoid using any force at all. Commanders must, however, keep in mind that a 
peaceful situation could become hostile because of the provocative display of an 
overlarge force. Doing too much may be a greater danger than doing too little.  
(4)  Do maximum benefit – US forces should select operations so they 
accomplish positive benefit for the population. If this is not possible then the 
operational concept is wrong and should not be executed. 
(5) Do minimum damage – US forces ensure that operations preclude 
unnecessary damage to facilities, activities, and resources. Since this is almost 
an impossibility, compensation for any damage to property must be made and 
the property restored, as much as possible, to its original state. In any case, a 
major consideration is to plan activities to limit damage.64
The authors of FM 90-8 made an effort to address the problem of counterinsurgency in 
conventional doctrinal terms, integrating the tenets and imperatives of AirLand Battle 
into counterguerrilla operations:  ensure unity of effort; direct friendly strengths against 
enemy weaknesses; designate and sustain the main effort; sustain the fight; move fast, 
strike hard, and finish rapidly; use terrain and weather; protect the force.65  Several 
years later, Counter Insurgency Operations adopted a similar technique, successfully 
setting the British Army’s warfighting operational principles and framework into the 
context of counterinsurgency.66   
FM 90-8 explained that the “use of armed forces in a counterguerrilla role is primarily 
to provide enough internal security to enable the host country to initiate 
counterinsurgency programs and pursue national objectives,”67 as opposed to the 
conventional view of the use of armed forces in defeating the opposing force.  This 
reversal of the counterinsurgency paradigm was to become a central tenet of FM 3-24 
and subsequently the Baghdad Security Plan.  FM 90-8 identified three groups for the 
counterinsurgent to deal with, in line with the thinking of Galula, Thompson and other 
mainstream counterinsurgency theory.  The first group was the population, the support 
of which the government must “win back ... through providing them security and 
showing an honest effort to correct those conditions which caused dissatisfaction.”68 
The second group was the insurgents, which must be isolated “from the population, both 
physically and psychologically, thereby denying him personnel, materiel, and 
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 intelligence support.” The final group was those external actors who provide active or 
passive support to the insurgent or the counterinsurgent.  The military’s role and 
function were made clear: 
The military assists the COIN program through the conduct of six major 
operations: intelligence, psychological operations, civil affairs, populace and 
resources control, advisory assistance, and tactical operations. The successful 
employment of these operations contributes to the success of the COIN program. 
They are normally conducted simultaneously, in conjunction with each other, 
and require close coordination of diverse government agencies.69
This is an important point.  It listed the tasks which first FMi 3-07.22 (2004) and then 
FM 3-24 later restated as core counterinsurgency capabilities.  It emphasized, as the 
CORDS programme had in Vietnam, the need to integrate the military contribution with 
those of other government departments.  The tasks, and by inference the training and 
equipment required to conduct them, reinforced the central tenet of placing the 
population firmly at the centre of the counterinsurgency campaign.  The order in which 
it listed the military tasks is also significant.  Although it is not clear that they are listed 
in priority – it is reasonable to assume that they are following the convention in doctrine 
of establishing priorities – they are clearly at odds with the requirements for a 
conventional army designed to fight a large conventional war.  John Waghelstein, 
writing in 1985, the year before FM 90-8 was published, highlighted this conflict of 
interests: 
In many respects, best counterinsurgency techniques are a step toward the 
primitive (for example, less firepower that is more surgically applied). The keys 
to popular support, the sine qua non in counterinsurgency, include psychological 
operations, civic action and grass-roots human intelligence work, all of which 
runs counter to the conventional U.S. concept of war.70
FM 90-8, based on the Salvadorian experience, not only reflected the by then well-
established theories of Thompson and Galula but it emphasized the central point of 
classical counterinsurgency:  “The focus of all civil and military plans and operations 
must be on the center of gravity in any conflict – the country’s people and their belief in 
and support of their government.”71  The important point to note is that FM 90-8 was 
the U.S Army’s extant doctrine when the Iraq insurgencies developed; the principal 
themes and concepts it contained were then redeveloped and re-emphasised in FM 3-24.  
The issue at stake is that whilst the U.S. Army had learnt from El Salvador, it had not 
gone on to assimilate the lessons and the doctrine which it subsequently published.  
That doctrine was and remains a valid approach to countering insurgency, but the U.S. 
Army failed to absorb its central tenets into its culture.  Clint Ancker, CADD’s director, 
observed, “no one knew it existed.”72
7.1.7 Assimilating Counterinsurgency Doctrine 
In addition to FM 90-8, the U.S. Army published other manuals.  These included FM 
100-20 Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, published in 1990, and FM 7-98 
Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict, published in 1992.  Although these publications 
included much of classic counterinsurgency theory, and while they had evolved as the 
result of U.S. operations in El Salvador and Panama, they harked back to small scale, 
largely covert Special Forces operations in Central and South America.  They were not 
written with large-scale interventions in mind.  Despite having a valid doctrinal model 
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 for counterinsurgency in FM 90-8, it had little discernable impact on the U.S. Army.  
FM 100-5 was clearly the centrepiece of army thinking, and, as Wass de Czege notes, 
the “depth, breadth and substance of the doctrine, and the understanding of it... reached 
levels never before attained.”73   Unfortunately, perfecting the central tenets of FM 100-
5 came at the cost of developing any capacity and subsequent professional 
understanding for other forms of conflict.  In an army where, as Waghelstein notes, 
counterinsurgency had “virtually become a non subject in the US military educational 
system,”74 no new doctrine for counterinsurgency or low intensity operations would 
make any impression on an army so focussed on winning the conventional battle.   
The U.S. Army thus came to regard counterinsurgency as a specialist’s task and not 
something to which it should devote any time.  Low intensity operations and 
counterinsurgency, although covered at CGSC were electives, not core subjects.  Col. 
Mike Smith and Dr. Tom Marks taught counterinsurgency and irregular warfare at 
CGSC in the 1990s, where theory and British, French and U.S. history were part of the 
curriculum.  Smith used British doctrine and taught case studies from The Oman (where 
he fought in the War) and Northern Ireland.75  Inevitably, however, with such a 
tremendous institutional focus on ‘winning the first battle,’ with the exception of those 
officers who studied the lessons of Vietnam – notably for this discussion, Gen. Petraeus, 
Col. H. R. McMaster, and John Nagl76 – or those with experience from El Salvador or 
Panama, counterinsurgency was not generally well understood.  Gen. Jack Keane, who 
was to be the catalyst for the U.S. Surge and a former Assistant Chief of Staff of the 
Army, concluded that the U.S. Army was untrained to deal with insurgency: 
We put an army on the battlefield that I had been a part of for 37 years. The truth 
of the matter is:  it doesn’t have any doctrine, nor was it educated and trained, to 
deal with an insurgency.  And that insurgency challenged us, as I knew it would 
for that first year.  
After the Vietnam War, we purged ourselves of everything that dealt with 
irregular warfare or insurgency, because it had to do with how we lost that war. 
In hindsight, that was a bad decision.77
7.2 Section II – The Development of FM 3‐24 
7.2.1 Interim Doctrine:  Field Manual Interim 3‐07.22 
In December 2003, Gen. Wallace, then commanding the CAC, discovered that no 
counterinsurgency doctrine existed to support III Corps’ mission rehearsal exercise for 
Iraq (III Corps was to form the nucleus of HQ MNF-I in Baghdad).  Ancker recalls that 
Wallace gave him six months to produce it,78 and the new doctrine was published as an 
interim Field Manual on 1 October 2004.79  This was a new departure for the U.S. 
Army because doctrine normally takes time to develop and is only published after 
gaining official endorsement.  In this case, Wallace took the decision to get an 
unendorsed interim version into the field as quickly as possible to help with the problem 
at hand; irregular, not conventional warfare.  The new manual was well received.80
Lt. Col. Jan Horvath, a Special Forces Officer and a doctrine writer at CADD, was 
given the task of writing the new doctrine.  The first two books he read were British 
counterinsurgency manuals (Counter Insurgency Operations and AFM Vol. 1 Part 9 
Counter Insurgency and Peace Support Operations Tactics).  He then looked at the 
challenge posed by the fast developing insurgencies in Iraq, and attempted to identify at 
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 which level of command insurgency had the greatest impact; “It was a bit 
Clausewitzian.  If it was at the operational level, how did it affect the tactical and the 
strategic?  If it was a tactical problem, how did it affect the operational and strategic 
levels?”81  He concluded that the primary audience was the corps headquarters since it 
provided the political-military interface but, more importantly in terms of consistency of 
approach, it established the framework within which divisions and brigades operated.  
Horvath then broke the subject into its key component parts, worked out how they were 
inter-related and then, rather like Bulloch with Counter Insurgency Operations in 1994, 
he laid out the chapters, and wrote a draft.  Like Bulloch, Horvath circulated it to those 
he felt would contribute and improve the manual. With military expertise in 
counterinsurgency limited, he drew heavily on U.S. academics.82
FMi 3-07.22’s publication was an important step, being the first official U.S. 
counterinsurgency, not just counter-guerrilla doctrine since 1965.  Although it included 
new tactical lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan, its supporting analysis indicated that 
many of the traditional counterinsurgency strategies and tactics remained valid.  This 
was particularly true of the point emphasized by Max Manwaring that Legitimacy is 
crucial for effective counterinsurgency.  Crane would re-emphasize this in FM 3-24: 
... the moral right of a regime to govern is the most important single dimension 
in a counterguerrilla war. Thus, a politically strong and morally legitimate 
government is vital to any winning internal war strategy. The rectitude and 
legitimacy of the incumbent regime is the primary target—the primary center of 
gravity—as far as the insurgent organization is concerned.83
Although FMi 3-07.22 used a mainly Maoist model of insurgency and did not address 
the new forms appearing in Iraq, its very publication, the speed with which it was 
produced, and it contents, provided an important means by which institutional 
misunderstanding and confusion over what counterinsurgency required could be 
addressed.  Interestingly, FMi 3-07.22 was not simply an update of FM 7-98 Operations 
in a Low-Intensity Conflict or FM 90-8 Counterguerrilla Operations.  It was a fresh 
look at counterinsurgency, and rather intuitively, Horvath included the essential themes 
which would be developed yet further in FM 3-24: 
Planning for a counterinsurgency focuses on the following conditions that the 
force must establish to be successful: 
• A secure populace.  Security of the populace is imperative... 
• Established local political institutions. 
• Reinforce local governments. 
• Neutralize insurgent capabilities. 
• Information flow from local sources.84 
FMi 3-07.22 went on to describe in detail the role of Civil Affairs groups, and the 
importance of close civil-military relations.  It emphasized the central role of 
intelligence, the need to develop effective host nation security forces, the role of media 
and psychological operations, and it introduced the concept of ‘Clear and Hold.’  This 
was another key development because it made clear that clear and hold operations 
focussed civil-military effort, combat operations, information operations, intelligence 
and psychological operations to create specific conditions in the target area:  the 
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 creation of a secure physical and psychological environment, the establishment of firm 
government control of the population and the area, and the securing of “willing support 
of the population and their participation in the governmental programs for countering 
insurgency.”85   
The planning process FMi 3-07.22 described, and its explanation of the conduct of each 
stage of the operation – clearing, holding and consolidation – were entirely in keeping 
with the logic of Thompson’s method, the British Ink Spot, and the very detailed 
method provided by David Galula.86  Although FMi 3-07.22 lacked contemporary 
context, interim or not, it was a very sound piece of doctrine.  Once published, it 
became the core text at the COIN CFE at Taji, and from December 2004, when the first 
brigade combat team went through, U.S. commanders, down to company level, were 
taught a version of Clear-Hold-Build. 
7.2.2 Revising the Interim Doctrine 
During 2005, Horvath continued to revise FMi 3-07.22.  Interest in it increased and he 
received a great deal of advice and material for the next edition.  He recalls his 
difficulty was trying to find anyone who would offer an objective criticism of what he 
had published:  “There were lots of good ideas but did not much ‘push back’.  Trusting 
that I had got it right was not what I needed at that point; the manual needed rigorous 
criticism to keep the ideas clear and succinct.”87  Without any firm guidance, his second 
draft incorporated many new views but he did not feel it made the subject any clearer.   
The second draft, published in October 2005,88 included both Thompson’s and T. E. 
Lawrence’s principles, and used examples from Vietnam to illustrate new ideas about 
complexity and adaptation.  It covered intelligence in much more detail, it introduced 
the concept of logical lines of operation – based on the work of Maj. Gen. Peter 
Chiarelli and 1st Cavalry Division in Baghdad89 – but surprisingly the explanation of 
clear and hold operations were removed without any alternative being provided.   
The major conclusion to draw from the October 2005 edition is that Horvath’s initial, 
intuitive and theoretically sound work had been re-cast more in the mould of 
conventional operations.  Counterinsurgency was now portrayed as a form of warfare to 
be conducted within the framework of existing structures and approaches, not as one 
that required a change in approach from being enemy-centric to population focussed.   
Krepinevich’s ‘Army Concept’ could be seen to be attempting to re-cast the emerging 
counterinsurgency doctrine in the image of the well-understood and intellectually 
familiar tenets of conventional operations. 
7.2.3 Developing FM 3‐24 
The startpoint for what became FM 3-24 was a meeting held in April 2005 at the U.S. 
Army War College at Carlisle, PA, between John Nagl, Steven Metz, David Kilcullen 
and Jan Horvath.  The meeting had been called to shape the next draft of FM 3-07.22, 
due to be published in October, but it highlighted to those present how difficult it would 
be to reconcile the expectations of the conventionally-minded army with the demands of 
counterinsurgency.90  In October, the then Lt. Gen. Petraeus returned from Baghdad 
where he had commanded MNSTC-I.  On his way to Fort Leavenworth, where he was 
to take command of the CAC, he paid several office calls in Washington DC.  One was 
with Paul Wolfowitz, then Deputy Secretary of Defense and for whom John Nagl 
worked as Military Assistant.  Nagl took the opportunity to raise his fundamental 
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 concerns about the emerging doctrine with Petraeus.  In Nagl’s view, the new draft had 
plenty of material, but it lacked a clearly defined logic or approach.  More seriously, it 
epitomized the problems of developing doctrine by consensus, and the U.S. Army’s 
conventional mindset.  Unless both were resolved, he told Petraeus, the Army would not 
get the doctrine it needed to change the campaign in Iraq.91  A month later, at a 
conference in Washington, Petraeus described changes he had already made at CAC to 
collective training and to the curriculum at CGSC, and he announced that Nagl was to 
lead the team to rewrite counterinsurgency doctrine.92  On the evening of 7 November 
2005, Nagl and a group of friends planned the pamphlet’s outline on a napkin in a ‘The 
Front Page’ bistro.  Nagl’s plan introduced chapters on training local forces, leadership 
and ethics.93   
Petraeus wanted the new writing team to have some academic credibility so he invited 
Kalev Sepp and Andrew Krepinevich to join (Sepp declined because he was too busy), 
and had Nagl released from his job in the Secretary of Defense’s office.94  After some 
further discussion with Petraeus it was agreed that Conrad Crane would be a more 
appropriate editor than Nagl.  Crane and Petraeus were West Point classmates, both had 
PhDs, and the relationship between a serving 3-star and a retired officer, one of ‘Dave’ 
and ‘Con,’ would be more effective than a service-based, hierarchical sponsor-editor 
relationship.95  Horvath mentions the sense of trust between editor and sponsor was 
evident from the outset.96   
Nagl and Crane’s review of the principal counterinsurgency doctrines and the classic 
theories identified that the essential logic of counterinsurgency was population-, not 
insurgent-focused.  With this agreed, they then started to develop the principles, 
imperatives and paradoxes – reproduced in Table 6 over – which were to provide the 
manual’s conceptual framework.  Crane’s work on the principles drew directly from 
British counterinsurgency doctrine.97  Crane and Prof. Sarah Sewall then developed the 
paradoxes.  These were not intended to be truths, rather they were to act as mental 
prompts to planners and provide an intellectual framework against which plans could be 
held. 98   
The paradoxes were greatly influenced by T. E. Lawrence and recent experience from 
Iraq, particularly Petraeus’,99 and they supported what Sepp identified as the best 
counterinsurgency practices and argued against the worst.100  The value of the 
paradoxes was that they were counter-intuitive to the conventional U.S. military mind, a 
point which was explained in an early article published by the FM 3-24 authors to 
introduce their framework to the rest of the Army:  “COIN operations present complex, 
often unfamiliar missions and considerations. In many ways, conducting COIN 
operations is counterintuitive to the traditional American approach to war and combat 
operations.”101  As Nagl observes, “the nine maxims turn conventional military thinking 
on its head, highlighting the extent of the change required for a conventional military 
force to adapt itself to the demands of counterinsurgency.”102   
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 Principles Contemporary Imperatives Paradoxes 
Legitimacy as the Main 
Objective 
Unity of Effort,  
Political Primacy 
Understanding the 
Environment 
Intelligence 
Isolate the Insurgent 
Security under the Rule of 
Law 
Long Term Commitment 
Manage Information and 
Expectations 
Use Measured Force 
Learn and Adapt 
Empower the Lowest Level  
Support the Host Nation 
The more you protect your 
force, the less secure you are 
The more force you use, the 
less effective you are 
Sometimes doing nothing is 
the best reaction 
The best weapons for COIN 
do not shoot 
The insurgents doing 
something poorly is 
sometimes better than us 
doing it well 
If a tactic works this week, it 
won’t work next week  
If it works in this province, it 
won’t work in the next 
Tactical success guarantees 
nothing 
Table 6 - FM 3-24:  Principles, Contemporary Imperatives and Paradoxes 
Source:  FM 3-24, pp. 1-20-1-28. 
At a conference at Fort Leavenworth in early December 2005 Petraeus took the 
opportunity to marshal potential contributors.  Crane and Nagl picked the chapter 
authors on 10 December 2005, and sent them the principles, imperatives and paradoxes, 
and an outline of the book so that they could start work.  Horvath recalls how the book 
was to be organized: 
After Dr. Tom Marks, [Col.] Tom Western and I wrote half the draft FM, we sat 
down with Con Crane and John Nagl and re-organized the chapters in 
December.  We adopted John [Nagl]’s chapter titles/sequence and stayed with 
my internal chapter topical organization except in Chapters 1 and 2 [Insurgency 
and Counterinsurgency] where Con integrated them into one chapter.  Then, we 
brought in all the other writers. Our Intel writer reduced most of the operational-
level Intel in that chapter, and Gen. Mattis contributed to Chapter 4.103
The working assumptions were that that U.S. military dominance in major combat 
operations had driven the U.S.’s enemies away from conventional warfare to insurgency 
and terrorism, and that the response to these threats required a joint service and a cross-
governmental approach.  As Nagl notes, the latter was an old lesson rediscovered.104 
Petraeus recalls the approach during this stage of the manual’s development: 
We tried to capture our thoughts prior to setting the formal process underway 
but it soon became clear that we needed a comprehensive review that walked us 
through what we knew and what our experiences were telling us.  It was evident 
to us all that it was much more than classical COIN.  We were dealing with 
enemies beyond the classical populist insurgent; terrorists - AQI and the Shi’a 
militia secret cells - violent criminals, limited government capacity, outside 
interference.  All these had to be addressed when coming to terms with 
counterinsurgency.105
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 The first draft was produced within a month and it proved to Nagl the importance of not 
writing doctrine by committee and of using a hand-picked writing team.  The draft was 
circulated widely for comment and experts – human rights groups, government officials, 
representatives of international and non-governmental organisations, anthropologists 
and military officers from across the armed services – were brought together by 
Petraeus for a two-day doctrine workshop at Fort Leavenworth in late February 2006.  
In what Sarah Sewall describes as “an unprecedented collaboration, a human rights 
center partnered with the armed forces to help revise the doctrine,”106 the Carr Centre 
for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University co-sponsored the workshop with Gen. 
Petraeus to critique the U.S. Army’s draft manual.107  It also allowed Petraeus to give 
advance notice of his intentions.  Even as early as February 2006, there was already 
discussion among senior officers that Petraeus would return to Baghdad to command 
the Multi-National Force.  If that were to be the case, he was developing the doctrine his 
troops would use.108
Petraeus refers to the February conference as his opportunity to start to shape more 
general expectations about what the doctrine would contain and how the approach 
would be laid out.  Participation was important; “a process like this, producing 
something as important as COIN doctrine, where so many seem to hold a view, needs 
engagement with a much wider group than standard doctrine has traditionally needed.  
You have to get as many as possible inside the tent.”109  Petraeus’ views on the outcome 
of the conference are also informative: 
The result was that not only did it give the doctrine good substance; it gained a 
greater sense of investment from those who were involved.  If a point was 
important, we had to find out what it was, who held it, who disagreed and, 
eventually, make a decision about which view was to be included.  I had to 
adjudicate a lot of ‘Solomon’ moments.  The strongest arguments centred on the 
balance between kinetic and non-kinetic and the wording of the paradoxes and 
imperatives.  Adding the word ‘sometimes’ managed to get us out of the 
argument and allowed us to get on.  We really had to work hard at reworking 
some of the newer ideas in order to strike the right balance.110
During the conference, discussion and debate were open, inclusive, non-defensive, high 
quality, and very positively led by Gen. Petraeus; there was unanimous agreement on 
the Principles, Contemporary Imperatives and Paradoxes (although subsequently 
Petraeus had to soften the paradoxes), on how the Field Manual should be developed, 
and for whom it was intended; that it needed to be linked to Stability Operations; that it 
needed to provide more focus on the host or partner nation; and it had to emphasize the 
Rule of Law and rules of engagement.  It is interesting to note that none of the material 
presented provided a clear view of how the complex coalition dynamic would affect the 
U.S. contribution to counterinsurgency operations; no obvious hooks were provided to 
either U.S. forces or their allies and partners.  Given the tensions and misunderstandings 
that would arise, for example, between the UK and the U.S. which Petraeus would have 
to handle, rather like Counter Insurgency Operations’ omission of the multinational 
dimension, this was an important oversight.111
While a number of academics had called for a radical reconceptualising of the 
insurgency-counterinsurgency dynamic,112 the FM 3-24 writing team, with its strong 
historical background, returned to the classical theories.113  David Galula’s influence 
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 was particularly important.  Crane read Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare in 
December 2005, having had it recommended to him by Nagl and Horvath.114  What 
Nagl describes as Galula’s “intellectual roots” were important, the way he blended his 
experience from French Indo-China and Algeria into a coherent, persuasively presented 
theory that accounted for two very different and equally violent forms of insurgency.115  
Galula used his analysis of his counterinsurgency experience, in particular that in 
Algeria, to develop laws, principles and an approach which centred on securing and 
protecting the population, gaining its support, and then acquiring information to identify 
and locate insurgents in order to defeat the insurgency.  FM 3-24 reflected this: 
An essential COIN task for military forces is fighting insurgents; however, these 
forces can and should use their capabilities to meet the local populace’s 
fundamental needs as well. Regaining the populace’s active and continued 
support for the [Host Nation] government is essential to deprive an insurgency 
of its power and appeal. The military forces’ primary function in COIN is 
protecting that populace.116
Work continued over the summer.  As editorial and content issues were gradually 
resolved, as Nagl observes, “Iraq was spiralling downhill.”117  Two chapters caused 
some concern.  The first was the chapter on intelligence.  The early drafts were too far 
removed from the day-to-day requirements of divisional and brigade operations, so 
Nagl brought it back to the tactical level which was where most of the U.S. Army’s 
intelligence officers were comfortable.118  The second was the chapter on operational 
design, which was written by the USMC.  Horvath recalls that its authors kept missing 
deadlines.  Eventually the chapter arrived with strict instructions that it could not be 
amended.  This caused some consternation and required Petraeus to speak with Lt. Gen. 
Mattis, his USMC counterpart to resolve matters.  It transpired that Mattis wrote the 
chapter and it was his concerns about how it might be edited which had prompted the 
instruction about amendment.  The chapter was amended.119
To meet publication deadlines, writing had to stop in October, even though there were 
some areas which still needed to be developed.  One was engaging with allies and the 
host nation; “We Americans always have trouble getting our partners to do what we 
think they should. How do you influence the host nation to do what you think is best, at 
all levels?”120   Second, having introduced the concept and importance of legitimacy, he 
still thought that the principle had not been fully developed, in particular in the context 
of a global insurgency.  Third, there were still disagreements over definitions.  “Words 
matter and there was institutional dissonance over meaning and interpretation.”121  
Finally, a point was raised at the Fort Leavenworth conference that doctrine had to 
avoid using overt military terminology if it was to get greater non-military ‘buy in.’122
7.2.4 Developing Doctrine:  AirLand Battle and FM 3‐24 Compared 
Comparing the development of FM 3-24 with AirLand Battle highlights some 
interesting similarities that highlight the importance of clear-sighted leadership and 
well-founded experience in major doctrine projects.  Both publications were likely to 
have profound changes on the U.S. Army; both were likely to run into internal 
opposition and ran the risk of failing to achieve Downie’s sustained consensus, not least 
in the case of FM 3-24 because the approach it developed was very likely to be at odds 
with the approach being followed in Iraq.  AirLand Battle and FM 3-24 both required 
high-level sponsorship to break through any institutional reticence.  Like AirLand 
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 Battle, FM 3-24 was written to meet the U.S. Army’s immediate and pressing needs.  
Like Gen. Starry and the development of AirLand Battle, Gen. Petraeus took charge of 
the counterinsurgency project when he took command of CAC; like Starry, he brought his 
considerable experience and understanding of insurgency and counterinsurgency from two 
tours in Iraq, where he commanded the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) throughout 
the first year of Operation Iraqi Freedom and then MNSTC-I between June 2004 and 
September 2005.  Like Wass de Czege and Holder, Crane and his writing team started by 
conducting a thorough review of the main doctrine, the history and the classic theories.123  
Like Starry, Petraeus read every chapter and every revision and it was at his insistence that 
the emerging doctrine was tested by as wide a range of interested parties as possible.124  
The result was the same: FM 3-24 had as profound an effect on today’s U.S. Army as 
AirLand Battle had in the 1980s.
7.2.5 Overview of FM 3‐24 
The introduction to FM 3-24 explains the intention of establishing a counterinsurgency 
doctrine, based on lessons learned from past campaigns and contemporary operations.  
As has been demonstrated, it was a development of the existing interim doctrine (FMi 
3-07.22) and that doctrine had been developed since 2005.  Both in the introduction and 
the preface, written jointly by Petraeus and Mattis, there is a clear sense of wanting to 
put right the neglect the U.S. Army had shown counterinsurgency:   
Counterinsurgency operations generally have been neglected in broader 
American military doctrine and national security policies since the end of the 
Vietnam War over 30 years ago. This manual is designed to reverse that trend. It 
is also designed to merge traditional approaches to COIN with the realities of a 
new international arena shaped by technological advances, globalization, and the 
spread of extremist ideologies—some of them claiming the authority of a 
religious faith.125
Crane introduced the February 2006 conference at Fort Leavenworth by explaining that 
the purpose of the work was to make up for what had been recognised, painfully, as 
thirty years of institutional disregard of counterinsurgency doctrine.  In order to 
overcome this, the project intended to build understanding from scratch in order that the 
doctrine would provide useful guidance for commanders, their staff and troops on the 
ground.  Crane handed out small, polished pieces of fossilised dinosaur dung to the 
attendees as a warning; he did not want “a new polishing of old crap.”126   
The manual follows a conventional format, similar to its British counterpart, and begins 
with a description of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, with the first chapter 
explaining the principles of successful counterinsurgency operations and introducing 
contemporary imperatives and paradoxes.  Chapter 2 describes the characteristics, 
objectives and methods of the non-military organizations commonly involved in 
counterinsurgency operations and principles for integrating military and civilian 
activities.  Chapter 3 addresses aspects of intelligence specific to counterinsurgency 
operations, while the next two chapters discuss the design and execution of those 
operations, including Clear-Hold-Build.  Chapter 6 covers the development of host-
nation security forces, acknowledged as an essential aspect of successful 
counterinsurgency operations.  Chapter 7 covers leadership and the ethical dimensions 
of counterinsurgency and the final chapter describes sustainment operations. The 
appendices cover factors to consider during the planning, preparation, execution, and 
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 assessment of a counterinsurgency operation, two appendices on intelligence, Appendix 
D covers further legal issues and Appendix E describes the role of air power.  It is a 
comprehensive book. 
From the outset, FM 3-24 was intended to be applicable to counterinsurgency in general 
and not to be specific to Iraq and Afghanistan.  The model was built essentially on 
counterinsurgency designed to defeat a Maoist-style insurgency but in putting the 
doctrine together, the writing team examined a great number of campaigns to test the 
validity of the central themes they had identified.  Just as FM 90-8 had attempted to 
introduce the key tenets of AirLand Battle into counterinsurgency doctrine (albeit 
couched as counterguerrilla doctrine), so FM 3-24 based its general approach on the 
Offensive-Defensive-Stability Operations balance that characterise conventional 
operations.  The result, in Clinton Ancker’s view, is a doctrine which is compatible with 
the main ideas of Stability Operations.  There is an obvious logic to this:  stability and 
security must go hand in hand if a vacuum of power or effective governance is to be 
avoided in post-conflict operations or in the specifics of countering insurgency.127
7.2.6 The Campaign Planning Framework 
FM 3-24 presents an operational framework which centres on securing the population 
rather than seeking out and destroying insurgents.  The population is therefore central to 
the approach U.S. counterinsurgency was to follow.  By securing and controlling the 
population, it argues, insurgents can be isolated from the people they seek to control, 
they will lose the initiative and this will force them to react in ways the counterinsurgent 
can exploit.  Such an approach, redolent of the Ink Spot method, requires the 
counterinsurgent to understand why the insurgency exists in the first place, and to 
recognise that the solution will require a broad range of responses, not simply military.  
Thus Clear-Hold-Build operations were part of a broad, multi-faceted response from 
“joint, interagency, multinational, and [Host Nation] forces toward a common 
purpose.”128
Just as FM 100-5 integrated joint operations into a conventional warfighting campaign, 
FM 3-24 sought to integrate military operations “into a comprehensive strategy 
employing all instruments of national power.”129  Chapter 2 explained how to integrate 
civilian and military activities, and Chapter 4 explained a new method of campaign 
design which used logical lines of operation (LLO) to create a framework for 
interagency planning and co-ordination.  LLOs were a planning tool used “to visualize, 
describe, and direct operations when positional reference to enemy forces has little 
relevance.”130  They helped articulate how individual operations were inter-related to 
achieving the campaign’s overall objectives: 
Guided by the campaign’s purpose, commanders articulate an operational logic 
for the campaign that expresses in clear, concise, conceptual language a broad 
vision of what they plan to accomplish. The operational logic is the 
commander’s assessment of the problem and approach toward solving it. 
Commanders express it as the commander’s intent. Ideally, the operational logic 
is expressed clearly and simply but in comprehensive terms, such as what the 
commander envisions achieving with various components or particular LLOs. 
This short statement of the operational logic helps subordinate commanders and 
planners, as well as members of other agencies and organizations, see the 
campaign’s direction. It provides a unifying theme for interagency planning.131
228 
 
 To design such a plan, FM 3-24 modified conventional U.S. military planning, 
introducing an iterative planning process.  This started with a diagnosis of the problem, 
and a dialogue to further develop understanding of the social, political, economic, and 
cultural conditions which affected the situation.  Once the character of the problem was 
understood, the campaign plan could then be designed.  Implementing the plan then 
presented opportunities to learn, to achieve a greater understanding of the problem, and 
to allow modifications to be made.  The process of diagnosis, dialogue, design, and 
learning would then be repeated.  The process is illustrated in Figure 5 below.   
 
Figure 4 - Iterative Counterinsurgency Campaign Design 
Source:  FM 3-24, p. 4-5. 
Petraeus was particularly struck by the logical way the iterative approach allowed 
further development and adaptation and adopted it in Iraq.132  FM 3-24 also offered 
illustrative LLOs which Petraeus would develop in his revision of the MNF-I Joint 
Campaign Plan in April 2007:  conduct information operations, conduct combat 
operations/civil security operations, train and employ the host nation’s security forces, 
establish or restore essential services, support development of better governance, and 
support economic development. 
7.2.7 The Central Operational Framework:  Clear‐Hold‐Build 
FM 3-24’s central operational framework was Clear-Hold-Build, the intention of which 
was to take control of an insurgent area, re-establish government control and create 
what Petraeus would describe as ‘the political space’ for resolution.  FM 3-24 defined it 
as follows: 
A clear-hold-build operation is executed in a specific, high-priority area 
experiencing overt insurgent operations. It has the following objectives: create a 
secure physical and psychological environment; establish firm government 
control of the populace and area; gain the populace’s support.133
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 The November 2004 edition of FMi 3-07.22 had already introduced the Clear and Hold, 
paraphrasing much of Galula’s eight-step method.  FM 3-24 built on both and included 
more recent experience form Iraq and academic thinking to develop the Clear-Hold-
Build approach, itself an example of learning and adaptation.  Horvath identified four 
particular influences which helped develop the concept further:  McMaster’s operation 
at Tal Afar in 2005, Krepinevich’s paper How to Win in Iraq, published in October 
2005, Col. Sean MacFarland’s 1st ‘Ready First’ Brigade operation in Ramadi in the 
summer 2006, and a prize-winning article published in Military Review in July 2006.134  
Krepinevich later cited Tal Afar and Ramadi as evidence that the U.S. was making at 
least some progress in the campaign.135   
7.2.8 McMaster at Tal Afar 
In many ways the catalyst was provided by McMaster’s operations in Tal Afar in 
Nineweh province with 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (3 ACR), between August 2005 
and May 2006.  As early as October 2005, 3 ACR’s operation was being held up as an 
exemplar.136  McMaster believed that “one of the responsibilities of professional 
officers is to ... prepare yourself and your organization for combat through the study of 
history, because it’s very difficult before a war to understand completely the demands of 
that war.”137  It was a view entirely in keeping with Kitson’s view of education and 
training.  3 ACR’s pre-deployment training emphasized cultural awareness and Arabic 
language skills: 
One out of every 10 soldiers received a three-week course in conversational 
Arabic, so that each small unit would have someone capable of basic exchanges 
with Iraqis. McMaster... distributed a lengthy reading list to his officers that 
included studies of Arab and Iraqi history and most of the classic texts on 
counterinsurgency. He also quietly relieved one battalion commander who 
didn’t seem to understand that such changes were necessary.138
By mid-2005, Tal Afar had become a significant insurgent problem and a major staging 
area into Iraq for foreign fighters but McMaster did not move into the city straight 
away.  Instead, he took time to learn about the social and political situation in the area, 
and to isolate the city before taking control of it.  His operations on the Syrian border 
disrupted insurgent movements into and out of Tal Afar, and a preliminary clear and 
hold operation in a nearby town helped McMaster to refine his plan, gain the confidence 
of MNC-I, and secure the additional forces and equipment needed to build a berm (sand 
embankment) around the entire city.139  By the time 3 ACR launched its clearance 
operation, much of the city’s population had moved into a specially built camp outside 
the berm, and many insurgents were detained as they tried to leave the city.  
McMaster’s operation to clear Tal Afar was a carefully controlled, sequenced operation, 
not a rapid advance which might have been expected.  Having cleared the city, 3 ACR 
then built twenty-nine patrol bases to dominate all the main routes, recruited 1400 
police and started civil development projects.140   
McMaster’s operation and the results it obtained were noted by senior policy makers 
and commanders.141  In October 2005 and influenced by what had happened in Tal 
Afar, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice used Clear-Hold-Build to explain U.S. 
strategy in Iraq: 
Clear the toughest places ... Hold and steadily enlarge the secure areas, 
integrating political and economic outreach with our military operations... Build 
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 truly national institutions... [to] sustain security forces, bring rule of law, visibly 
deliver essential services, and offer the Iraqi people hope for a better economic 
future.142
A month later it became a central theme in the White House’s National Strategy for 
Victory in Iraq, published on 30 November 2005.  The new strategy set Clear, Hold, 
Build as the centrepiece of security operations in Iraq: 
Objective: To develop the Iraqis’ capacity to secure their country while carrying 
out a campaign to defeat the terrorists and neutralize the insurgency.  
–To achieve this objective, we are helping the Iraqi government: Clear areas of 
enemy control by remaining on the offensive, killing and capturing enemy 
fighters and denying them safe-haven. 
Hold areas freed from enemy control by ensuring that they remain under the 
control of a peaceful Iraqi government with an adequate Iraqi security force 
presence. 
Build Iraqi Security Forces and the capacity of local institutions to deliver 
services, advance the rule of law, and nurture civil society.143
The authors of  FM 3-24 reflected the thinking behind these policy developments and 
cited the operation in Tal Afar as an example of best practice.144
7.2.9  “How to Win in Iraq” 
As the impact of McMaster’s operation became more widely known, Krepinevich 
published How to Win in Iraq.  In it, he called for a radically new approach to the 
conduct of the war in Iraq, albeit that the approach he suggested was a return to classical 
counterinsurgency.145  Krepinevich argued that the U.S. campaign had not and could 
not defeat the insurgencies it faced because it did not secure the Iraqi population. The 
population, he concluded, was one of the three centres of gravity – the American 
people, and the American soldier were the others –   and, to be true to U.S. doctrine, this 
meant it had to be secured.  He argued that the oil-spot strategy as the ‘way to win’: 
The oil-spot strategy, in contrast [to search-and-destroy operations], focuses on 
establishing security for the population precisely for the sake of winning hearts 
and minds. In the 1950s, the British used it successfully in Malaya, as did the 
Filipinos against the Huk insurgents. Given the centers of gravity and the limits 
of U.S. forces in Iraq, an oil-spot approach – in which operations would be 
oriented around securing the population and then gradually but inexorably 
expanded to increase control over contested areas – could work. 
Krepinevich recalls how his paper became for a short time in late-2005 the focus for 
discussion in Washington, because it made the argument that there was “no clear, 
coherent, understandable strategy in Iraq at this point in time. But here [was] a strategy 
[the oil spot] that I [thought would give] the best chance for success.”146  Krepinevich’s 
recommendation was noted by Nagl and Horvath and it reinforced their thinking.147
7.2.10 The ‘Ready First’ in Ramadi – June 2006‐May 2007 
As work on FM 3-24 continued into summer 2006, another operation demonstrated the 
value of the Clear-Hold-Build method.  In June 2006, as Operation Together Forward 
faltered in Baghdad, Col. Sean MacFarland and 1st ‘Ready First’ Brigade, 1st Armored 
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 Division arrived in Ramadi.  What McFarland achieved there was as significant as 
McMaster in Tal Afar.  When ‘Ready First’ arrived in Ramadi, Anbar province’s 
capital, attacks averaged over thirty per day.  Less than one hundred police out of a total 
of 4,000 were present and few left the safety of their stations.  As in Tal Afar, the 
population expected the Americans to launch a full-scale assault to retake the city, 
similar to that when U.S. Marines retook Fallujah in October 2004.148  Previous units 
had tried to engage with key leaders but twelve sheiks were killed in two weeks by AQI, 
and police recruiting stations were targeted by suicide bombers.  These were symptoms 
of a lack security.149
Instead of launching a conventional clearance operation, MacFarland disregarded the 
theatre strategy of withdrawing to large forward operating bases.  He built FOBs to 
isolate the city then pushed his forces forward into the city to build company combat 
outposts in the worst insurgent areas.  These outposts restricted insurgent movement and 
demonstrated willingness to confront AQI in its sanctuary.  The outposts were a 
demonstrable sign that McFarland wanted to wrest the city from insurgent control and 
that he was prepared to stay and fight.  He then engaged with those tribal leaders who 
remained, offering protection and economic development in exchange for police recruits 
to clear the city.  They provided over 4,000 recruits during the following six months to 
police the city. 
MacFarland followed his concept of clear, hold, and build, building more combat 
outposts to further limit insurgent freedom of movement, and he used an information 
operations campaign to further discredit AQI in the eyes of the people.  Intelligence 
provided by the allied tribes led to raids which further demoralized AQI.  The Iraqi 
Army and U.S. forces took control of the city’s large hospital, freeing access to medical 
care.  Micro- and macro-economic development projects started in co-operative areas, 
providing much needed local jobs and alternative, legitimate sources of income for the 
population.   Sensing diminishing support and legitimacy among the population, AQI 
attempted to retaliate against co-operating tribes through a murder and intimidation 
campaign.  The ‘Ready First’ provided the tribes with air and artillery support and 
troops to defend against insurgent attacks when required.  This demonstration of unity 
solidified the tribal rebellion, which expanded exponentially.150  
Police recruits were used to hold cleared areas, and they allowed MacFarland to expand 
his operation to clear the remaining insurgent areas.  He also established a leadership 
academy to develop local forces’ ability to conduct counterinsurgency operations.   
Soldiers and local security forces lived and worked together in joint security stations 
throughout the city.  The tribal councils selected mayors and local leaders to rebuild the 
human infrastructure of the city.  By February 2007, violence decreased by nearly 
seventy per cent, and by summer 2007 attacks practically ceased in Ramadi.  The 
‘Awakening’ spread quickly from Ramadi to the rest of Anbar, changing the course of 
the Iraq war.151  MacFarland’s approach confirmed what the authors of FM 3-24 had 
concluded, that Clear-Hold-Build was an effective and appropriate approach to 
develop.152
7.2.11 ‘Producing Victory’ 
The final influence on Clear-Hold-Build was Lt. Col. Douglas Ollivant’s paper 
Producing Victory, in which he distilled his experience in Iraq in 2004 to present a 
simple thesis: “The combined arms maneuver battalion, partnering with indigenous 
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 security forces and living among the population it secures, should be the basic tactical 
unit of counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare.”153  Ollivant argued that responsibility for 
operations should be disaggregated to battalion level, rather than brigade or division, 
and that companies and platoons should live and work among the population not operate 
out of large bases.  He emphasized the importance of tactical intelligence, particularly 
HUMINT, the need to train and build local forces, the vital role of civil-military 
operations and economic reconstruction, and the need to foster political institutions 
even at the lowest level.  Although all these themes were being followed in Iraq, they 
were not integrated effectively enough to make the progress necessary in security and 
political terms: 
As the institutional Army gradually recognizes the importance of full-spectrum 
operations, maneuver commanders will realize the need to integrate kinetic and 
non-kinetic targeting. Community relations are the main effort of the entire 
counterinsurgent force, not just a specialized unit.154
Ollivant’s approach was founded on five lessons from Galula:  successful COIN 
operations require assistance from the community; a static unit with responsibility for a 
specific area of responsibility is preferable to a mobile unit moving from area to area; 
no one approach can defeat an insurgency; the principle of unity of command is even 
more important in COIN than it is in conventional warfare; and effective COIN requires 
a grid of embedded units.155  The article won the CAC Commanding General’s Special 
Topic Writing Competition, judged by Crane, Horvath, Marks, Nagl, and Sepp, and 
Petraeus contacted Ollivant directly, who was by summer 2006 the divisional planner in 
Baghdad, to find out how the ideas outlined in the essay were working in the field.156  
Ollivant’s ideas and the logic supporting them were incorporated into the developing 
doctrine and later evident in MNF-I’s Counterinsurgency Guidance, published in July 
2007 as the Surge got under way. 
7.2.12 Learn and Adapt  
The second important development introduced by FM 3-24 is that of learning and 
adapting.  John Nagl was instrumental in developing this, drawing on and incorporating 
the main themes of his doctoral thesis.  As a Rhodes Scholar, Nagl examined how 
armies adapted to changing circumstances during the course of a campaign for which 
they were initially unprepared.  Comparing the experience of the British Army in 
Malaya with the U.S. Army in Vietnam, Nagl concluded that in order to succeed in 
counterinsurgency – to be seen as hard, slow, dirty, protracted campaigns not suited to 
rapid victories – an army must adapt to the changing circumstances.  In particular, Nagl 
posed five questions as a way of determining whether an army had the ability to learn 
and adapt: 
1) Does the Army promote suggestions from the field? 
2) Are subordinates encouraged to question superiors and policies? 
3) Does the organization encourage theoretical thinking about the problems it 
faces? 
4) Are doctrine and training centres developed locally in response to local 
conditions? 
5) Is the high command assisted by a small, responsive staff or isolated by a 
233 
 
 large, unresponsive one?157
Nagl concluded, like Downie before him, that, against the criteria he identified, the U.S. 
Army did not have the culture and attitude of mind to respond to changed 
circumstances; “The culture of the American army does not, unless the changed 
situation falls within the parameters of the kind of war it has defined in its primary 
mission.”158  Nagl’s findings go some way to explain the failure of FM 90-8. 
Nagl’s thesis was republished by University of Chicago Press in 2005 as the U.S. Army 
sought to adjust to Iraq.  Gen. Peter Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army, wrote the 
foreword, and encouraged its readers to develop a spirit of innovation, to learn lessons 
and to integrate those lessons quickly.  As one of the contemporary imperatives of 
counterinsurgency, learning and adaptation is a theme which runs through FM 3-24.  
Metz describes insurgency and counterinsurgency as “a deadly learning contest between 
insurgent and counterinsurgent,”159 and this comes through clearly in the Learn and 
Adapt imperative: 
An effective counterinsurgent force is a learning organization. Insurgents 
constantly shift between military and political phases and tactics. In addition, 
networked insurgents constantly exchange information about their enemy’s 
vulnerabilities—even with insurgents in distant theaters. However, skilful 
counterinsurgents can adapt at least as fast as insurgents. Every unit needs to be 
able to make observations, draw and apply lessons, and assess results. 
Commanders must develop an effective system to circulate best practices 
throughout their command. Combatant commanders might also need to seek 
new laws or policies that authorize or resource necessary changes. Insurgents 
shift their AOs looking for weak links, so widespread competence is required 
throughout the counterinsurgent force.160
7.2.13 Sepp’s “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency” 
In October 2005, Casey commissioned Sepp and Hix to analyze the campaign.  Their 
findings showed that the U.S. Army in Iraq found the conditions laid out in FMi 3-07.22 
(secure the populace, establish local political institutions, reinforce local governments, 
neutralize insurgent capabilities, create an information flow from local sources) difficult 
to meet.  In autumn 2004, Casey asked Sepp, who was working in HQ MNF-I in the 
Strategy, Plans and Assessments division, to determine what constituted best practices 
in counterinsurgency to assist in the development of the campaign plan.  Sepp, who had 
taught insurgency at West Point and American small wars history at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, took thirty-six hours to produce a report 
which identified the best and worst practices from fifty-three historical campaigns.  The 
table which summarized his report, reproduced in Table 7 (over), was included in the 
campaign plan, and used by Sepp and a colleague from MNF-I (Col. Tom Hix) to 
conduct a theatre-wide appraisal of how brigades were performing across the 
country.161  Sepp recalls, “It was, at the time, actually a mixed assessment and reflected 
the different way that commanders at the lower levels understood the war. The most 
successful of them were the lieutenants and captains. They came in with the fewest 
prejudices and the most creativity in how they were going to deal with the war.”162   
Sepp concluded that the U.S. Army’s performance in counterinsurgency in Iraq was 
inconsistent.  As late as 2007, he noted “unsettling signs that the US Army’s adaptation 
to small wars is uneven.”163 He highlights the example of an airborne regiment 
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 operating with a shoot-to-kill policy – “The colonel commanding the regiment had 
sternly declared, ‘The Rakkasans don’t do warning shots’”164 - ‘exclusion zones’, and 
‘kill zones’ at the same time as McMaster was in Tal Afar.  Sepp offers U.S. political 
and military fixation on large-scale conventional war as a major contributory factor.  An 
army focussed on overwhelming firepower, speed and mass was likely to ignore the 
context of the conflict and treat all wars the same.  This was the ‘Army Concept’ again.   
Successful Unsuccessful 
Emphasis is placed on developing intelligence Military direction has primacy 
Attention is focused on the population, its needs, 
and its security 
The priority is to “kill or capture” the enemy, not 
on gaining the support of and securing the 
population 
Secure areas are established, and then expanded Large battalion-sized operations are the norm 
rather than company or small-scale operations 
Insurgents are isolated from the population 
(population control) 
Military units are concentrated on large bases for 
protection and administration 
There is a single campaign authority Special Forces operations are focused on killing 
and capturing insurgents 
Effective, pervasive psychological operations 
campaign supports the lines of operation 
Ensuring the right sort of people are appointed to 
MiTTs and advisory teams is a low priority in 
personnel assignment 
Amnesty and rehabilitation are offered to 
insurgents 
Peacetime government processes continue as 
normal 
The police leads; the military supports Borders, airspace, coastlines are not controlled 
Police forces are expanded, diversified and 
professionalized 
 
Conventional military forces adapt and re-
organize for counterinsurgency 
 
Special Forces advisers are embedded with host 
country forces 
 
Building, training and mentoring host nation 
forces is a priority 
 
Table 7 - Successful and Unsuccessful Counterinsurgency Practices 
Source:  Kalev I. Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency”, Military Review, May/June 2005, p. 10 
The uneven approach Sepp identified was one of the principal reasons why Casey gave 
orders in September 2004 to establish an academy, the COIN Centre for Excellence at 
Taji, with a view to it teaching FMi 3-07.22, and for it to be the focal point in Iraq for 
the collection, analysis and dissemination of lessons and best practice. He wanted to 
standardize the approach in-coming brigades took to counterinsurgency operations.  
Sepp recalls that,  
Hix ... proposed this to Gen. Casey, and Gen. Casey, constantly after that, 
referred to it as the Hix Academy, and then finally gave the order, after our 
report ... included that specific recommendation that Bill had generated, to 
establish a counterinsurgency, or COIN, academy. Gen. Casey received the 
report at the end of August; he gave the order to establish the academy in 
September; in October it was set up with the cadre formed, and the first units 
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 began to attend.165
The COIN CFE mirrored the British Jungle Warfare School in Malaya, which was set 
up to standardize training and tactics and to ensure best practice was shared.  The 
problem for the U.S. Army, until FM 3-24 was published and the Petraeus reforms of 
education and training started to take effect, the broken link between its approach and 
the tenets of FM 90-8 were painfully evident.  While the tenets of the doctrine it 
contained, just like Counter Insurgency Operations, may have been entirely valid, the 
issue for the U.S. Army in Iraq was that its FM 90-8 and the approach it laid out had not 
shaped any common understanding of counterinsurgency. 
7.3 Section III – Putting Doctrine into Practice:  the New 
Doctrine and the Surge 
7.3.1 The Conflict’s Character and Its Evolution 
The invasion of Iraq in March 2003 collapsed the Iraqi state and overturned its political 
structure by taking control from the Sunni minority and giving it to the Shi’a majority.   
One immediate effect of this was a primarily Sunni insurgency to which the Coalition 
responded and largely contained despite facing an adaptive adversary, even when AQI 
materialized.  Iraq’s collapse as a state produced sectarian conflict which, by 2006, 
threatened to undo the fragile progress made since 2003 to rebuild the country, and 
which AQI attempted to explode into civil war to exacerbate the political and military 
problems faced by Iraq and its coalition partners.  MNF-I’s slowness to recognise the 
deepening communal power struggle took the campaign close to failure.166  Cordesman 
concluded in 2006 that the U.S. was “slow to see that the emergence of civil violence, 
and sectarian and ethnic conflict, was becoming at least as serious a threat as the Sunni 
insurgency.”167
For the first three years, MNF-I characterised the conflict in Iraq as a war against the 
Sunni insurgency which was resisting the Coalition’s presence and its attempts to 
instate a new democratically based political order, and hoped to return the Sunnis to 
power.  The result was that the U.S. Army and the USMC quickly found themselves 
involved in an unfamiliar form of warfare in which, as counterinsurgency theory makes 
clear, U.S. military prowess alone could not produce a stable Iraq.  By 2006, the legacy 
of the Hussein regime and the prolonged failure of the Iraqi state to exercise any form of 
effective government caused a strategic shift in circumstances which had been obscured 
by the U.S. efforts which focussed on the Sunni insurgency and AQI.  The nature of the 
conflict had changed.   
Iraq’s disintegration as a state, and the emergence of militant groups to fill the power 
vacuum, had profound implications for Iraq politically and the likelihood of MNF-I 
achieving success.  Without a strong, responsive and effective government, the militant 
ethno-sectarian factions used violence and subversion to oppress and intimidate sections 
of the population.  It was eventually recognized by MNF-I as a ‘zero-sum game’, where 
factions fought to secure their political and economic power:  “a struggle for the 
division of power and resources among and within ethnic and sectarian 
communities.”168  In response, the Iraqi population returned to its foundations of tribe, 
sect or ethnic group and society, polarised under the Ba’athist regime, fractured along 
ethnic and sectarian lines.   
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 By mid-2006, it was clear that the Coalition’s focus on supporting the elected GOI and 
defeating the Sunni insurgents and AQI was adding to the problem rather than solving 
it.  The approach was clear and unequivocal but it was “rushing to failure.”169  
Supporting the Shi’a-led government only fuelled continued violence from and 
disengagement by the Sunni minority.  In turn, the Shi’a government was unable to 
provide basic services, to lead the counterinsurgency effort and to make any serious 
steps to reconcile the country politically.  Several destabilising forces emerged to 
disrupt and frustrate Iraq’s stabilisation and development: “the insurgencies; communal 
power struggles; weak and divided institutions; destabilising aims and fears of the 
participants and regional interference which verged on being a foreign-fuelled proxy 
war.”170
On 15 December, Petraeus published FM 3-24.  Five days later, President Bush 
admitted publically for the first time that the campaign in Iraq was struggling.171  His 
views reflected those of an internal MNF-I assessment which concluded, “we are failing 
to achieve our objectives in economic development, governance, communicating and 
the security lines of operation.”172  The prerequisite to success, the MNF-I report 
identified “will be protecting the Iraqi population from the violence spurred on by AQI 
and extremist organizations such as JAM.”  The key to making political progress was to 
reduce sectarian violence.  This meant having to “retain the cleared areas to guarantee a 
sustained security,” which in turn meant there was “a need for and a mission for a surge 
of forces.”173   
7.3.2 The Surge 
The story of the Surge is highly relevant to this thesis because the arguments for it are 
founded on the guidance FM 3-24 provided,174 and it returned U.S. strategic thinking 
and policy to classical counterinsurgency theory, which was at odds with the apparent 
and pressing logic to withdraw U.S. forces out of Iraq as quickly as possible.  During 
the summer of 2006, a small group of military officers, some serving and some retired, 
and strategists concluded that the U.S. policy of Transition in Iraq was flawed and that 
force reductions, while politically and generally attractive in terms of reducing the 
casualty rate, were adding to the problem not solving it.  The principal protagonists 
were Gen. (Retired) Keane, Fred Kagan, a former West Point history professor who 
worked at the American Enterprise Institute, and the then Maj. Gen. Ray Odierno, who 
had been selected to take command of MNC-I in early December 2006.  Keane’s role 
was particularly important because he used his position as an influential, credible retired 
officer to challenge the accepted view of U.S. policy with its leading proponents in the 
Department of Defense.  He argued with them persuasively enough to prompt an 
internal analysis of the concept of a surge, and this, in turn, gave him the opportunity to 
influence President Bush personally.175   
In early December 2006, Keane and Kagan presented their case at the Pentagon and 
then to the President.  They argued that the campaign in Iraq, which was vital to U.S. 
security, was at a critical point, the approach to eliminate the insurgency by political 
reconciliation and accommodation had failed, and widespread sectarian violence 
threatened the whole campaign.  Focussing on Baghdad, which they identified as the 
decisive point, they argued that, through a quick, decisive change in U.S. policy, 
security and stability could be restored.  The essence of their proposal was: 
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 We must balance our focus on training Iraqi soldiers with a determined effort to 
secure the Iraqi population and contain the rising violence. Securing the 
population has never been the primary mission of the U.S. military effort in Iraq, 
and now it must become the first priority. 
• We must send more American combat forces into Iraq and especially 
into Baghdad to support this operation ... to support clear-and-hold 
operations ... sufficient to improve security and set conditions for economic 
development, political development, reconciliation, and the development of 
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to provide permanent security. 
• American forces, partnered with Iraqi units, will clear high-violence 
Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shi’a neighborhoods, primarily on the west side of 
the city. 
• After those neighborhoods are cleared, U.S. soldiers and Marines, again 
partnered with Iraqis, will remain behind to maintain security, reconstitute 
police forces, and integrate police and Iraqi Army efforts to maintain the 
population’s security. 
• As security is established, reconstruction aid will help to re-establish 
normal life, bolster employment, and, working through Iraqi officials, 
strengthen Iraqi local government. 
• Securing the population strengthens the ability of Iraq’s central 
government to exercise its sovereign powers.176 
Five days after Keane, Kagan et al briefed President Bush, he announced his intentions:  
“I’m inclined to believe that we do need to increase our troops,” he said. “And I talked 
about this to Secretary [of Defense] Gates, and he is going to spend some time talking to 
the folks in the building, come back with a recommendation to me about how to 
proceed forward on this idea.”177  In January 2007, the White House published its new 
strategy for Iraq, The New Way Forward.178
7.3.3 Appointing Petraeus and Revising the Joint Campaign Plan 
With the doctrine published and planning for the Surge underway, hints that Gen. 
Petraeus would take over from Gen. Casey in Baghdad emerged in early January 
2007.179  Rumours about this had been circulating in military circles for nearly a 
year,180 and they were substantiated when Petraeus was confirmed by the Senate Armed 
Services Committee on 23 January.181  During his confirmation hearing, Petraeus 
affirmed that “making security of the population, particularly in Baghdad, and in 
partnership with Iraqi forces, [was to be] the focus of the military effort.”182  On 10 
February 2007 Petraeus took command of MNF-I.   
In March 2007, Petraeus issued initial guidance to his staff in Baghdad based on the 
findings of a review he commissioned when he arrived.  The Joint Strategic Assessment 
Team (JSAT), a multi-disciplinary team of experts which included H. R. McMaster, 
identified the fundamental changes to the threat and the operational situation since the 
last major review in 2006 and provided three sets of findings.  First, it concluded that 
success would not be possible without accommodation and reconciliation among the 
competing sects, factions and parties, which meant that the political line of operation 
had to be the main effort.  Second, it identified that conflicting factors had resulted in 
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 slower progress than previously expected:  the increasing application of Iraqi 
sovereignty, which increasingly hampered U.S. political freedom in Iraq; reducing 
support for the Coalition presence; and slow development of Iraqi ministerial capacity, 
largely as a result of sectarianism and corruption.  Finally, it identified the key tasks the 
campaign needed to implement:  protect the Iraqi population from criminal and 
extremist organizations; break the cycle of sectarian violence; establish representative 
and responsive government; ensure effective application of the Rule of Law; and create 
sustained economic development.  All these tasks were, as might be expected, entirely 
congruent with FM 3-24 and classical counterinsurgency theory. 
Casey ordered MNF-I’s first joint campaign plan (JCP) to be written over the summer 
of 2004 and it was published that August.  Thereafter, at six-month intervals, the 
direction the plan gave and progress the campaign had made against it were reviewed 
and adjusted by the MNF-I Combined Assessment and Strategy Board.183  From the 
start, the JCP followed four broad lines of operation: security, governance, economic 
development and essential services. These were reflected in the corps and divisional 
plans and mirrored, eventually, in FM 3-24, albeit in the Chiarelli mould.  Following the 
March 2007 review, Petraeus concluded that the original thrust of JCP 2006 remained 
broadly relevant but short- to mid-term objectives had become disconnected and this 
was likely to prevent long-term plans from being achieved.184  The JSAT and staff from 
MNF-I and the U.S. Embassy then re-wrote the JCP to provide a plan which linked the 
creation of short-term, localized security across Iraq, through sustainable, Iraq-led 
security in the mid-term, to longer-term Iraqi national reconciliation and development.  
As such, Petraeus’ first campaign plan was not a revolutionary change but it introduced 
new themes.   
The first theme, in line with FM 3-24, was the central importance of the political line of 
operation (LOO).  Military operations were to focus on protecting the population, which 
became the campaign’s centre of gravity, shifting under Petraeus’s direction from 
maintaining support within the Coalition to securing the broad support of the Iraqi 
people for the GOI.  This would require security to be established locally, what MNF-I 
defined as “sufficient protection against hostile acts to enable effective civic and civil 
life.”185
All other LOOs were to be focussed toward the end of established legitimate national 
and regional governance.  Second, the JCP placed renewed emphasis on regional 
diplomatic initiatives designed to secure an international and regional environment in 
which Iraq could flourish.  Third, it introduced major cross-cutting initiatives to engage 
with disenfranchised but reconcilable actors – principally Sunni –  to move them away 
from violence and to reintegrate them into Iraqi political, economic and social 
development.  Finally, actions had to take place in partnership with the Government of 
Iraq and the “transition of security responsibility had to take place at a responsible rate 
based on conditions and the GOI’s capacity.”186  These themes were reflected in a 
revised mission, developed personally by Petraeus in discussion with President Bush: 
The coalition, in partnership with the government of Iraq, employs integrated 
political, security, economic and diplomatic means, to help the people of Iraq 
achieve sustainable security by the summer of 2009.187   
In parallel with the effect FM 3-24 was to have on the U.S. Army’s training and 
education, the 2007 MNF-I JCP was a crucial step forward in terms of the considerable 
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 collaborative civilian and military effort made in Baghdad to develop it.  The planning 
process, although ostensibly military, and not readily embraced by the State Department 
staff, drew a wide range of ideas together, and the planning process started to shape the 
behaviour of all the agencies involved.188
7.3.4 The Baghdad Security Plan 
On 15 June 2007, Iraqi Security Forces supported by the 30,000 U.S. reinforcements 
made available by the Surge, launched the Baghdad Security Plan.  Its objectives were 
to secure Baghdad and to clear what were referred to as insurgent ‘belts’ surrounding 
the city.  The overall intention was to secure the population and to take control of 
Baghdad.  Lt. Gen. Odierno’s plan pre-dated the announcement of the Surge by a month 
or so,189 but it was designed explicitly to make use of the surge troops to secure the 
population.190  By November 2007, the operation’s results were apparent and that albeit 
fragile security, which had been so lacking in Iraq since the invasion of 2003, had 
returned to Baghdad:   
There has been striking success in the past few months in the attempt to improve 
security, defeat al-Qaeda sympathisers and create the political conditions in 
which a settlement between the Shi’a and the Sunni communities can be 
reached. This has not been an accident but the consequence of a strategy 
overseen by General David Petraeus in the past several months. While 
summarised by the single word “surge” his efforts have not just been about 
putting more troops on the ground but also employing them in a more 
sophisticated manner.191
David Kilcullen, a retired Australian Lieutenant Colonel and author of the thesis 
Countering Global Insurgency,192 was one of General David Petraeus’ 
counterinsurgency advisors in Baghdad and one of the operation’s architects.  Kilcullen 
considered that the operation was qualitatively different from any operation in Iraq over 
the previous four years.193  While a number of factors contributed to the much improved 
security situation – the Sunni ‘Awakening’, the increased U.S. troop numbers, a much 
increased ISF presence and capability, and Moqtada al Sadr’s cessation of hostilities – 
for the U.S. military, having a doctrine was an important factor.194
Odierno’s plan embodied FM 3-24 but adapted Clear-Hold-Build into a concept of 
operations of Clear-Control-Retain.  In an army which built its approach on doctrinal 
uniformity, the MNC-I variation from what was fast becoming the common 
terminology was unusual. There was a rational explanation:  the doctrine had only just 
been published and, as Col. John Murray (Odierno’s planner) notes, the corps planners 
believed that using a commonly understood terminology was important: 
Clear/Control/Retain was an attempt to put US ‘doctrinal’ terms against the 
problem.  At the MNC-I level we all pretty much understood what 
Clear/Hold/Build meant but they were not terms that were found in our doctrine 
– something a Soldier could look at in a manual and understand.  Clear, Control 
and Retain are all specific doctrinal terms with specific meanings.  Of course, it 
does not include things like reconciliation, reconstruction, economic 
development, etc. – those were added later.  In many ways it was not much 
different than Clear/Hold/Build, at least not in the effect we were attempting to 
accomplish.195
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 The MNC-I plan focused on securing the people where they lived; operations would be 
intelligence- and Iraqi Government-led; areas were to be cleared of insurgents and then 
held and secured by Iraqi and Coalition forces at the same time as political and 
economic development programmes got underway.  Iraqi and Coalition forces were to 
establish “localized contacts, collect excess weapons, and use human intelligence to 
detain large numbers of suspected militants.”196  Unlike previous operations, security 
forces were to remain in the areas they had secured and to work to reduce the threat of 
violence and intimidation which sat over so much of Iraq since 2003. 
Ambassador Crocker and Gen. Petraeus reflected the more promising picture in Iraq in 
their testimonies before Congress in April 2008.197  Both emphasized that the progress 
made in Iraq was fragile and reversible, but it was clear from their reports that enough 
progress had been made to allow questions to be asked which had been almost 
unthinkable six months before, when the situation then was so uncertain:  had the 
strategy worked, what exactly would constitute success, and when would America be 
able to leave Iraq?  That these questions could be entertained at all marked a significant 
change in circumstances from the state of denial that existed in the two years or so after 
the invasion of Iraq.   
FM 3-24 provided the doctrinal stimulus for planning and developing tactics appropriate 
for counterinsurgency.  Just as Petraeus drew in experts to form the JSAT, so he and 
Odierno brought in proven counterinsurgency thinkers and practitioners, such as 
Kilcullen and Sky.  Petraeus selected as his executive officer Col. Peter Mansoor who 
had set up the U.S. Army’s Counterinsurgency Center at Fort Leavenworth in 2006 and 
who had been part of the Council of Colonels which analyzed the Surge option in 
November that year.  Their collective influence was evident.  As the Surge brigades 
arrived in Iraq, their command groups went through a five-day package at the COIN 
CFE in Taji, where Kilcullen and Horvath, later supported by Daniel Marston, led 
seminars and gave presentations on counterinsurgency doctrine and best practice from 
across Iraq.  Petraeus gave the closing address to each course and the divisional 
commander and MNC-I principal planning and operational staff presented their concept 
of operations and laid out their expectations in terms of approach.  In June 2007, 
Petraeus published guidance to MNF-I to focus attention on how to secure the 
population: 
As you read, think through, talk about, and ultimately operationalize these 
points, always remember that in this environment, “business as usual” will not 
be good enough.  Complacency will kill us; we must visibly improve security.  
A sense of urgency and good situational awareness will also be critical.  
Troopers on the spot, and their immediate instinctive reactions, will win or lose 
the perception battle at the local level.  Everything we do supports and enables 
this battle of perceptions, locally here in Iraq and also in the global audience.198
He then listed his ten requirements for the conduct of operations.  They are evidence of 
a clear understanding of what constitutes an effective counterinsurgency approach, and 
they provide a clear rationale, if one were needed, as to why the approach in Iraq had to 
change.  The positive, decisive approach Petraeus required MNF-I to adopt – changing 
mindsets, taking the offensive against the insurgents to secure the population, and 
returning to tried and tested counterinsurgency principles – is in stark contrast to that 
adopted at the same time in Basrah.  Petraeus’ guidance is summarized below:  
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 1.  Secure the people where they sleep.  Population security is our primary 
mission.  And achieving population security promises to be an extremely long-
term endeavor – a marathon, not a sprint – so focusing on this mission now is 
essential… This protection must be kept up until the area can be effectively 
garrisoned and controlled by Iraqi police. 
2.  Give the people justice and honor… Second only to security, bringing 
justice to the people and restoring their honor is the key task. 
3.  Integrate civilian/military efforts — this is an inter-agency, combined 
arms fight… Close working relationships, mutual respect, and personal 
interaction between BCT/RCT commanders and PRT Team Leaders are critical 
to achieving “interagency combined arms”.  
4.  Get out and walk — move mounted, work dismounted.  Stop by, don’t 
drive by.  Patrol on foot to gain and maintain contact with the population and 
the enemy. 
5.  We are in a fight for intelligence — all the time.  Intelligence is not a 
“product” given to commanders by higher headquarters, but rather something we 
gather ourselves, through our own operations.  Most actionable intelligence will 
[be] locally produced… Work with what you have. 
6.  Every unit must advise their ISF partners.  Joint Security Stations and 
Combat Outposts have put coalition and Iraqi forces shoulder-to-shoulder 
throughout the battlespace… Regardless of mission, any coalition unit operating 
alongside ISF is performing a mentoring, training, and example-setting role. 
7.  Include ISF in your operations at the lowest possible level… Units 
should build a genuine, field-based partnership with local ISF units:  move, live, 
work, and fight together.   
8.  Look beyond the IED — get the network that placed it… Over time, 
units that adopt a pro-active approach to IEDs will degrade enemy networks 
and push back the IED threat in their area.  This will ultimately save more lives 
than a purely reactive approach. 
9.   Be first with the truth…  Tell the truth, stay in your lane, and get the 
message out fast.  Be forthright and never allow an enemy lie to stand 
unchallenged.    
10.  Make the people choose…  People in Iraq exercise choice collectively, 
not just individually; win over local leaders to encourage the community to shift 
to the side of the new Iraq.199
Petraeus’ first principle was taken directly from classical counterinsurgency doctrine:  
troops had to secure and serve the population and this would have them living among 
the people they were to secure, in combat outposts not big bases.  This completely 
reversed his predecessor’s process of transition – handing security responsibility to the 
Iraqis as soon as they had the numbers to take over – and was highly controversial, 
particularly as casualties continued to rise as al Qaeda fought back.  But the approach 
worked.  American military efforts, fighting alongside the Iraqi security forces, and 
using money from the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program, started to win 
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 round the people and, most surprising of all, turned Sunni insurgents from fighting 
against to fighting alongside U.S. troopers.   
7.3.5 Case Study 2:  Summer 2007, 1‐4 Cavalry in Baghdad 
In March 2007, as 4 RIFLES were about to deploy to Basrah Palace, a U.S. Army 
cavalry squadron (the equivalent of a British battlegroup) deployed as part of the Surge 
into Doura, a Sunni neighbourhood in Rashid, at that time the most violent part of 
Baghdad.  In its first thirty days in Doura, 1-4 Cavalry (1-4 CAV) of the 4th Infantry 
Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, was subjected to more than fifty-two 
attacks, over seventy per cent of which were IED attacks.200  Sunni insurgents had 
unrestricted freedom of movement to place IEDs almost wherever they wanted.  1-4 
CAV’s mission was, 
combat, stability, and support operations in coordination with the Iraqi Security 
Forces to defeat Al Qaeda and irreconcilable extremists, neutralize insurgent and 
militia groups, and gain the support of the people in order to reduce violence, 
protect the population in [the AO], and secure the eastern flank of [the 
neighbouring task force].201
Lt. Col. James Crider, the commanding officer, faced two categories of insurgent, AQI 
and disgruntled Iraqis.  AQI hid among the population and intimidated it, trying to 
separate Coalition Forces from the public by fostering the belief that Doura’s desperate 
economic and social conditions were in some way the fault of the Coalition.  It coerced 
support on the pretext that without AQI, JAM would come into the district to kill 
innocent Sunnis.  As it did elsewhere in Iraq, AQI, recruited the young and uneducated 
and used money from criminal activity to turn insurgency into employment for young 
men with no prospects.  The GOI perpetuated this by not providing any essential 
services, no legal system, and doing nothing to counter the perception among Sunnis 
that it was subject to Persian influence on all its policy decisions.202  With no 
governance extending from the GOI, Crider was the de facto government.  
Unfortunately, to start with, he had virtually no intelligence to work with.  However, by 
30 June 2007, and reflecting the effort Crider put into building the intelligence picture 
from the ground up in a very Kitson-like approach, it had thirty-six sources.203   
Crider soon realized that the enemy was hiding in plain view and that his unit could not 
“detain or kill [his] way to victory.”  It was, instead, about the people.  He readjusted his 
plan so that he could re-establish authority over the population, physically isolate the 
population from the insurgents, and establish a robust intelligence network.  His 
approach was to make contact with the population, protect and control it, collect 
intelligence and win the support of the population.  At the same time, operations would 
seek to “purge the insurgents from the population.”  Crider’s plan also acknowledged 
the long-term solution through establishing and legitimizing local security efforts, and 
through local elections.  Crider later discovered that the approach he devised “is aptly 
described in Chapter 7 of Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare.”204
Making contact with and protecting the population meant, first and foremost, providing 
a continuous presence on the streets so he put two platoons on the streets 24 hours a day 
for the duration of the tour.  Crider notes that this had an immediate effect:  “In the 10 
days following this tactic, IED attacks dropped to 4—with 2 of those found prior to 
detonation—and civilian murders dropped to only 1.”205  The troops began to realize 
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 that the longer they were out, the safer they were, not least because their permanent 
presence meant that it was difficult for the insurgents to plant IEDs undetected.   
Crider fostered a very active interest in intelligence gathering, encouraging his soldiers 
to be curious.  1-4 CAV took photographs of everyone they met, platoon commanders 
visited every house, where the people were generally much more open and informative, 
and spoke to everyone they could.  They gradually gained the confidence of the general 
population, and since they knew where people lived, and they conditioned the 
population to their visits, there was no need to mount large arrest operations.  Platoons 
simply went to the target house and detained the suspect.  Population control measures, 
including a curfew, were imposed across Baghdad.  Large concrete barriers were used 
to isolate troubled districts, with checkpoints manned by local people – many former 
insurgents – opened to control general movement and channel insurgents. 
Coupled with the intelligence effort, 1-4 CAV set about improving essential services.  
This included attempting to repair the dilapidated electricity supply, clearing and 
disposing of rubbish, running clinics and providing micro-loans to stimulate the local 
economy.  Crider’s operation brought fuel into the neighbourhood, thus avoiding 
insurgent-run price rackets, hired trusted and proven contractors and hired local 
workers.206  This approach followed FM 3-24 exactly:  “Counterinsurgents should use 
every opportunity to help the populace and meet its needs and expectations. Projects to 
improve economic, social, cultural, and medical needs can begin immediately. Actions 
speak louder than words.”207
Attacks against 1-4 CAV reached their height in June 2007 but they quickly fell away as 
the final surge brigade took its place in Baghdad, the operation to build the concrete 
walls got underway, the small-scale, local development projects started to improve the 
economic situation and Crider’s approach started to have effect.208  The recruitment of 
Sons of Iraq to provide local security within Doura (a programme which ran throughout 
Sunni areas in Iraq and which brought a great many Sunni insurgents across to the GOI) 
from September saw a further marked reduction in violence, to the point where in 
November and December there were no attacks at all.  In January 2008, most 
remarkably, given the security situation less than nine months before, displaced Shi’a 
families started to return to Doura, although there was a small increase in violence as a 
result.  Crider summarized his battalion’s achievements: 
In just over four months, using the ‘close encounters’ strategy, and a constant 
presence, we forged a strong alliance with the local population, denying the 
insurgents the ability to operate effectively. In fact, 1-4 CAV was not attacked 
inside our area of operations in any way over the final six months of our time 
there. We detained 264 insurgents and transferred over 80 percent of them to 
prison. Twenty of those cases were tried in the Iraqi criminal court system. Parks 
and soccer fields replaced burning piles of trash, hundreds of stores reopened, 
and happy customers filled formerly empty streets.209
A journalist made the comparison between Doura before 1-4 CAV and as its tour came 
to an end: 
A Sunni neighborhood in the Doura section of Baghdad ... is a showcase for our 
counterinsurgency successes. Once, for Americans to come here was a 
‘deliberate combat operation,’ in the words of Col. Ricky Gibbs. Then, in late 
September, the neighborhood turned. Now, it is ‘what right looks like.’210
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 From his approach and the results that his battalion achieved in what had been seen as 
an area of Baghdad unlikely to be secured, Crider concluded that the doctrine had 
worked and that it was “imperative that we should embrace principles that have proven 
successful over time.”211   
7.3.6 Comparisons:  Baghdad and Basrah 
The contrast with the situation in Basrah could not be sharper.  Isolated, with restricted 
intelligence and with no possibility of employing proven doctrine to achieve any of the 
objectives which Crider understood he had to achieve in Doura, Sanders was limited to 
violent raids against JAM.  Crider’s detention operations took place without incident; 
British raids added to the perception that it was the British who were destabilizing the 
city.  Crider’s method reduced attacks on 1-4 CAV within weeks of taking over his area 
of operation; by July 2007, attacks on Basrah Palace, as Sanders noted, were at their all 
time high.212  Crider, as part of the Surge, was deployed to Doura for over a year; his 
British counterparts were there for only six months at a time.  Crider had to take the 
long-term view.  Despite his AO being one of the most violent and fiercely contested in 
Iraq, Crider pacified it using an approach which he based on a thorough understanding 
of doctrine backed up by a detailed study of Galula’s work.  In contrast, by July 2007, 
British counterinsurgency doctrine had become wholly inappropriate, with no prospect 
at all of it being applied because its value had been nullified by the central theme of 
Operation ZENITH.  Instead, raiding, relief in place and withdrawal were the tactical 
options available to British forces in Basrah.  The results of the two approaches could 
not be more different:  Crider pacified his area of operation, as the Baghdad Security 
Plan did across the capitol, while in Basrah, British withdrawal handed control of the 
city to Shi’a militias. 
7.4 Section IV – Conclusions:  Is FM 3‐24 Effective Doctrine? 
7.4.1 Criticisms of FM 3‐24 
From mid-2006, draft editions of FM 3-24 appeared in the public domain.  Each 
prompted a very public debate about the validity and the efficacy of the approach 
Petraeus and his writing team had developed.213  Crane gathered the comments, both 
positive and negative, from a wide range of commentators and experts.214  They are 
illuminating and identify a number of potential weaknesses in the doctrine and the 
central approach it describes.   
Some saw the doctrine as philosophically flawed.  Edward Luttwak suggested that, 
among other things, only brutality works and that the doctrine did not reflect the truly 
violent character of the insurgency and the punitive measures which might be necessary 
to re-establish control: “Occupiers can …be successful without need of any specialized 
counterinsurgency methods or tactics if they are willing to out terrorize the insurgents, 
so that the fear of reprisals outweighs the desire to help the insurgents or their 
threats.”215  Ralph Peters considered it too politically correct, “designed for fairy-tale 
conflicts and utterly inappropriate for the religion-fuelled, ethnicity-driven hyper-
violence of our time.  We’re back to struggling to win hearts and minds that can’t be 
won.”216   
Stephen Biddle considered the doctrine as irrelevant since Iraq was, by 2006 in a civil 
war, where identity not ideology was the determining factor.  Biddle suggested that 
most discussions of U.S. policy in Iraq assumed that it would be informed by the 
245 
 
 lessons of Vietnam.  However, since the conflict in Iraq was communal civil war, not a 
Maoist ‘people’s war,’ so those lessons were not directly applicable, and the U.S. policy 
of ‘Iraqization’ or Transition, Biddle believed was likely to make matters worse, not 
better.217  Steven Metz was one who viewed the new doctrine as being too traditional, 
suggesting that classic COIN thinking was out of touch with contemporary realities, and 
was inexplicably still tied to Mao and 1960s theory, and it therefore failed to reflect the 
complex insurgencies that exploited factors such as globalised media and 
interconnectedness:   
The traditional American solution to insurgency is to strengthen the regime and 
encourage it to reform. Today, that may no longer be adequate…the state-centric 
approach to counterinsurgency codified in American strategy and doctrine 
swims against the tide of history.218   
Jeffry Record, in similar vein to Colin Gray who identified thirteen characteristics of 
what he described as the American way of war (apolitical; astrategic; ahistorical; 
problem-solving, optimistic; culturally challenged; technology dependent; focused on 
firepower; large-scale; aggressive, offensive; profoundly regular; impatient; logistically 
excellent; highly sensitive to casualties),219 considered that the U.S. social, political, and 
military culture was too impatient and too focused on rapid success and conventional 
war to adjust to counterinsurgency.  As a consequence, FM 3-24 would be impossible to 
put into practice:   
The very attributes that have contributed to the establishment of unchallenged 
and unchallengeable American conventional military supremacy—impatience, 
an engineering approach to war, confidence in technological solutions to 
nontechnological problems, preference for decisive conventional military 
operations, sensitivity to casualties, and, above all, the habit of divorcing war 
from politics—are liabilities in approaching war against motivated and 
resourceful irregular enemies.220
Lt. Col. Gian Gentile was vociferous in his criticisms.  A serving officer who had 
commanded a battalion in Baghdad in 2006,221 he argued that counterinsurgency was a 
temporary and dangerous preoccupation of the moment, which, because of the specific 
skills and equipment it required, would erode the military’s ability to conduct large 
scale decisive operations in the future.  Although he subsequently developed his 
arguments during 2008, the essence of his criticism of FM 3-24 was that AirLand Battle 
assumed that fighting was the essence of war and the new doctrine did not; “Fighting 
gave the 1986 manual a coherence that reflected the true nature of war. The Army’s new 
COIN manual’s tragic flaw is that the essence of war fighting is missing from its 
pages.”222
Another criticism Crane noted was that the inter-agency approach which underpinned 
the doctrine would “lead military practitioners to expect too much from the rest of the 
US government. We all talk about a comprehensive whole government approach, but 
the US never really gets there.”223  Finally, there was a criticism that FM 3-24 was 
essentially Luddite, neglecting technology and air power, and avoiding alternative 
approaches which would avoid having to put U.S. troops in harm’s way.  Maj. Gen. 
Charles Dunlap, a U.S. Air Force lawyer, considered the doctrine was “a one 
dimensional, ground-centric perspective almost exclusively, as evidenced by the fact 
that considerations of airpower are confined to a short, five-page annex.”224  His 
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 solution was for a joint approach to counterinsurgency that moved away from ‘boots on 
the ground’ – his interpretation of securing the population - to one that better reflected 
the capabilities of all the services involved. 
While each critic presented a logical, generally dispassionate view, none of those who 
publicly criticized FM 3-24 would have to put the doctrine into practice.  Interestingly, 
Petraeus took some account of what was raised and tempered and adjusted some of the 
contentious issues accordingly.  Nagl recalls that “Ralph Peters’ criticism in particular 
served to impose delay on publication as Petraeus responded by adding more red meat 
to the book.”225  Petraeus noted that “adding the word ‘sometimes’ managed to get us 
out of the argument and allowed us to get on.”226
7.4.2 Is it Manageable and Accessible? 
FM 3-24 was published on the internet on 15 December 2006 and was downloaded 
more than 1.5 million times in the first month.  This did not address the issue of how 
people were to read it, or what specifically they were to take away from it.  At over 220 
pages, concern has been raised about both the manual’s length and how much 
information it contains.  Conrad Crane explains that it was decided from the outset that 
the first edition had to include a great deal of information that otherwise might have 
been omitted to re-establish the scope of the subject and the knowledge baseline.  It was 
General Petraeus’s intent to break new ground, and the writing team recognized that not 
everyone would read it from cover to cover.  As a result it included very specific themes 
that were not covered elsewhere in doctrine.227  Nevertheless, some account was taken 
of the reader who merely dipped into doctrine, so each section was self-contained.  The 
point has to be made that so much more might have been included, it brings in the How 
or What to Think debate and the editor’s dilemma:  at what point does doctrine become 
too descriptive or too prescriptive?   
7.4.3 Suitability as educational material?   
Doctrine and what is taught should be synonymous, and this is certainly the case with 
FM 3-24.  It became the principal text at CGSC, and for all divisional, brigade and 
battalion command teams deploying to Iraq.  It reinforces the Learn and Adapt 
imperative which, as British and American experience has shown, is crucial to effective 
counterinsurgency.  This is worth highlighting, not just in terms of learning from 
operations per se but also learning from history.  Nagl made this point, and one of 
Metz’s main themes is the need to take a broader view than simply the present.228   
7.4.4 Contemporary Relevance? 
FM 3-24 was written to meet the needs of the soldier in the field and to provide 
guidance for commanders.  One obvious difficulty the doctrine writer faces when 
starting from scratch is identifying at which level of command the doctrine is to be 
focused.  Horvath explained the dilemma: 
Pitch it too low and gearing the command chain and its decision-making would 
have been hard.  Pitch it too high and it is difficult for the battalion commander 
and the company commander to translate it into action.  The audience I settled 
on was the corps, division and brigade staff officer and that range allowed me to 
touch on the strategic and still get down to the coal face of COIN at the 
company level.229
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 In the case of FM 3-24, the focus is the tactical level, albeit spanning from corps to 
battalion in the context of a joint, combined campaign for which no doctrinal guidance 
existed.  Here, Galula’s assertion that counterinsurgency was eighty percent political, 
twenty percent military is relevant.  It raises the question of how can doctrine be 
developed without a clearly articulated joint and inter-agency approach?  In the absence 
of a unified or agreed inter-agency position in Washington DC, Petraeus and his writing 
team used their experience and initiative to make FM 3-24 at least a start point, one 
which he developed effectively with Crocker in Baghdad.   
The doctrine writer generally must make a sensible assessment of what would be 
required in ideal circumstances for the successful completion of a campaign.  He has to 
recognize that reality may fall well short of the ideal.  There was thus a tension between 
what the writer presented and the soldier who had to apply doctrine in far from ideal 
circumstances.  As the example of 1-4 CAV illustrates, soldiers had to carry out far 
more non-military tasks than was ideal, since civilian agencies could not or chose not to 
be present on the ground.  While FM 3-24 explains operational design and the 
integration of non-military lines of operation into the campaign, this is still an area of 
weakness.  This is not in terms of what the pamphlet outlines but in terms of the 
absence of doctrine and policy to draw in the full range of instruments of national 
power. 
7.4.5 Endurability?   
Whether the doctrine has general military acceptance is difficult to judge from afar.  In 
two obvious ways, the requirement for its acceptability becomes secondary if doctrine is 
not just the teaching focus in the schoolhouse but it underpins the operational concept 
for subsequent use in the field.  Teacher knows best and orders are orders.  While what 
the principal approach to counterinsurgency the doctrine describes might have been 
challenged on the grounds that it was unfamiliar to some, the coverage the Baghdad 
Security Plan has received has gone a long way to explain what it is, why it is being 
followed and what is different about it.230  The approach of Clear-Hold-Build has 
clearly identifiable theoretical roots based, like all effective doctrine, on experience and 
sound analysis.  Those familiar with Thompson will see his basic operational concept of 
Clear-Hold-Winning-Won, a concept which is similar to that which Galula puts forward 
and which is central to FM 3-24.   
7.4.6 Was the Approach Acceptable to The Reader? 
There is an inevitable tension between personal experience and doctrine, particularly 
when doctrine is written in the heat of war.  This can make doctrine jar with the reader.  
The challenge for the writer is all the greater when a large proportion of the Army has 
been so deeply involved.  FM 3-24 makes the point that a counterinsurgency campaign 
has stability, defensive and offensive operations running through it, with the emphasis 
that each set of operations required varies depending on the specific time and place.  
The net outcome is very likely to be a mosaic of activity which has an effect on 
perception and understanding.  This in part explains the criticism of “that’s not the war I 
saw” made of FM 3-24.231  Petraeus recognized the doctrine’s strengths but he also 
recognized it was not the final statement on counterinsurgency.  In his view, “it had to 
be more explicit about the doctrine being more than classical COIN.  It needs to be in 
big bold print who our enemies are and what the lack of government capacity really 
means for us.”232
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 7.4.7 Was it Assimilated?  Did FM 3‐24 Deliver in Iraq? 
The questions of whether the doctrine is useable, intuitive, applicable, relevant and 
current – criteria identified for it to be effective – fold into whether FM 3-24 delivered 
in the field.  It was clear from the assessment Petraeus delivered to Congress in 
September 2007 that the doctrine helped engender coherency in Iraq.  When 
interviewed in June 2007, he observed, 
It is still early days but I can see that it is delivering.  The doctrine is being used 
and this really underpins everything that we do.  The doctrine is general enough 
that not too many changes or gaps seem apparent.  The more general the 
doctrine is, the more applicable it is proving to be.233
Doctrine has to be assimilated if is to be effective.  In the case of FM 3-24, the 
enormous effort needed to first produce counterinsurgency doctrine and then to 
recalibrate training, education and the road to deployment worked.  The palpable 
coherency that was created in Iraq, underpinned by the Clear-Hold-Build approach, 
enabled a clear improvement to be made in the conduct of the campaign.  Doctrine does 
not, however, stand alone:  it is the sum total of understanding, experience, training and 
resources, applied through a plan, to a specific set of circumstances.  If a soldier’s 
understanding is reasonably complete and is guided by sound doctrine, his likelihood of 
success in accomplishing his mission is that much stronger. 234   
7.5 Conclusions 
In his introduction to Kitson’s Low Intensity Operations, Gen. Sir Michael Carver noted 
it was “written for the soldier of today to help him prepare for the operations of 
tomorrow.”235  FM 3-24 is not general enough to allow fully for future insurgencies.  
However the issue when it was written was not to address the aspirational or predictive 
function of doctrine, but the more pressing problem of winning, or in the words of 
Counter Insurgency Operations ‘simply not losing’, the campaign in Iraq.  The authors, 
particularly Gen. Petraeus who faced the prospect of taking command of the operation 
in Iraq, could not be criticized for concentrating on the practical issues of effective 
campaign design and appropriate tactics.  Although the British model was influential, 
particularly in terms of principles and general approach, the first edition of FMi 3-07.22 
discarded the British assumption of effective intelligence on which an insurgent-centred 
approach could be followed.  Instead, it returned to the classical thinking of Thompson 
and Galula, both of whom recognized the critical importance of securing the population 
first.  As such, FM 3-24 better reflected the dynamics of interventionist 
counterinsurgency, where intelligence would be difficult to establish and in the time 
taken to develop it the population would be at risk from insurgents until secured.     
Although FM 3-24 drew criticism during and after its publication, and those criticisms 
are generally reasonable, the issue is not that they have been made.  In themselves, they 
are not enough to demonstrate irrelevant or inappropriate doctrine.  What matters much 
more is whether or not it has been assimilated and converted into an effective military 
approach.  It was evident by the summer of 2007 that they were.  As Michael O’Hanlon 
and Kenneth Pollack were able to observe at first hand in Baghdad:236
Here is the most important thing Americans need to understand: We are finally 
getting somewhere in Iraq, at least in military terms. As two analysts who have 
harshly criticized the Bush administration’s miserable handling of Iraq, we were 
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 surprised by the gains we saw and the potential to produce not necessarily 
“victory” but a sustainable stability that both we and the Iraqis could live with. 
FM 3-24 provided the intellectual foundations for success on operations and has started 
to shape the development of counterinsurgency doctrine to meet future challenges.   
The U.S. Army in 2003 was trained, equipped and organised to win large scale 
conventional battles and campaigns and to do so rapidly.  It was not educated, trained 
and organised to counter armed political opposition to the government and democratic 
processes it strove to put in place in post-Saddam Iraq.  By and large, it struggled and 
one of the first conclusions it came to was that it needed a doctrine on which its 
approach could be built.  The steps that followed proved to be by no means 
conventional; while all the organisational strength that an army designed to win could 
harness was brought to bear, it also drew in a wide cross-section of governmental, 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations.  In this case it was to develop, 
agree, promulgate, assimilate and act on a doctrine and approach relevant to the 
considerable problems it faced.  The U.S. Army’s response to the conditions that 
prevailed in Iraq in 2006 is pivotal in terms of the development and application of 
counterinsurgency doctrine and sets a new benchmark for the development of doctrine 
in general terms.  
At the time of writing, in summer 2009, the outcome in Iraq was still far from certain 
however in general terms, the development of FM 3-24, the change in U.S. strategy 
which followed, the development of a true counterinsurgency campaign plan, the surge 
of five additional American brigades to Iraq during 2007 and 2008, and the shift to 
protecting the Iraqi population, met with success.237  The approach Petraeus instilled in 
MNF-I enabled a level of security to be reached in Iraq which in turn allowed the 
necessary and significant political progress to be made.   Whatever its failings, 
omissions, over-simplifications and misunderstandings, FM 3-24 prepared the way for 
success on operations and started to shape the development of counterinsurgency 
doctrine to meet future challenges. 
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 8 Conclusions 
 
This thesis has analyzed whether the British Army’s doctrinal approach for countering 
insurgency is still valid in the light of its experience in Iraq.  Why is the British 
approach to counterinsurgency important?  Insurgency remains a prevalent form of 
insecurity and instability, and in the absence of a major conventional threat to British 
national interests, it is one which is very likely to confront the Army for the foreseeable 
future.  If British doctrine for counterinsurgency has been invalidated by the campaign 
in Iraq, there are profound implications for the way the Army approaches, and is 
organized, equipped and trained for counterinsurgency in the future.  If the doctrine it 
has is valid, there are equally profound questions to be asked about why the campaign 
in Iraq ended as it did, with the British Army’s reputation as skilful counterinsurgents 
doubted by its allies and the operations it conducted in Iraq of questionable strategic 
value. 
8.1 What was the Doctrinal Approach to Countering 
Insurgency?   
During the 1990s, the intellectual impetus provided by Field Marshal Sir Nigel Bagnall 
enabled the Army to publish authoritative doctrine that codified best practice, and 
introduced a manoeuvrist approach based on sound historical analysis.  The principal 
influences on doctrine’s development in the 1990s became the manoeuvrist approach to 
warfare and its accompanying philosophy of mission command.  At the same time a 
growing pressure developed to take account of the Revolution in Military Affairs and 
the advantages which information technology offered.  The focus at DGD&D thus 
switched from writing doctrine to developing concepts for future conventional, high-
intensity warfare drawing on the RMA.  Little attention was paid to counterinsurgency, 
and lessons from operations in the Balkans went largely ignored.1  Yet those lessons 
suggested that the most likely form of conflict in the early part of the twenty-first 
century would be distinctly asymmetric, and conducted between antagonists among the 
population.  This was a manifestly different vision than the characterization of war 
posited by those writing conventional concepts and the one for which the Army 
prepared. 
The Army’s manoeuvrist doctrine took three to four years to be fully assimilated 
through education and training.2  Once it had been, the Army demonstrated great 
confidence in applying its manoeuvrist approach.  It started to discuss and develop 
doctrine’s central tenets and to use them in shaping tactical- and operational-level 
thinking.  The new doctrine was introduced successfully into the campaign in Northern 
Ireland, where previously there had been no doctrine per se.  In turn, lessons from 
Northern Ireland were used to shape revisions of counterinsurgency doctrine.  Mission 
command proved effective in the Balkans where a relatively small British force was 
dispersed over a large area, and initiative proved essential.  In March and April 2003, 
the advance on and investment of Basrah was founded on the Army’s warfighting 
doctrine which proved effective in high tempo coalition operations with the U.S.  It 
provided the common language of operations and provided the common understanding 
of approach and practice. 
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 Counter Insurgency Operations was written as part of the revision of the Field Manual 
series.  It blended the key tenets of manoeuvrist doctrine, operational art, and the 
operational framework with the well-established themes of counterinsurgency:  political 
primacy, co-ordinated government approach, pre-eminence of intelligence, separating 
insurgents from their support and then neutralizing them.  It was entirely recognizable 
in terms of the essential British approach.  Unusually for official doctrine, it was written 
because the author thought relevant counterinsurgency doctrine would be necessary, not 
because of any organizational recognition that counterinsurgency might be important.  
On the contrary, the Army’s generally held view in the late 1990s was that 
counterinsurgency was no longer relevant as a form of warfare; instead Peace Support 
Operations provided the new paradigm for future operations short of full scale war.  If 
these types of campaign materialized, the Army took the view that an army trained for 
high intensity warfare could ‘step down’ to deal with the lesser problem.  It held that the 
converse was not true.  The missing piece in this logic, as Kitson identified twenty years 
before, was that officers had to be educated in the demands of planning, conducting, and 
training for counterinsurgency.  This did not happen. 
Running against the general trend of conventional warfare, Brigadier Gavin Bulloch, the 
Army’s principal doctrine writer, reviewed the Army’s existing counterinsurgency 
doctrine and the principal theories.  He then identified the main lessons from Northern 
Ireland, and then wrote Counter Insurgency Operations.  He consulted those who had 
something to contribute to the counterinsurgency debate, he avoided those who he 
considered would be disruptive, and he short-circuited the intrusive process of 
circulating working drafts of the doctrine.3  Counter Insurgency Operations’ 
publication went almost unnoticed.  Its much-restricted distribution to the Staff College 
limited the extent to which the new doctrine could be assimilated by the Army as a 
whole.  The move to joint command and staff training further marginalized 
counterinsurgency as a subject and severely reduced the only opportunity staff college 
students had to learn about the complexities of counterinsurgency.  The U.S. Army had 
a similar experience although by design, as part of the ‘never again’ response to 
Vietnam, counterinsurgency as a subject was removed from the core syllabi at the Staff 
College and arms schools.  In Iraq, both armies struggled to adjust to the increasing 
violence and complexity of the insurgencies.  One army had both relevant experience 
and a published doctrine on which to draw, the other had a published but little known 
doctrine but no recent experience of counterinsurgency.  Their respective responses 
were very different.  Even before the Petraeus-led reformation, the U.S. Army learnt 
from and adapted to conditions in Iraq; the British response was to reduce its presence 
and withdraw which ran counter to its doctrine for counterinsurgency. 
Although Bulloch developed new principles for Counter Insurgency Operations, they 
reflected those themes which had evolved as doctrine for counterinsurgency evolved 
from 1909.  As such, Bulloch’s principles are readily identifiable as classical 
counterinsurgency thinking and for the first time they provided a logical sequence 
against which a campaign could be planned, conducted and assessed.  The concept of 
operations it described was a development of the by now well established and proven 
Ink Spot method.  The Ink Spot’s sequence is important for this analysis because the 
British operation in Iraq followed almost its exact opposite:  secure a base area, 
establish a firm forward operational base, secure a controlled area, consolidate the 
controlled areas, and continue to restore and extend government control.  A similar 
261 
 
 sequence can be found in all similar western doctrine and in the principal theories.  
British campaign experience, notably in Malaya, Kenya, Borneo, and the Oman, amply 
demonstrates the efficacy of this approach.  In contrast, the operation in Iraq secured 
bases in Basrah and Amarah but rather than develop them into secure forward bases, 
from which areas could be controlled and consolidated, a process of force reductions 
and withdrawals followed, without restoring and extending Iraqi government control. 
Like the British, the U.S. Army had doctrine for counterinsurgency.  It was published in 
FM 90-8 Counter Guerrilla Operations.  Unlike the British Army, which followed a 
twin-track approach of conventional armoured warfare in Germany and 
counterinsurgency in Northern Ireland, the U.S. Army institutionally turned its back on 
counterinsurgency after the Vietnam War, and instead concentrated on major combat 
operations.  It therefore had no organizational understanding of the complexity of 
counterinsurgency on which to build.  FM 90-8 stressed the importance of protecting 
the population, using minimum force, being justifiable in the eyes of the population, 
doing maximum benefit and minimum damage, and isolating the insurgent physically 
and psychologically.  Its approach used intelligence, psychological operations, civil 
affairs, population control, assistance to the host nation’s security forces and, finally, 
tactical operations to secure the population and allow the host country to address the 
root cause of the insurgency.   
8.2 Was the Doctrinal Approach Sound Theory and Relevant?   
Side-by-side, FM 90-8 and Counter Insurgency Operations provided a comprehensive 
view of insurgency, and they both described a classical approach to counter it.  It would 
be tempting to question their relevance in 2003 since neither addressed the specific 
questions of large scale militias or transnational insurgencies of the type which emerged 
in Iraq.  To do so would ignore the central tenet laid out in both manuals:  to counter an 
insurgency the host government is required to re-establish control over its country.  This 
means securing the population, isolating the insurgent and neutralizing the effects of the 
insurgency both physically and psychologically.  Effective counterinsurgency focuses 
on securing the population and not solely on the insurgent.  Both extant British and U.S. 
doctrine in 2003 were sound and relevant to contemporary problems.  They were both 
weak, however, in the area of multinational operations.  Neither took account of the 
complexity of the contemporary strategic environment, nor the tensions inherent in 
major campaigns. 
The pressing issue for both armies was the extent to which respective doctrines were 
understood.  The U.S. case is clear cut:  it was not.  There were, however, a small 
number of well-informed officers who understood counterinsurgency, and who seized 
the opportunity to develop an appropriate new doctrine on which the U.S. Army’s 
approach to the campaign in Iraq could be built.  Gen. Petraeus proved to be the catalyst 
for change, and he provided the leadership, energy and top-level protection needed to 
get the doctrine published and introduced into training and education at a remarkable 
speed.  There is no evidence that he achieved, or indeed was seeking to achieve 
sustained organizational consensus; there is, however, ample evidence that he got what 
he thought the U.S. Army needed.  That was a sound doctrine, which was good enough 
to form a startpoint for reform of the U.S. Army’s approach to counterinsurgency, and 
relevant enough to help him change mindsets quickly enough to avoid defeat in Iraq.   
262 
 
 By contrast, the British Army had a recognizable organizational aptitude for 
counterinsurgency.  Counter Insurgency Operations provided sound, relevant theory 
and was readily identifiable in terms of the classical British approach.  This thesis has 
identified eight themes of counterinsurgency which recur throughout British doctrine 
and represent the essential elements of the approach.  Counter Insurgency Operations 
has all but one of them:  political primacy and the need for a political aim, the 
requirement for co-ordinated government action, legal considerations, the importance of 
intelligence, the need to separate the insurgent from his support, the need to maintain 
public confidence, the requirement to neutralize the insurgent.   
The element missing in Counter Insurgency Operations is education and training.  This 
was not a careless omission on Bulloch’s part, but a reflection of the conditions in 1995 
when Counter Insurgency Operations was written.  The draft had been developed at the 
Staff College and taught there in 1994, as was all Army doctrine.  Doctrine was actually 
that which was taught.  It was reasonable for him to assume that staff-trained officers 
understood counterinsurgency theory and, because the counterinsurgency module at 
Camberley was so designed, they could analyze and evaluate its component parts and its 
key tenets.  Many officers were very familiar with operations in Northern Ireland and 
this added context to the theory taught at Camberley. 
By 2001, this was no longer the case.  Students at JSCSC were simply not taught 
counterinsurgency doctrine.  Counter Insurgency Operations may have been on the 
reading list but it was a flawed assumption that students would read, understand and 
learn the complexities of insurgency, counterinsurgency, campaign design, and the 
British approach.  Furthermore, the campaign in Northern Ireland had reached its final 
phase.  The threat of terrorism remained but military operations no longer matched the 
tempo and intensity which they had up to the first PIRA Ceasefire in 1994.  The result 
was that the Army had a field manual which laid out a valid approach.  It was not, 
however, understood in the way it had been only six years before, and there was no 
operational theatre in which it could put theory into practice.  Of course, there were 
individual exceptions.  Officers steeped in the Northern Ireland campaign undoubtedly 
understood the requirements for successful counterinsurgency, but they understood it 
from a practical viewpoint rather than the theoretical.  Those who had worked at 
headquarters level in Northern Ireland knew about campaign management, but within 
the Army as a whole, no one had been instructed in the complexities of putting a 
campaign together.  By 2003, it is safe to conclude that the Army was familiar with 
counterinsurgency, but it was not well-versed in its general theory, and far less its 
doctrine. 
8.3 Did the Doctrine work and, if not, why?   
8.3.1 Political Primacy and Political Aim  
Once the British Government took the decision in 2006 to reinforce operations in 
Afghanistan, the political aim was to withdraw from Iraq.  While UK civil authorities 
retained primacy, the British operation in Southern Iraq had neither the resources nor 
the opportunity to defeat the political subversion of Shi’a extremists, neither did it have 
the means to neutralize the insurgents.  In the absence of a fully co-ordinated plan, by 
default, interest focussed on military operations.  There is no evidence of a clear UK 
national plan other than to withdraw; any account of longer term post-Insurgency 
conditions in Iraq was taken by the U.S. campaign plan, but really only after Petraeus 
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 and Crocker forced the issue in mid-2007.  While British security forces were aware of 
the complexities of the provincial and national Iraqi political situation, the 
discontinuous relationship at provincial level, and limited intelligence coverage limited 
the extent to which they could subsequently act. 
8.3.2 Co‐ordinated Government Action 
Co-ordinated government machinery was not established at every level for the direction 
of the British campaign.  Successive commanders worked to develop and improve local 
arrangements with those representatives of other government departments present, but 
working groups and committees lacked the same focus and authority which 
characterized the emergency committees set up in Malaya or those subsequently formed 
in Northern Ireland.  Doctrine calls for close co-operation between Civil and Military 
authorities, and effective intercommunication must be maintained between departments 
and agencies.  These may have been achieved in Basrah but this was not evident in 
Whitehall.  The U.S. eventually achieved a co-ordinated approach in Baghdad, largely 
through the forceful leadership of Petraeus and Crocker but this was at campaign level.  
The Americans too lacked co-ordinated government machinery in Washington to 
develop strategy and unify inter-departmental efforts. 
8.3.3 The Law 
The essential British approach requires a legal system to be maintained adequate for the 
needs of the moment.  There is no evidence that the legal framework within which 
British forces operated was inadequate, and for the most part they operated in 
accordance with British law.  There were a handful of cases where soldiers broke the 
law and were subsequently court martialed.  The Army went on to investigate a number 
of cases of serious abuse and unlawful killing of civilians in Iraq in 2003 and early 
2004.  It found that there was in those cases, a failure of those involved to obey the law 
and also to reflect the Army’s core values.  The wider issue at first in Iraq was the 
absence of Iraqi rule of law.  This was addressed through the U.S.-led campaign effort 
to develop legal capacity and to foster belief in the value of the Iraqi judicial system.  
These efforts, in line with FM 3-24, serve to reinforce the essential British view of the 
importance of conducting a counterinsurgency campaign through the legal system and 
the authorities it provides. 
8.3.4 Intelligence 
Since 1923, British doctrine has emphasised the importance of creating an intelligence 
organisation to integrate intelligence into the co-ordinated government response.  In 
Iraq, efforts to set up such an organization proved frustratingly difficult.  This was both 
in integrating the considerable volume of intelligence available from military sources, 
and in capturing and exploiting the limited and reducing flow of intelligence provided 
by the Iraqi population.  The essential British approach placed emphasis on developing 
an understanding of the background to the unrest, identifying the dissident elements, 
having good topographical knowledge of the area of operations, and maintaining a 
deeply rooted sense of the importance of security and employ effective security 
measures.   
In Southern Iraq, it is now clear that it took too long to identify the underlying causes of 
insurgent activity.  By the time they were understood, insurgent groups had gained the 
power and control that they needed, and British and Iraqi forces were not strong enough 
264 
 
 to counter them directly.  This experience only serves to reinforce the critical 
importance of intelligence:  all involved in countering an insurgency must understand 
the problem, and for that level of understanding being developed quickly.  Kitson was 
clear that the requisite level of understanding was built from the bottom up, with 
company commanders learning about their area of responsibility and being pro-active, 
not reactive in gaining intelligence.   
British forces were never strong enough to control their area of responsibility fully, or to 
gain the confidence of the local population so that the population provided intelligence 
on which operations could then be based.  U.S. forces experienced the same paucity of 
intelligence until Gen. Odierno ordered the move out to forward-based forces in which 
U.S. forces were to live to secure the people where they lived.  The comparison between 
the intelligence picture and the security situation in Basrah and Baghdad in September 
2007 could not be starker.   British forces, having withdrawn from Basrah, had virtually 
no intelligence from the population; U.S. forces established local security across some 
of the most troubled and violent districts of Baghdad, attacks against them fell and the 
intelligence picture was improving greatly.  Iraqi forces experienced the same upwards 
spiral of intelligence, noted by Thompson, Kitson and Galula, when they retook Basrah 
in April 2008.  The pre-eminence of intelligence is underlined by the campaign in Iraq. 
Commensurate with developing understanding is the need to maintain it.  Continuity 
among intelligence staff and in the approach followed proved remarkably difficult to 
maintain.  It was a problem heightened by the rate at which battlegroups and 
headquarters changed over.  The British policy was for units and headquarters to serve 
for six months.  The U.S. response was to lengthen tour lengths.  Although this placed 
increased pressure on individuals and unit cohesion, particularly those in the most 
violent areas, this gave units the time to learn about their area of operation and to 
understand its dynamics.  The U.S. method proved to be effective.  Rapid changes 
among British commanders proved to be utterly disruptive for their Iraqi counterparts, 
whose culture placed emphasis on relationships and trust.  While continuity among 
British commanders and senior staff appointments was eventually addressed and tours 
extended, by the time policy was adjusted, the damage had been done. The essential 
British approach depends on continuity; the experience of Operation TELIC reinforces 
its importance.  No change is necessary; the doctrine simply has to be followed. 
8.3.5 Separate the Insurgent from his Support 
The essential approach requires base areas to be secured and for them to be expanded to 
allow government authority to be re-established over former insurgent areas.  A 
government’s first move must be to bring the population back under its control and give 
it effective security.  This will isolate insurgents from the rest of the community, disrupt 
their contacts, and allow the security forces to maintain a continual attack on the 
periphery of the enemy organization to eliminate the rank and file and to open up 
opportunities for deeper penetration.  All this is tied into an information campaign to 
“drive a wedge between enemy elements and the people and to develop resistance to the 
political ideologies of the former.”4   But most importantly it would help to increase the 
people’s confidence in the government. 
Attending to the psychological aspect of the campaign is as important as establishing a 
strong physical security presence.  It is evident that the British presence was never 
strong enough to secure the Iraqi population; the reverse Ink Spot meant that it was 
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 never a possibility.  However, as with so many aspects of the British doctrinal approach, 
although it was not applied in Southern Iraq, when the U.S. moved out of its big bases 
to secure the population in Baghdad, the approach worked.  The extent to which 
insurgents had the support of the general population in the south is unclear.  It was 
generally felt that the militias had a tight control over the population and that they were 
well supported.  Operation Charge of the Knights soon showed how tenuous that control 
was, as JAM leadership fled under pressure, and the population started to point out arms 
caches and individual insurgents and criminals. 
8.3.6 Maintain Public Confidence 
The essential British approach seeks to ensure that the insurgents do not win the war for 
the minds of the people by fostering strong and popular security forces, and by 
safeguarding civilians.  This means using effective publicity and counter-propaganda to 
influence public opinion, and requiring the security forces to maintain relations with the 
press.  It emphasizes using the minimum force necessary to achieve military objectives.  
Almost from the start, the British presence in Southern Iraq struggled to win public 
confidence among Iraqis and domestic support for the war was never strong.  Public 
confidence continued to decline as the campaign progressed, and the campaign never 
fully or effectively addressed the requirement, identified in Counter Insurgency 
Operations ‘to win and hold popular support, both at home and in the theatre of 
operations.’5  Minimum force was followed as a policy and nothing from Operation 
TELIC suggests that its underpinning logic, which is to protect the population, has been 
undermined.  On the contrary, if the doctrine had been applied fully, and greater efforts 
made to secure the population, Iraqi confidence may have been higher and the security 
situation may not have deteriorated as it did.  Operation Charge of the Knights restored 
confidence in the Iraqi Security Forces and the security situation benefitted accordingly 
with an increased flow of intelligence and information. 
8.3.7 Neutralize the Insurgent 
Neutralizing insurgents requires adequate force levels to be deployed.  The population 
has to be secured where it lives, and it must be secured on a permanent basis.  This 
means that the military commander must establish and maintain a continuous and 
effective presence on the ground.  Security forces must then remain adaptable, maintain 
the ability to carry out offensive action with surprise, and be mobile.  It has been 
emphasized a number of times that force levels were never high enough to be 
considered ‘adequate’.  As British force levels reduced, so did the tactical options 
available to commanders, and as bases were closed and forces concentrated on the COB 
at Basrah Air Station, so the ability to introduce surprise and unpredictability into plans 
reduced.  Moves into and out of the city were limited to a few routes which channelled 
British movement and left operations open to ambushes and increasingly more complex 
and extensive IED obstacle belts.  Their gradual withdrawal from Basrah city ceded 
control of the population to the militias, and restricted British options to raiding, which 
produced only a temporary and limited security effect. 
U.S. forces suffered similar problems as they concentrated on large FOBs and had to 
‘commute to work.’  The limited time troops could spend in their areas of operation 
after driving for several hours made their operations increasingly less effective.  They 
were channelled by limited routes, they lacked HUMINT, and increasing casualties, 
particularly from IEDs, created the sense that the campaign had become unwinnable.  
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 The Surge and the switch to classic counterinsurgency reversed this, with U.S. and Iraqi 
forces living among and protecting the population.  They soon outmatched insurgents in 
Baghdad and security was restored on a localized basis but one which spread across the 
city over the coming months.  Outbreaks of violence from JAM in March and April 
2008 were dealt with aggressively, breaking up the militia’s military leadership, 
destroying many of its mortar and rocket teams and removing its safe-haven in Sadr 
City.  The U.S. experience supports the long-held view that adequate forces are 
necessary to secure the population; the British experience demonstrates the dangers of 
under-resourcing an operation of this sort. 
8.3.8 Education and Training 
The essential British approach ensures that forces are trained for the theatre of 
operations.  This was the case in Operation TELIC.  A great deal of effort went into 
preparing forces for operations in Southern Iraq.  At the tactical level, companies and 
battlegroups were trained in specific and often rapidly evolving tactics, techniques and 
procedures.  There is, however, no evidence that doctrine served any planning purpose 
at all, despite it having been written specifically with a counterinsurgency campaign in 
mind.  In the six years leading up to the invasion of Iraq, education in 
counterinsurgency was negligible.  Although the Army published Counter Insurgency 
Operations (1995), it was not taught at JSCSC to the level necessary to inculcate future 
commanders and staff officers with any meaningful understanding of a highly complex 
form of warfare.  The response came from the bottom up.  Two years into the campaign, 
battlegroups started to arrange their own in-theatre education packages to ameliorate the 
problem.  Young captains who had been taught counterinsurgency as part of their 
promotion course were the driving force.  They alone had been taught the history of 
counterinsurgency, its principles and best practice.  Counterinsurgency is a complex 
business.  It is not, as both the British operation and the U.S. approach from 2003 to late 
2006 show, something which should be learnt in the theatre of operation in the middle 
of a campaign.  While forces must learn from and adapt to circumstances, they must be, 
as Kitson observed, attuned to the complexity of the problem before they are deployed.  
In the case of Operation TELIC they were not. 
8.4 What was it about the campaign in Iraq which made theory 
difficult to apply in practice?   
In overall terms, the issue at stake for the British campaign in Iraq was that policy rather 
than doctrine or conditions on the ground determined how it developed.  Until Iraq’s 
civil war took the campaign to the brink of defeat, the imperative was to hand over 
security to Iraqi forces as quickly as possible.  This gave some credence to the reverse 
Ink Spot.  When Bush and Petraeus turned the whole U.S. approach on its head, the 
weaknesses of the British method were exposed.  While British forces had a base from 
which to operate, the Iraqi government was unable to demonstrate its ability to govern 
in Southern Iraq; the population was not secured from insurgents, the insurgents were 
the authority until defeated in April 2008; there was no ‘Controlled Area’, nor was there 
any attempt to consolidate or expand it.  Petraeus introduced conditions-based 
transition, and emphasized that transition not based on security conditions would result 
in chaos.  The British withdrawal from Basrah City in 2007 took little account of the 
actual security conditions in the city, and it left Baswaris exposed to militia violence 
and coercion.  Whitehall did not agree to the conditions-based plan, and contrary to 
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 doctrine and Kitson’s guidelines for working with allies, MND(SE) deferred to London 
and not to the Coalition chain of command in Baghdad. 
A principal compounding problem in the campaign was the failure to identify the true 
character of the problem correctly.  The question was raised at the beginning of this 
thesis; what happens when doctrine is relevant but it is not understood?  In the case of 
Southern Iraq, it meant that otherwise highly competent, well-trained officers misjudged 
the problem they faced.  In comparison to the violent insurgency which flared up in and 
around Baghdad, the relative early calm in the south fostered the view that Iraq was a 
stability operation akin to what went on in the Balkans model.  Yet the presence from an 
early stage of militias, prepared to resort to violence in pursuit of their aims, met the 
doctrinal definition of insurgency.  The fact that the Iraqi government and British forces 
were confronted by powerful, violent militias meant that a comprehensive campaign 
plan was required.  Doctrine explained that a national plan should be nested within the 
objectives of the host nation and the multinational force.  This was not the case in 
Southern Iraq.  The Army did not understand its own doctrine, and did not follow its 
own precepts.  This created a condition which was beyond the influence of those with 
experience from Northern Ireland or the Balkans.  In campaign terms, the British 
operation became more one of making a manageable contribution to the Coalition effort 
rather than making a decisive contribution. 
One counter-balance might have been the development of Theatre or Operation 
Instructions.  They were of proven value in Malaya, Kenya and, eventually, Northern 
Ireland, where they set general doctrine in the context of the operational theatre.  Yet no 
such doctrine was written for Iraq.  Why?  The campaign in Iraq was highly complex 
and multi-faceted with a wide range of cultural, political and ethno-sectarian influences.  
The political situation was particularly volatile.  The U.S. taught every brigade and 
battalion its counterinsurgency doctrine from December 2004.  By comparison, 
although every British brigade was taught the tactics for company-level operations, they 
were not taught doctrine in the same way as their U.S. counterparts.  It took initiative 
from individual commanding officers once they had deployed to realize that something 
was missing from their preparation and called for in-theatre counterinsurgency 
education.  The Tactical Aide Memoire, regularly amended as the campaign wore on, 
provided low-level procedures, but there was no attempt to set them in the wider context 
of operations in Iraq.  By contrast, although the U.S. did not produce a theatre 
handbook, they used their interim doctrine and finally FM 3-24 as the doctrinal 
foundation for their training and final preparation. 
Practical constraints placed on the British force, in particular troop numbers, meant that 
from the very start, the British operation could only have a limited effect on the security 
situation.  What followed was the Ink Spot in reverse:  instead of building a security 
infrastructure from which governance could be established, the British operation 
consistently scaled down efforts from its high water marks of presence and influence in 
summer 2003.  The British operation made developing Iraqi security forces a priority 
but not with the level of commitment to make an appreciable difference.  Those forces 
which had been developed under British guidance failed at their first test and 10 Iraqi 
Division was eventually recognized to be so thoroughly infiltrated by the Shi’a militia 
that a second division had to be raised.  By comparison, the U.S. not only trained and 
equipped Iraqi forces but its forces fought alongside them, and provided crucial 
enabling capabilities of intelligence, firepower and logistic support.  When British 
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 forces adopted the same model in March 2008, it proved to be highly successful, just as 
it had been when used in the past.  There was nothing new in embedding training teams 
with indigenous forces; Counter Insurgency Operations explained its importance, 
principally because of the success the approach had had in the campaigns in Malaya and 
the Oman.  Attention to the doctrine and some knowledge of the lessons from history 
were missing from the campaign. 
Doctrine has traditionally been viewed as ‘that which is taught;’ if doctrine is not 
taught, does the Army have a doctrine?  Without the philosophy contained in doctrine 
being assimilated, where is the central idea?  There was none.  The view of what the 
campaign was changed with every new commander.  Some came closer to recognizing 
the reality than others.  There is, however, no evidence that there was anything wilful or 
incompetent in this; as the campaign rolled on, so successors had to live with decisions 
made or the effect of indecision from previous tours, often being desperately frustrated 
by the conditions which they faced.  Continuity, the watchword in Northern Ireland, 
became institutionalized discontinuity as the campaign veered from being cast as 
nation-building, to peace support, to stability operations, to – eventually – 
counterinsurgency, and then counter-corruption, crucially, with no underpinning 
intelligence database, or established connections with the Baswari population.  With 
every change came a further reduction in forces available to commanders in Iraq, not 
matched by a commensurate increase in the capacity or capability of the Iraqi security 
forces, nor linked to the security situation in Southern Iraq. 
8.5 Where does Iraq leave the British approach to countering 
insurgency? 
The British Army found itself intellectually unprepared for what transpired in post-
invasion Iraq.  Many of its officers had relevant experience from Northern Ireland and 
the Balkans, but they had not been given the education necessary in counterinsurgency 
to establish a common philosophical foundation on which they could build.  The Army 
was not familiar with its own doctrine, and this prevented it from establishing the 
unified and consistent approach necessary in counterinsurgency.  The little which was 
known about counterinsurgency doctrine was applied idiosyncratically and sometimes 
inappropriately.  As a consequence, it is difficult to make a case that the Army’s 
doctrine was inappropriate, or that it was a significant contributory factor in how the 
campaign developed.  On the contrary, as the campaign progressed the Army 
maintained the view that its principles remained valid.  Indeed in June 2006 the Army’s 
Doctrine and Concepts Committee endorsed them as valid.  All those interviewed 
agreed:  there is no evidence that the principles per se were inappropriate to 
contemporary campaigns or indeed invalidated by Iraq.  Yet all the evidence indicates 
that they were not followed.  As the result of his sound analysis in 1994, Bulloch 
provided a logical set of principles which could be used to both plan a campaign and to 
assess its progress.  They were not tested as intended, yet when the U.S. applied its new 
doctrine, which drew heavily on Bulloch’s work, and resourced the campaign in Iraq, 
the principles were used to good effect.   
Doctrinal principles underpin the two armies’ respective operational concepts.  In the 
British case the approach was the Ink Spot; in the U.S. case it was Clear-Hold-Build, 
adapted by MNC-I to match the circumstances in Baghdad.  There is no appreciable 
difference between the two.  The British approach was not followed, except briefly and 
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 in a very limited way with Operation SINBAD.  It offered a glimpse of what might have 
been achieved if the doctrine had been followed.  By contrast, properly resourced and 
with the clear intent of establishing security and government control, the U.S. Surge 
demonstrated that the underpinning logic of the Ink Spot method remained sound:  
counterinsurgency depends on security, and establishing security requires force 
numbers.  British forces in the South did not have enough troops to achieve the 
necessary level of security, and their efforts to develop the Iraqi Army were limited in 
effect when compared with the performance of U.S.-trained divisions.  This division 
became apparent when sufficient forces were made available in March 2008, in support 
of Prime Minister Maliki’s Iraqi-led security operation to retake Basrah.  The plan he 
adopted was based on Clear-Hold-Build, and Operation Charge of the Knights was 
entirely in keeping with the Ink Spot method. 
It was established early in this thesis that one aspect of the doctrine which was clearly 
lacking was its failure to address multinational operations in a meaningful way.  
Virtually none of the experience from the Balkans carried over into doctrine, and 
although the Army had doctrine for UN operations, the traditional approach of writing 
British doctrine for British-led operations had been overtaken by policy which assumed 
that future operations would be with the U.S.  Basrah and the south east became neither 
an exemplar of the British approach nor a fully integrated part of the overall U.S. 
campaign.  MND(SE) used British nomenclature and staff processes, and the difference 
between the Shi’a south and the rest of Iraq became an operational divide.  The 
approach adopted in the south was markedly different, both in intentions and tactics, 
from that in the U.S. area.  The significance of the difference only became apparent 
when President Bush took the decision to reverse his strategy in Iraq in late 2006.  By 
then, British and Iraqi forces could not maintain security in the south, and they were not 
in a position to replicate what American and Iraqi security forces were by summer 2007 
achieving in operations in and around the capital.   The contrast between the two units 
examined in the two case studies – 1-4 CAV and 4 RIFLES – could not be sharper.  
Both acknowledged they were fighting an insurgency yet one followed classic doctrine 
and fought for and pacified its area of operation in Baghdad; the other had to resort to 
warfighting doctrine to conduct raids so that it could withdraw from Basrah city. 
The conclusion to be drawn is that the doctrine available to the British Army in 2003 
was valid in terms of counterinsurgency theory, but there is no evidence that the 
doctrine was in any way a determining aspect of the campaign in Iraq.  For an army 
with such an extensive history in small wars and counterinsurgency, the second point is 
an almost unimaginable conclusion to draw, akin to the British Expeditionary Force 
deploying to France in 1914 without having a formal understanding of organization, 
tactics and administration laid out in its Field Service Regulations.  For the British in 
Basrah, although some commanders used their previous experience and understanding 
of counterinsurgency intuitively and effectively, for the most part, those interviewed 
turned to doctrine retrospectively.  Thus, while Counter Insurgency Operations laid out 
all the key elements for effective counterinsurgency, it did not provide the philosophical 
foundation on which the operation in Southern Iraq should have been built. 
British operations in Iraq between 2003 and 2009 were relatively modest in terms of 
military forces committed.  The political and strategic outcomes of Operation TELIC 
are much more significant than the scale of effort required.  The British Army’s 
reputation for counterinsurgency has suffered a major setback, on a par with the 
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 withdrawal from Aden in 1967.  Beckett and Pimlott noted that when the British 
encountered insurgency in Palestine between 1945 and 1948, “their neglect of lessons of 
Ireland left them little prepared to respond satisfactorily.  Thus the British were required 
to extemporise a response to insurgency in Palestine as it developed.”6  This problem 
was repeated in Iraq.  It might be tempting to regard the campaign as a strategic 
aberration and therefore dismiss it from future discussion of counterinsurgency.  This 
would not be right.  It must inform future analysis because it has much to tell us about 
the conduct of operations.  Reappraisal of the British operation must be part of any 
effort to avoid repeating the mistakes of Iraq.   Like any campaign, it has its limits, and 
the applicability of lessons from Operation TELIC will depend on the circumstances of 
future campaigns.  The Army’s doctrine for counterinsurgency remains sound but, to 
return to the original definition of doctrine, it must be taught.  
                                                 
1 Bulloch, interview, Enford, 3 November 2008. 
2 Wall, interview, Blagdon, 15 May 2007. 
3 Bulloch, interview, Enford, 3 November 2008. 
4 Keeping the Peace (Duties in Support of the Civil Power), 1963, p. 66. 
5 Counter Insurgency Operations, p. B-3-1. 
6 Beckett and Pimlott, Armed Forces & Modern Counter-insurgency, p. 5. 
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